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The notion of ‘democratic security’ assumes, in addition to growing security as democracy expands 
geographically and new democracies emerge, the strengthening of the European security as the process 
of democratization in each country deepens. [...]  Throughout the conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
Bulgaria was labelled an “island of stability”. [.. ..JBulgaria has undertaken a series of foreign policy 
steps to strengthen peace and security in South-Eastern Europe: participation in and playing host to 
meetings of the ministers o f defence, transport and energy, initiating trilateral meetings on different 
levels, including top-level, between Bulgaria, Romania and Greece as well as between Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey. These trilateral meetings are dedicated to specific problems, for instance 
combating organised cross-border crime. These endeavours of Bulgaria in the field of multilateral 
regional cooperation have already produced results: for the first time states o f South-Eastern Europe, at 
the initiative of the Bulgarian diplomacy, reacted promptly and concertedly to a crisis development in 
the Balkan region. [...]The world has been an eyewitness of Bulgaria’s active foreign policy over the 
past year. The explanation is clear: it is the internal political stabilization achieved in Bulgaria and the 
broad consensus of the parliamentary forces on the main priorities as reflected in the Declaration on 
National Salvation adopted in May 1997. [...]  The application for European Union and NATO 
membership was Bulgaria’s natural and conscious choice of the civilization to belong to. The 
Bulgarians return to Europe where they have always been. European Union and NATO membership is 
not an end in itself but the only way that can bring economic prosperity, sustainable development and 
security to Bulgaria. While we bring the national legislation in line with European standards we create 
the enforcement mechanisms. Our new law-making activity codifies civil, political, economic, cultural 
and social rights of people and provides the legal guarantees that these rights will be respected. We 
make a lot of effort to improve administrative and judicial practices in that field and highly appreciate 
the recommendations and advice that international organisations offer to us.
An extract from the statement made by the Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan 
Rostov at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 
April 21,1998) ( Rostov’s whole statement is available on 
http://212.122.160.99/old/eng/prime_minister/statements/Pase_eng.html)
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ABSTRACT
This PhD thesis analyses the mechanisms and factors which have determined foreign 
policy making in Bulgaria since 1989. It contributes to the process of theoretical 
discussion concerning whether and how democratization affects foreign policy 
making. This discussion traces its academic origins to the beginning of the 20th 
century with theoretical debates among international relations scholars on the subject 
of whether liberal democratic regimes follow by nature qualitatively different foreign 
policies than authoritarian political regimes.
Post-Cold W ar Bulgaria is a good case study for such a topic. A destabilizing factor in 
the Balkan region and politically isolated from both the immediate regional and the 
international environment for much of its modem history, Bulgaria has reversed this 
position since the end of the Cold War. It has engaged in a course of political 
integration into the regional and the international environment, following a foreign 
policy aimed at bringing stability and peace to the Balkan region.
Sofia’s qualitatively different foreign policy since 1989 has been interpreted as being 
the direct result of post-Cold War democratization. It is true that both the scope and 
the depth of democratization have been unprecedented in Bulgaria’s modem history, 
but is it enough to explain the country’s post-1989 foreign policy? The thesis argues 
that such an interpretation is only partially true.
If democratization refers to the establishment of political pluralism, then this process 
in itself is not enough to explain the country’s post-1989 foreign policy. Bulgaria’s 
political integration into international institutions such as the European Union (EU)
xx
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has also exercised a large 
influence on Sofia’s foreign policy making since the end of the Cold War. This is 
because Bulgaria’s membership of the EU and NATO was conditional on Sofia’s 
ability to adjust its foreign policy mechanisms for the political needs of Bulgarian 
integration into these organisations and to align the country’s foreign policy decisions 
on a broad range of issues with the foreign policy decisions of the EU and NATO.
The thesis employs a wide range of primary and of secondary sources from both the 
communist and post-communist periods. These were collected during a lengthy period 
of fieldwork in Bulgaria which included work in the archives of the Bulgarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The primary sources include foreign policy documents, 
and personal interviews with a number of political activists, journalists and academics 
from the communist period and after.
xxi
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Introduction
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States
thDespite efforts since the late 18 century to link W estem-style liberal democracy to 
the democratic system of ancient Athens, it seems that the only similarity between the 
two political systems is the shared name itself.1 Liberal democracy refers to a type of 
governance in which rules and policy decisions are made not directly by the 
electorate, as was the political practice in ancient Athens, but by representatives 
accountable to the electoral body. This accountability is primarily secured through 
free, fair and competitive elections, in which adults eligible to vote have the right to 
elect their political representatives.2
The W estern model of liberal democracy is inextricably linked to the modem 
phenomenon of the nation-state.3 Many of its underpinning principles, however 
ambiguous, such as ideas of self-governance and popular sovereignty, are closely 
related to the meaning that nationalism gave to the Westphalian state system after the 
eighteenth century. Nationalism mobilized the masses and provided them with the 
political role of a modem demos, while the Westphalian system provided the borders 
for the definition of the national community and bequeathed to the political authorities 
principles such as sovereignty, autonomy and legality.
While the territorial base of W estem-type democracy is the nation-state, the 
socioeconomic environment in which it has developed is that of the capitalist or
1 Parry & Moran, 1994, pp. 1-8; Wolker, 1994; Talbott, 1996, p. 50.
2 Potter et al, 1997, p. 4; Parrot, 1997, p. 4.
3 McGrew, 1997, pp. 3-6; see also Wolker, 1994 and Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 16-33; Parrot, 1997,
p.10
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market economy. Academic scholars have not yet concluded what the relation is, if 
any, that binds liberal democracy to the market economy.4 Some of them treat this 
type of political system as separate from any economic process by arguing that 
historically non-democratic systems have coexisted with market economies.5 
However, it seems that although liberal democracy is not a prerequisite for a market 
economy, there is no historical example of a liberal democratic system that has 
become established in a state prior to the emergence of a capitalist economy.6
Scholarly literature produced since the Second World W ar (WWII) has generally 
approached the concept of liberal democracy in two different ways: a) normative and 
b) procedural or institutional. The first approach emphasizes the cultural and 
behavioral norms of the liberal democratic system. It uses the economically 
developed states of Western Europe and America as the ideal model for how a liberal 
democratic system should function, and suggests that any state wishing to become a 
liberal democracy has to follow this model. It also maintains the idea that the success 
or failure of the democratic system depends on the degree of accountability of the 
government to the public and thus favours people’s participation in the democratic 
process.
Post-war American modernization theorists have been the primary proponents of this 
view and they have also argued that liberal democracy is closely linked to the
4 Almond, 1991; Fukuyama, 1992; Olson, 1993; Lipset, 1993; Maravall, 1994; Schumpeter, 1950, pp. 
297-8.
5 Boyer, 1999, pp. 50-1
6 Simai, 1998, pp. 119-126.
7 Boyer, 1999, pp. 74-82
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economic development of a state. According to them, a state, by promoting economic 
development and contributing to the welfare of its people, broadens the base of the 
middle classes, which are the most important pillar of the democratic system.9 These 
theorists have also argued that economic development increases the living standards 
of citizens and gives them the potential to gain a better education, which in turn, 
contributes to their political awareness and further participation in the democratic 
process.10 These scholars were highly influenced in their approach by the breakdown 
of Western European democratic regimes during the interwar period, which they 
explained as the result of the economic crisis of 1929.11
The second approach to the concept of liberal democracy, the procedural, arose due to
the decline of normative theories by the 1970s. The crisis of the welfare state in the
seventies, de-colonization, challenges to the Western model of liberal democracy due
to the emergence of new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and a wave of
democratic breakdowns in Latin America, lowered the high expectations that
normative theories had cultivated regarding that political system.12 Instead, liberal
democracy came increasingly to be understood in terms of what elites and individuals
11do and how democratic political institutions function. According to this approach, 
the stability o f democratic regimes is not the outcome of the economic development 
of a state, but depends on the actions of the political elite and the way in which these
8 Schumpeter, 1950; Lipset, 1983, p.51; Lipset, 1993, p. 52; Potter et al, 1997, pp. 11-13 and pp. 24-25; 
Almond, 1991; Fukuyama, 1992; Olson, 1993; Haggard & Kaufman, 1994; Maravall, 1994; 
Huntington, 1991, pp. 46-58; Nelson, 1994.
9 Lipset, 1983, p.51; Lipset, 1993, p. 52; Potter et al, 1997, pp. 11-13 and pp. 24-25; Haggard & 
Kaufman, 1994, p. 11.
10 Hadenius, 1992.
11 Lipset, 1993, pp. 43-44.
12 Nagle & Mahr, 1999, 5-12
13 Dahl, 1971.
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actions are formally structured and pursued within the political system.14 Economic 
development is important to the extent that it determines the political actions of the 
elite and crafts a democratic compromise among them, but it is not central to the 
argument.
Procedural theorists assume a minimalist approach to liberal democracy. They define 
a liberal democratic system in terms of how it functions through the frequency of 
elections.1:5 This approach suggests that liberal democracy is not a condition which, 
once achieved, remains unchanged. On the contrary, it is seen as a continuously 
evolving process, even in the liberal democratic states of the so-called ‘first world’. It 
was under the influence of this second approach that the term ‘democratization’ came 
to be preferred to the term ‘democracy’ in the literature, because it fits better with this 
new approach of continuous process.16
Conceiving of democracy as a process, scholars started to discern different stages 
within it and began to measure the degree of democratization of each state which 
declared its political system a democracy.17 In spite of disagreements about 
measurement methods and the results obtained, there was broad agreement in 
identifying four general stages in the democratization process. The first is the period 
of liberalization of non-democratic rule; the second is the period of transition between
14 Potter et al, 1997, pp. 13-18; Dahl, 1971.
15 Huntington, 1991, pp. 3-13; see also Nagle & Mahr, 1999, pp. 8-12; Boyer, 1999, pp. 53-73; Parrot, 
1997, p. 4.
16 Shin, 1994, Parry & Moran, 1994, pp. 4-8
17 Shin, 1994; Dawisha, 1997, pp. 40-2; Bollen, 1980; Bollen, 1993; Lipset, 1959; Lerner, 1958; Banks 
&Textor, 1963.
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this and the third stage of consolidation and the fourth is that of ‘maturity’ of the 
democratic regim e.18
The passage from the first to the second stage is usually determined either by the 
violent collapse of the non-democratic regime or a declaration by the non-democratic 
regime that free and contested elections will be held in the near future.19 The conduct 
of the first free and fair multiparty elections, the adoption of a new constitution and 
the repetition of elections at regularly defined terms normally mark the passage from 
the second to the third stage.20 According to Linz, consolidation begins “ ... when 
sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an 
elected government, when a government comes to power [and] when this government 
de facto has the authority to generate new policies and when the executive, legislative 
and juridical power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power 
with other bodies de jure”.2] Finally, the maturity stage refers to the highly 
consolidated democratic regimes of the so-called ‘first world’ which are thought to be 
characterized by free, fair and competitive elections, political representatives 
accountable to their electorate and equal rights for their citizens to participate in the 
political process.
The scholarly literature concerning democratization is mainly preoccupied with the 
relation between this process and the domestic politics of a state. Little attention has 
been paid to the relationship between democracy and international relations. This is 
for two reasons. The first is the traditional division in the academic field of politics
18 Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 3-7
19 Parrot, 1997, pp. 5-6
20 Dawisha, 1997, pp. 43-44.
21 Linz & Stepan, 1997, p. 3.
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between domestic concerns and international relations. Since democratization refers 
to the formation of a particular type of domestic political system, it has generally been 
accepted that it falls outside the field of international relations. This trend has also 
been facilitated by the fact that since the WWII the field of international relations has 
been dominated by the neo-realist school, which downplays the impact of domestic 
politics on the international interactions of a state. Secondly, when the third wave of 
democratization began,22 social scientists were primarily concerned with the processes 
by which democratization occurred and the problems associated with the 
consolidation of newly democratic regimes.23 This has necessarily focused attention 
on domestic factors. Even in cases where scholars have examined the democratization 
process of a state in relation to the international environment, they have primarily 
dwelt on how the domestic politics of a democratizing state are influenced by the 
international environment before and during the democratization process, rather than 
how democratization has influenced the foreign policy making of a state.24
The few works that examine the influence that the democratization process has on the 
foreign policy of a state belong to a larger body of theoretical literature, which 
analyses the relationship that exists between the domestic political system and the 
foreign policy of a state. The differences in their approach to the democratic system is 
reflected by the different conclusions these essays have reached regarding the 
relations between the democratic political system and foreign policy. Moreover, the
22 The term ‘wave o f democratization’ is used by Samuel Huntington to refer to “a group o f transitions 
from non-democratic regimes that occur within a specified period o f time and that significantly 
outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time” (Huntington, 1991, p. 15). 
The ‘third wave of democratization’ began with the collapse o f the authoritarian regime in Portugal, 
Greece and Spain in the mid-1970s, it has lasted to date and includes the post-1989 democratization of 
East European and post-Soviet states. For more details see Huntington, 1991, pp. 1-26.
23 Huntington, 1991, pp. 25-27; see also O’Donnel et al, 1986.
24 Pridham, 1994; Parrot, 1997, pp. 8-15.
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long-standing debate between liberalism and realism that has dominated the field of 
international relations since the Cold W ar has further intensified the divergence 
between the conclusions reached regarding this topic. Therefore, before reviewing 
these works, it is worth reviewing how realism and liberalism conceive of foreign 
relations, focusing on aspects of their theoretical argument relevant to 
democratization.
Realism proposes a state-centric theoretical model, which focuses on three important 
assumptions. The first is that states are the most important actors in the international 
system.25 The second is that states act like rational individuals in pursuing their 
national interests and the third is that the international system lacks a central 
government, the so-called ‘anarchy assumption’. Domestic politics, according to both 
classical realists and neo-realists, can play only a minimal role in foreign policy 
making.26 Classical realists see the accumulation and use of power as the state’s 
primary mission, and from this viewpoint domestic politics is seen as one of the many 
capabilities that a state should use in its effort to maximize power.27 There is no 
established link between realism and democracy, and in some cases classical realists 
have come to support the idea that democratic regimes are not the most efficient 
political systems when it comes to exercising power in the interests of the state.28
25 For a general overview o f the key assumptions o f realism see Goldstein, 1996, pp. 51-93; Burchill, 
2001b.
26 Burchill, 2001b, pp. 70-2; Carr, 2001, pp. 11-12.
27 Morgenthau, 1985, pp. 168-9 and 189-92
28 Ibid, pp. 164-168.
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In contrast to classical realists, neo-realists focus more on the constraints which the 
international system imposes on the state.29 According to neo-realists, it is the 
anarchic system which forces states to interact within the international environment in 
a similar way, despite their diverse political regimes. Economic and political 
interdependence between states exists, but, according to neo-realists, it is unable to 
change the international system, since the interdependence between states is minimal 
in comparison to the level of economic and social integration found within the 
domestic environment. This is because, within the anarchic international system, 
states try to minimize their degree of interdependence. In other words, neo-realism 
looks away from domestic politics in order to explain the foreign policy of a state, 
thus limiting the link between democratization and foreign policy.
In general, both classical realism and neo-realism have failed to consider the changing 
role of state structures. At the very core of both theoretical models lies the argument 
that the anarchical system has endured over time and that there is little possibility for 
internal factors such as sub-national identities, state structures or political systems, to 
change it. According to realism, the ‘code of conduct* between states is the same, 
regardless of whether the state belongs to the absolutist era or the twenty-first century.
Liberals have challenged the realist premise that the state is a unitary rational actor 
and have argued against the anarchy assumption.30 According to them, international 
relations, far from being anarchical, are highly structured in many ways through 
institutions and norms based on reciprocity and cooperation, which are sometimes
29 For a good comparative analysis o f classical realism and neo-realism see Linklater, 1997 and 
Keohane, 1986, especially pp. 7-16; Burchill, 2001b, pp. 84-5; Waltz, 1979.
30 For a general overview o f liberalism see Goldstein, 1996, pp. 95-108; see also Grieco, 1988, pp. 487- 
492
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enshrined in international law. Moreover, liberals have emphasized the role that 
domestic politics play in the international interactions of a state, most famously in the 
contention of democratic peace theory, that democracy can play a pacifying role in the 
international behaviour of the state.31
In supporting this argument, liberal theorists have drawn upon studies from the field 
of political science which adopt a normative approach towards democracy. Like these 
studies, liberals point to the pacifying role that democratic norms exercise in societies 
where a democratic political system is practised. According to liberals, the pacifying 
effect of these norms extends from the societal level to influence the foreign policy of 
a state in a similar way. Moreover, liberals have argued that democratic systems based 
on market economies promote trade relations with other countries, which in turn 
increases economic interdependence between states and encourages them to pursue a 
pacifying foreign policy.32
Liberal theoretical models offer weak points which should not escape criticism. First 
of all, recent liberal approaches, known as neo-liberal institutionalism, concede to 
realism many important assumptions including the notion that states are unitary 
actors, which, as noted above, leaves less scope for considering the impact of any 
domestic factors in the shaping of the international relations of the state.33 In addition, 
contrary to what many neo-liberal institutionalists argue, the degree of real power that 
international law has to restrict the international behaviour of a state might be
31 Doyle, 1986; Lake, 1992; Ikenberry, 1996; Talbott, 1996.
32 Russet, 1998, pp. 163ff; Lake, 1992; Ikenberry, 1996; Talbott, 1996; see also Little, 1995, pp.67-74 
(for a counter argument see ibid, pp. 74-83); Strange, 1995, pp. 160ff.
33 For more information about neo-liberalism see Goldstein, 1996, pp. 98-100; see also Grieco, 1988, 
pp. 492-5; Grieco, 1993, pp. 116-140 and pp. 301-338; Keohane, 1993; Skak, 1996, p. 23; Young,
1986; Walander, 1992.
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questioned, as might the extent to which morality or concern for international law is a 
real motive behind foreign policy decisions. To what extent, for instance, were 
international organisations, even the United Nations (UN), able to constrain Soviet 
foreign policy in Eastern Europe during the Cold War?
In addition, most liberals see economic interdependence among states as a linear 
process of continuous improvement, which can have only pacifying results in the 
international relations of states.34 They fail to see that, under certain circumstances, 
economic interdependence may lead to increased tensions.35 According to Holsti, “ ... 
in some cases governments and sections of the populations have tried to control or 
reduce or eliminate influence of transnational processes on their societies because 
they have been perceived as threats to a variety of ‘national values’” .36 This thesis 
could be well exemplified in the efforts made in the mid-1990s by Albania, Bulgaria 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to construct a highway 
going through the three states so as not to be dependent on Greek highways for their 
trade relations with Western Europe and the Middle East.37
Many liberal scholars who examine the relationship between liberal democracy and 
foreign policy, such as M. Doyle, M. Howard or F. Fukuyama, have restricted their 
scope to examining the degree of war-proneness of democratic states. Most of them
34 Strange, 1995, pp. 160ff; Cox, 1997, pp. 57-71.
35 Holsti, 1991, pp. 53-81.
36 Ibid, p. 55.
37 This is an example o f both cooperation and antagonism since the discussions on the construction of 
the highway between the governments of Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM in the mid-1990s were a 
source o f political tension between these states and Greece, but, at the same time, they did foster good 
relations between Tirana, Sofia and Skopje. Nikova, 1998, pp. 287, 289; Triffonova & Kashoukeeva- 
Nousheva, 1999, pp. 179-181.
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conclude that liberal democratic states pursue a peaceful foreign policy.38 These 
analyses, however, present two weak points. The first is that, being influenced by the 
Cold W ar climate, they assume a narrow approach to foreign policy relations, 
according to which a state has two choices: either to make peace or go to war. Such an 
approach, however, fails to include other aspects of foreign policy, such as the ability 
of a state to pursue protectionist or more open trade policies. Secondly, even by 
accepting the pacifying effects that liberal democracy has on the foreign policy of a 
state, the way that these analyses approach liberal democracy, by seeing it in terms of 
norms and values, restricts the applicability of their theories to a minority of nations, 
which includes the mature democratic states of the so-called ‘first world’.
Therefore, the theoretical framework given by these theoretical works is not 
applicable in the case of newly democratizing states. Even if one accepts that the 
pacifying foreign policy of a democratic state is due to the role that democratic norms 
and values play in the society of this state, in a newly democratizing state democratic 
values and norms are not well entrenched, and from this viewpoint it is questionable if 
its political system exerts the same pacifying effect as in the case of a mature 
democratic regime.39
Two of the most prominent scholars to have examined the foreign policy behaviour of 
newly democratizing states are Jack Snyder and Alexander Kozhemiakin.40 Snyder 
challenges the classical liberal argument that democracies never go to war with other 
democratic states by pointing to the initial stages of democratization, which he claims
38 Doyle, 1986, p. 1151; Doyle, 1995; Doyle, 1997; Howard, 1978, p. 31; Fukuyama, 1992, pp. xi-xii, 
xx; Russet, 1993; Rawls, 1999, p. 49; Burchill, 2001a, pp. 29-47; Schweller, 1992; Skak, 1996, pp. 32- 
33; Weart, 1998; Gilbert, 1999; Elman, 1997;Rummel, 1997;Gowa, 1999.
39 Ember et al., 1992
40 See also Malcolm & Pravda, 1996.
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is an unpredictable period for state foreign policy. He argues that the unpredictability 
is often due to the competitive domestic political environment, which may lead both 
rising democratic and old political elites to pursue nationalist strategies in order to 
mobilize the masses to consolidate their hold on power.41 For Snyder, these strategies 
can be particularly successful in the event that the political elites seek to prevent their 
foreign policies from being politically accountable to the public 42
Snyder’s theory has been criticized on two points. First, he has been accused of 
confusing the political concept of liberalization with that of democratization. The 
former refers to the period of loosening political restrictions within an authoritarian 
regime, while the latter presupposes at a minimum free, fair and competitive elections 
for the selection of the most powerful executive body of the state.43 It has been 
argued that both the states and historical periods used by Snyder in advancing his 
theoretical model, namely 19th century Britain and France and 20th century Germany 
and Japan, refer to liberalizing rather than democratizing political regimes.44
Secondly, the potential of nationalism for mass mobilization over foreign policy 
issues has been analysed by a number of scholars.45 However, like these scholars, 
Snyder has also failed to consider the impact that socioeconomic factors can have on 
nationalist strategies.46 No matter how vigorous nationalist propaganda is, it is still 
less likely that people will fall prey to hawkish slogans when they feel socially and 
economically secure. For nationalistic propaganda to be successful, the socio­
41 Snyder, 1996; see also Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Haass, 1956, p. 62.
42 Ibid.
43 Shin, 1994, pp. 142-3; see also Linz & Stepan, 1996, p.3
44 W olf et al., pp. 176-180; see also Mansfield’s and Snyder’s reply in pp. 196-8
45 See, for instance, Bloom, 1990, pp. 76-104
46 Kozhemiakin, 1998, pp. 15-16
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economic environment has to facilitate the success of such propaganda. Furthermore, 
Snyder fails to conceive of the influence that the international environment can have 
on the foreign policy of a newly democratizing state.
However, this influence is an important factor for analyzing the foreign policies of the 
democratizing states of Eastern Europe and, in his work, Kozhemiakin does take three 
factors into account. These are the degree of institutional change, the level of socio­
economic development, and the influence that the international environment exerts on 
the democratization process. Regarding institutional change, he claims that 
democratization influences a state’s foreign policy because of two direct political 
consequences, which he terms the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ accountability of the 
chief executive.47 The first refers to the degree that the chief executive’s authority is 
subject to electoral approval through free and competitive elections, while the second 
refers to the pressures and influences coming from within the political establishment 
of the democratizing state, in particular those from political parties and interest
48groups.
Socioeconomic factors can have a destabilizing effect in two ways.49 The first is that 
policies leading to economic uncertainty and unemployment can undermine the 
societal consensus regarding the pursuit o f a peaceful foreign policy and can shift 
public attitudes towards radical politics. Secondly, the extent to which liberal 
democratic norms and procedures have permeated the political system of the newly 
democratizing state can determine both the stability of the system and the belligerence
47 Kozhemiakin, 1998, pp. 20-23.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid, pp. 24-27
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of state foreign policy.30 In a nutshell, Kozhemiakin argues that the war proneness of 
democratizing states depends on the ability of their nascent democratic systems to 
include liberal members of the political elite and society in the decision-making 
process and to keep them accountable for their foreign policies. Both the inclusion of 
these members in decision-making and the increased accountability of the political 
authorities of newly democratizing states are seen as the only means by which 
nationalist, militant and religious fundamentalist foreign policies can be kept in 
check.51
Finally, the role that the international environment can play in the foreign policy of a 
democratizing state is important, especially with growing economic interdependence 
between states.52 Governments are nowadays conceived as players in a ‘two-level 
game’,53 with the domestic political and social arena on the one hand and the 
international environment on the other. According to Kozhemiakin, international 
factors can influence democratic transition and the foreign policy of a state by 
constraining the potential of democratizing regimes to act autonomously in the 
international environment.
Examining the foreign policy of newly democratizing states requires scholars to move 
beyond the narrow approach of how war-prone or not these states may be. Instead, 
what is needed is a theoretical framework capable of integrating the domestic and 
international influences and constraints on the foreign policy of a nascent democratic
50 Ibid, pp. 18-20.
51 Ibid, pp. 14-16.
52 Kozhemiakin, 1998, pp. 29-31; see also Strange, 1995, pp. 160ff; Cox, 1997, pp. 59-61.
53 Ibid, pp. 29-32; see also Putnam, 1988, pp. 433-435; Rosenau, 1969; Starr, 1989, pp. 23-46; Evans et 
al., 1993.
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state because, in the end, it is through such a framework that the susceptibility to war 
of states in Eastern Europe can be assessed.
A number of scholars such as Tonra, Christiansen, Jdrgensen and Radaelli, have 
moved beyond the question of war-proneness and have instead argued that norms, 
values and the ideas of domestic and international actors can by themselves be 
explanatory variables for foreign policy behaviour.54
Part of the research of these scholars focuses on foreign policy making in the newly 
democratizing Eastern European states after 1989. In particular, they attempt to 
explain how the process of integration into the European Economic Community 
(EEC), and later into the EU, has influenced foreign policy making in states such as 
Bulgaria. Their focus on the EEC/EU is justified by the emphasis that the 
overwhelming majority of foreign policy actors within the states of the region have 
placed on accession to the EEC/EU, making it the most influential international actor 
in East European foreign policy making during the post-Cold W ar period.
For these authors integration into the EEC/EU is mainly conceived of as a process of 
interaction of norms, values, beliefs and ideas between domestic actors within the 
Eastern European states and those of EEC/EU institutional bodies in Brussels as well 
as EEC/EU member states. The main outcome of this process has been the gradual 
alignment of the foreign policy of the states of Eastern Europe with that of the 
EEC/EU member states and they argue this has had a positive effect on the security 
and stability of the European continent and beyond.
54 Tonra & Christiansen, 2004; J0rgensen, 2004; Radaelli, 2003.
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In order to better explain this process of interaction, these scholars have employed the 
term “Europeanization” which is best defined by Radaelli as “processes of (a) 
construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘way of doing things’, and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political 
structures, and public policies”.55
Looking at the states of Eastern Europe, it is possible to suggest that through this 
process of interaction domestic actors have come to adopt similar policy styles, 
procedures, discourses, norms and beliefs to those employed within EEC/EU 
institutional organs in Brussels and political actors within the EEC/EU member states. 
In addition, through the process of integration an increasing number of institutional 
mechanisms within Eastern European states have also become aligned with those of 
the EEC/EC. Even the very process of democratization in these states after the end of 
the Cold W ar has been both inspired and influenced by the EEC/EU. According to 
Huntington, the EEC was instrumental in aiding the consolidation of democracy in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal, where “the establishment of democracy was seen as 
necessary to secure the economic benefits of EEC membership, while Community 
membership was in turn seen as a guarantee of the stability of democracy”56 and now, 
in relation to the post-communist states of Eastern Europe, Geoffrey Pridham has
55 Radaelli, 2003, p. 30.
56 Huntington, 1996, p.5.
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written, “ [The EU ’s] influence is...one of persuasion through the link between 
democratic conditionality and the attractive prospect of membership.”37
This alignment between the states of Eastern Europe and the EEC/EU has also 
affected foreign policy making within the states of the region. This is exemplified 
both by the political positions which these states have adopted in international forums 
and their policies towards non-EEC/EU member states. Over the years these have 
increasingly come to resemble those agreed within the EEC/EU institutional organs 
and followed by EEC/EU member states.58
Despite this alignment, however, Europeanization theory should not be accepted 
uncritically as a model to explain foreign policy making within the newly 
democratizing states in Eastern Europe. First of all, it is problematic to claim the 
existence of ‘common European’ norms, policy styles, beliefs and institutions to 
which the states of Eastern Europe are seeking to align themselves. The EEC/EU is a 
political organisation with many member states, each of which has a different 
historical, political and cultural background. Characteristically the political systems 
adopted by the various Eastern European states since 1989 do not resemble those of 
any particular EEC/EU member states but take components from a number of sources. 
For example, Bulgaria’s semi-presidential system presents elements of the 
presidential systems of France and the USA as well as the political systems of Britain 
and Germany.
57 Pridham, 1994, p. 23.
58 For more details about Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy to that of the EEC/EU see chapters III 
and IV of this thesis.
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Secondly, alignment to the European norms, values and institutions has not been an 
unwavering political process. With reference to the Balkans, for example, Anastasakis 
and Bechev argue that the ability of the EEC/EU to influence the process of 
democratization in the war-torn states of the former Yugoslavia and Albania has been 
markedly less than its ability to influence democratization elsewhere in the Balkan 
Peninsula, including Bulgaria.39 The question remains ‘why’ and the answer would at 
least in part seem to lie with this lack o f influence within the former Yugoslavia. This 
offered neighbouring states, such as Romanian and Bulgaria, the chance to benefit 
from their support for EEC/EU policy during the conflicts. Their prospects of 
accession to the Union were thus enhanced but so also were the opportunities for the 
EEC/EU to play a greater role in the domestic and foreign policies of these states. The 
accession process and Europeanization has therefore not just been about meeting the 
needs of conditionality and the adoption of wider European values and norms. It has 
also reflected the geopolitical reality of the post-cold war world.
Therefore, the alignment of foreign policy making in states such as Bulgaria to that of 
the EEC/EU should not be seen merely as a product of the interaction of norms, 
values, beliefs and institutions between these states and the EEC/EU. On many 
occasions trade relations, economic investment and the prospect of EU membership, 
have been conditional upon East European states meeting certain political and 
economic criteria set by the EEC/EU and adopting policies in line with those of 
Brussels. Such is the leverage of the EU that these demands are often implemented 
even if they run counter to inclinations of domestic political elites and are potentially 
detrimental to the countries in question. For example, in line with the conditions set
59 Anastasakis & Bechev, 2003.
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by the EU, the Bulgarian authorities have pledged to shut down the nuclear power 
station at Kozlodui by 2020. This is being done despite the fact that the country 
already faces a shortage of energy resources brought about by the curtailment of 
cheap electricity, oil and gas supplies from the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
when policies are imposed in such a fashion it inevitably raises doubts as to the extent 
to which wider European norms and values have been internalised and the degree to 
which externally imposed forms have generated real domestic content.
This thesis looks beyond realist and liberal models and Europeanization theory to 
suggest that none of these alone provides an adequate theoretical framework to 
explain the foreign policy making of the newly democratizing states of Eastern 
Europe. It does this through an examination of foreign policy making in post-1989 
Bulgaria; a country which, among the former communist bloc states, is one of the 
most interesting. Being a destabilizing factor in South-Eastern Europe and politically 
isolated from the immediate regional environment for much of its modem history, 
Bulgaria has engaged in a course of political integration into the regional and 
international environment since the end of the Cold War, in the process following a 
foreign policy aimed at bringing stability and peace to the Balkan region.60 This 
foreign policy has been interpreted as being the result of post-1989 democratization. 
But to what extent is such an interpretation true?
The central questions which this thesis attempts to answer are: who are the main 
foreign policy making actors in Bulgaria during the 1990s; how is foreign policy 
made, and what factors influence foreign policy decision-making? In order to answer
60 Giatzidis, 2002, p.2.
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these questions, it will build on the previously cited works to shape a novel theoretical 
base that can better explain Sofia’s post-1989 foreign policy.
Examining the foreign policy of newly democratizing states requires scholars to move 
beyond the narrow approach of how war-prone or not these states may be. Instead, 
what is needed is a theoretical framework capable of integrating the domestic and 
international influences and constraints on the foreign policy of a nascent democratic 
state because in the end it is through such a framework that the susceptibility of states 
in Eastern Europe to war-proneness can be assessed.
Liberal democracy is approached using the minimalist procedural-institutional model 
and the four stages of the democratization process as previously defined.61 In 
examining the impact that democratization has on the foreign policy making of a 
state, the thesis primarily focuses on the decision making process. In the case of 
Bulgaria, the process is influenced by two different parameters, and it is the purpose 
of this research to see how these affect foreign policy making. The first parameter 
refers to the openness of domestic political life and the way that this, through the 
introduction of a multiparty system, competitive elections and domestic political 
actors, such as interest groups and ethnic minorities, affects Sofia’s foreign policy. In 
doing so, the thesis goes beyond the structural explanations adopted by a number of 
scholars in the past, who have tried to approach the influence of domestic politics on 
foreign policy in terms of state institutions. Since, in the long term, state institutions 
remain unchanged, they alone are inadequate in explaining short- and medium-term 
changes in the foreign policy of states. Therefore, looking beyond state structures, it is
61 Parrot, 1997, p. 4.
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also necessary to stress politics in terms of parties and interest groups and to adopt the 
horizontal and vertical accountability model proposed by Kozhemiakin.
Apart from the constitutional bodies involved in foreign policy making and the degree 
to which they have changed in comparison with the communist past, a number of 
political issues are examined in the second chapter of this thesis. These include the 
extent to which the constitutional bodies responsible for foreign policy making are 
limited in their actions, the amount of influence parliamentary bodies have in foreign 
policy making, the foreign policy agenda of the various political parties, and the 
influence the electorate has on foreign policy making. Moreover, apart from the 
political parties, this chapter analyses which other interest groups are influential in 
foreign policy making and asks whether they gain their influence because of links 
with political parties or by other means. Finally, it examines the degree to which 
ethnic minorities participate in foreign policy making. Do minority elites have their 
own foreign policy agendas? If this is the case, what influence do they have and how 
is it shaped, by the minority elite themselves, by the wider minority community, or by 
pressures from the kin-state?
The second parameter refers to influences coming from the international environment 
and the role that key international actors, such as the UN, NATO, the EU, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, 
USA and Russia have on Bulgarian political life. The collapse of the communist 
regime in Bulgaria produced political, economic and social insecurities, which Sofia 
wishes to tackle through integration into Western organisations. Western states and 
organisations have their own foreign policy agenda in relation to Bulgaria, which
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stress aspects such as trade, minority protection, tourism and so on. Sometimes, this 
agenda conflicts with the economic and political relations that Bulgaria already has 
with Russia or which it is trying to develop with that country. This draws Russia, 
which in some cases uses economic or other mechanisms deriving from the 
communist past to preserve its economic and political relations with Sofia, into the 
analysis of Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy making.
The third and fourth chapters examine how much influence these international actors, 
which have been already listed in the previous paragraph, can exert on Bulgaria’s 
post-1989 foreign policy making. The third chapter argues that the most influential of 
all international actors on Bulgaria’s post-1989 democratization and foreign policy 
making is the EU. Joining the EU has been the highest foreign policy priority for most 
of the country’s political agents and, therefore, since the beginning of the 1990s, Sofia 
has embarked on a long-term political project to gain EU membership. This project 
has had a huge impact on Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy making, and has come 
to determine Bulgaria’s foreign relations both with many neighbouring and distant 
states and a great number of international and regional organisations.
In particular, the main questions which the third chapter seeks to answer are: Why has 
the EU been the most influential international actor on Bulgarian foreign policy since 
1989 and what factors have determined its influence? What are the institutional 
mechanisms through which EU influence on Bulgarian foreign policy has been 
exerted, and how has this influence been exercised? What political agenda(s) does the 
EU have in relation to Bulgaria, and how does Sofia respond to this or these 
agenda(s)? Which factors have determined the EU ’s political agenda(s) in relation to
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Bulgaria? What institutional links does Brussels have with the Bulgarian government, 
political parties and interest groups, and how do these links influence their foreign 
policy agendas? What constraints do EU projects impose on Bulgarian governmental 
policies, and how is this reflected in governmental foreign policy agendas?
The fourth chapter of the thesis examines the way that Bulgaria’s process of accession 
into the EU has influenced Sofia’s foreign relations with international organisations 
such as the UN, NATO, the IMF, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, to mention 
but a few, as well as bilateral relations with states with which Sofia had either limited 
or extensive political and economic relations during the communist period. With 
reference to international organisations, emphasis is given to Bulgaria’s relations with 
NATO and the IMF, which have met fierce political opposition from political parties 
such as the BSP and a large section of Bulgarian society. Yet, despite political 
opposition, Bulgaria has managed to establish strong political ties with, and be 
actively involved in, the political activities of both organisations.
With reference to bilateral relations with states, emphasis is given to Bulgaria’s post- 
1989 relations with the Russian Federation, the USA and with economically 
undeveloped and developing states of the so-called Third World. These relations are 
emphasized firstly because Russia is deemed to be the political heir to the Soviet 
Union, with which Sofia kept strong political and economic ties under communism. 
As a result of these ties, Bulgaria has continued to be economically dependent on 
Moscow during the post-Cold W ar period. Vital economic sectors, such as the energy 
sector, are almost fully dependent on oil and gas imports from the Russian Federation 
- a factor which every post-1989 Bulgarian government could hardly underestimate.
23
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
Secondly, they are emphasized because of the change in Sofia’s relations with the 
USA, a state with which it had limited political and economic contact during the 
communist period. Thirdly, these relations are emphasized due to the strong political 
and economic ties which the Bulgarian communist regime used to keep with a number 
of Third World states, such as Angola, Libya, Cuba and Nicaragua, to mention but a 
few.
Some of the main questions which the fourth chapter seeks to answer are: How have 
Bulgaria’s relations with international organisations evolved since 1989? To what 
extent have these relations been different from those under communism? How have 
Bulgaria’s relations with NATO and the IMF evolved during the post-Cold War 
period? To what extent has Bulgaria’s process of accession to the EU influenced 
Sofia’s political and economic relations with international organisations in general, 
and with NATO and the IMF in particular? Are any aspects of Bulgaria’s foreign 
policy influenced by international organisations other than the EU, e.g. NATO and the 
IMF; if so, which are they? How have Bulgaria’s relations with the Russian 
Federation, the USA and Third World states evolved since the end of the 1980s? 
Which aspects of Sofia’s bilateral relations with these states has Bulgaria’s accession 
to the EU influenced and how? Are any aspects of Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign 
policy making determined by Sofia’s bilateral relations with these states and, if so, 
what are they?
The fifth chapter examines Sofia’s post-Cold War foreign policy towards the Balkans. 
Overall, this policy has aimed at bringing stability and peace to the Balkan region and 
has been in sharp contrast to Sofia’s Balkan policy prior to 1989, which was guided 
either by Sofia’s irredentist views towards its Balkan neighbours or by Bulgaria’s
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need to loyally serve the foreign policies of Great Powers allies, regardless of whether 
these policies undermined any prospect for long-term peace and stability in the 
peninsula. This change in Sofia’s post-1989 Balkan policy has been interpreted as a 
result of the peaceful effects which Bulgaria’s democratization process has exerted on 
the country’s foreign policy making since 1989. But to what extent is this 
interpretation true? The chapter argues that this interpretation is not entirely true and 
it does so by answering the following questions: What have been the main factors 
influencing Sofia’s Balkan policy both prior to 1989 and after that date? To what 
extent do the post-1989 factors comply with the factors influencing the foreign policy 
making of liberal democratic states as advanced by liberal theorists of international 
relations?
The questions set in these four chapters direct the empirical part of the research of this 
thesis and lay the groundwork for some theoretical remarks regarding democratization 
and foreign policy making in the concluding chapter. This chapter will address the 
following questions: Who are the foreign policy making actors in post-Cold W ar 
Bulgaria? W hat factors influence Sofia’s post-1989 foreign policy making? Is there 
any well-defined national interest in post-Cold W ar Bulgaria? Are there enduring 
priorities in the foreign policy agenda(s) of post-1989 Bulgarian governments? W hat 
determines their prioritization? To what degree is foreign policy making a closed 
decision-making process? To what degree do ethnic or social cleavages in Bulgaria 
determine foreign policy making? Which international actors have been most 
influential in Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy making? Are domestic or 
international actors more influential in Sofia’s post-Cold War foreign policy making, 
and which factors determine the dominance of one over the other? How has foreign
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policy during the period of democratization in Bulgaria changed from or remained the 
same as foreign policy during the communist period? In general, given the Bulgarian 
case study, how does democratization influence the foreign policy making of a state? 
Under what conditions does democratization promote peaceful foreign policies within 
a state?
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Chapter I
Foreign Policy Making in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria during
the 1980s
Introduction
This chapter initially examines the ideological principles governing Bulgaria’s foreign 
policy during the 1980s, how these principles were applied in practice and the 
mechanisms of foreign policy making. It then moves on to describe the factors which 
defined Bulgaria’s foreign relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), the West and the countries of the so-called Third World. Finally, it analyses 
the elements which determined Sofia’s bilateral relations with neighbouring Balkan 
states and the political stance Bulgaria adopted during various efforts at multilateral 
regional cooperation.
The chapter provides the background needed to compare Sofia’s foreign policy after 
the collapse of communism. The fact that it mainly focuses on the 1980s is justified 
inasmuch as, during that time, the Soviet Union, of which Bulgaria was the most 
faithful ally in the Eastern bloc, experienced political changes which culminated in 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s coming to power and the inauguration of his policies of 
Perestroika and Glasnost. These changes came to have serious implications for Sofia’s 
foreign policy, since they offered Bulgaria the opportunity to follow a more 
autonomous path than before. In addition, anyone wishing to analyse Bulgaria’s post- 
1989 foreign policy could hardly ignore its foreign policy in the 1980s because this
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period saw the appearance of many of the premises and actors that influence the 
country’s foreign policy during the post-communist period.
Foreign Policy Decision Making
Ideological Principles o f Foreign Policy
Communist ideology, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, was meant to 
play a significant role in the political life of the socialist system which Bulgaria 
adopted in the post-WWII period. At the very least, communist doctrine was used to 
justify policies a priori or a posteriori. For that reason, before examining Sofia’s pre- 
1989 foreign policy, it is necessary first to look at the foreign policy principles of that 
ideology, as expressed by Soviet theoreticians, and then to see how Bulgaria’s foreign 
policy converged with or diverged from the Soviet model.
Prior to WWII, Soviet theory was preoccupied either with relations between classes or 
individual communist parties and not interstate relations per se.62 This was for two 
reasons: first of all, influenced by the theoretical essays of Marx and Lenin, who 
downplayed the role of the state in the socialist revolutionary process, Soviet 
theoreticians hesitated to deal with interstate relations. Secondly, since the socialist 
community before the war included only the Soviet Union and Mongolia, the 
international environment did not favour such a discussion. Attempts to create a 
theory of socialist interstate relations therefore only really began during Khrushchev’s 
time in office, primarily in an effort to achieve cohesion within the socialist bloc
62 Light, 1988, pp. 145-159.
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through theoretical principles rather than through the coercive practices used in the 
Stalinist era.63 In doing so, Soviet theoreticians used pre-war works on inter-party 
relations as their theoretical framework.64
According to these, socialist internationalism was the basic concept underpinning 
socialist interstate relations. Based on the prewar concept of proletarian 
internationalism, which referred to the unity that should govern inter-party relations in 
the common struggle against capitalism,65 socialist internationalism demanded unity 
among socialist states in the conduct of their foreign policy. However, since the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had the ‘last say’ in defining the 
interests of international socialism, the latter usually came to coincide with Soviet 
state interests.66
However, socialist states were not always willing to sacrifice their own interests to 
serve those of the Soviets. This was evident in the stance adopted by states such as 
Yugoslavia, China, Albania and Romania from the 1940s onwards. This reality led 
the Soviets to adjust Khrushchev’s theoretical model so as to enforce their influence 
on the socialist world. This was achieved in the following ways. Firstly, immediately 
after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets tried to enforce their 
leading role within the Soviet bloc through the so-called Brezhnev doctrine.67 This 
held that the sovereignty of any socialist state would be respected as long as its 
political actions domestically or internationally were in line with those of the Soviet
63 Skak, 1996, pp. 101-129;
64 Ibid, 169-170; Rakowska-Harmstone, No. 1, 1976, pp.42ff.
65 Light, 1988, pp. 169-75.
66 Skak, 1996, pp. 115-123; Jones, 1990, p. 66.
67 Skak, 1996, pp. 116-123; Jones, 1990.
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Union. 68 Secondly, in order to enhance their control within the socialist bloc, the 
Soviets developed a number of institutional mechanisms, such as the annual meeting 
between the first secretaries of the East European communist parties and the first 
secretary of the CPSU.69 Lastly, they stressed the importance of allegiance to 
principles such as ‘democratic centralism’, which enhanced the control of communist 
leadership throughout Eastern Europe and through the formers’ fidelity to the USSR 
ultimately M oscow.70
Under Gorbachev the concept of socialist internationalism remained in force. This is 
evident from various interstate agreements signed by socialist states after 1985 and in 
the official documents of the CPSU, such as the party programme introduced at the 
27th Congress.71 However, during the second half of the 1980s, socialist 
internationalism acquired a new meaning. While continuing to espouse the notion that 
politics within any of the states of the socialist bloc affected the others, the notion of 
‘limited sovereignty’ that lay at the heart of the Brezhnev doctrine was renounced.72 
As a result, the scope for future Soviet military intervention in EES was lim ited.73
The redefinition of socialist internationalism under Gorbachev was in line with his 
new approach to Soviet foreign policy, which was known as New Political Thinking 
(N PT).74 At the crux of this approach was Gorbachev’s wish to reduce Soviet control 
in Eastern Europe in an effort to eliminate the economic burden that this entailed,
68 Light, 1988, pp. 194-200.
69 Ibid, pp. 196-7; Skak, 1996, p. 113.
70 Dawisha, 1988, pp. 73-80; see also Skak, 1996, p. 79, 99.
71 Dawisha, 1988, p. 219; Dawisha, 1989, p. 519; Skak, 1996, pp. 123-136.
72 Shumaker, 1994.
73 Dawisha, 1989, pp. 519-521; Dawisha & Valdez, 1987.
74 Light, 1988, p. 295; Shearman, 1993; Dawisha, 1989, pp. 517ff.
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without harming Soviet security interests in the region.7:1 To this end, besides re- 
conceptualizing socialist internationalism, NPT also effectively abandoned the 
leading role of the USSR within the socialist bloc by accepting that the Soviet 
socialist model was not the only path to the future. Instead, the definition of a socialist 
system became broader, and concepts such as the monopolistic role of the communist 
party and democratic centralism were laid open to challenge. NPT also set East-West 
relations on a new basis by allowing EES to collaborate in security and economic 
matters with the capitalist world, thus increasing their political autonomy.76
Bulgaria followed the Soviet theoretical model closely for almost the entire Cold War 
period. The principle of socialist internationalism was enshrined in its constitution77 
and, for most of the communist period, the Bulgarian political system was organised 
according to the principle of democratic centralism, thus enhancing Soviet control. In 
addition, the Bulgarian state was fully integrated into the structures of Eastern 
European multinational organisations, such as the Warsaw Pact and the Council of the 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which provided Moscow with the economic 
and political leverage to constrain any signs of independence in Bulgarian foreign 
policy.78
However, despite Bulgaria’s receptiveness to the Soviet theoretical model, it seems 
that these Soviet mechanisms controlling Sofia’s foreign policy did not always have 
the desired results. This is especially true in the 1980s, when a partial emancipation of 
Bulgarian politics from Moscow was further accelerated by Gorbachev’s NPT.
75 Aspaturian, 1989, pp. 147-165; Skak 1996, pp. 123-136.
76 Light, 1988, pp. 296-300 and 308-312; Wettig, 1988.
77 Article 5.
78 Brown, 1970, pp. 263-300; Volgyes, 1982, pp. 31-4; Dawisha, 1988, pp. 80-6; Gati, 1990, pp. 136- 
157.
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However, this was not so much due to the initiatives of Bulgarian politicians as to 
upheavals within the Soviet political scene which distracted attention and gave the 
Bulgarians increased room to manoeuvre.79 This had also happened in the past. For 
example, following Brezhnev’s death, the Soviet Union had entered a period of 
prolonged introversion due to the country’s economic problems, which had again 
given Zhivkov the space to adopt policies less tied to Soviet directives.
Foreign Policy Mechanisms
After the amendment of the Bulgarian Constitution in 1971, the state organs 
constitutionally entitled to participate in foreign policy making were the National 
Assembly, the State Council and the government (the Council of Ministers). The 
National Assembly exercised “supreme direction of the state’s foreign policy” and 
was responsible for declarations of peace or war and the ratification of international 
agreements.80 The State Council set the general direction of foreign policy, and among 
its responsibilities was the representation of the state in its international relations, and 
the appointment or recall of state diplomatic representatives at the behest of the 
Council of Ministers.81 It also shared responsibility with the National Assembly for 
the ratification or abrogation of international agreements. Finally, the government
79 The period of the mid-1960s is another case in which Bulgaria’s foreign policy was less tied to 
Soviet control. Khrushchev’s fall from power and the preceding as well as the ensuing power struggle 
in Moscow spurred Zhivkov’s regime in Bulgaria to follow a foreign policy which resulted in more 
emancipation from the Soviet Union. Such emancipation can be well exemplified in the case o f the 
Balkans where, at that time, Sofia undertook a series o f political initiatives aimed at strengthening 
bilateral relations with neighbouring Balkan states such as Greece and Turkey with which Sofia had 
limited relations. For more details see Brown, 1970, pp. 273-297.
80 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, 1971, article 78.
81 Ibid., article 94. Under the 1971 constitution, the State Council had legislative as well as executive 
powers and mostly functioned as the supreme supervising body of state administration. For the entire 
period of its institutional life, the State Council was chaired by Bulgaria’s communist leader, Todor 
Zhivkov. For more details on the establishment and the institutional role of the State Council in the 
People’s Republic of Bulgaria, see the Constitution of the People’s Republic Bulgaria, 1971, articles 
90-7; Huleva, 1994a; Huleva, 1994b, Crampton, 1997, p. 198.
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“organised” and “implemented” state foreign policy according to principles set by the 
National Assembly and the State Council.82
Constitutional stipulations, however, should not be considered to reflect the real 
allocation of power in Bulgarian politics. The only constitutional provision that 
should be taken at face value is item 2 of the first article, which stipulated that the 
guiding force in Bulgarian society and the state was the Bulgarian Communist Party 
(BCP).83 In communist Bulgaria, as was the case with other Eastern European 
regimes, real political power in almost every matter including foreign policy lay with 
the BCP.
However, what made the Bulgarian case different from many of the other socialist 
states was that, even by Eastern European standards, Bulgaria’s political structures 
were particularly highly centralized and hierarchical. In foreign policy terms, this 
meant that decision-making power in the 1980s was almost exclusively concentrated 
in the hands of the General Secretary of the BCP, Todor Zhivkov, and his political 
faction, the principal members of which included politburo members Milko Balev, 
Grisha Filipov, Dimitur Stoianov, Iordan Iotov, Dobri Dzhurov and Pencho 
Kubadinski.84 Almost every major foreign policy decision was first conceived by 
Zhivkov and this political entourage. The decision was then rubber-stamped by the 
Politburo of the BCP before being sent to the Department of Foreign Policy and 
International Relations of the BCP Central Committee, which worked out in detail
82 Ibid., article 98.
83 Ibid., article 1, item 2.
84 Tchakarov, 1991, pp. 78-9; Minchev, Chavdar, personal interview, 15/11/2001; Ganev, Ivan, 
personal interview, 25/1/2002; Lilov, Alexandur, personal interview, 4/12/2001; Popova, Svetla, 
personal interview, 16/1/2002; Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001; Minchev, Ognian, 
personal interview, 2/11/2001.
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how the decision should be carried out.85 The actual implementation of the policy was 
the responsibility of various state institutions, such as the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Bulgarian National Assembly, which both worked under the 
close scrutiny of the State Council.86
Aside from its role in shaping foreign policy, the Department of Foreign Policy and 
International Relations of the Central Committee performed two other duties relevant 
to the country’s relations with the outside world. The first was that, along with the 
Central Committee of the CPSU, it monitored the political activities of both ruling 
and non-ruling communist parties in the World, as well as parties with similar 
political ideologies such as labour, leftist and social democratic parties. Based on the 
findings of this monitoring process, the Department proposed to the Politburo and the 
Plenary Session of the BCP Central Committee initiatives aimed at either fostering or 
weakening relations with these parties and then applied any decisions taken on these 
matters.87 The second duty of the Department was to monitor the activities of the 
country’s diplomats. This was not only confined to issues such as their qualifications 
and performance but extended to their loyalty to the BCP. Almost all promotions of 
Bulgarian diplomats under communism, though conducted by the Bulgarian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, was based on the monitoring process taking place within the 
Department of Foreign Policy and International Relations of the BCP Central 
Committee.88
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Minchev, Chavdar, personal interview, 15/11/2001; Ganev, Ivan, personal interview, 25/1/2002; 
Lilov, Alexandur, personal interview, 4/12/2001; Popova, Svetla, personal interview, 16/1/2002; 
Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001; Minchev, Ognian, personal interview, 2/11/2001.
88 Ibid.
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Throughout most of the communist period, Bulgaria’s foreign policy making was a 
closed political process mainly involving the institutional mechanisms already 
discussed and restricted to a few high-ranking members of the communist elite. Shifts 
in foreign policy could only come through either a change in the attitude of the top 
leadership or with a change in personnel. There were no independent policy making 
institutes similar to what is known in the West as think-tanks.89 This was because the 
Bulgarian communist regime did not allow the establishment of any form of 
independent policy institutes outside the control of the party. Bulgarian academic 
scholars also tended to consciously avoid research areas with policy relevance lest 
they provoked the communist authorities to take an interest in their academic work 
and personal lives.90
The picture began to change gradually after the mid-1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev 
came to power in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s policies of Perestroika and Glasnost 
lessened the close control that the CPSU had exercised until then on the political and 
social life of the Soviet Union and promoted a greater freedom of speech and the 
political emancipation of the Soviet press from tight state control. Bulgaria’s close 
political and economic ties with the Soviet Union facilitated the influx of these ideas, 
especially since there was an almost universal knowledge of Russian within the 
Bulgarian population, and an extensive network of Russian bookshops, making the 
Soviet press widely available.91
89 Krastev, 2001, pp. 24-26.
90 Ibid.
91 Drezov, 2001, p. 425; Borisov, Boiko, personal interview, 6/11/2001; Baeva, Iskra, personal 
interview, 26/11/2001; Draganov, Dragomir, personal interview, 20/11/2001, Neikova, Maria, personal 
interview, 14/12/2001, Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 30/11/2001.
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The immediate result of this influx of ideas was the emergence at the end of the 1980s 
of dissident political groups, such as the ‘Association for Human Rights’, the 
‘Discussion Club in Support of Glasnost and Perestroika’, and ‘Ecoglasnost’. These 
groups were mostly organised by communist party members and people with strong 
connections with the security services, who sought to distance themselves from BCP 
political activities, hoping that in this way they would be able to capitalize on any 
effects which Soviet Perestroika might have on Bulgarian politics.92
In terms of foreign policy, these groups pushed for alignment with Gorbachev’s 
NPT.93 Although their lobbying never took an institutional form - no representatives 
of these groups participated in any of Bulgaria’s foreign policy making mechanisms - 
at the end of the 1980s, for the first time since they came to power, the Bulgarian 
communist authorities were faced with domestic political pressure to follow a certain 
foreign policy agenda, which ironically was that of the Soviet Union.
Apart from the emergence of dissident political groups lobbying the communist 
authorities to follow the foreign policy path of the Soviet Union, NPT also came to 
challenge the concept of democratic centralism and the way this had previously been 
applied to Bulgaria’s foreign policy. As a principle, democratic centralism was used 
by communist theorists to refer to the centralization of political power in the hands of 
the communist leadership that EES was expected to implement.
For most of the Cold W ar period, the principle of democratic centralism was applied 
in the case of Bulgaria’s foreign policy making, and this is reflected in the highly
92 Ivanov, 1994, p. 141 & pp. 281-92.
93 For more details on the political opposition under communism and the emergence of dissenting 
political groups at the end of the 1980s in Bulgarian politics, see Ivanov, 1994.
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centralized and hierarchical structures which were mentioned previously. These 
structures reflected the iron discipline which the long serving Bulgarian communist 
leader, Todor Zhivkov, imposed on all ranks of the BCP. Indeed, after he took the 
party’s helm at the end of the 1950s, Zhivkov succeeded in establishing an almost 
unchallenged personal rule inside the BCP, which allowed him to remain in power for 
almost thirty five years. By the mid-1960s, he had managed to politically marginalize 
any possible contender for the party leadership and since then, whenever he felt that a 
party member either posed a threat to his power or impeded his political plans, he did 
not hesitate to remove them from the party organs.94 One of the techniques which the 
Bulgarian communist leader often used in this regard was to appoint the person in 
question as an ambassador abroad. Even if this did not occur, Zhivkov was still 
careful to compensate for the dismissal, either by offering them another political 
position, however insignificant it was in comparison to the post held previously, or by 
allowing them to continue to enjoy some of the privileges of their previous post, e.g a 
salary and the use of a state car.95
However, to argue that Zhivkov’s long-standing survival as a BCP leader and his 
ability to discipline the country’s foreign policy structures was merely the result of his 
highly skilled manoeuvring within Bulgarian domestic politics is only partially true. 
Very little of this would have been achieved if he had not enjoyed M oscow’s full 
support for his political activities. Indeed, all the Soviet communist leaders from 
Khrushchev to Chernenko were interested in Zhivkov maintaining his strong personal 
position inside the BCP, and thus offered him full political support in both domestic
94 Crampton, 1997, pp. 195-215; Brown, 1970, pp. 53-142;
95 This was the case with Alexander Lilov, a Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the BCP since the beginning of the 1970s. Lilov was dismissed from the Politburo, but despite his 
dismissal he was allowed to enjoy his salary as a Politburo member and a state car after he left office. 
See Tchakarov, 1991, p. 150.
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and international environments. This is mainly because the Soviet leadership viewed 
the Bulgarian communist leader as the politician that would best serve the USSR’s 
national interests, both inside Bulgaria and abroad. Indeed, under Zhivkov’s 
leadership Sofia’s foreign policy remained almost totally obedient to the Soviet 
Union. On issues relating to the Vietnam War, the Middle East and Latin America one 
could hardly find any difference between Sofia’s foreign policy and that followed by 
Moscow.96
With reference to Bulgaria’s domestic politics, Zhivkov was always quick to 
anticipate new political currents in the Soviet Union after a change of leadership and 
adjust policy accordingly. In doing this, the Bulgarian communist leader wished to 
please and show his political loyalty to the new Soviet leadership, which in turn was 
expected to confirm his tenure in power. For instance, after he came to power in the 
mid-1950s, Zhivkov promoted a series of political measures aimed at relaxing the 
BCP’s tight political control over Bulgarian society, and economic reforms that 
allowed local enterprises and their managers greater responsibility than they had had 
in the past.97 These policies were mainly encouraged by similar political and 
economic measures which had taken place in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, 
and which were frozen both in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria immediately after the 
political upheavals of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. These prompted the then Soviet 
leader, Leonid Brezhnev, to tighten political control within the Soviet Union and to 
urge the communist leaders of Eastern Europe to do the same lest they experience
96Crampton, 1997, p. 199.
97 Crampton, 1997, pp. 198-205; Brown, 1970, pp. 23-195
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similar civil unrest that could challenge the U SSR’s hegemony of the communist 
bloc.98
Zhivkov’s ability to anticipate political changes occurring in the Soviet Union was 
mainly the result of the personal links that the Bulgarian communist leader had 
established which allowed him to receive confidential information about the 
Kremlin’s backstage politics. These primarily involved the Soviet ambassador in 
Sofia, with whom Zhivkov always sought to maintain a strong personal friendship, 
and a circle of trusted diplomats inside the Bulgarian embassy in Moscow, whose 
mission was to infiltrate the personal environment of the Soviet leaders. According to 
Kostadin Tchakarov, one of Zhivkov’s closest political advisors, at the time of Leonid 
Brezhnev’s leadership, one of the main ways through which the Bulgarian communist 
leader managed to receive confidential information about Kremlin politics was Milka 
Kalinova, a female diplomat working at the Bulgarian embassy in Moscow.99 
Kalinova succeeded in establishing friendly relations with both Brezhnev’s daughter, 
Galina, and his son, Iuri, to whom she often gave expensive presents such as fur coats, 
jewellery or vacations in Bulgaria, all paid for by Zhivkov’s office. Through these 
relations, Kalinova received useful information about intrigues inside the Kremlin or 
forthcoming political changes with respect to either the Soviet domestic political 
scene or Eastern Europe, which she conveyed directly to Zhivkov.100
In addition, the Bulgarian communist leader kept a close watch on the political 
activities of high-ranking party members, particularly those whose jobs involved 
regular trips to Moscow, and close working relations with Soviet officials. Nobody
98 Crampton, 1997, pp. 198-205; Tsvetkov, 1993, pp. 370-374.
99 Tchakarov, 1991, p. 99.
100 Ibid.
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was allowed to work as close with Soviet officials as to gain greater confidence and 
support from the Soviet Union than he enjoyed. Those party members who did not 
realize this soon experienced Zhivkov’s anger, which on many occasions led to their 
removal from the political posts they held. The close political circle of the Bulgarian 
communist leader was aware of Zhivkov’s sensitivity to party members’ relations 
with Moscow and on many occasions exploited this to undermine the political power 
of their political opponents. The last decade of Zhivkov’s rule offered many examples 
of this, with a number of powerful Politburo members, some of whom even managed 
to climb to the second highest position in the BCP’s hierarchy, such as Alexandur 
Lilov and Choudomir Alexandrov, being removed from their posts because close 
members of Zhivkov’s political entourage such as Milko Balev succeeded in 
persuading the Bulgarian leader that these Politburo members were plotting with 
Soviet officials to undermine his power.101
One of the main aims of Gorbachev’s NPT was to disengage the Soviet Union from 
the political life of EES and, in this way, to provide them with the necessary political 
space to become autonomous in their domestic and foreign policies. For the USSR, 
disengagement from Eastern Europe in practice meant a gradual reduction of Soviet 
troops in that region and less spending on sustaining mechanisms for monitoring the 
political and social life of EES. To Moscow such troop reduction was seen as a way 
of relieving pressure on the domestic budget at a time when the economy was faced 
with severe problems. For its part, EES saw the Soviet disengagement as creating a 
political momentum in the region that would assist them in overcoming the problems
101 Ibid., p. 97.
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of economic stagnation and recession, which most of them faced at the end of the 
1980s.
But for Zhivkov and other East European communist leaders like him, Gorbachev’s 
NPT also meant that they could no longer count on Soviet support for either their 
policies or even maintaining their hold on power, unless they aligned their domestic 
positions with the Soviet policies of Perestroika and Glasnost. However, this would 
mean among other things that they would have to tolerate greater freedom of speech 
both inside their communist parties and their states, accept the existence and cope 
with the activities of dissident political groups and be prepared to negotiate with these 
groups or adopt policies which would accommodate at least some of their political 
interests. In other words, any alignment with the policies of Perestroika and Glasnost 
would challenge the monopoly of power which democratic centralism had bestowed 
on these leaders and, as far as Zhivkov was concerned, he was not prepared to take 
any measures that would diminish his personal rule either inside the BCP or the state 
as a whole. Therefore, while he was willing to apply the economic principles of 
Perestroika to Bulgaria, Zhivkov was not prepared to accompany this with the 
necessary political changes, fearing that these would undermine his ability to exercise 
tight control over Bulgarian politics and society.102
Feeling that Moscow, following its policy of disengagement from Eastern Europe, 
would not directly attempt to topple him from power through military or other means, 
as it did in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Zhivkov, for the first time since he 
took power in the mid-1950s, distanced himself from the Soviet leadership. The
102 Crampton, 1997, p. 168; Levesque, 1997, p. 168; Jackson, 1989.
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Bulgarian leader started to openly express doubts on the political impact of Soviet 
policies on Eastern Europe. According to Kostadin Tchakarov, in a conversation he 
had with Zhivkov about Soviet policy in January 1989, the communist leader referred 
to Perestroika and Glasnost as “pure demagogy if they lack a firm economic base”,103 
while according to other sources Zhivkov often stated to his political entourage that 
“Perestroika is a political storm which I hope to weather soon”.104 These statements 
contrasted sharply with remarks such as “Bulgaria and the Soviet Union act as a 
single body, breathing with the same lungs and nourished by the same 
bloodstream”,105 which the Bulgarian leader had made in the past.
Zhivkov also took practical measures aimed at restricting the influence of Perestroika 
and Glasnost on Bulgarian society. According to an Athens News Agency journalist, 
who at the time worked for the Bulgarian official state news agency Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency (BTA), after the announcement of Perestroika and Glasnost, the 
BTA received directives from Zhivkov’s political office to censor news coming from 
Moscow.106
Zhivkov’s political distancing from Moscow provided the opportunity for a number 
of BCP party members to assume a pro-Perestroika political profile, which they used 
to establish direct political contacts with Moscow in an attempt to oust Zhivkov from 
power. At the Politburo level, two such members were Petur Mladenov and Andrei 
Lukanov. Both belonged to the young generation of communist cadres that was 
known as the nouveau nomenclature. They had not climbed the BCP’s hierarchy
103 Tchakarov, 1991, p. 161.
104 Ganev, Ivan, personal interview, 25/1/2002; Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 26/11/2001.
105 Crampton, 1997, p. 199.
106 Borisov, Boiko, personal interview, 6/11/2001.
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ladder due to credentials gained during the W WII as communist partisans, but rose to 
power after the mid-1960s as a result of their loyalty to the party and their abilities as 
technocrats. As such, they were less obsessed with defending communist ideology 
and more prepared to adapt their ideas to what they saw as the political realities of the 
time.
At the end of the 1980s, Mladenov and Lukanov began to openly question the 
doctrine of democratic centralism and to distance themselves from many of the 
political decisions taken by Zhivkov,107 including his downplaying of Bulgarian- 
Soviet relations and his decision to change the Muslim names of Bulgarian Turks, 
which had created tension in Bulgarian-Turkish relations. On many occasions, 
Zhivkov with his close circle of friends and political advisers mocked Mladenov and 
Lukanov but despite his evident displeasure, he found it difficult to dismiss them 
from the Politburo.108 By the end of the 1980s, the Bulgarian leader was becoming 
increasingly politically isolated and he feared that an attempt to remove M oscow’s 
political favourites from the Politburo would further complicate his already strained 
relations with the USSR, which, in turn, might take measures to remove him from 
power. His fear was based on the fact that the Soviet leadership, although it had 
officially declared that it would not interfere in the political changes unfolding in 
Eastern Europe, by no means remained a passive onlooker. Throughout this period, 
the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was actively promoting the policies of Perestroika 
and Glasnost through diplomatic means.
107 Iahiel, 1997, pp. 355-364.
108 Tchakarov, 1991, 190-1; Lilov, Alexandur, personal interview, 4/12/2001; Baeva, Iskra personal 
interview, 26/11/2001.
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But Zhivkov was not going to escape what he feared. By the end of the 1980s, he was 
on strained terms with the Soviet leadership as he stubbornly opposed political and 
economic reform, despite the fact that Bulgaria’s economy was in crisis with a foreign 
debt of almost $10bn; an amount which was almost twenty times as much as the war 
reparations that Bulgaria had had to pay under the terms of Neuilly Treaty that put an 
end to Sofia’s participation in the First World W ar.'09 In addition, contrary to the 
wishes of the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian leader showed no signs of abandoning the 
assimilation campaign which he had launched against the Bulgarian Turks in the mid- 
1980s, in spite of all the security implications which such a campaign had for the 
entire communist bloc. This was because the campaign threatened to destabilize 
Bulgaria and draw Sofia into military conflict with Ankara, both of which would have 
a spill-over effect on the Warsaw Pact states as a whole.
For all these reasons, the Soviet leadership was no longer prepared to continue 
offering Zhivkov political support as it had in the past. With M oscow’s consent and 
its tactful diplomatic involvement, Mladenov and Lukanov orchestrated a palace coup 
which removed Zhivkov from power on 10 November 1989, the day after the Berlin 
Wall was breached.110 The coup took place after Mladenov had paid an official visit to 
China in October 1989.111 On his return journey, he stopped off in Moscow to talk 
with Gorbachev and it is believed that during these talks the Soviet leader was 
informed about the existence of coup plans against the Bulgarian communist leader,
109 This is partly because the Bulgarian leader had no clear picture of the country’s real foreign debt 
until he was removed from power. According to Zhivkov’s close political adviser, Kostadin Tchakarov, 
as late as 1989, the Bulgarian leader still talked o f a $6bn foreign debt. This is mainly due to the fact 
that a number of state officials and many of Zhivkov’s political advisers concealed the real amount 
foreign debt from him lest its revelation lead Zhivkov to proceed with political and economic reforms 
which might sweep them out of their posts. See Tchakarov, 1991, pp. 156-7; Tsvetkov, 1993, p. 417.
110 For more details on the organisation and implementation of the palace coup, see Traikov, 1999, pp. 
65-112; Iahiel, 1997, pp. 364-380.
111 Crampton, 1997, p. 215.
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for which Gorbachev gave his consent and promised that the USSR would do its best 
to ensure a successful outcome. Immediately upon his return from Moscow, 
Mladenov, along with Lukanov and a number of other Politburo members, moved to 
oust Zhivkov by persuading him to resign. A key figure was also the Soviet 
ambassador in Sofia, Viktor Sharapov, who in a meeting that he held with Zhivkov on 
3 November 1989 is alleged to have made it clear to the Bulgarian leader that he no 
longer enjoyed Soviet support.112 As a result of all this, Zhivkov announced his 
decision to resign from the leadership of the BCP and the state on 8 November 1989. 
The decision was approved by the Politburo the very same day and ratified by the 
Plenum of the BCP Central Committee on 10 November 1989.
Relations with States from Outside the Region
In the previous section, Bulgaria’s foreign policy principles and decision mechanisms 
were examined. The remaining part of this chapter will analyse how these principles 
and mechanisms worked in practice by examining four aspects of Sofia’s foreign 
relations: a) with the USSR and the W est;113 b) with the countries of the so-called 
Third W orld;114 c) bilateral relations with neighbouring Balkan states; d) Bulgaria’s 
stance towards various efforts at regional multilateral cooperation during the 1980s.
Examining foreign relations with the USSR and the W est is essential, not only 
because of the entrenchment of the two blocs in the Balkan region after the WWII, but
112 Tchakarov, 1991, p. 194; Drezov, 2001, p. 426; for a different view see Tsvetkov, 1993, p.424-425.
113 For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘West’ refers to the economically developed regimes of the 
so-called ‘first world’, be they members of NATO and the European Community or neutral in the post 
war divide.
114 For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘Third World’ mainly refers to economically 
underdeveloped as well as developing countries o f the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the African 
continent and Latin America.
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also because, due to their weakness, modem Balkan states, including Bulgaria, have 
tended to give a high political priority to relations with economically and militarily 
powerful states outside the region.113
Bulgaria’s Relations with the USSR
Bulgaria’s full integration into East European institutions offered Moscow the 
economic and political means to intervene in Bulgarian politics and, if necessary, 
force Sofia to comply with Soviet directives. Economically, throughout the whole 
communist period, the USSR was a secure market for about 60% of Bulgaria’s 
exports and was almost the sole source of energy."6 Almost 90% of Sofia’s oil and 
gas requirements during the 1980s were imported from the Soviet Union.117 Economic 
dependence grew after the end of the 1960s, when Sofia, pressured by Moscow, 
increased its participation in the ‘socialist division of labour’ (Sblizhenie), through 
which the Soviets wished to foster economic integration within the socialist bloc.118 
This led Bulgaria to concentrate industrial production on hauling and lifting 
machinery and electronics, most of which was exported to the Soviet Union.119
Apart from these economic levers, the Soviets could also ensure Bulgaria’s 
subservience through a number of other devices which they used to influence political 
decision-making and the communist nomenclature. The 8th Department of the BCP
115 Markov, 1998; Panaiotov, 1998; Tsvetkov, 1998.
116 Appendix, tables 1-12.
117 EIU, 1988, pp.66-67; Braun, 1983, pp. 200-208.
118 Dawisha, 1988, pp. 92-98; Light, 1988, pp.188-200; Lampe, 1986, pp. 183-187; Ministerstvo na 
Vushnite Raboti, 1974, (No. 195& No. 199), pp. 566-9& 572-4.
119 Montias, 1988, pp. 522-539; Archives of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BMFA), 1-102- 
64-2-3//03-09-66 (1984); BMFA, I-102-64-7//55-64-18 (1982); Ministerstvo na Vushnite Raboti, 1974, 
(No. 195& No. 199), pp. 566-9& 572-4; appendix, tables 6&9.
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apparatus closely supervised the workings of the party and state administration in 
every foreign policy issue. This department had direct link with the CPSU Central 
Committee’s Liaison Office for Relations with the Ruling Communist and W orkers’ 
Parties of Socialist Countries, and the International Department of the CPSU Central 
Committee, whose main responsibility was to supervise the activities of all 
communist parties within the socialist bloc.120 In addition, the Soviet Union could 
monitor the loyalty of the more senior political and military cadres by inviting them 
for consultation in Moscow, where many of them had undertaken their studies.121 
Finally, the role of the Soviet ambassador in Sofia seems to have been of key 
importance. As was mentioned above, he even played a role in the palace coup of 
1989 which ousted Zhivkov.122
Despite these mechanisms of political control, the Soviets, however, could not always 
ensure Bulgaria’s subservience, thus making Soviet-Bulgarian relations less 
harmonious than one would expect. This was especially true during the 1980s. While 
superficially Bulgaria appeared to be the closest ally of the Soviet Union, bilateral 
relations were in reality plagued by a number of problems. These disputes were 
rooted in the autonomous foreign policy which first began to develop as an expansion 
of the nationalism championed by Zhivkov’s daughter Liudmila in the 1970s.
The policy of autonomy was further developed as a result of Bulgaria’s economic 
problems following the two oil crises of the 1970s and the consequent USSR decision 
to review Soviet economic relations with Eastern Europe.123 In 1982, the Soviet
120 Dawisha, 1988, p.76.
121 Ibid, pp. 76-77; Ashley, 1989, p. 114.
122 See above; see also Levesque, 1997, pp. 170-6.
123 Tchakarov, 1991, pp. 155-6.
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Union, plagued by economic difficulties, tried to exploit the rise in world oil prices 
by increasing its deliveries to the West in exchange for hard currency and 
technology.124 To provide the necessary oil, the USSR notified its East European 
partners that crude oil deliveries would be reduced by 10% from planned levels.125 
The Soviet notification was the coup de grace to a Bulgarian economy already under 
strain due to the rising oil prices.126 The country’s terms of trade deteriorated and 
industrial growth fell from 4.1% in the period 1971-75 to a mere 1.23% in the period 
1981-84. As a result, Bulgaria turned to the Middle East in search of energy sources 
to feed the country’s large industrial sector, which in turn increased the trade 
deficit.127
Soviet energy policy towards Eastern Europe was not the only point of discomfort in 
Soviet-Bulgarian relations during the 1980s. During the same period, the Soviets also 
complained to the Bulgarians about the quality of the industrial products they were 
being sold.128 Afraid of losing a sure market for its industrial products, the Bulgarian 
regime responded by turning to the West in search of new technology. The Zhivkov 
regime also inaugurated a new economic policy, known as the New Economic 
Mechanism (NEM),129 which was designed to rectify the chief faults of the Bulgarian 
economy. This would then lead to a rise in industrial productivity and an 
improvement in the quality of goods, thereby securing export markets. In the course 
of the decade, however, it became evident that the aims of the NEM were over- 
ambitious and the policy had little real impact.
124 BMFA, 1/64/H.4.16//55-64-376 (1988); BMFA, 1/64/h.3//55-64-37
125 Kramer, 1985, p. 32.
126 Montias, 1988, pp. 539ff; Lampe, 1986, pp. 177-183; Macmillan, 1985, pp. 368-378; Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1985, pp. 303-329.
127 Ibid, p. 540.
128 BMFA, I-102-64-2-3//03-09-66 (1984)
129 Crampton, 1997, pp. 206-208.
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When Gorbachev assumed power in the USSR, these problems were accentuated. In 
line with Gorbachev’s intention of subordinating foreign policy to the needs of the 
economy, the USSR ended the system of subsidizing Soviet oil prices to Eastern 
Europe, which previously had been fixed at a five-year average of the world price. 
Instead, prices rose to world market rates.130 The result was a further deterioration in 
the already strained Bulgarian economy and a growing sense of panic among the 
Bulgarian communist authorities, who instructed the Bulgarian Embassy in Moscow 
to monitor closely discussions among Soviet officials about future energy plans.131 
Secondly, Gorbachev strongly disapproved of Zhivkov’s policy towards the Turkish 
minority, because it was causing disquiet in a number of Western states and could 
potentially spoil the climate of rapprochement and cooperation between Eastern 
Europe and the West which the NPT had inaugurated.132
Bulgaria’s relations with the West
Although Bulgaria was allied to the Soviet Union, it was able to develop diplomatic 
and economic relations with the West, but these were very much influenced by the 
ebbs and flows of inter-bloc relations. After the period of detente in the 1970s, which 
created a favourable environment for Bulgaria’s relations with the W est,133 bilateral 
relations with most Western states cooled at the beginning of the 1980s with the so- 
called ‘second Cold W ar’ following the victory of Ronald Regan in the US
130 Ibid, p. 208; Levesque, 1997, p. 172; Tchakarov, 1991, p. 186.
131 Central Intelligence Agency, 1985, pp. 310-12; BMFA, No 2492-7t/29 & No. 501 h/9; BMFA, 
1/64/h. 10//55-64-434 (1989).
132 Crampton, 1997, pp. 210-213.
133 Lampe, 1986, pp. 187-198.
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Presidential elections of 1980.134 Imports of high technology products were especially 
affected due to the restrictions imposed on Eastern Europe by the Reagan 
administration, with American imports to Bulgaria dropping to $125.3m in 1982 from 
$225.7m in 1981.135 In addition, the acute tensions in inter-bloc relations which rose 
after the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe 
also impacted on Sofia’s relations with the W est.136 Thus, in 1984, on the insistence of 
the Soviet Union, Zhivkov cancelled an official visit to the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), which he had hoped would lead to an increase in economic and 
technical aid to Bulgaria to assist the NEM .137
At the same time, Bulgaria’s relations with the West were further harmed by a 
number of other events, in particular the suspected involvement of the Bulgarian 
secret service in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981, and of 
Vladimir Kostov, a Bulgarian journalist, at the end of the 1970s in Paris,138 the 
assassination of the Bulgarian journalist Georgi Markov in London at the same 
time,139 and the alleged participation of state trade agencies such as Kintex in drug and 
arms trafficking to the W est through Bulgarian territory.140 In the Cold War climate, 
rumours and suspicions were sometimes sufficient for Western governments to make 
official protests to the authorities in Sofia. One such case occurred in 1982 when the
134 Crampton, 1997, p. 206; Nedeva, 1985, pp. 64-5; Bell, 2001, pp. 352-3.
135 UN Yearbook for International Trade Statistics (henceforth UN-YITS), Vol. 1, 1983, p. 180.
136 Bell, 2001, pp. 349-352.
137 New York Times, 10/9/1984, p. 3:1; Central Intelligence Agency, 1986, p. 179.
138 Henze, 1983; Henze, 1985.
139 The involvement of the Bulgarian intelligence service in the attempted assassination of Kostov and 
the murder of Georgi Markov was believed to be driven by comments Kostov made on a series of 
programmes of the Bulgarian service of Radio Free Europe and Markov on the BBC in which they both 
exposed some of the international activities o f the Bulgarian and Soviet secret services. See Tsvetkov, 
1993, p. 403; Crampton, 1997, p. 202.
140 RFE, Bulgarian SR/3, 15-2-1985, item 1; The Times, 31-3-1986, p. 12g; New York Times, 28-1- 
1983, p. 3:1.
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American State Department officially accused Bulgaria of being a country engaged in 
“state-sponsored terrorism”.141
The political changes in the Soviet Union following Gorbachev’s accession to power 
produced a turning point in Bulgaria’s relations with the West. Bilateral relations with 
Western states started to warm again and trade increased. The FRG serves as a good 
example. Bulgarian-German relations, cool after Zhivkov’s postponing of his official 
visit to Bonn in 1984, improved after 1985, and culminated in Zhivkov’s official trip 
to the country in 1987, where the two sides signed economic agreements for 
strengthening cooperation in the field of high technology through establishing joint 
ventures. Bulgarian trade with the FRG increased so that the latter became Bulgaria’s 
chief source of imports in the West by the end of the decade: at $16.4m, a 14% 
increase over the preceding four years.142
However, Soviet energy policy imposed limits on any improvements in Bulgaria’s 
trade relations with the Western world. Sofia’s main export items to Western 
countries were oil and petroleum products made from crude oil imported from the 
Soviet Union.143 The Soviet decision to reduce the amount of oil exported to Eastern 
Europe and switch to world market prices badly affected Bulgaria’s exports to the 
West. The trade deficit increased, reaching $2bn by the end of the decade.144 To try 
and diminish this deficit, Bulgaria began to encourage foreign investment. It enacted a 
new investment law in 1989 which, for the first time, allowed foreign companies to 
acquire shares in Bulgarian firms without formally establishing joint ventures, and
141 Crampton, 1997, p. 206; The Times, 3-7-1984, p. 5h.
142 EIU, No4, 1988, appendix 14; appendix, tables 5 & 7.
143 Central Intelligence Unit, 1985, pp. 310-12.
144 EIU, No 1, 1988, p. 66; Terry, 1985, pp. 521-524; appendix, table 11.
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generally lightened the tax burden for foreign companies investing in the country.141 In 
addition, the Bulgarian regime tried to promote tourism by upgrading the country’s 
infrastructure and building hotels and restaurants. However, these measures proved 
insufficient and since trade, foreign investment and tourism failed to produce the 
necessary income, the Bulgarians had no optio#n but to resort to foreign loans, with the 
result that the country’s external debt rose to almost $10bn by 1990.146
Bulgaria’s Relations with Third World States
With reference to the states of the so-called Third World, Bulgaria’s foreign policy 
seems to have blindly followed that of the Soviet Union. M oscow’s political and 
economic interests were promoted at all times, and Sofia worked to undermine the 
power of pro-Western regimes and to offer economic and military support to 
subversive political and military movements which were friendly to the regimes of 
communist bloc states and the Soviet Union in particular.147
This policy remained the same throughout the 1980s. Indeed, the Bulgarian 
communist regime offered generous political, economic and military support to 
radical pro-Soviet states such as Libya, Iraq, Cuba, Yemen and Nicaragua, with 
Zhivkov keeping close personal relations with leaders such as Muammar al-Qaddafi, 
Saddam Hussein and Daniel Ortega.148 In addition, with the tacit support of the 
authorities, a number of special schools were set up in Bulgaria to train military 
forces from these states and their revolutionary movements, while the Bulgarian
145 EIU, No 1, 1989, pp. 24-26.
146 Levesque, 1997, p. 169; appendix, table 8.
147 Maxwell, 1985, pp. 254-8
148 Tsvetkov, 1993, p. 397; Maxwell, 1985, pp. 254-8.
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intelligence service, along with the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), was involved in a series of political activities 
aimed at overthrowing pro-Westem governments and military regimes in the Middle 
East, Africa and Latin America to the benefit of pro-Soviet groups.149
Apart from any extension of Soviet political influence on Third World countries, the 
economic and military support of pro-Soviet political and military movements in the 
Third World brought welcome economic benefits to Bulgaria in a period of acute 
economic crisis. Indeed, it is estimated that, by the mid-1980s, Bulgaria was earning 
approximately $500-600m annually from arms sales by state-owned companies, such 
as Kintext, to conflict-torn Third World states like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and to 
insurgency movements in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.150 This amount 
represented 7% of Bulgaria’s exports and about 60% of the country’s annual hard 
currency earnings and put it in 12th place in terms of arms sales among the 39 arms 
exporting states.151 It is not coincidental that the Bulgarian arms industry developed 
rapidly, with generous Soviet technical and logistical support between the end of the 
1960s and the first half of the 1980s.152 This was a period during which the Soviet 
bloc was actively involved politically and militarily in the Middle East, Latin America 
and the African continent.
Bulgaria’s policy towards the Third World does not appear to have changed after 
Gorbachev’s coming to power. Sofia continued to have good relations with and to 
offer economic and military support to, pro-Soviet regimes and liberation movements
149 Ibid.
150 Dimitrov, 2002b, p. 17.
151 Ibid.
152 BMFA, I-102-64-2-3//03-09-66 (1984), pp. 30-2; BMFA, I-102-64-7//55-64-18 (1982), pp. 70-5.
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in the Third World. Although it is difficult to research issues which are closely related 
to the world of the intelligence services, the fact that the Bulgarian arms industry 
continued to build new plants and modernize existing facilities throughout the period 
would seem to support the view that by the end of the 1980s Bulgaria had not changed 
its previous policy.153 Such a view is also corroborated by the fact that the Soviet 
Union under Gorbachev does not seem to have encouraged Bulgaria to change its 
policy towards the Third World. It is noteworthy that, during the second half of the 
1980s, the Soviet Union started to disengage itself from military activities in Third 
World states such as Afghanistan. Soviet military troops had been involved in military 
operations in Afghanistan since December 1979 and Moscow decided in May 1988 to 
withdraw from the engagement. Yet, both the Soviet Union and Bulgaria continued to 
provide arms and military equipment to pro-Soviet political and military movements 
in the Third World as they did the Afghan Marxist resistance organisations after the 
Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan on the pretext that Third World anti­
communist rebellions received similar aid from the USA.154
Bulgaria’s Bilateral and Multilateral Relations in the Balkan Region
The next two sections examine the factors which influenced Bulgaria’s bilateral 
relations in the Balkan region and the political stance that Sofia adopted towards 
various efforts at regional multilateral cooperation during the 1980s. Bulgaria’s 
relations with its Balkan neighbours have often been complicated. Prior to WWII, this 
was mainly due to unfulfilled irredentist aspirations. Of all the Balkan states, Bulgaria 
had fared worst in post-war territorial settlements, having been on the losing side after
153 Dimitrov, 2002b, p. 17.
154 Tsvetkov, 1993, p. 415.
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the Second Balkan War and both World Wars. These defeats deprived Bulgaria of 
territory in the regions of Macedonia and Thrace which the Bulgarian authorities had 
long viewed as Bulgarian, and it was to prove difficult for them to come to terms with 
their loss to neighbouring states. They thus constantly worked for their annexation to 
Bulgaria. #
As a result, relations between Bulgaria and the other Balkan states throughout this 
period were full of mutual suspicion, which in itself was a restraining force preventing 
the country’s political authorities from engaging in regional initiatives aimed at 
forging sound bilateral and multilateral relations. Sofia did not take part in most of the 
Balkan conferences organised in the early 1930s with the aim of forging political and 
economic cooperation in the region, because the Bulgarian authorities were concerned 
that by participating they would legitimise the territorial status quo and thus 
effectively relinquish the territorial claims which the Bulgarian state had historically 
made in the region.155
After WWII, Bulgaria’s Balkan relations were mainly affected by the country’s 
participation in the communist bloc and the degree of control which the Soviet Union 
exercised over Bulgarian politics. There were occasions in the country’s Cold W ar 
history when Sofia had to follow policies which were the outcome of direct Soviet 
interference with Bulgaria’s foreign policy making. Such interference often took the 
form of crude political pressure on Bulgarian officials. Thus, for example, 
immediately after WWII and under Soviet pressures, the BCP not only renounced pre- 
War territorial claims in the geographic region of Macedonia but also agreed that the
155 Crampton, 1997, pp. 161-162; Stavrianos, 1964, pp. 230-270; Geshkoff, 1940, pp. 77-139;
Bulgarian National Group for the Balkan Conferences, 1934.
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Macedonian territories, known as Pirin Macedonia, which had been incorporated into 
the Bulgarian state after the end of the Second Balkan War, should be ceded to the 
newly established Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) which was part of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and contained the part of the 
Macedonian region which had been given to Serbia after the Second Balkan W ar.136 
The agreement was part of a Soviet plan to increase Moscow’s political influence in 
the Balkan region by creating a Balkan federal state which would first include the 
SFRY, Bulgaria and Albania, with the prospect that Romania and Greece would join 
later.157 However, the plan was shelved immediately after the breakdown in Soviet- 
Yugoslav relations in 1948 and, from then on, Sofia’s relations with the SFRY were 
mainly determined by the ebbs and flows of Soviet-Yugoslav relations.158
On the other hand, there were occasions when Soviet political control over Bulgarian 
foreign policy making was looser, either because the Soviet authorities wished to 
provide the states of the communist bloc with enough scope to follow their own 
foreign policies in areas where Soviet interests were not at stake or because Moscow 
was engaged in domestic and foreign policy issues which distracted Soviet attention 
from Sofia’s Balkan policies. Whatever the case, when Soviet control loosened, the 
Bulgarian communist regime often appeared to have become more keen to engage in 
regional bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Yet, Bulgaria’s participation in these 
initiatives by no means signalled or involved any political distancing from Moscow.
156 According to the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913, which put an end to the Second Balkan War, 
the Balkan region which constituted part of the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia was mainly divided 
between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria took almost 10% of the region, known as Pirin 
Macedonia. Greece got control o f approximately 52% of the region, which remains known as Aegean 
Macedonia. Finally, Serbia acquired around 30%, known as Vardar Macedonia. The remaining 8% 
became part of the new Albanian state. See Jelavich, Vol.2, 1983, pp. 79-105; Grigorova, 1985, 171- 
239.
157 Crampton, 1997, p. 194; Braun, 1983, pp. 32-9; Grigorova, 1985, 171-239.
158 Crampton, 1997, p. 194; Braun, 219-224; Grigorova, 1985, pp. 250-7.
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Two cases exemplify Sofia’s foreign policy autonomy towards the Balkan region. The 
first occurred during the period which followed the fall of Khrushchev. The power 
struggle inside the Kremlin which preceded and followed Khrushchev’s fall spurred 
the Bulgarian communist regime towards more ‘individual’ diplomatic action in the 
Balkan region, which led Sofia to improve # its strained bilateral relations with 
neighbours such as Greece, Romania and Turkey.159 The second case occurred in the 
1980s and is analysed below.
Efforts at Multilateral Cooperation
Since the emergence of the modem Balkan states, alongside fragmentation there have 
also been efforts towards multilateral cooperation. For a long time, these revolved 
around the idea of building a federal state which would include all the Balkan 
nationalities. Prior to the First World War, such an idea was primarily expressed by 
revolutionaries, who enjoyed a marginal position within Balkan societies and had 
little impact on the foreign policy agendas of Balkan governments.160 It was only after 
the First World War that the idea gained the support of movements with mass 
followings, primarily socialists, agrarians and liberals. For the socialists, federation 
was seen as the end result of a process of social transformation of Balkan societies.161 
For agrarians, the Balkan states should unite themselves into a federal union in order 
to avoid being economically exploited by industrialized European states.162 Finally,
159 Brown, 1970, pp. 269-283; Grigorova, 1985, 310-328, 373-406; Iahiel, 1997, pp. 167-8; 168-9.
160 Stavrianos, 1964, pp. 84-195.
161 Ibid, pp. 196-206; Braun, 1983, pp. 32-33.
162 Stavrianos, 1964, pp. 206-223; Braun, 1983, pp. 47-48.
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liberals supported the idea of Balkan federation as a means of maintaining peace 
rather than as a means of economic and socialist transformation of the region.163
After WWII, the idea of a Balkan federation came to be most keenly advanced by the 
communists, whose influence in the region increased because they took power in 
many states. Until the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslavian split the communist movement 
enjoyed homogeneity under Soviet tutelage and nurtured a belief in universalism, 
which in turn reflected on the proposed federal schemes.164 These schemes favoured 
the establishment of a federation in the area under communist government as a first 
step on the road to worldwide revolution.
The period following the Soviet-Yugoslav split left no space for federal schemes, 
because the universalistic spirit, which was supposed to infuse such plans fell victim 
to the power of nationalism, which now came to influence doctrinal development. 
Albania and Romania refused to recognize the ideological hegemony of the Soviet 
Union in the 1960s and Bulgaria, being the most faithful ally of the Soviet Union, 
buried post-war federal schemes, because they had lost favour with Moscow.165 There 
were some voices, such as Ceau§escu’s call in the 1980s for the establishment of a 
zone of peace and cooperation in the Balkans. However, the core idea behind such 
schemes was not the creation of a Balkan federation, but the elimination of Cold W ar 
antagonism in the region through cooperation among Balkan states, either on a 
specific or a range of issues. Nevertheless, the Cold War climate and entrenchment of 
communist nationalism in the region after the Soviet-Yugoslavian split boosted
163 Stavrianos, 1964, pp. 224-258.
164 Braun, 1983, pp. 32-3.
165 Grigorova, 1985, pp. 250-7.
58
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
regional cleavages, thus rendering most of these schemes inactive and regional 
cooperation extended little beyond bilateralism.
The beginning of detente during the 1970s set the necessary preconditions for regional 
multilateral cooperation to make headway. Immediately after the Helsinki Summit in 
1975 the Greek Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, proposed a scheme for 
multilateral cooperation influenced by neo-functionalist ideas.166 According to 
Karamanlis’ scheme, successful regional cooperation could be achieved through a 
step-by-step rapprochement of Balkan states, starting from low politics issues, such as 
communications, transport, trade and tourism, later moving on to include high 
politics. In 1976 Karamanlis made the first step towards the implementation of his 
scheme by convening a Balkan conference in Athens, in which all states except 
Albania participated and signed 154 proposals on low politics issues.167 Beyond the 
promising expectations that such a meeting caused there were problems that 
prevented a repetition of a similar meeting before the end of the 1980s. The most 
serious of those problems was Bulgaria which, in line with the Soviet position on the 
matter, did not favour further multilateral cooperation. Moscow feared that such 
cooperation would weaken its ability to control Bulgarian politics effectively and thus 
challenge its interests in the Balkan region.168
At the beginning of the 1980s Sofia started to review its negative stance regarding 
multilateralism in the Balkan region. In November 1981 Zhivkov put forward a 
political project aimed at rendering the Balkans a nuclear-free zone. Zhivkov’s project
166 Veremis, 1995, p.35; Svolopoulos, 1987, pp. 74-9; Constantine Karamanlis Archeio, Volume 8, 
pp.499-501; about neo-functionalism and its influence on Karamanlis’ scheme see Braun, 1983, pp. 48- 
51.
167 Braun, 1983, pp. 51-3.
168 Ibid, p. 53.
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was similar to an old Romanian scheme propounded by the Romanian Prime Minister 
Chivu Stoica in 1957. This had had the similar intention of rendering the Balkans a 
nuclear free zone, but had been generally rejected as a Soviet-inspired plan.169 What is 
interesting with reference to the Bulgarian project of 1981 is that its implementation 
necessitated the conduct of multilateral meetings and the conclusion of agreements 
between the Balkan states, both of which had not found favour with Sofia until that 
time. The Bulgarian communist authorities had previously feared that fostering 
political and economic cooperation in the Balkan region would distance Sofia from 
Moscow’s political and economic influence and thus would undermine close 
Bulgarian-Soviet relations, together with all the political and economic privileges, 
such as Soviet economic subsidies in the form of cheap oil and gas, which these 
relations entailed for Bulgaria. The question that needs to be raised at this point is 
what led Sofia to review its stance towards regional multilateral cooperation?
The Bulgarian project of 1981 was launched a few days after a meeting between 
Zhivkov, and his Soviet counter-part, Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea. The exact 
content of that meeting’s talks is not known, but it is believed that, as in the case of 
the Romanian scheme of 1957, the Bulgarian project of 1981 was first conceived by 
the Soviets and was then launched by the Bulgarian communist authorities.170 After 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow sought ways to distract the attention of 
the international community from its invasion and reassure the W est that it might 
signal an escalation of Soviet military activities in the Third World. Initiatives such as 
the Bulgarian proposal for a Balkan nuclear free zone were thus designed to cajole the 
West, which, after the change of both the American administration, with the
169 RFE Bulgarian SR/14 23-11-1981, item 1; BMFA, I-100-58-2-3//154-P-58-1 (1981);
170 RFE Bulgarian SR/1, 16-1-1984, item 5; BMFA, I-100-64-22//01-04-10 (1981).
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Republicans coming to power in 1981, and the British government with the 
Conservatives winning the general elections in 1979, showed it was prepared to 
escalate the inter-bloc conflict as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
through launching military projects such as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), a 
space based, computer controlled defence system that would intercept nuclear 
missiles before they reached their targets.171
The political landscape in the Balkan region seemed to favour the promotion of the 
Bulgarian project. In October 1981, a month before it was put forward, the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) under the leadership of Andreas 
Papandreou had taken power in Greece. PASOK came to power with an extremely 
radical political agenda which pledged to remove Greece from both NATO and the 
EEC. The country would thus be rendered a non-aligned state patterned on the 
Yugoslav model. In addition, the Bulgarian project was also fully in tune with the 
long-term objectives of both Yugoslav and Romanian foreign policy which sought to 
reduce the military presence of both superpowers in the Balkan region. If the 
Bulgarian project were accepted by Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian 
communist authorities believed that sufficient political momentum would be gained to 
lead Albania and Turkey to accept it as well. Correctly, Bulgaria expected Tirana and 
Ankara to be most sceptical on to whether its project was a genuine political initiative 
or if it was part of a political plan whose long-term goal would be to promote the 
Soviet interests in the region.
171 Lefebvre, 1995, pp. 306-7.
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The Bulgarian project of 1981 was received by the Balkan states as the Bulgarian 
communist authorities had expected it to be received. Albania, consistent with its 
policy towards multilateral cooperation, refused any participation.172 Turkey, which 
along with Greece was the only Balkan state that admitted to having nuclear weapons 
on its soil, rejected the Bulgarian plan as a Soviet-inspired ploy to oust NATO nuclear 
weapons from the region. Because of its policy of non-alignment, which favoured the 
disengagement of both superpowers from regional affairs, Yugoslavia supported the 
idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone. However, according to Yugoslavia, in order 
for the Balkans to become a real nuclear-free zone, the project should also include the 
nuclear weapons of the Soviet bases on the Black Sea coast, whose range include the 
entire peninsula.173
Only Romania and Greece responded positively to the Bulgarian project. Romania, in 
line with its foreign policy of autonomy from the Soviet Union had been keen on 
establishing a Balkan zone free from the influence of both superpowers. The socialist 
government of Greece, although fully aware that the objections to the project rendered 
it unfeasible, tried to exploit the Bulgarian initiative so as to invigorate a leftist profile 
and to counter criticism within PASOK over its failure to keep its pre-electoral 
pledges to take Greece out of NATO and the EEC.174 Papandreou invited all the 
Balkan leaders to participate in a meeting in Athens in early 1984 and all except 
Hoxha attended but with no real results.175 In the joint communique issued at the end, 
it was stated that the participants agreed to submit the ideas proposed during the 
meeting to their governments with a view to continuing the dialogue in the future but
172 Biberaj, 1990, p. 92; Hoxha, 1985, pp.406-7; RFE Bulgarian SR/1, 16-1-1984, item 5.
173 Gligorova, 1984, pp. 27-8; RFE Bulgarian SR/1, 16-1-1984, p.16.
174 Loulis, 1984, pp. 375-91.
175 BMFA, I-100-18-15//05-15-2 Athens.
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there is little sign this occurred.176After the Athens meeting, Bulgaria made a final 
effort to promote its project during the talks for signing a regional ecological pact held 
in Varna in 1986 but without any success due to strong Turkish objections.177
The unsuccessful outcome of the Bulgarian project of November 1981 did not mark 
an end to regional initiatives aimed at promoting both political and economic 
cooperation in the Balkans. Neither did it put an end to the Bulgarian communist 
authorities’ will to participate in these initiatives in future. Thus, after lengthy 
diplomatic manoeuvres, in February 1988 a conference of Balkan foreign ministers 
convened to Belgrade to discuss a wide range of low politics matters, covering 
economics, transport, cultural, scientific and environmental issues. There seemed to 
be a unique opportunity for a multilateral breakthrough. The Reagan-Gorbachev 
agreement on nuclear arms limitation improved East-West relations and there were 
signs of resolution to long standing bilateral disputes.178 In 1987, Greece had put an 
end to its technical state of war with Albania and after the 1987 Greco-Turkish 
dispute over the status of the Aegean Sea, Greece and Turkey had started negotiations 
in Davos, Switzerland, in 1988 aimed at resolving outstanding bilateral issues.179 At 
the same time, Albania had reached an agreement with Yugoslavia over re­
establishing cultural relations which had been broken after the riots in Kosovo in 
1981.180
The Belgrade conference of 1988 was the only regional multilateral initiative after 
WWII in which all the Balkan states participated, including Albania which until then
176 RFE Bulgarian SR/1, 16-1-1984, item 5.
177 RFE Bulgarian SR/3, 8-3-1988, item 1.
178 Bell, 2001, pp. 361-369.
179 Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1994, pp. 158-161.
180 RFE Bulgarian SR/7, 29-7-1988, p 14ff.
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had abstained from all such gatherings.181 Bulgaria’s participation in the conference 
can be explained by the country’s need to expand its export markets due to the 
economic problems which it faced after the mid-1980s and by the new leeway that the 
Soviet policy of NPT gave to the country’s foreign policy.182 The communist 
authorities also viewed the Belgrade Conference as an opportunity to break the 
international isolation resulting from the country’s policy towards its Muslim 
minority.
Despite the hopes for a multilateral breakthrough raised by the Belgrade Conference, 
any expectations were swept away by Yugoslav ethnic rivalries and the transformed 
international environment after the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern 
Europe. The second meeting of Balkan foreign ministers held in Tirana in 1990 was 
dominated by discussions about the Yugoslav wars. In contrast to the conference in 
Belgrade, the Balkan states did not now seek to promote cooperation on common 
economic and political areas, but ways of solving conflicts and bringing the area back 
to a peaceful multicultural symbiosis.
The various attempts at establishing multilateral cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s 
had all floundered. The principal reason for this lies in the divisions in the region, 
both those engendered by the Cold War and those more long-standing. Consolidation 
of inter-Balkan cooperation on a more solid basis could not but involve cooperation 
on military matters because most of the perceived threats in the area were in this field- 
something which was unthinkable, especially in periods of high tension between the 
two blocs. However, even in periods of detente multilateral efforts reached only a
181 RFE Background Report (Albania) / 192, 21-10-1987.
182 Dawisha, 1989, p. 528; Bradant et al, 1989, p.497-500.
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certain point, due to disputes over minority and territorial issues, which accentuated 
bilateral differences. Albanian-Yugoslav tensions over the Albanians of Kosovo and 
Macedonia, the Bulgarian-Turkish disputes over the Bulgarian Turks and the Greco- 
Turkish disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean serve only as a few such examples.
Bilateral Relations
In most cases, Bulgaria’s bilateral relations with the states of the Balkan region during 
the 1980s present a remarkable change in comparison with the past. In order to 
explain this, it is necessary to look at the factors affecting these relations, which can 
be systematized in four areas. These are: (a) environmental issues; (b) nationalism; (c) 
territorial issues; and (d) economic issues, with particular reference to bilateral trade 
and investment.
a. Environmental Issues
The term ‘environmental issues’ refers to those regional and international issues 
which affected intra-bloc relations. On some occasions, these issues came to 
determine Bulgarian relations with its Balkan neighbours for the following reasons. 
Firstly, environmental issues were always at the centre of the USSR’s attention and in 
some cases, this led Moscow to tighten its control over Bulgaria’s foreign policy in 
order to make sure it loyally followed its line. Secondly, due to the close political and 
economic relations between Moscow and Sofia throughout the Cold War, Bulgaria 
was often viewed with suspicion by other Balkan states and thus the Soviet policy on
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a number of environmental issues often determined the Balkan states’ will to promote 
bilateral relations with Sofia.
The two Balkan states whose relations with Bulgaria were particularly affected by 
environmental issues throughout the 1980s were Albania and Yugoslavia. In the case 
of Bulgarian-Albanian relations, it could be argued that they imitated Albanian-Soviet 
relations. Sofia’s relations with Tirana were frozen after the rift in Soviet-Albanian 
relations in the 1960s and were officially terminated when Albania withdrew from the 
Warsaw Pact after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.183 From then on 
bilateral relations remained cool, both sides often engaged in bitter polemics, and only 
after Gorbachev’s accession to power did they enter a new phase with Tirana relaxing 
its rigid political stance towards the Warsaw Pact countries, including Bulgaria.184
Environmental issues also influenced Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations, especially as 
regards Macedonia. At the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
led to a decline in Belgrade-Moscow relations and this gave Bulgaria an opportunity 
to raise again the Macedonian issue.185 However, problems resulting from its policy of 
assimilating the Muslim minority led the Bulgarian authorities to adopt a more 
conciliatory tone. During an exchange of official visits by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian 
Prime Ministers in 1984 and 1985, the Bulgarians put forward plans for encouraging 
cross-border trade and an agreement to control information on the issue that the mass 
media were broadcasting to the public on both sides.186
183 Griffith, 1963; Marmullaku, 1975, p. 127; Grigorova, 1985, pp. 295-309
184 RFE Background Report/207, 14-10-1988, pp. 1-3.
185 Braun, 1983, p.223.
186 RFE Bulgarian SR/10, 14-8-1984, pp. 1-4; RFE Bulgarian SR/13, 17-12-1985, item 1; Palmer & 
King, 1971.
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b. Nationalism
According to William Bloom, when governments feel insecure about their ability to 
keep political control, they sometimes use nationalist propaganda to rally support.187 
This was especially true of the Bulgarian government during the 1980s. Sofia faced 
harsh economic realities, which caused social unrest and eroded the communist 
regime’s legitimacy. Coercion alone can compensate for declining legitimacy, but as 
G. Schopfin remarks “ ...any regime, no matter how repressive, needs some sort of 
wider goal which may be future-oriented but it needs also to refer to the past”.188 In 
the 1980s, the Bulgarian communist regime exploited nationalism.189
Since the late 1960s, nationalism, along with the policy of consumerism, had been one 
of the strategies used by the Bulgarian communist authorities to enhance its 
legitimacy, which had been eroded by the tough domestic political measures 
introduced following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.190 However, since the 
Bulgarian economy was not sufficiently developed to sustain a policy of 
consumerism, nationalism became increasingly important as an instrument for 
maintaining legitimacy.
The fact that Sofia was closely aligned with Moscow meant that expressions of 
nationalism were highly dependent on the will of the Soviet authorities. In the 1980s 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and accumulated problems in the Soviet economy 
monopolized Moscow’s political attention, providing the space for a greater
187 Bloom, 1990, p. 79-81.
188 Schopflin, 1993, p. 191.
189 Ibid, pp. 193-5.
190 Crampton, 1997, pp. 202-3.
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expression of Bulgarian nationalism. This was seen in cultural events, such as the
celebration of the 1300th anniversary of the founding of the first Bulgarian state.191 In
addition, as will be discussed below, nationalism was expressed in the form of
policies discriminating against ethnic minorities, for instance the Bulgarian Turks, and
engagement in bitter polemics with neighbouring countries such as Yugoslavia over
«
the Macedonian issue.192
1. Bulgarian Turks
Since the creation of the modem Bulgarian state, the Bulgarian Turks have often been 
an issue colouring Sofia’s relations with both the Ottoman Empire and modem 
Turkey. The Bulgarian Turks generally live in close communities in the Arda river 
basin in South Bulgaria, and in the region of Dobrudzha in the North. They are 
generally believed to have inhabited these areas since the 14th century, when Turkish 
ethnic groups began to settle in the Balkan region.193
The importance of the Bulgarian language and the practice of the Christian Orthodox 
religion as fundamental elements of Bulgarian national identity, has led the state to 
often treat its Turks as second-class citizens,194 because most were practising 
Muslims, used Turkish as their mother tongue, and often were unable to communicate 
in the Bulgarian language. On many occasions, the state authorities took such 
measures as the closure of Turkish schools and demolition of mosques, with the hope 
that by discouraging these people from speaking their mother tongue and practising
191 RFE Bulgarian/14, 23-10-1981, items 1&2; Crampton, 1997, p. 204.
192 See below.
193 Appendix, maps 7&8; Poulton, 1991, p. 119; Simsir, 1988, pp. 1-3; Sahin et al., 1990; Yasar, 1986.
194 Eminov, 1997, pp. 4-18, 24-51; Simsir, 1988, pp. 13-129; Karpat, 1990; Tuncoku, 1990; Crampton, 
1990.
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their religion in public, they would foster their assimilation into the ethnic majority. 
However, such measures proved counterproductive, and many Bulgarian Turks 
migrated to Turkey, where they believed their cultural rights would be respected. 
These measures also brought Bulgaria into conflict with Turkey, which viewed these 
people as a kin ethnic group, and defended their human and minority rights inside 
Bulgaria.
After the end of the WWII, the communist regime took a series of measures aimed at 
preserving the distinct ethnic identity of the Bulgarian Turks. The regime wished to be 
seen to be introducing policies that were more tolerant of this minority than those of 
the previous ‘bourgeois governments’. Thus, on coming to power, the new regime 
allowed the circulation of Turkish language newspapers and magazines, gave 
authorization for the creation of Turkish schools, and opened a department for 
Turkish language and literature at the University of Sofia.195
However, this situation did not continue. The BCP feared that the existence of a 
Turkish minority inside Bulgaria served Turkey’s and the Western bloc’s long-term 
interests in the Balkan region and that it would give Ankara the right to intervene in 
Bulgarian politics under the pretext of defending the minority rights of a kin ethnic 
group.196 In addition, Sofia’s communist authorities feared that any measures aimed at 
fostering a community spirit among the members of the Turkish minority would 
provide fertile ground for secessionist political and military movements to erupt, 
which could challenge the territorial integrity of the state. For all these reasons, on 4 
October 1958, the plenum of the BCP Central Committee decided to merge Turkish
195 Poulton, 1991, p. 120.
196 It should be noted at this point that both Greece and Turkey became full NATO member states in 
1952.
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and Bulgarian schools, and by the early 1970s the teaching of Turkish in schools had
been discontinued.197 The department of Turkish language and literature in Sofia
University, which reportedly attracted large numbers of students most of whom were
ethnic Turks, also stopped admitting students. These measures soured Bulgaria’s
relations with Ankara and caused unrest among the members of the Turkish minority
%
who started emigrating to Turkey. Emigration was regulated under the terms of two 
agreements which Sofia had concluded with Ankara; the first of which was signed in 
1950 and the second in 1968.198
One measure that seriously affected Bulgarian-Turkish relations in the 1980s was 
euphemistically termed by the Bulgarian communist regime Vuzroditelmia Protses 
(Regenerative Process). It arose in 1984 with the aim of assimilating the 
approximately one million ethnic Turks living in Bulgaria by forcing them to change 
their Turkish names to Slavic ones. The idea was conceived by Zhivkov and his
political entourage, and is believed to be the last resort of the communist regime
following the failure of earlier political strategies to integrate Bulgaria’s large Muslim 
minority into a ‘united Bulgarian socialist nation’.199 The timing of the launch of this 
‘process’ was determined as much by the domestic need to boost the legitimacy of the 
regime as by international factors, which the BCP saw as being opportune. The Soviet 
Union was powerful enough to protect Bulgaria from international reaction, but 
incapable of enforcing it to follow more tolerant policies towards the Muslim minority 
due to the prolonged illness of the then Soviet leader, Konstantin Chernenko, which 
had diverted Soviet attention from the domestic politics of its satellites.200
197 Simsir, 1988, pp. 198-206; Eminov, 1997, pp. 128-138;
198 Simsir, 1988, pp. 167-181, 245-264; Grigorova, 1985, pp. 372-3.
199 RFE Bulgarian SR/5, 28-3-1985, item 1; RFE Bulgarian SR/3, 27-3-1986, item 7; Hoepken, 1997.
200 Dimitrov, 2001b, p. 11.
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The Regenerative Process seriously harmed Bulgaria’s economic and diplomatic 
relations with Turkey, and reduced Bulgaria’s standing throughout the world, 
including Moscow when Gorbachev came to power.201 In an effort to put pressure on 
the Bulgarian regime, the Turkish government cut back its already minimal bilateral 
trade, with imports from Bulgaria falling by 31.6% and exports by 68.9%, and put 
forward plans to free its traffic from reliance on the overland route through Bulgarian 
territory by seeking to establish ferry links with Romania and Italy.202 In addition, 
Turkey launched a campaign to isolate Zhivkov’s regime internationally by lobbying 
international organisations, such as the UN and the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), which gave it unconditional support.
In response to the Turkish political initiatives, the Bulgarian regime pursued a two­
fold policy. First, the Bulgarian leadership sought to prevent Turkey from undertaking 
any military action against Bulgaria and to this end Sofia forged a temporary military 
alliance with Greece with the signing in 1986 of the Declaration of Friendship and 
Good Neighbourliness, which obliged both states to confer in the event of 
emergencies. The signing of this was seen by Turkey as being aimed at them, 
suspicions that became stronger when, at the height of a Greek-Turkish dispute over 
the legal status of the Aegean Sea, Greece tried to secure Bulgaria’s support in the 
event of a Greco-Turkish war.203 Second, in order to appease international and Soviet 
interests, the Bulgarian government gave signs of concession regarding the 
assimilation campaign, and signed a protocol with Turkey obliging both sides to 
promote relations of Good Neighbourliness and Friendship by creating a mixed
201 Helsinki Watch Committee, 1986; Crampton, 1997, pp. 210-13.
202 RFE Bulgarian SR/7, 6-8-1986, item 4; RFE Bulgarian SR/8 29-6-1985, item 3.
203 RFE Bulgarian SR/7, 29-7-1988, p. 15; Ashley, 1989, p. 141.
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commission to work for full normalization of bilateral relations. In fact, this protocol 
had no real results because the Bulgarian regime did not really want to put an end to 
the campaign.204
The Regenerative Process was to fatally undermine Zhivkov’s regime. By the end of 
the 1980s, the Turkish minority areas were in a state of virtual revolt and it seemed 
that the Bulgarian leadership had lost control of the situation. In 1989, in an effort to 
curb the turmoil, Zhivkov opened the borders to those minority members who 
preferred to emmigrate to Turkey, a gesture to which about 300,000 Bulgarian 
Muslims responded.205 Turkey, unable to absorb such huge numbers of refugees, 
retaliated by closing its borders, which resulted in a further deterioration of already 
strained Bulgarian-Turkish relations. Faced with an intolerable situation Moscow 
offered its backing to a palace coup led by prominent BCP members, which ousted 
Zhivkov from power.206
2. Bulgarian Macedonians207
Bulgarian Macedonians are a national minority whose lives have been closely 
interwoven with Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations. In contrast to the case of the Bulgarian 
Turks, whose welfare determined Bulgaria’s relations with Turkey, it was the welfare 
of the Bulgarian Macedonians that was affected by Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations.
Z04 RFE Bulgarian SR/7, 29-7-1988, p. 15.
205 The Times, 26-6-1989, p. l lg ;  The New York Times, 30-8-1989, p. 4:3; Crampton, 1997, p. 215; 
Anagnostou, 1999, pp. 250-253.
206 Levesque, 1997, pp. 170-6; Dimitrov, 2001b, p. 18.
207 Bulgarian Macedonians are a Slavic ethnic group that lives mainly in the Pirin region o f South­
western Bulgaria.
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There is no agreement on the exact number of ethnic Macedonians living in Bulgaria. 
Yugoslav academic and political sources claim their numbers to be some 252,908 
people.208 These claims are based on the results of an official census conducted by the 
Bulgarian state in 1946. However, this census was conducted in a period that was 
favourable to Bulgarian Macedonians as a result of the then Bulgarian communist 
leader, Georgi Dimitrov, being of Macedonian origin, both his parents originating 
from the region known today as FYROM. The BCP recognized the existence of a 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and encouraged cross-border economic and cultural 
contacts between the Macedonians living in the Bulgarian region of Pirin and the 
citizens of the SRM in the SFRY. In addition, with Moscow’s encouragement, 
Bulgaria was at that time prepared to promote a customs union with the SFRY and 
forge a series of other measures aimed at simplifying passport formalities and 
facilitating border crossing procedures with the SFRY with the view to creating a 
federal Balkan state, which would first include the SFRY, Bulgaria and Albania and 
eventually extend to include Greece and Romania.
However, the plan to create a federal Balkan state was abandoned after the rift in 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1948, which led the communist authorities in Sofia to 
change their views regarding the existence of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. 
Indeed, the official position of the BCP was that there was no Macedonian nation in 
the Balkan region and the people who called themselves Macedonians were in fact 
ethnic Bulgarians. Furthermore, the communist regime took a series of administrative 
measures aimed at discouraging any open manifestation of Macedonian ethnic 
identity among the so-called Bulgarian Macedonians. Thus, when renewing the
208 Poulton, 1991, pp. 107-8.
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compulsory personal identity cards in 1960, the Bulgarian authorities re-classified all 
those originally registered as Macedonians, as ethnic Bulgarians. A series of political 
trials were held where Bulgarian Macedonians were accused of undermining state 
sovereignty and, with the adoption of the criminal law of 1968, the largest number 
ever of those accused of propaganda, antidemocratic and nationalist ideology were 
tried under articles 108 and 109 for agitation and propaganda against the state. As a 
result of these measures, the number of people who officially defined themselves as 
Macedonians was severely reduced. The national census of 1956 showed 
approximately 187,789 people registered as Macedonians, a number which fell to 
8,750 in the national census of 1965.209 After 1965, the communist authorities of Sofia 
stopped recording the numbers of Bulgarian Macedonians in national censuses.210
In refusing to recognize the existence of either a Macedonian nation in the Balkans, or 
a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian communist regime had adopted a 
policy which was to fester in Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations after 1948. This was one 
of the main impediments to Sofia fostering sound political and economic relations 
with Belgrade. On numerous occasions, the issue was also used by Zhivkov’s regime 
to distract public attention from Bulgaria’s economic problems.
A number of events gave rise to bitter polemics between the communist authorities, 
the academic communities and the press of the two states.211 In January 1979, for 
example, Tsola Dragoitseva, a Bulgarian Politburo member, published her memoirs, 
in which she explicitly stated that the Slavic population of the SRM were ethnic 
Bulgarians and not Macedonians as they claimed, while, in 1983, the Bulgarian army
209 Ibid.
210 Ortakovski, 2000, pp. 165-6.
211 Maxwell, 1985, pp. 251-2.
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celebrated the 80th anniversary of the Ilinden uprising, an event which the 
historiography of the Macedonians of Yugoslavia treat as part of their national 
history.212 There were political attempts to reach a compromise about the existence of 
Bulgarian Macedonians in Bulgaria. In November 1980, for example, the Yugoslav 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Josip Vrohvec, paid an official visit to Sofia during 
which this issue was discussed without any agreement being reached.213 In July 1984, 
the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milka Planic, also paid an official visit to Bulgaria, the 
first since the end of WWII.214 During talks with Bulgarian officials, Planic attempted 
to persuade Bulgaria to recognize the existence of a Macedonian minority in its state 
by referring to the approximately 30,000 Bulgarians living in the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia, close to the Bulgarian-Yugoslav borders, to whom the Yugoslav communist 
authorities had granted minority status. However, the results of these discussions were 
negligible. Zhivkov’s regime continued to hold the view that there were no 
Macedonians in the Balkans and that all those who claimed to be Macedonians were 
ethnic Bulgarians, thus undermining any real prospect of improvement in Yugoslav- 
Bulgarian relations.215
c.Territorial Issues
Prior to WWII, Bulgaria had nurtured territorial claims against its Balkan neighbours 
and, as a consequence, territorial issues often determined Bulgaria’s bilateral relations 
with neighbouring Balkan states. Although similar issues were affecting the bilateral
212 RFE Background Report/26 (Bulgaria), 31-1-1979;RFE Background Report/297 (Bulgaria), 31-12- 
1983, p. 5-6; RFE Bulgaria/5, 18-4-1983; RFE Bulgaria/3, 20-2-1981, item 1; RFE Background 
Report/49 (Bulgaria), 3-6-1985.
213 RFE Background Report/282 (Bulgaria), 25-11-1980.
214 RFE, Bulgaria/10, 14-8-1984.
215 BMFA, Kui/3/80/n.27, No. 55-80-82 (1988).
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relations of many states in the Balkan region at that time, with the exception of the 
First Balkan War, Bulgaria was on the losing side in all the wars in which it 
participated during the first half of the 20th century, and lost many of the territories in 
the geographic regions of Macedonia and Thrace which had originally constituted part 
of the Medieval Bulgarian Kingdoms of the Bulgarian Kings (Tsars) Samuel and 
Simeon. These kingdoms were inhabited by large Slavic ethnic groups in modem 
times and, thus, were viewed by the Bulgarian political elite as being Bulgarian. As a 
result of these losses, there was a feeling among the Bulgarian political elite that, in 
territorial terms, Bulgaria had been treated unfairly by most of the treaties which 
determined the territorial status quo of the Balkans.
During WWII, Bulgaria increased its territorial holdings. The first territorial gains 
since the First Balkan W ar came in September 1940 as a result of Soviet-German 
cooperation. Following German conquests in Scandinavia and France, Stalin 
demanded compensation in the East, which was made at the expense of Romania. In 
the treaty of Craiova signed on 7 September 1940, Romania was forced to offer 
Southern Dobrudzha to Bulgaria.216 In addition, after the German invasion of Greece 
and Yugoslavia in April 1941, Sofia was given political control of several large 
territories in Greece and Yugoslavia, including western Thrace, the islands of 
Samothrace and Thassos, and Serbian Macedonia, but not full ownership, thereby 
denying it from taking full territorial control and leaving the German Axis.217 After the 
end of the War, Sofia lost these Greek and Yugoslav areas, but retained control of 
Southern Dobrudzha.
216 Crampton, 1997, pp. 169-170; Cornea, 1940.
2,7 Ibid., pp. 171-2.
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After WWII, territorial issues did not seem to have the same influence over Sofia’s 
relations with neighbouring Balkan states and throughout the period of the Cold War 
Bulgaria made no attempts to make territorial claims. With its signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act in 1975, Sofia committed to accepting the post-War territorial status quo of 
the region.218
There are cases where it could be argued that Sofia’s communist regime had not 
abandoned its long held territorial claims. For example, for most of the Cold War 
period, it refused to recognize the existence of a Macedonian nation in the Balkans 
and did not cope well with the newly created SRM as a constituent republic of the 
SFRY after WWII. Apart from its negative attitude vis-a-vis the Macedonian issue, a 
series of cultural events was initiated in the 1970s with-the aim of orientating the 
cultural historical inheritance of Modem Bulgarians to the ancient Thracians, whom 
Greek national historiography claims were the Modem Greeks’ ancestors. In addition, 
in March 1987 when Greece was on the brink of war with Turkey, the Greek Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Karolos Papoulias, paid a visit to Sofia and asked for military 
assistance in the event of a Greco-Turkish military conflict. The Bulgarian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Petur Mladenov, agreed to offer such assistance to Greece, provided 
that Athens recognized article 48 of the Neuilly-sur-Seine treaty signed between 
Bulgaria and the winning states of the First World War in 1919. This article 
compensated for Bulgaria’s loss of western Thrace with guarantees of economic 
access to the Aegean Sea, which have never been realized since 1919-even after 
Mladenov’s demanding its recognition in return for assistance.
218 Bell, 2001, pp. 310-14.
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However, these cases should be seen more in the light of an attempt to distract the 
Bulgarian public from the country’s economic and political problems than a 
systematic diplomatic effort to redraw the territorial boundaries in the Balkans. In 
particular, Sofia’s refusal to recognize a distinct Macedonian nation aimed to deprive 
the Yugoslav authorities of the theoretical basis on which they claimed the existence 
of a Macedonian minority within Bulgaria. The recognition of such a minority was 
seen as possible encouragement to the appearance of secessionist movements in the 
region of Pirin, to challenge Bulgaria’s territorial integrity.
Mladenov’s willingness to offer military assistance to Greece, with its condition that 
Athens should implement article 48 of the Neuilly-sur-Seine treaty, should be viewed 
as a reaction, which, if it had been applied in practice, would have been seen as 
having a positive effect on the current fragile Bulgarian economy. It could also be 
argued that the Bulgarian Foreign M inister’s willingness to offer assistance was of no 
practical value since, as the then Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivan 
Ganev, maintained, the offer was made in the belief that war between Greece and 
Turkey would not be declared, because NATO would intervene to stop two member 
states from becoming engaged in a military conflict.219
The question at this point then is why did territorial issues during the Cold War period 
have less influence on Bulgaria’s relations with its Balkan neighbours compared to 
the period before WWII? There are several possible answers. Firstly, Sofia’s 
communist elites renounced pre-War Bulgarian territorial claims towards 
neighbouring Balkan states, because they did not wish to identify themselves with
219 Ganev, Ivan, personal interview, 25/1/2002.
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what they viewed as a political means used by pre-war ‘bourgeois’ elites to rally 
public support and remain in power. Secondly, the fulfilment of these claims was 
impossible during the Cold War because it presupposed an autonomous foreign 
policy, which Sofia lacked as a result of its close alliance with Moscow. Even had 
Bulgaria enjoyed autonomy, engagement in policies which sought to revise the 
territorial status quo of the Balkan region was a political and military task which Sofia 
could not sustain without Moscow’s active diplomatic, economic and military 
support. According to Zhivkov, even with this support, Bulgaria was incapable of 
resisting a land attack by NATO forces spearheaded by the Turkish army.220 Warsaw 
Pact military exercises throughout the Cold W ar period indicated that the USSR’s 
closest ally in the Balkans would have to depend on its own military capabilities for at 
least ten days before Soviet military aid arrived, something which was far beyond 
Bulgaria’s military abilities.221
d. Economic Issues
In the immediate post-war period, the foreign relations of the Balkan states were 
influenced by political more than by economic criteria. The fact that all these states 
emerged from the WWII with their economies wrecked favoured excessive political 
control over these economies, which in turn prevented the development of an 
autonomous economic sector able to influence foreign policy making. This was 
especially true in the case of Bulgaria, where the establishment of a communist 
political system submerged every economic activity under the tutelage of the BCP.
220 Zhivkov, 1993, pp. 150-1.
221 Ibid.
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Economics progressively came to play a major role in Sofia’s foreign policy after the 
mid-1970s. This was not because the BCP lessened its political control over the 
country’s economy or because an autonomous economic sector emerged. Rather, 
economic problems, such as increased foreign debts, eroded the legitimacy of the 
communist regime and necessitated a reorientatiop of Bulgaria’s foreign policy on a 
more pragmatic basis. This reorientation meant that Sofia had to turn westwards and 
to the immediate Balkan region to find hard currency in order to renew industrial 
technology, thus revitalizing productivity and economic growth. Although economic 
pragmatism after the mid-1970s was not immune to the political climate, the state of 
the Bulgarian economy came to determine the country’s Balkan policies.
In its search for hard currency, Bulgaria turned to the Greek and Turkish markets, 
where its industrial products had a comparative advantage because they were priced 
lower than Western industrial goods.222 However, external constraints limited speedy 
development of trade relations with both NATO states. In the case of Greece, entry to 
the European Community compelled Greece to trade more with Western European 
than with Comecon countries, especially with regard to the products that Bulgaria 
tended to be exporting.223 At the same time, Bulgaria could not absorb many of the 
agricultural products which Greece could not sell in the European market because it 
had a developed agricultural sector. Thus, bilateral trade with Greece did not develop, 
despite the good political and military relations of the two states.224 Total bilateral 
trade value was $7.18m at the beginning of the decade, and was $7.6m in 1988.225 In 
the case of Turkey, Bulgaria’s treatment of its Turkish minority had a serious impact
222 Gianaris, 1982, p. 147 and 153.
223 RFE Bulgarian SR/10, 6-11-1986, item 3; Gianaris, 1982, pp. 154-8.
224 Appendix, tables 1 &2.
225 EIU, No. 1, 1986, appendix 4; EIU, No. 4, 1989, appendix 4.
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on bilateral trade. During the first half of the decade, this trade, although modest, was 
increasing, with exports rising from $4.64m in 1981 to $10.70m in 1984, and imports 
growing from $0.82m in 1981 to about $2m in 1985.226 After the initiation of the 
Vuzroditelniia Protses, both exports and imports fell sharply, with the former being 
$0.8m and the latter $0.9m by the end of the decade.227
Despite these constraints on Bulgaria’s trade with Greece and Turkey, however, the 
large trade deficit with Western states during the second half of the decade compelled 
the Bulgarian regime to forge cooperation with its two Balkan neighbours by 
encouraging joint ventures as a way of attracting hard currency. One could cite joint 
ventures such as the collaboration between the Greek company Elleourgia Voriou 
Ellados and the Bulgarian firm Bulgarsko Pivo in the production of beer and non­
alcoholic drinks,228 or the joint ventures in 1986 between the Bulgarian, Greek and 
Turkish governments with the Soviet Union for the supply of 750,000m3 of Soviet 
natural gas through a pipeline crossing Bulgarian territory.229
Conclusion
There were discernible differences from the past in Bulgaria’s foreign policy making 
of the 1980s. Although its foreign policy mechanisms remained the same, the change 
of leadership in the USSR in the mid-1980s, harsh economic realities, and a changed 
international environment resulting from the demise of the Soviet empire favoured
226 EIU, No. 1, 1986, appendix 4; UN-YITS, 1983, Vol. 1, p. 180.
227 EIU, No. 4, 1989, appendix 4.
228 EIU, No. 3, 1988, p. 29.
229 EIU, No. 3, 1986, pp. 26-27.
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new foreign policies, which were in sharp contrast to the principles of socialist 
internationalism.
During this period, a power vacuum in Moscow following the death of the long- 
serving Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Noveipber 1982, along with the Soviet 
foreign policy of NPT, which was introduced after the Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power, gave Sofia leeway to seek some degree of autonomy for 
Bulgaria’s foreign policy. This was encouraged by the country’s harsh economic 
realities which were the result of state economic mismanagement and M oscow’s 
decision to restrict the USSR’s previously generous economic subsidies. As a result, 
the West and the immediate Balkan region gained in importance, while the Third 
World retained the same significance in Sofia’s foreign policy agenda as in the past. 
In the case of the Balkans in particular, this pragmatism was the foundation for 
increasing both bilateral relations and efforts at regional multilateral cooperation.
However, the economic realities did not determine a linear course in Bulgaria’s 
foreign policy agenda during the 1980s. A number of factors led the country to 
deviate from the immediate region and the West. In relation to the West, it was the 
presence of the USSR in the Balkan region, whose role, although diminishing, 
remained important to Sofia. Bulgaria’s full integration in the Soviet bloc, for 
instance, gave the Soviet Union a strong say in Sofia’s foreign policy, such as 
preventing Zhivkov from improving relations with the FRG in 1984. In terms of 
bilateral relations, this linear process was disturbed by nationalism, and the aggressive 
policies, such as the Vuzroditelniia Protses towards the Bulgarian Turks.
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Despite a relaxation in Bulgarian politics during the 1980s, the BCP continued by and 
large to control domestic political life, thus restricting the factors influencing foreign 
policy to its cadres. However, this relaxation established the ground for other factors 
to come into play in Bulgaria’s foreign policy: for example, ethnic minorities and 
political movements opposing the country’s communist regime from which a number 
of political parties emerged in the 1990s.
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Chapter II 
From a People’s to a Liberal Democracy
Introduction
The ‘palace coup’ of 10 November 1989 ended the BCP’s monopoly on power and 
introduced Bulgaria to democratization. During this period, a series of domestic 
political changes occurred which affected the country’s foreign policy. First, the 
process of democratization increased the number of actors in domestic politics. These 
included political parties, think-tanks and ethnic minority groups, many of which had 
their own foreign policy agendas. Second, the whole process of foreign policy making 
changed. In the communist past, foreign policy was decided within the party and 
implemented by the state; with the introduction of a multiparty political arena during 
democratization, foreign policy was decided by political parties in power and 
implemented by state institutions, while parliamentary political parties in opposition, 
public opinion, ethnic minorities and several social groups also played a role.
This chapter shows how Sofia’s foreign policy making since 1989 has been 
influenced by changes in the country’s domestic political scene, resulting from the 
collapse of communism. Two aspects of Bulgaria’s foreign policy making in the post­
communist period are analysed: a) how foreign policy mechanisms function; b) the 
factors influencing the formation of the foreign policy agendas of the domestic actors,
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including the political parties, public opinion, think-tanks and ethnic minority
230groups.
Foreign Policy Mechanisms
At its December 1990 plenum, the Central Committee of the BCP decided to repeal 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 1971 constitution,231 which had legitimised the leading role 
of the Party in foreign policy making. This decision opened debate over the 
mechanisms and processes of foreign policy making in the new democracy. The 
formal debate took place at the National Roundtable Talks. Based on its outcomes, in 
the 1990 constitution, the state institutions contributing to foreign policy making 
were: the Council of Ministers (government); the National Assembly; the President of 
the Republic; and the Constitutional Court.232
The Council of Ministers has the authority to conclude, ratify and renounce 
international treaties.233 The National Assembly has responsibility for declaring war 
and making peace, deciding on the dispatch of the Bulgarian armed forces abroad, the
230 Political elites in democratic states typically demonstrate their political power through official 
political channels such as political parties, the public, and policy making academic institutes, known as 
think-tanks. This chapter analyses the foreign policy agendas of the political elite and its official 
political channels of one particular state and time: post-1989 Bulgaria. The unofficial channels, such as 
organised economic groups and the mass media, are not dealt with here but this is not to say that their 
political influence in post-1989 Bulgaria was not important. However, organised economic groups in 
Bulgaria have rarely acted as lobby groups with clear foreign policy agendas; generally, their political 
agendas are driven by economic opportunities. Thus, whenever they felt that it would be economically 
advantageous for them, they would support policy decisions. Topenergy, which is analysed in the next 
chapter, is one such example where these lobby groups tried to influence the Bulgarian authorities’ 
decisions. The influence of the private sector in the mass media is weak with only the television 
channels - which are under state control - being allowed to broadcast nationwide during most of the 
post-1989 period. This left the media with little scope for developing a foreign policy agenda that 
deviated from that of the state authorities.
231 Melone, 1998, pp. 83-85.
232 Irena, Ilieva ‘The Mechanism for Making Foreign Policy Decisions’, FBIS-EEU-95-107, 5 June 
1995, pp. 4-9.
233 Article 106.
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stationing of foreign troops on Bulgarian territory, and the ratification or abrogation 
of international treaties.234 The President of the Republic concludes international 
treaties, ratifies changes to Bulgaria’s territorial borders and appoints or dismisses the 
heads of diplomatic missions abroad.235 Finally, the Constitutional Court rules on 
whether the above mentioned mechanisms are in line^with international treaties.236
Since the start of democratization, there have been no coordination problems over 
foreign policy between the government and the National Assembly for three reasons. 
Firstly, their domains of responsibility are different: government deals with the 
executive side of foreign policy while the National Assembly is responsible for the 
legislative side. Secondly, while all parliamentary political forces are represented on 
the foreign policy committee of the parliament and can voice their opinions, the 
majority of the members of this committee are political representatives of the political 
party in power. This is usually sufficient to ensure that the committee backs 
government policy, since in Bulgaria, as in any other parliamentary democracy, the 
political party controlling the government is generally in the majority. Thirdly, the 
constitution decrees that the National Assembly is the supreme authority and, over 
foreign policy issues, the government must either support the Assembly or resign.
The Constitutional Court and the other three institutions have also operated amicably 
since 1989. According to the Constitution, the Court pronounces on the 
constitutionality of foreign policy decisions taken by the state authorities. Therefore, 
its sphere of responsibility is narrow, limiting the possibility of conflict. In addition, 
even in the event of institutional conflict, the Constitutional Court, as the supreme
234 Article 84.
235 Article 100.
236 Article 149.
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juridical authority, makes the final decision in conflicts over matters concerning the 
constitutionality of laws and government decisions.237
However, between the government and the President of the Republic, major conflicts 
can arise because they are involved in executive foreign policy making. This situation 
is exacerbated if the President is from a different political party from the ruling 
government, and therefore has potentially a different foreign policy agenda. Also, 
there are constitutional anomalies which have become the basis for clashes between 
the two institutions.
For instance, article 98 of the constitution stipulates that the President, after 
consultation with the government, is responsible for appointing or dismissing 
Bulgarian diplomats.238 However, while constitutionally a consensus between the two 
institutions is required, the constitution does not specify how differences over 
appointments or dismissals are to be resolved. This situation is not merely theoretical 
as such cases have occurred. One such was in November 1995 when the Zhan 
Videnov government decided to recall six ambassadors who happened to be personal 
friends of the then President, Zheliu Zhelev.239 The President refused to ratify the 
government’s decision and a conflict arose over the issue, which was only resolved by 
the government agreeing to some of Zhelev’s advisers being made foreign 
diplomats.240
237 For the composition of the Constitutional Court see article 147 of the constitution; see also Melone, 
1998, p. 142.
238 Article 98.
239 The ambassadors involved were: Slavi Pashovski, Bulgaria’s ambassador to New York; Lea Koen, 
ambassador to Brussels; Svetlozar Raev, Bulgaria’s representative in the EU (Strasbourg); Vladimir 
Filipov, ambassador to Lisbon; Elena Kircheva, ambassador to Bern; and Yani Milchakov, ambassador 
to the Vatican. See Staff Reporter, ‘Nine Ambassadors Secretly Replaced’, 24 Chasa, 22 September 
1995, pp. 1-2, in FB1S-EEU-95-186, 26 November 1995, p.3; Zhelev, 1998, pp. 80-94.
240 Ibid.
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Also, article 98 stipulates that the President should conclude international treaties,241 
while article 106 refers to the government as also being responsible for concluding 
such treaties.242 To date, no legal decision has been reached about when the President 
is responsible and when the government has responsibility, an ambiguity which has 
produced conflict on many occasions. In October 1995, President Zhelev signed a 
declaration in New York with the Presidents of Albania and FYROM, giving consent 
to the construction of a highway corridor linking the Bulgarian port of Burgas on the 
Black Sea with the Albanian port of Vlore on the Adriatic Sea. This declaration was 
signed without consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and went against the 
policy of the Zhan Videnov government, which did not favour relations with Albania 
and FYROM.243 After the declaration had been signed, the deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Kostadin Glavanakov, stated that he was unaware of its contents.244
Constitutional Anomalies and Constitutional Crafting
The constitutional anomalies relating to executive power in foreign policy making 
should be viewed within the context of the crafting of the constitution during the first 
two years of democratization. The main priority in this process was the creation of a 
checks and balances political system, which would prevent executive power being 
assumed by a single political force. There are many historical examples of such 
usurpation in Bulgaria, even before the communist era, and, to avoid a recurrence, the
241 Article 98.
242 Article 106.
243 Interview with Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgi Pirinski by Kostadin Ivanov, Duma, 26 
January 1995, pp.7-8 in FBIS-EEU-96-021, 31 January 1996, pp. 3-4
244 Rosen Iankov, ‘Zhelev, Videnov Solve the Puzzle’, 24 Chasa, 26 October 1995, p.5, in FB1S-EEU- 
95-209, 30 October 1995, p .l.
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post-communist political elite followed the example of other EES by seeking to copy 
the institutional framework of WES.245 The Bulgarian political elite saw Western 
Europe as a model in terms of political stability, which it attributed to the good 
performance of the political institutions in WES.246
%
However, Western Europe does not present a uniform picture of government design. 
While certain democratic principles, such as the separation of powers, or checks and 
balances between state institutions, are shared by all Western European political 
systems, these principles can take different forms, such as the constitutional monarchy 
in Great Britain, the French semi-Presidential system or the German chancellor-based 
parliamentary system.
The fact that Bulgaria adopted a political system close to the French semi-Presidential 
model with a directly elected President was mainly the result of a compromise 
between the leadership of the two major political forces, the BSP and the Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF), during the constitution making process. The BSP 
supported a strong parliamentary system, where the authority of the President would 
be weak. This was mainly because, at the time, the BSP had a parliamentary majority, 
which party leaders thought they could maintain in the years to come.247 In contrast, 
the UDF and its leaders argued for a strong Presidential system based on the fact that
245 Batt & Wolczuck, 1998, pp. 86-7; Taras, 1998, pp. 103-111, 113-116.
246 Ibid.
247 It is noteworthy that during the National Roundtable Talks, which began on 4 January 1990 and 
ended on 30 March 1990, BSP supported a strong Presidential system. This was because: 1) the 
President at that time was Petur Mladenov, a leading BSP member; 2) BSP believed it would lose the 
first general elections in June 1990. Grozev, 1994, pp. 4-7; also Interview with Grozev Kostadin, 16 
January 2002. For a general overview on the National Roundtable Talks in Bulgaria see Melone, 1997, 
pp. 19-111; Bell, 1997, p. 364.
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Bulgaria’s President at the time was Zheliu Zhelev, who had in the past led the 
UDF.248
The compromise was also influenced by the intense political climate in which the 
constitution making process took place. This was, marked by heated parliamentary 
exchanges over economic issues, such as the food shortages in Bulgaria in the 
summer of 1991, and the situation was inflamed by huge public demonstrations. The 
socialist government wanted to finalise the constitution as quickly as possible in order 
to focus its energies on the economy, which would ultimately determine the 
government’s fate. However, this rendered the process hasty, and affected the final 
outcome. As a result of the speed with which the constitution making process took 
place, the document presents anomalies, such as those already mentioned concerning 
the responsibilities of the executive in foreign policy making.
The Role of Personality in Foreign Policy Making
Constitutional anomalies do not fully explain the institutional conflicts over foreign 
policy making. For example, while the constitution remained unchanged throughout 
the period of democratization, most of the conflicts between the President and the 
government on foreign policy issues occurred before November 1996, which was 
when Zhelev relinquished his position as President of the Republic. It is often the case 
that in democratizing states, such as Bulgaria, the powers claimed by state institutions 
do not always coincide with those set by constitutional prerogatives. Quite often, the 
individuals in charge of these institutions violate the constitutional prerogatives, and
248 During the Roundtable Talks, UDF favoured a strong parliamentary system because the UDF 
leadership expected to win the general elections of June 1990. Ibid.
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attempt to expand the sphere of their responsibilities when they feel that political 
conditions are favourable.
By the end of 1996, when Zhelev was President, Bulgaria was experiencing marked 
governmental instability, which continued for £  couple of months after he 
relinquished the position. There had been four changes of government by November 
1996 and the President was the only stability in the executive power. Zhelev exploited 
this situation to try and increase his influence over foreign policy making.
Zhelev’s attempts to increase his influence were mainly exemplified by two 
occurrences. The first was his plan to establish a network of foreign diplomats who 
were friendly to him, through which he could more easily promote his views on 
foreign policy. This plan was implemented by Zhelev’s adviser on foreign policy, 
Kamen Velichkov.249 After the UDF government of Filip Dimitrov came to power in 
1991, Velichkov found it possible to appoint such diplomats. To this end, he was 
helped by the constitutional prerogatives requiring consent between the President and 
the government, because in 1991-1992, when these appointments took place, both 
branches of the executive were controlled by the same party, namely the UDF.250
The second example was Bulgaria’s decision on 15 January 1992 to recognize 
FYROM under its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia.251 Although the 
decision was taken by the government, Zhelev’s input was decisive.252 Through his 
friend, Stefan Trafov, who at that time was deputy Prime Minister, Zhelev persuaded
249 Elena Triffonova ‘In foreign Affairs There Are Also Domestic Problems’, Kontinent, 26 January 
1996, p. 9, in FBIS-EEU-95-034, 21 December 1995, pp. 8-9.
250 Alexandrov, 1997, p. 69; Bell, 1997, p. 368.
251 Georgiev & Tsenkov, 1993, p. 17
252 Zhelev, 1998, pp. 151-158.
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the government that Bulgaria should be the first country to recognise FYROM under 
such a name. At the government session which took the decision, Trafov disclosed 
confidential information from the Presidential Palace, that Turkey was planning to 
recognise the Republic and it was in Bulgaria’s interest not to lag behind Turkey.233
%
The decision was taken when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stoian Ganev, was on 
an official tour in Europe, and this was no coincidence. Ganev had argued that 
Bulgaria’s policy towards FYROM should be in line with the policy of the EEC, 
otherwise it risked complicating relations with the EEC, and especially with Greece, 
and endangering the possibility of it entering the Community.254 Thus, immediately 
after the decision was announced, Ganev made a public statement holding the 
President and the Prime Minister name responsible for this decision. The Prime 
Minister reacted by accusing Ganev of acting contrary to Bulgaria’s interests. An 
institutional crisis was avoided by concessions and compromises being made on both 
sides. Trafov became the scapegoat and, after an agreement between Zhelev and 
Dimitrov, he was sent to be ambassador to Rome, with the promise of a move to 
London when his period of office in Rome expired. On returning to Sofia, Ganev 
made a public statement agreeing with the decision to recognize FYROM as the 
Republic of Macedonia, but maintaining that the government would review the 
decision if the EEC failed to recognize FYROM under such a name.255
Foreign Policy Making under the Presidency ofPetur Stoianov
253 Alexandrov, 1997, p. 71.
254 Georgjev & Tsenkov, 1993, p. 17; Tsenkov, Emil, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Alexandrov, 
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Cooperation between the President and the government on foreign policy making 
improved greatly after 1997, when another UDF member, Petur Stoianov, replaced 
Zhelev as President. This improvement was not the result of amendments to the 
constitutional prerogatives of the government and the President but rather because, 
unlike Zhelev, Stoianov had no credentials that allowed him to pursue an autonomous 
foreign policy. Again, unlike Zhelev, the founder of the party, Stoianov had been one 
of the younger generation of members who were elevated in the hierarchy after 1995 
when Ivan Kostov became the UDF’s leader.
In addition, during the second half of the 1990s, there was political stability in 
Bulgaria, largely explained by the fact that after 1994 Bulgarian governments had 
enjoyed a one-party parliamentary majority. This de facto diminished the political role 
of the President because, only in a situation of governmental instability was the 
President responsible for overseeing the compromises made among the political 
parties forming a coalition government, which, in turn, gave the President an 
increased role in foreign policy making.
In summary, the abolition of article 1 of the 1971 Constitution freed state institutions 
from communist party control. The abolition led to the establishment of necessary 
state institutions with an inbuilt system of checks and balances and, with the 
exception of the President and the government, generally well-defined responsibilities 
in policy making. Such establishment was aimed at preventing institutional conflicts 
and to facilitate the policy making process during the period of democratization.
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However, during the process of constitutional crafting by the Grand National 
Assembly in summer 1990, it was realised how difficult this would be. On the one 
hand, Western Europe, which had influenced every aspect of Bulgarian post­
communist politics, did not offer a single constitutional model. On the other hand, the 
country’s pre-communist past offered negative examples of a democratic political 
system. This left much scope for debate between the political forces participating in 
the Assembly.
The debate was influenced by the political circumstances of the time. Lack of 
constitutional expertise, the rush to finalise the constitution in order to focus on the 
country’s economic crisis, and the desire of the members of the team drawing up the 
constitution to reflect party and personal interests in the final document, resulted in 
poor definition of the exact responsibilities of state institutions. This affected foreign 
policy making. In particular, constitutional anomalies regarding the appointments of 
ambassadors and the signing of international treaties resulted in numerous 
institutional conflicts between the President and the government.
The constitution was not the only factor determining the role of state institutions in 
the new era. Personality seems to have been equally important, especially in relation 
to foreign policy making. Although the constitution remained unchanged throughout 
the 1990s, cooperation between the President and the government was less 
problematic when Stoianov became President. This can be explained by Stoianov’s 
rather weak personality compared to Zhelev, and the stability of governments during 
the second half of the 1990s, which de facto limited the influence of the President on 
foreign policy making.
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Foreign Policy Agendas of the Bulgarian Political Parties
In liberal democratic systems, political parties constitute the political nucleus in which
foreign policy is first conceived. This policy takes the form of a political agenda and
%
constitutes part of the parties’ political platforms, which are then exposed to 
competition at a general election. The Bulgarian electorate, in choosing which of the 
political parties should have power, therefore also helps decide the official foreign 
policy of the state.
General elections may determine state foreign policy, but they do not limit foreign 
policy making to the party that assumes governmental power: the opposition parties 
can also influence foreign policy through participation in the parliamentary committee 
for foreign policy and various international organisations and forums. If the 
presidency is held by a member of the opposition, this is another source of influence.
The previous section examined how the decentralization of the policy making process 
in post-communist Bulgaria influenced foreign policy making. This section examines 
the factors influencing foreign policy making within Bulgarian political parties. It 
argues that foreign policy making by the parties in the post-communist period was 
inextricably linked to their ideologies. These ideologies were the theoretical lenses 
through which the party leaders analysed international events. On this basis, the party 
leaderships set foreign policy priorities and formed foreign policy agendas, which 
they applied if they come to power, or lobbied for with the ruling party.
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Democratization introduced a competitive political environment, which has affected 
the policy agendas of the Bulgarian political parties. Most of the parties appeared after 
1989 and followed different historical courses during the post-communist period.256 
Some of them have enjoyed a continuous presence in the parliament, which de facto 
has rendered them influential in foreign policy making. Other parties have either only 
intermittently or never been represented in parliament. The People’s Union, which 
gained entry to parliament by forming a coalition with the UDF, one of the larger 
parties, is one such. The fact that these parties have had at best limited experience in 
parliament renders them less influential in foreign policy making therefore, this 
chapter focuses only on the parties that had been continuous members of parliament, 
and on a new party, the National Movement for Simeon the Second (NMSII), which 
recently held power.
The parties that have been continuous members are the BSP, the UDF and the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). This section focuses on the first two. The 
MRF is treated as a special case because of its links with the Muslim minority, and is 
described in the section on ethnic minorities.
Ideology, Identity and the Foreign Policy Agenda
Party ideology is an organised system of ideas that constitutes the theoretical 
framework within which the party makes its policy decisions and on the basis of 
which it forms its political platform. Parties reform their ideologies as a way of
256 Wightman, 1998.
96
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
modifying their political identities and presenting a new image to the electorate.237 
They will modify their political image if they see their popularity decreasing, with the 
aim of rallying public support and regaining political power. In democratic regimes, 
political power is seen in terms of the electoral rating the party receives in a general or 
Presidential election and is compared with the ratings in previous elections. In 
contrast to totalitarian regimes, where political parties modify their identity only to 
the extent that such a modification serves the parties’ goal to keep power, in 
democratizing states, political pluralism introduces competition among political 
parties, leading them to modify their identities on a regular basis.
Modifications, when they do occur, are mostly reflected in the parties’ foreign policy 
agendas. In Bulgaria, this seems to be true both for the communist and the 
democratizing period. As was shown in the previous chapter, many of the foreign 
policy changes adopted by the BCP at the end of the 1980s were related to the new 
identity that Gorbachev was trying to force on East European communist parties 
through Perestroika. This section shows that the foreign policy agendas of the BSP 
and the UDF after 1989 reflected the political identities of these parties.
Foreign Policy Agenda o f the BSP
After 1989 the BCP remained in power but could no longer legitimise itself in 
communist terms, that ideology having been discredited throughout Eastern Europe. 
Like most of the communist parties of Eastern Europe, the BCP needed to renounce
257 Waller, 1996, pp. 23-40; Wightman, 1998.
258 Kitschelt, 1995.
259 Shearman, 1993; Dawisha, 1989, pp. 517ff; Light, 1988, pp. 295ff; Crampton, 1997, pp. 208-215; 
Whitehead, 2001.
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communism and adopt a new ideology if it was to survive politically. This was 
underlined at the party congress of January 1990, the first congress after the ousting 
of the party’s communist leader, Todor Zhivkov. The congress abandoned 
communism and opened the debate over a new ideology.260
The decision to abandon communism was to have two immediate implications. 
Firstly, it led to the Party adopting a new name: the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). 
Secondly, it heralded a new process of decision-making within the party, which was 
to affect its foreign policy making.261 Communism essentially used a closed decision­
making process, confined to the members of the politburo, and now, a new model of 
decision-making was introduced in which the party congress was the chief political 
organ and all major decisions were made through free, open and democratic debate.
This new model of decision-making led to the appearance of two political groups 
within the new BSP, namely the reformers and the conservatives 262 Both groups 
agreed on the ideology that would replace communism: i.e. socialism. However, 
despite their agreement on the name, the reformers and conservatives had different 
conceptions of what was meant by ‘socialism’, which in turn, was reflected in the 
foreign policy agendas of these groups.
Thus, for reformers such as the Chavdar Kiuranov and the then Bulgarian Prime 
Minister, Andrei Lukanov, socialism meant the ideology of European social
260 For more details about the party congress of January 1990 see Dimitrova, 1998, p. 177ff.
261 Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Grozev, Konsstadin, personal interview, 
16/1/2002; Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 26/11/2001.
262 Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001.
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democratic parties such as the SPD in Germany or the French Socialist Party.263 
According to the reformers, this identified them as a European socialist democratic 
party, which, in turn, would grant them access to the Socialist International and give 
the impression that the party had really broken with its communist past, thus securing 
its long-term survival in the post-communist scene.264
The reformers argued that the party’s foreign policy agenda should be formed on the 
basis of two principles which were closely linked to the social democratic identity that 
the reformers sought to confer on the BSP.265 The first principle was that Bulgaria 
should seek entry to the EEC, which it was believed would serve the twin political 
aims that reformers saw as crucial to the party’s survival in the years to come. Firstly, 
it would send the message to the electorate that the BSP had become a Western 
European political party opening a new chapter in the country’s future. Secondly, it 
would be in line with the views of about half the Bulgarian public, mostly young and 
educated people living in urban areas, which also supported entrance to the EEC.266 
Although the vast majority of the BSP’s political supporters were older and less 
educated people who mainly lived in the countryside, they were emotionally bound to 
the BSP and were thus less likely to vote for other political parties. By supporting 
Bulgaria’s entry to the EEC, the BSP would therefore be able to increase its appeal to 
the young and educated people in the cities.
However, the principle of integration with the EEC had other implications for 
international policy, which the reformers’ agenda also sought to promote. This policy
263 Ibid; Dimitrov, Boiko, personal interview, 24/1/2002; Draganov, Dragomir, personal interview,
20/11/2001; Grozev, Kostadin, personal interview, 16/1/2002.
264 Todorov, 1999a, pp. 19-21, p. 30.
265 Ibid.
266 Shikova & Nikolov, 1999, p. 27.
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of integration meant that Bulgaria had to seek admission to international organisations 
such as the CSCE and the Council of Europe, a necessary first step for candidate 
states. Also, relations with the Soviet Union up to 1991, and the Russian Federation 
and other former Soviet Republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
had to be kept at a level that would not negatively affect Bulgaria’s entry to the EEC. 
Bulgaria also needed to promote multilateral relations in the Balkan region and seek 
participation in regional organisations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC), because such a policy would be in line with the EEC’s policy of promoting 
stability in the Balkans.
For the reformers, integration into the EEC did not mean that Bulgaria had to become 
a member of NATO. This view was regularly voiced by various middle- and high- 
ranking party reformers such as Chavdar Kiuranov, who argued that entry to NATO 
would upset Bulgaria’s relations with Russia, towards which a large part of the 
Bulgarian public and the political elite were sympathetic. It would also restrict the 
country’s right to pursue an independent foreign policy, and could even lead to 
Bulgarian involvement in military operations such as the Iraq war of 1991, and the 
war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, both of which conflicts the Bulgarian public was opposed 
to.267 Opinion polls held in the 1990s record a negative stance towards NATO. For 
example, in 1997, two years after the end of the war in Bosnia, opinion polls showed 
that only 40% of the public supported Bulgaria’s accession to NATO.268
After the mid-1990s, however, many reformer socialists began to revise their views 
concerning NATO. For many, Bulgaria’s integration into Atlantic structures was seen
267 Todorov, 1997, pp. 31-33; Goranov, 1997; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Ivanov, 
Andrei, personal interview, 13/11/2001; Grozev, Kostadin, personal interview, 16/1/2002;
268 BBS Gallup International, report 10, 2001.
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as a forerunner of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU.269 This change of heart was the 
result of two factors. The first was that NATO’s success in ending the war in Bosnia 
and bringing about a lasting, though fragile, stability in the former Yugoslavia, 
boosted its image in the eyes of BSP reformers.270 The second was the fact that in the 
mid-1990s there was a debate among NATO member states about the organisation’s 
expansion eastwards, and many BSP reformers believed that since most of the EU 
member states were also NATO members, Bulgaria’s accession to NATO would pave 
the way for the country’s accession to the EU.
The second principle was the promotion of liberal economic reforms in Bulgaria, so 
that the state would become free market economy. This principle was in line with the 
programmes of other European social democratic parties, which conceived of their 
policies as being best pursued within free market economic environment. However, 
the creation of such an economic environment presupposed cooperation with 
international economic organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, and the 
promotion of policies that would liberalize the country’s trade and contribute to the 
free movement of capital and people. These policies challenged the network of 
foreign economic relations which Bulgaria had developed under communism and 
gave the country the opportunity to interact with Western states such as the USA, 
Greece and Germany, which in the past had played only a marginal role in Bulgaria’s
271economy.
269 Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Ivanov, Andrei, personal interview, 13/11/2001; 
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Conservatives such as Alexandur Lilov, politburo member of the BCP until 1983 and 
BSP leader after the fall of Todor Zhivkov, and Zhan Videnov, Bulgarian Prime 
Minister between 1994 and 1996, did not use the term socialism to refer to the 
ideology of the European socialist democratic parties, as the reformers did. For the 
conservatives, socialism in many respects resembled the ideology of the Greek 
Socialist Party, PASOK, in the 1980s.272 In both cases, in the field of foreign affairs, 
socialism overemphasised the rights of Bulgarians and Greeks to emancipate their 
nations from the dangers posed by so-called American imperialism, and organisations 
such as NATO and the IMF, which were seen as aiding this ‘imperialism’ to promote 
their political goals.
For the conservatives, the party should give the impression of being a national 
political force which was striving to protect Bulgaria’s national sovereignty. Such an 
impression, the conservatives considered, would serve the party’s electoral purposes 
well. Firstly, it would strongly rebuff the arguments of UDF activists that the BSP 
was the same communist party which in the past had surrendered national sovereignty 
to the Soviets.273 Secondly, by emphasizing issues concerned with national 
sovereignty, the BSP would evoke feelings of nationalism in the public and, thus, 
have the potential to gain the electoral support of ethnic Bulgarians, who constituted 
about 80% of the country’s population.274
Protection of national sovereignty came to be the main principle of the conservatives’ 
foreign policy agenda, on two levels: a) the international, and b) the regional. At the
272 Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 26/11/2001; Lilov, Alexandur, personal interview, 4/12/2001; 
Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Grozev, Kostadin, personal interview, 16/1/2002.
273 Ibid.
274 Access Organisation, 1999, pp. 7-9.
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international level, Bulgaria felt threatened by the USA’s growing political and 
economic influence in international politics, which, following the collapse of the East
275European bloc, threatened to render EES American satellites. According to the 
conservatives, Bulgaria could preserve its sovereignty by developing relations with 
international actors able to counterbalance the growing influence of the US. These 
actors were the EU and Russia.276
The conservatives, like the reformers, therefore also supported Bulgaria joining the 
EU. However, the conservatives tended to emphasize the outcome, rather than the 
process of, integration and the obligations that this process entailed for Bulgarian 
foreign policy. This is exemplified by two cases. The first case is cooperation with 
NATO. While the EU has strong links with NATO, the conservatives were against 
Bulgaria seeking NATO membership. Even in the second half of the 1990s, when 
many reformers had revised their opinions, the conservatives persisted with their anti- 
NATO views.277
The second case is Bulgaria’s bilateral relations with Russia, which the conservatives 
saw as vital to upholding the country’s national sovereignty. They propounded the 
view that these relations should not be restricted to the foreign policy framework set 
by the EU or any other international organisation. Russia was seen as important for 
two reasons. Firstly, the communist period had bequeathed a high degree of 
dependence on Moscow as a source of fuel for post-communist Bulgaria.278 By
275 Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 26/11/2001; Lilov, Alexandur, personal interview, 4/12/2001; 
Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Grozev, Kostadin, personal interview, 16/1/2002.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid; Todorov, 1997, pp. 31-33; Ivanov, Andrei, personal interview, 13/11/2002.
278 With reference to Sofia’s economic dependence on Moscow under communism see Braun, 1983, 
pp. 199-208.
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controlling the price and supply of oil and gas sales to Bulgaria, Moscow could
270influence the Bulgarian economy. For the conservatives, it was necessary to 
encourage good political relations with Russia in the hope that, through such relations, 
Bulgaria would receive favourable terms for the purchase of oil and gas on a long­
term basis. Secondly, the Russian and Bulgarian nations shared a common Slavic 
origin.280 As had been the case with communism in the past, this was seen as 
providing a particular link between the two states, and as something which could 
secure Russian support in the event that Bulgaria’s territorial unity came under 
threat.281
At the regional level, Bulgaria’s national sovereignty was perceived as being 
threatened by Turkey. Turkey was seen as being able to use its kinship with the 
numerous Bulgarian Turks living in the country to challenge Bulgaria’s territorial 
unity. In the view of the conservative socialists, Turkey had two reasons to challenge 
Bulgaria’s territorial unity: the first of which was historical. As the successor to the 
Ottoman Empire, Turkey was believed to be seeking to regain the political and 
economic influence of the Ottomans in the Balkans. The second reason was the 
promotion of American interests inside Bulgaria. Since WWII, the Turkish 
establishment, and especially the Turkish military, had forged strong links with the 
USA. Due to these links, many BSP conservatives felt that the USA viewed Turkey 
as its most trusted ally in the Balkans, and used it to promote American political and 
economic interests in the region.
Ilieva, 2001.
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281 Gantsev, 1998, pp. 74-9,
104
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
For the conservatives, the only way that Bulgaria could counter the threat that Turkey
posed to Bulgaria’s national sovereignty was the promotion of bilateral relations with
282those Balkan states that were unsympathetic to Turkey, such as Greece and Serbia. 
The bases for these relations were twofold. The first was the Eastern Orthodox 
religion, followed by the ethnic majorities in all three states, and a tested basis for 
forging political and military alliances between the three states against Turkey in the 
past. The second was the ideologies of the socialist parties in these states, which were 
similar to the conservative BSP members’ conception of socialism.
At the April 1990 congress, the BCP, though keen to reform its identity, was not 
prepared to go so far as to become a social-democratic party. The majority of the 
party members found it impossible to cope with the idea that social democracy, an 
ideology that communism had accused of being the enemy of the labouring class, 
should become the party’s ideological banner. Therefore, the conservatives found the 
ground fertile for gaining control of the party and renewing Alexandur Lilov’s 
mandate as BSP leader.283 The reformers’ influence was restricted to the government, 
mainly due to the fact that a number of government cadres, such as the then Prime 
Minister Andrei Lukanov, were leading reformer figures. Their influence, however, 
proved to be short-lived. The BSP lost power in the October 1991 general elections 
and the government, until then a bastion of reformist power, fell. The reformist policy 
agenda which the government had sought to pursue was considered responsible for 
the electoral result, further undermining the reformers’ influence within the BSP.284
282 Videnov, 1996, p. 6; Nikova, 1998, pp. 285-290; Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 150-1, 153-4; Baeva, Iskra, 
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The conservatives took control of the party at a time when a large faction of the 
Bulgarian public was nostalgic for the communist past. This nostalgia was the result 
of the country’s economic crisis, which after the fall of communism deepened due to 
the loss of markets in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and led to a 
decline in living standards for the majority of Bulgarians. This faction discredited the 
Western orientation as well as the economic reforms supported by BSP reformers and 
the UDF, and supported the conservatives’ view that strengthening relations with 
other EES, and countries of the former Soviet Union, was the only means by which 
Bulgaria could overcome its economic crisis. By the mid-1990s, the section of society 
sharing these beliefs had grown to give the BSP a parliamentary majority with 43% in 
the general elections of December 1994. Thus, the party leader, Zhan Videnov was
285able to form a one-party government.
Videnov’s government, however, proved incapable of bringing Bulgaria out of the 
economic crisis. Indeed, attempts by government to forge close economic relations 
with other states within Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were very 
unsuccessful.286 Times had changed and, unlike the communist past, economic 
relations were more dependent on mechanisms set by the environment of the market 
economy than on political dictates. In the post-1989 economic environment, for 
example, the poor quality of many Bulgarian goods such as machinery, food and 
textiles, which under communism Sofia had mainly exported to Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, were not competitive with the qualitatively superior products of the
285 As Lilov’s protege Zhan Videnov became BSP’s new leader in the fortieth party congress of 
December 1991.
286Panaiot Denev, ‘Stoianov to try to restore Friendship with Moscow’, /Continent, 15 August 1996, p.
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West. In addition, Videnov’s government followed a foreign policy which led 
Bulgaria into isolation from the Western world and deprived the country of the 
potential to overcome its economic crisis through cooperation with Western states and 
international organisations.287 In particular, the government did not promote market 
economic reforms and, as a result, came into conflict with international economic 
organisations such as the IMF.288 Within the Balkans, the government abandoned the 
multilateralism followed by previous governments in favour of the promotion of 
bilateral relations with states such as Serbia and Greece.289
As a result of this policy, in 1996 Bulgaria’s economy faced bankruptcy, leading 
society into turmoil with strikes and street protests occurring in all Bulgaria’s major 
cities.290 Videnov’s government, incapable of handling the economic situation, 
resigned in December 1996, two years before the end of its term. In the general 
elections which followed four months later, the BSP suffered a crushing defeat, 
receiving only 22% of the general vote, with the UDF coming first with 52.26%.291
The events of 1996 re-opened the debate on the party’s political identity. The 
conservatives supported the view that the BSP should preserve its identity, and placed 
the blame for the failure of Videnov’s government to tackle the country’s economic 
issues, not on the political programmes that it had sought to introduce, but on the 
unwillingness of the reformers to support the government once the economic crisis
287 Alexandrov et al., 1997, pp. 104-121.
288 Bell, 1997, pp.391-2.
289 Videnov, 1996, p.6; Nikova, 1998, pp. 285-290; Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 150-1, 153-4; Alexandrov et 
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erupted.292 The reformers, on the other hand, stressed the fact that the events of 1996 
had undermined any effort which the party had made to break with its totalitarian 
past, and gave the impression that, despite its change of name, in essence the BSP was 
the same as the BCP, with the same policies and practices as those of the communist 
past.293 According to the reformers, the only way the party could win a future election 
was for it to become a European social democratic party and adopt a similar political 
platform.
The events of 1996 had seriously undermined the position of the conservatives within 
the party. Immediately after the fall of Videnov’s government, an extraordinary party 
congress was convened which elected a new leader, the 35-year-old historian Georgi 
Parvanov, who on his election, declared his intention to reform the party along the 
lines of a European socialist democratic party.294 This declaration of intent provoked 
such a major reaction from the conservatives that the party was in danger of splitting. 
Immediately after the fall of Videnov’s government, a number of reformers such as 
Alexandur Tomov and Dragomir Draganov left the BSP and formed a new party 
called the Euroleft Party,295 an occurrence that threatened such a split.
The Presidential elections of November 2001 further strengthened the position of the 
reformers within the party. Parvanov was elected President of the Republic, which 
boosted the morale of BSP activists who, unlike many political analysts, saw this as 
resulting from Parvanov’s reformist views and not the outcome of a protest vote
292 Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Grozev, Kostadin, personal interview, 16/1/2002; 
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294 For a general overview on Parvanov’s views regarding Bulgaria’s foreign policy see Kanev, 2002.
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against the government or a split in the non-BSP vote.296 At the party congress of 
December 2001, Parvanov successfully used his electoral victory to further 
marginalize the conservatives. The political platform of the reformers was adopted, all 
the party’s major institutions were reformer dominated, and the new party leader, 
Sergei Stanichev, was a reformer.297
Foreign Policy Agenda o f the UDF
The UDF was established on 7 December 1989 from a coalition of 13 political 
groups, most of which had been anti communist dissident movements at the end of the 
1980s.298 AH these groups were represented on the UDF’s supreme governing body, 
the National Coordination Council (NCC). At the beginning of the 1990s, the NCC 
was constituted by moderate politicians such as Zheliu Zhelev and Petur Dertliev, 
who had been influenced by Soviet Perestroika. This influence was reflected in the 
UDF’s political identity at the time. The UDF resembled a political movement
297 http://www.bsp.bg/44kongress en/uprpr7.htm: Vigenin Christian, personal interview, 10/1/ 2002; 
Gaitandzhiev, Ivan, personal interview, 24/1/ 2002.
298 These political groups were: Klub za Glasnost I Demokratsiia (Club for Glasnost and Democracy), 
Nezavisimo Druzhestvo ‘Ekoglasnost’ (Independent Association ‘Ecoglasnost’), Konfederatsiia na 
Truda ‘Podkrepa’ (Confederation for Labour ‘Podkrepa’), Nezavisimo Druzhestvo za Zastita Pravata 
na Choveka (Independent Association for Human Rights), Komitet za Zashtita na Religioznite Prava, 
Svobodata Na Suvestta I Duhovnite Chennosti (Committee for the Protection of Religious Rights, 
Freedom of Conscience and Spiritual Values), Klub na Nezakonno Represiranite sled 9 Septemvri 
1944 (Club of Unlawfully Repressions after 9 September 1944), Federatsia Na Nezavisimite studentski 
druzhestva (Federation of Independent Student Associations), Dvizhenie ‘Grazhdanska Initsiativa’ 
(Movement ‘Initiative of Citizens’), Bulgarska Sosialdemokratitseska Partia ( Bulgarian Social- 
democratic Party), Bulgarski Zemedelski Naroden Siuz-Nikola Petkov (Bulgarian Agrarian National 
Union-Nikola Petkov), Zelenata Patiia (Green Party), Radikaldemokratitseska Partiia (Radical- 
democratic Party), Demokratitseska Partiia (Democratic Party). In 1990 three more parties joined UDF, 
thus raising the number o f the political groups participating in UDF to 16sixteen. The three parties that 
joined UDF in 1990 were: Nova SDP [Sosial Demokratik partiia] (New Social Democratic Party); 
Obedinen Demokratitseski Tsentur (United Democratic Center); Democratichen Forum (Democratic 
Forum). See http://www.omda.bg/bulg/news/partv/sds.htm
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seeking to reform the totalitarian system rather than a political force prepared to 
administer state government.299
The influence of Perestroika is especially evident in the foreign policy agenda of the 
UDF, which had been influenced by the foreign pohcy of the Soviet government 
under Gorbachev. That agenda, in line with Gorbachev’s foreign policy, which 
encouraged foreign policy autonomy among EES, suggested that equality should be 
the guiding principle of Soviet-Bulgarian relations, and argued for the autonomy of 
Bulgaria’s foreign policy.300 In addition, it set Bulgaria’s integration with the EEC as a 
first priority.301
At the beginning of the transition period, the idea of Bulgaria entering NATO was 
mainly symbolic, although the issue was raised by the UDF as early as the ‘Round 
Table’ talks in January 1990, and afterwards at the Grand National Assembly by UDF 
MPs such as Solomon Pasi. At that time an application to NATO for membership was 
seen as signalling that Bulgaria had shaken free of its communist ties.302 These ties 
included Bulgaria’s political dependence on the USSR through the Warsaw Pact and 
the CMEA, and a mistrust of the West and its political and economic structures, all of 
which the UDF sought to change. In addition, the UDF sought to emphasize the new 
rather than the old, which the BSP seemed to represent, and promised to bring 
political freshness and changes to the political scene once it gained power.303
299 Karasimeonov, 1995, pp. 159-164; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 30/11/ 2001; Kiuranov, 
Deian, personal interview, 4/12/2001; Zhelev, Zheliu, personal interview, 7/1/2002.
300
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302 Todorov, 1997, pp. 30-1, 33-4.
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At that stage the issue of national security, if discussed at all, was of secondary 
importance for two reasons. Firstly, the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe did not seem to have any immediate impact on the military might of the 
Soviet bloc. The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet bloc’s military branch, remained intact and 
the Soviet army was sufficiently powerful to protect Bulgaria’s territorial integrity in 
the event that the country came under military attack. In addition, there was no 
indication at the time that NATO would expand to the East, let alone accept a country 
such as Bulgaria, which had been the most loyal ally of the Soviet Union during 
communism and whose population was perceived to be generally Russophile -  a term 
with negative connotations, both in Bulgaria and the West, used to describe someone 
with ‘anti-Western’ feelings. The issue of national security became relevant only at 
the end of the 1990s with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, 
and Bulgaria’s possible entry to NATO.304
It is not clear what the UDF’s views were concerning Bulgaria’s relations with 
neighbouring states at this time. With reference to Greco-Turkish relations, it seems 
that the party was in favour of maintaining similar relations with both states,305 
because both Greece and Turkey had close links with the West, and it was thought 
that this might promote Bulgaria’s Western orientation.306 Also, the New Democracy 
Party in Greece was identified as the UDF’s ideological ally. As a result, the New 
Democracy Party gave financial support to the UDF for its electoral campaigning. It is 
estimated that on the eve of the June elections in 1990, the UDF had received the 
equivalent of $ lm  from its Greek ideological ally.307
304 Ibid.
305 Bogdanov, Bogdan, personal interview, 7/11/2002.
306 Ibid.
307 Raidovski, Krasimir, personal interview, 11/1/2002.
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The general elections of June 1990 played a decisive role in shaping the UDF’s 
political identity. The UDF came second, disappointing activists who had thought that 
Bulgaria would follow the example of many Eastern European states by giving the 
majority vote to the UDF, which had been linked with the fight against 
totalitarianism. This electoral defeat undermined the position of the moderate cadres 
who held the leadership at that time, and laid the ground for the party hardliners to 
take control. These included such radical politicians as Filip Dimitrov and Stefan 
Savov, who supported the view that the only way for the UDF to become a leading 
political force was to abandon the platform of Perestroika.
The radicals were helped in their bid to take control of the party by the political 
circumstances that prevailed. The election of Zhelev as President of the Republic had 
left a gap in the party leadership. Zhelev was popular among UDF activists and, 
despite his moderate political platform, nobody thought of challenging his leading 
role in the party. Shortly after his replacement by Filip Dimitrov, most of the 
moderate political figures in the party were either marginalized or purged.
Under the new leadership, the political identity of the UDF changed. It no longer 
conducted itself as a political movement that wished to reform Bulgaria within the 
existing political discourse, but became a radical political force which sought to move 
the country away from its communist past, this being considered responsible for 
everything negative in Bulgaria and a radical break being seen as a necessary 
precondition for democratization. For the new leadership, ‘anti-communism’, 
however ambiguous a term, became the UDF’s ideological watchword and was it to
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mark every aspect of the party’s political platform. With reference to its foreign 
policy agenda, ‘anti-communism’ meant a freezing of relations with states which had 
previously enjoyed priority, e.g. the USSR, and the fostering of relations with the 
developed states of the West.308 These priorities came to determine the policy agenda 
of the first UDF government from 1991 to 1992. Integf&tion with the EU and NATO 
became top priorities of Bulgaria’s foreign policy despite the high economic cost to 
the country.309
Relations with former partners cooled: which included the USSR, and the Third 
World countries with which Bulgaria had close relations under communism.310 In 
terms of the USSR, relations deteriorated to such an extent that only a few political 
channels remained open. One such was represented by President Zhelev, mainly due 
to his personal relations with the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin.311 It is believed that 
this friendship between Yeltsin and Zhelev played a crucial role in Russia recognizing 
FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia in 1993.312 At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
all ties were severed. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stoian Ganev, was hostile 
towards Russia, which he saw as being responsible for Bulgaria’s economic 
dislocation. He went so far as to state publicly on the Bulgarian National TV 
programme ‘Panorama’ in October 1990 that Sofia should take Moscow to the
308 Todorov, 1999a, pp. 21-23; Dainov, Evgeni, personal interview, 26/11/2001; Tsenkov, Emil, 
personal interview, 3/12/2001; Kiuranov, Deian, 4/12/2001.
309 Alexandrov et al., 1997, pp. 67-82; Milanov, Milan, personal interview, 23/11/2001; Hinkova, 
Sonia, personal interview, 16/11/2001.
310 Alexandrov et al., 1997, p. 74; Alexandrov, Evgeni, personal interview, 11/1/2001; Hinkova, Sonia, 
personal interview, 16/11/2001; Milanov, Milan, personal interview, 23/11/2001.
11 Smirnova, 2001, pp. 265-267; Zhelev, Zheliu, personal interview, 7/1/2002.
312Ibid.; Zhelev, 1998, pp. 161-166; Insider, January 1993, pp. 18-19.
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International Court in the Hague for the 45 years of dominance it had imposed on 
Bulgaria.313
Bulgaria’s relations with most Third World states had been disrupted even before the 
UDF came into power in 1991. This was the natural outcome of Bulgaria’s economic 
reforms after the collapse of communism, which had an unfavourable influence on 
bilateral trade, as well as on the economic activities of the many Bulgarian companies 
operating in Third World countries. However, when Filip Dimitrov came to power, 
Bulgaria’s relations with a number of Third World states, such as Libya and Iraq, 
were further disturbed. The main reason for this breach was the pro-American foreign 
policy pursued by the UDF government and the determination of Dimitrov to 
strengthen relations with Israel. Though the Bulgarian-Israeli rapprochement had 
officially begun in April 1990 with Bulgaria’s recognition of Israel, it was not until 
Filip Dimitrov came to power that relations improved to the point that Dimitrov paid 
an official visit to Israel 17-19 March 1992, and made a symbolic visit to the Golan 
Heights.314 For the UDF government, improving relations with Israel was a strategic 
decision. Although it led to a weakening of relations with Arab states, the UDF 
government calculated that it would best serve Bulgaria’s long-term goal of 
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures because Israel was perceived to be the USA’s 
closest ally in the Middle East.315
313Abadzhiev, Dimitur, personal interview, 30/11/2001; Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 7/1/2002; 
Borisov, Boiko, personal interview, 6/11/2001; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001.
314 BTA, 18/3/1992 & 19/3/1992.
315 Alexandrov, Evgeni, personal interview, 11/1/2001; Hinkova, Sonia, personal interview,
16/11/2001; Milanov, Milan, personal interview, 23/11/2001.
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In relation to the Balkans, the UDF proposed that Bulgaria’s policies should be in line 
with the policies of Western Europe and NATO.316 This was because first, it was seen 
as furthering the party’s image as a political force seeking to break with the 
communist past. Unlike the policies of bilateralism, which had led Bulgaria into 
isolation in the past, the UDF favoured multilateralism.317 Secondly, aligning 
Bulgaria’s regional policy with those of the EU and NATO was thought to further 
Sofia’s long-term aim of gaining entry to these two international bodies.318
These views determined the government’s regional policy when the UDF took 
power.319 This policy can be outlined along the following three axes. Firstly, Bulgaria 
undertook initiatives to upgrade its relations with its two NATO neighbours, Greece 
and Turkey. One such initiative was the signing of military confidence building 
treaties at the end of 1992 by the Greek conservative government of Constantinos 
Mitsotakis and the Bulgarian UDF government under the leadership of Filip 
Dimitrov.320 Secondly, relations with Serbia cooled in order to reflect EU and NATO 
policies towards the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic.321 Thirdly, initiatives were 
undertaken to build relations with the new states emerging from the former 
Yugoslavia. Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina were recognised as was 
FYROM under its constitutional names. Although this went against EU policy on the 
issue, it was believed it would have a positive effect on Bulgarian-EU relations in the 
long run because it would demonstrate that Bulgaria had overcome the political 
prejudices of the past and did not nurture territorial claims against its Balkan
319 Alexandrov et al., 1997, pp. 75-6.
320 Ibid.
321 Ibid.
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neighbours. Instead it was ready to establish strong political and economic relations 
with them.322
Filip Dimitrov’s government remained in power for only one year, from October 1991 
to October 1992. During this period, the government dedicated itself to purging the 
state apparatus of people who were thought to have collaborated with the communist 
regime.323 This brought the government into confrontation with almost all state 
institutions. By October 1992, the government was politically isolated and, in an 
attempt to escape this Dimitrov asked for a parliamentary vote of confidence on 28 
October. The tactic backfired and the government was defeated.324
After the fall of the Dimitrov government, the UDF entered a prolonged period of 
internal debate over the party’s identity which was to continue until the next general 
election in December 1994.325 Two political tendencies emerged during this debate. 
The first was expressed by a group of hardliners, close to the party leader, Dimitrov, 
who argued that the most important issue was to rid Bulgaria of the members of the 
old communist elite who still controlled the state apparatus, which was impeding 
democratization. Cleansing the state apparatus was seen as the top priority, along with 
maintaining the identity of a radical political force seeking to save Bulgaria from the 
‘burden’ of its communist past.
322 Ibid; Georgiev & Tsenkov, 1993.
323 Bell, 1997, pp. 377-383.
324Ibid.
325 Dainov, Evgeni, personal interview, 26/11/2001; Abadzhiev, Dimitur personal interview,
30/11/2001; Malinov, Svetoslav, personal interview, 2/11/2001; Kiuranov, Deian, personal interview, 
4/12/2001; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Tsenkov, Emil, personal interview, 
3/12/2001. For a general overview on the internal politics o f UDF during the first years of the transition 
period see Nedelchev, 1993.
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Young technocrats such as Ivan Kostov typified the second political tendency,326 the 
reformers, who argued that ‘cleansing the state apparatus’ of members of the old 
communist elite was not a panacea for the country’s ills. For them, the priority was 
the promotion of economic reforms for growth and to reinforce the democratic 
system. For the reformers, therefore, it was important that the party should not define 
itself in relation to the communist past, but rather in relation to the political 
alternatives it offered for Bulgaria’s future.327 A liberal political platform would free 
the state economy giving economic prosperity and the prospect of integration into 
Euro-Atlantic structures.
The general election of December 1994 played a decisive role in deciding which of 
the two rival political tendencies prevailed. In these elections, the UDF received 24% 
of the vote, 10% less than it had got in the previous general election, and came 
second. This result seriously undermined the authority of the hardliners. At the 8th 
National Party Congress in February 1997, the reformers took control of the party and 
elected Ivan Kostov as the new party leader.328
With the reformers in the leadership, the UDF’s foreign policy agenda changed to 
reflect the party’s new identity, becoming de-ideologized and more pragmatic.329 
Foreign policy priorities were increasingly determined by the liberal economic 
changes that the reformers sought to promote. Their first foreign policy priority was 
Bulgaria’s integration into the EU. However, this was not seen as symbolizing
327 Todorov, 1999a, pp. 21-23, 32-3.
328 http://www.online.bg/politics/who/govern/parpart7sds-htm
329 Stoev, Valentin, ‘In 1995 the SDS Came to its Senses but not Completely’, Kontinent, 29 December 
1995, p. 13, in FB1S-EEU-96-002, 3 January 1996, p. 4; http://www.eapital.bg/weeklv/99-03/32-03- 
l.htm
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Bulgaria’s break with the communist past, but rather as a means through which the 
country could achieve economic growth.
The reformers supported entry to NATO, but endowed it with a different meaning 
from the hardliners of the past. For the reformers, joining NATO was seen as a 
political action from which the country would benefit in terms of national security, as 
Bulgaria was seen to be vulnerable in the turbulent post-Cold War Balkan region 
following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc’s military structures. In addition, unlike 
the hardliners, who on many occasions seemed to emphasize Bulgaria’s relations with 
the USA and NATO more than with the EU, for the reformers entrance to NATO was 
seen as a significant step towards Bulgaria’s entrance to the EU, which was viewed as 
the country’s primary foreign policy goal.330 For the hardliners, the USA and NATO 
symbolized the Soviet Union’s “other” and, therefore, fitted well with the political 
image of the radical anti-communist party which the hardliners wished to give the 
UDF. However, once the party’s political identity changed under the reformers, it was 
natural that the emphasis on Bulgaria’s relations with the USA and NATO became 
less strong.
The change in the party’s foreign policy agenda was particularly evident in Bulgaria’s 
relations with Russia. The reformers’ stance towards Russia was pragmatic.331 
Bulgaria could not afford to sever relations with Russia because it was dependent on 
Moscow for petrol and gas. However, this did not mean that the price of economic 
dependence should be political subservience as had been the case under communism. 
This soon became clear after the UDF came to power in April 1997. Moscow tried to
330 Grozev, 1994; Grozev, Kostadin, personal interview, 16/1/2002.
331 Denev, Panaiot, ‘Stoianov to try to restore Friendship with Moscow’, Kontinent, 15 August 1996, p. 
6, in FBIS-EEU-96-160, 16 August 1996, p. 7.
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exploit Bulgaria’s dependence on Moscow for gas, and sought unsuccessfully to put 
Bulgaria’s gas pipeline network under Russian control. This led to a crisis in 
Bulgarian-Russian relations which ended only in 1998 after the two sides reached an 
agreement, whereby Russia recognized Bulgaria’s right to control its own gas pipeline 
network.332
In relation to the Balkan region, the foreign policy agenda of the reformers was not 
very different from that of the hardliners. In both cases, the objective was the 
maintenance of a balanced policy towards all states in the region, except Serbia. 
However, while the objective of both was the same, the motives underlying it were 
different. The hardliners saw this policy as a means by which Bulgaria could enter 
Euro-Atlantic structures.333 For the reformers, however, it was a necessary 
precondition for economic growth through the increase of intra-regional trade and 
foreign investments. Reformers did not underestimate the effects that the policy 
would have on Bulgaria’s entry to the EU, but, unlike the hardliners, they believed 
that entry depended more on economic criteria than on aligning state foreign policy 
with that of the EU and NATO.334
The different philosophies of the hardliners and the reformers concerning regional 
foreign policy were evident as soon as the UDF returned to power in May 1997. 
Unlike the government of Filip Dimitrov, the government of Ivan Kostov emphasized 
the economic aspects of intra-regional cooperation such as liberalization of bilateral
332 Bell, 1998. 315-6: http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/17-98/15-17-l.htm
333 Dainov, Evgeni, personal interview, 26/11/2001; Abadzhiev, Dimitur, personal interview,
30/11/2001; Malinov, Svetoslav, personal interview, 2/11/2001; Kiuranov, Deian, personal interview, 
4/12/2001; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Tsenkov, Emil, personal interview, 
3/12/2001.
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trade through the elimination of custom duties for industrial and agricultural products 
with states such as Turkey and Romania,335 and the agreement with Greece on the 
creation of a free economic zone on the Greek-Bulgarian, border which would allow 
employees of these states to work as seasonal workers in their neighbouring 
countries.336 This measure was especially beneficial for the Muslim populated regions 
of the Bulgarian south, where unemployment had reached 90%.337
Foreign Policy Agenda o f the NMSII
The NMSII is a political force which was founded by the deposed King Simeon II 
three months before the general election of June 2001. Despite the short duration 
between the Movement’s formation and the general elections, the NMSII won the 
election with 42% of the vote. However, this was not enough to give it a majority in 
parliament, and it approached other parties to form a coalition government. After 
intense negotiations, which lasted almost a month, the NMSII managed, with the 
backing of the MRF, to form a government under the premiership of former King 
Simeon.
The electoral victory of the NMSII can be explained in two ways. The first has to do 
with Bulgaria’s economic performance, which was very poor, laying the ground for 
populist policies to appear and capture the imagination of the public. It is significant 
that the NMSII won the elections without any real electoral platform, apart from the
335 In political parlance as well as in many press and media reports, this process of liberalization has 
been known as the creation of free trade zones (FTZ henceforth).
336 http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/49-98/19-49-2.htm; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/32-98/03-32-1 .htm; 
http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/36-98/04-36-l.htm: http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/30-98/18-30-1 .htm: 
http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/99-l 1/31-11-l.htm; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/28-98/16-28-2.htm.
337 Koinova, 2001; Stantsev, Krasen, personal interview, 26/11/2001.
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promise that, were it victorious, it would improve the living standards of the 
Bulgarian people, and the country’s international image within a hundred days. The 
party’s political platform was made known only in November 2001, five months after 
the electoral victory, when Simeon’s government presented a four-year governmental 
plan before parliament.
The second explanation is related to Simeon’s popularity throughout the 1990s. On 
the eve of the general election of June 2001, his popularity had reached 50% in 
opinion polls.338 As former King he was linked to the monarchy which communism 
had fought against. In a period which for the most part, was characterized by the 
discrediting of communism and an acute economic crisis seen as resulting from 45 
years of communist rule, Simeon was seen by many Bulgarians as a Messiah who 
could transform the country during the period of democratization. Also, political 
powers such as the UDF had contributed to the building of a heroic and extremely 
popular image for Simeon because they wished to appease both party activists and the 
part of the electorate that supported the monarchy.
The NMSII did not build its political identity in relation to any conventional 
ideologies such as socialism or liberalism. For the activists of the NMSII, political 
ideologies were seen as having divided Bulgaria, being to some extent responsible for 
the political and economic instability of the preceding 12 years. What Bulgaria 
needed, according to NMSII activists, was an all-embracing political force, such as 
the NMSII, which would unite the Bulgarian people and enable all the country’s
338 BBSS Gallup International, Report 01, 2002.
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national problems to be resolved.339 In order to assume the identity of an all- 
embracing political force, the NMSII adopted a twofold strategy. Firstly, it attempted 
to present the former King Simeon as Bulgaria’s saviour, as one who cared deeply 
about the country, and was capable of solving all its problems.340 Secondly, it 
presented a plan to parliament which was an amalgam of the political ideas and 
suggestions of the other political forces.341 By this means, the NMSII hoped to attract 
voters from across the political spectrum and thus achieve viability. Such a manifesto 
was also in some ways the result of Bulgaria’s EU accession process, which had 
pushed all the main Bulgarian parties to adopt the pro-liberal political views needed to 
comply with EU policies and, through such compliance, to guarantee their political 
survival.
This amalgamation of ideas in the NMSII’s political platform is particularly evident in 
its foreign policy agenda, which was designed to satisfy as large a part of the 
electorate as possible. On the one hand, Bulgaria’s accession to the EU and NATO 
was given top priority in the foreign policy agenda,342 due mainly to the fact that 
membership of these two organisations was given priority by all other political parties 
and was well received by the Bulgarian public. On the other hand, the NMSII’s 
foreign policy agenda attempted to satisfy the conservative sections of the BSP 
electorate and some nationalist sections of the Bulgarian public which were unhappy 
at the prospect of Bulgaria’s becoming a full member of the EU and NATO. This is 
evident in the NMSII government’s four year plan, which stressed that Bulgaria
339 Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Tsenkov, Emil, personal interview, 3/12/2001.
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would take measures to strengthen relations with Russia and the Arab world.343 This 
part of the government programme should be seen as an attempt to satisfy 
conservative ex-communists who supported Bulgaria’s relations with Russia, and 
Bulgarian Muslims who favoured Sofia’s rapprochement with the Arab world.
•
In addition, the four-year plan stressed that the government would take political 
measures to protect ethnic Bulgarians living in neighbouring states. No significant 
measures were actually taken, and this statement should be seen more as an attempt to 
satisfy the electorate, and nationalist sections within NMSII rather than as a policy 
objective which the NMSII government intended working towards. Neighbouring 
states such as Greece and FYROM do not recognize Bulgarian minorities in their 
territories, and any action taken by the Bulgarian government to protect these 
minorities would harm Bulgaria’s bilateral relations with these states and negatively 
affect the country's Western orientation.344
In summary, the political identity and foreign policy agendas of Bulgarian political 
parties are inextricably related. Foreign policy agendas are an integral part of any 
party’s political platform and provide the means by which political parties construct 
their political identities and pass their political messages to the electorate. In the 
competitive environment that democratization has introduced to Bulgaria, political 
parties frequently change their identities to keep connection with as wide a section of 
the electorate as possible, thus made themselves more electable. However, each 
change of identity affects their foreign policy agendas. Changes to party identities 
normally occur after an electoral defeat. This defeat triggers debate within the party
343 Ibid.
344 Access Organisation, 1999, p. 8
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organs, and in most cases entails a change in the party’s leadership as well as the 
party’s political platform.
Think-tanks: Foreign Policy Analysts with Limited Influence
•
In the communist period, policy analysis was a government monopoly. In contrast, in 
the period of democratization, a number of policy research centres, also known as 
think-tanks, emerged which influenced the policy making process in Bulgaria. These 
policy research centres fall into two categories. The first includes centres that have 
close links with certain political parties. Examples include the ‘Democracy 
Foundation’, which is affiliated to the UDF, and the ‘Centre for Strategy Research’, 
which has close links with the BSP. The influence of these centres is restricted to the 
political parties they are affiliated to. The second category includes policy research 
centres, such as the Centre for Liberal Strategies (CLS), whose influence on foreign 
policy making is not restricted to particular political parties. They seek to remain 
autonomous, wielding continuous influence on Bulgarian policy making, regardless 
of which party is in power. Thus, the strategy of these centres is twofold. They have 
developed close links with Western institutes which support the Bulgarian centres in 
terms of funding and ideas. Also, they stay in touch with the public through the 
organisation of seminars, campaigns and publications focusing on various policy 
issues which they see as being important to Bulgarians.
This section focuses on this second category of policy research institutes. It examines 
how their evolution during democratization has affected their ability to influence 
Bulgaria’s foreign policy making. Through their strong links with certain political
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parties, the first category restricts their influence on foreign policy making and 
renders their foreign policy agendas similar to those of the parties they are affiliated 
to, and which were analysed in the previous section.
Evolution o f Think-tanks in Bulgaria •
Immediately after the fall of communism there were no think-tanks in Bulgaria.343 The 
political landscape was composed of two groups of policy-makers. One consisted of 
liberal intellectuals, mostly writers and poets whose writings and speeches had 
captured the imagination of a large part of the Bulgarian public. Some of these 
intellectuals, such as Zheliu Zlelev, had opposed the communist regime, and because 
of this gained legitimacy in the post-communist period. Owing to their popularity, 
these intellectuals became a sort of ‘counter elite’ and played an active role in 
Bulgarian politics in the new period.
The other group was known as the technocrats, and consisted of economists and 
lawyers working in the Agency for Economic Coordination and Development 
(AECD), a government advisory body that was established in May 1991 to help the 
government in its efforts to promote political and economic reforms in the Bulgarian 
state. Ivan Kostov, one of the technocrats, was a prominent Bulgarian economist who 
had worked in the AECD before joining UDF in the mid-1990s and Rumen Avramov, 
also a technocrat, is a well known Bulgarian economist who currently works in the 
CLS.
345 Krastev, Ivan, 1999, pp. 6-7.
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Both these groups supported Bulgaria’s Western orientation but held different views 
on it. For the intellectuals, a Western orientation was an emotional, ideological notion 
akin to the first UDF government’s conception of a Western orientation. This 
translated to integration with the EU and NATO, and a freezing of relations with 
Russia and Third World states, with which Bulgaria had had close ties under 
communism. For the technocrats, a Western orientation was viewed as necessary for 
improvement to the economy, which in practice meant integration with Western 
institutions such as the EU and NATO, and continued relations with Russia and Third 
World states only to an extent that would not endanger this integration. In other 
words, the technocrats’ views on foreign policy were closer to the foreign policy 
agendas of the BSP and UDF reformers.
The majority of Bulgarian think-tanks appeared after the fall of Filip Dimitrov’s 
government in autumn 1992 and was related to the fact that the influence of the 
liberal intellectuals on policy making was in sharp decline because most of the 
intellectuals were linked to the first UDF government of Filip Dimitrov, and their 
influence faded when his government lost power in October 1992. It was also related 
to the fact that the technocrats lost influence with almost all the governments that 
came to power in the aftermath of the fall of the UDF government in 1992 until the 
fall of socialist governments of Zhan Videnov and Georgi Parvanov in December 
1996 and February 1997 respectively. This was for the most part because the 
Bulgarian governments of that period were generally controlled by conservative ex- 
communists, whose foreign policy agenda was in sharp contrast to the foreign policy 
agenda supported by the majority of technocrats. Therefore, many technocrats left 
their jobs in government agencies and looked for new channels through which they
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could institutionalize their political ideas. Some, such as Ivan Kostov, entered politics 
by joining the UDF. Others, like Rumen Avramov, Director of the AECD, left their 
government jobs and set up policy research centres, such as the CLS. These research 
centres were also popular with young scholars who left their jobs in academia during 
the post-1989 period when salaries were low.346
Influence on Foreign Policy Making
The fact that the Bulgarian think-tanks came into being as a reaction to the policies 
followed by the government of Zhan Videnov restricted their scope of influence to 
the political parties in opposition, especially the UDF. Indeed, for a long time the 
BSP was against any cooperation with think-tanks, and this stance took the form of an 
official position ratified by all party congresses. On foreign policy issues, the only 
advice that the BSP accepted was that of a group of retired diplomats who had been 
dismissed by Filip Dimitrov’s government because of their communist beliefs.
Even after the fall of Videnov’s government and the increase in the reformers’ 
influence within BSP, it was not until the 47th party congress in December 2001 that 
the BSP declared its readiness to cooperate with think-tanks. The reason for this delay 
was that, although the influence of the reformers within BSP had increased after the
346 Other policy research centres were founded after the collapse of the UDF government, including the 
Agency for Social Analyses (ASA), which was founded in 1994, whose main tasks involved the 
conduct of social surveys and acting as consultants to government agencies, political parties and 
businesses on social economic and political issues (http://www.ASA-BG.NETFIRMS.COM); the 
Institute for Market Economics (IME) which was founded in 1993, whose main research objectives 
were to provide independent assessment and analysis of the government’s economic policies and to 
function as a focal point for the exchange of views on market economics and relevant policy issues 
(http://www.ime.bg/en/index.html); and the Center for Social Practices which was founded in 1994 
whose main research objectives are to conduct social surveys on Bulgaria and offer consultation on 
social and political issues
(http://www.atlasusa.org/directory/institute_profile.php?refer=directory&org_id=661).
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fall of Videnov’s government, the presence of the conservatives was still strong, and 
they always vetoed cooperation with think-tanks, which they viewed with suspicion 
mainly due to the think-tanks’ cooperation with Western institutes. The victory of the 
BSP in the Presidential elections of November 2001, and the election as President of 
the BSP leader, Georgi Parvanov, gave the party leadership enough strength to 
marginalize the conservatives in the party congress of December 2001 and impose its 
position on this issue.
The potential for think-tanks to influence the other political parties was greater. 
However, only a few of them are really influential. Many research policy centres 
were set up simply to offer lawful cover for the money-making operations of their 
directors. In doing so, they were capitalizing on a government decree of December 
1990, which exempted all research centres and foundations from both national and 
local taxes, and did not require these foundations and research centres to commit 
themselves to spending their income on particular projects.347
Also, despite the pluralism that democratization has brought to Bulgaria, policy 
making is still a closed process that is mainly confined to the political parties, leaving 
little scope for other actors such as think-tanks. This closeness is greater in foreign 
policy making due to the Cold War mentality prevalent among the Bulgarian political 
elite, according to which foreign policy making should not be open to many actors 
because it involves sensitive national issues, whose exposure to open debate would 
render the country vulnerable to states wishing it harm. In line with this argument, the 
think-tanks which are influential are those whose directors have forged strong
347 Ianeva, 1999, pp. 73-74.
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personal relations with either the state’s or the parties’ leaderships and are therefore 
seen as trustworthy political institutes whose involvement in foreign policy making 
would not pose any threat to the closed foreign policy process.348
Finally, the relationship of the think-tanks with the Bulgarian mass media is also 
important for the influence that they have on foreign policy making. The greater their 
influence in the mass media, the greater the influence they can exert on foreign policy 
making. This is because Bulgarian politicians prefer to follow the advice of think- 
tanks that have close links with the mass media, in the hope of boosting their personal 
and parties’ images. One such media-oriented think-tank with influence on Bulgaria’s 
foreign policy making is the CLS, which is described below.
The CLS
The CLS was founded in early 1994 as a non-govemmental policy research centre.349 
It was set up as a joint venture by a group of politically active researchers and the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation, a German policy research institute with close 
links to the German SPD. However, the CLS had distanced itself from the Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung Foundation by m id-1994, and was formulating its own goals as an 
independent think-tank. In relation to foreign policy it had three main goals: a) 
Bulgaria’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures; b) the creation of a pragmatic 
foreign policy towards the Balkan states, Russia and the Third World states with 
which Bulgaria had close relations under communism; c) cooperation with 
international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.
348 Krastev, 1999, p. 10.
349 Ibid. pp. 3-4.
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The CLS was actively opposed to the socialist government of Zhan Videnov, 
particularly in the period of economic crisis from 1996-1997. The young director of 
the CLS, Ivan Krastev, developed friendly relations with all the opposition parties, 
especially the UDF, in an attempt to coordinate the policies of the Centre with those 
of the parties in opposition and with the aim of toppling the government of Zhan 
Videnov. It also developed relations with the Bulgarian mass media, which it saw as a 
means of publicizing its policy agenda, and in so doing, swaying the Bulgarian 
electorate against the Videnov government. This strategy was assisted by the public 
unrest over the many economic problems that four years of Videnov’s rule had 
brought to Bulgaria. It engendered the political, as well as the social pressures 
necessary to bring down Videnov’s government. At the general election of April 
1997, the UDF assumed power for a second time, after seven years in opposition.
In addition to this short term strategy, the CLS’s objective also had long term success. 
In subsequent years, the CLS became one of the most influential policy research 
centres in Bulgaria. This influence was especially evident during the time of Ivan 
Rostov’s government and was facilitated by the personal links between the director of 
the CLS and the UDF leadership, as well as by the popularity that the CLS acquired, 
which rendered it useful to the UDF government. This popularity was the result of 
CLS’s good relations with the mass media, which had given much publicity to its 
activities.
In terms of foreign policy, the CLS’s influence can be seen in the following two 
cases. Firstly, it played a decisive role in the solving of the language dispute between
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Bulgaria and FYROM.350 The CLS organised workshops and meetings, where the 
issue was thoroughly discussed by officials from both sides in an attempt at 
conciliation between the two states.351 It also lobbied the UDF government to find a 
solution to the issue.
•
Secondly, as is described in the next chapter, when immediately after the inauguration 
of the UDF government of Ivan Kostov, Bulgarian-Russian relations were strained by 
the countries’ divergent views over the status of gas deliveries from Russia to 
Bulgaria, the CLS played a major role.332 The climate of bilateral relations improved 
in 1998 when, after tough negotiations which involved the CLS, the two sides signed 
a memorandum which clarified the status of gas deliveries.353 The CLS organised 
unofficial meetings between Bulgarian and Russian state officials, which aimed at 
increasing understanding between the two sides.354
In short, Bulgarian think-tanks came into being when the liberal agenda of sustaining 
democracy, promoting market reforms, and orienting Bulgaria towards the West were 
threatened by the socialist government of Zhan Videnov. Despite the pluralism that 
democratization has introduced in Bulgaria’s political life, foreign policy making still 
remains a closed political process, which is mainly confined to those parliamentary 
political parties which are in power. In many states, including France, the UK and 
Greece, there is a belief that foreign policy issues should involve few actors. In
350 For more details about the language issue between Bulgaria and FYROM see pp. 351-2 below.
351 Kiuranov, Deian, personal interview, 4/12/ 2001; Abadzhiev,Dimitur, personal interview, 30/11/ 
2001; Mladenov, Nikolai, personal interview, 18/1/ 2002; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/ 
2001; Tsenkov, Emil, personal interview, 3/12/ 2001.
352 Insider Business & Current Affairs, No 2, 1998, p. 13.
353 Mihalev, Ivan, ‘The Gas Compromise’, http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/24-98/16-24-l.htn
354 Kiuranov, Deian, personal interview, 4/12/ 2001; Abadzhiev, Dimitur, personal interview, 30/11/ 
2001; Mladenov, Nikolai, personal interview, 18/1/ 2002; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 
3/12/2001; Tsenkov, Emil, personal interview, 3/12/ 2001.
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Bulgaria, the scope for actors such as think-tanks to influence foreign policy making 
has been limited and mainly restricted to the centre right of the political spectrum. For 
some time, the BSP refused any cooperation with these actors, and those political 
parties that do consult think-tanks do so mainly because their leadership believes that 
maintaining close relations with them serves the electoral goals of their party.
Minorities and Foreign Policy Making
The participation of ethnic minorities in foreign policy is generally determined by the 
degree of their involvement in the country’s political life. The fall of communism 
generated hopes for increased minority involvement in Bulgaria’s politics. In 
adopting a liberal democratic system of government, Bulgaria bound itself to such 
political principles as freedom of expression and involvement for citizens, including 
the country’s ethnic minorities.
Despite the initial optimism generated by the political movements described, the 
participation of minorities in Bulgarian policy making was difficult to achieve. The 
difficulty mainly derived from the fact that members of the minority elite had a 
different understanding of participation in policy making from that of ethnic 
Bulgarians. This was the result of the divergent views of the elites in the ethnic 
minorities, and the ethnic Bulgarians regarding what constituted the Bulgarian demos. 
For the minorities, the Bulgarian public was not a unitary collective being. It 
consisted of the ethnic majority and sundry ethnic minority groups. According to the 
minority elites, the political system should provide guarantees of political 
participation for minorities. The most fervent supporters of this view were the
132
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
Bulgarian Turks, who, influenced by the assimilation campaign of the 1980s, 
favoured the establishment of what they termed the Bulgarian ethnic model. By this 
they meant the right of every ethnic minority to participate in the policy making 
process through their right to form political parties, and for their language and 
religion to be given official status. •
The members of the ethnic majority elite, however, saw the Bulgarian public as a 
unitary collective. The existence of different minorities was accepted by them at a 
cultural level, but at the political level it was proposed that members of ethnic 
minorities should participate in policy making as citizens of Bulgaria, rather than as 
members of the particular ethnic minority group.355 In addition, members of ethnic 
minorities should have the right to practise their own language and religion, but these 
languages and religions should not be given official status by the Bulgarian state 
because such status would contribute to the establishment of ethnic identities which 
could challenge the territorial unity of the Bulgarian state.
The intention of the ethnic majority elite to prevent ethnic minorities from 
participating in the policy making process was always evident. No ethnic minority 
group was represented at the Roundtable Talks, where all major decisions on the 
institutional and political reforms concerning democratization were taken. One 
decision forbade the formation of political parties to represent ethnic minorities. This 
decision was given constitutional status under article 12, which disallowed the
355 Bakalova, 1999.
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forming of associations, or engagement in any political activities intrinsic to political 
parties by ethnic minorities.356
However, some ethnic minorities did manage to contribute to policy making, despite 
the ethnic majority’s efforts to prevent it. One such groilp was the Bulgarian Turks, 
who in 1990 managed for the first time in modem Bulgarian history to form their own 
political party, the MRF, which allowed them to contribute to the policy making 
process. The political mobilization of the Bulgarian Turks following Zhivkov’s 
political campaign in the 1980s to have their names changed, widely known as 
Vuzroditelniia Protses (Regenerative Process), brought onto the Bulgarian political 
scene members of a minority elite who realised that formation of a political party 
would allow them to lobby for the protection of the human rights of Bulgarian 
Muslims.357 The Bulgarian authorities were reluctant to ban the Bulgarian Muslims’ 
party, fearing that such an action would produce ethnic conflict.
The Foreign Policy Agenda of the MRF
The MRF was formed on 22 December 1989 by Ahmet Dogan, a leading figure in the 
Bulgarian Turkish movement against Zhivkov’s 1980s attempt at assimilation. It was 
not registered as a political party like the BSP or the UDF because the Bulgarian 
constitution did not allow the formation of political parties based on ethnic origins, 
but claimed to be a movement for specific rights, related to the ethnic and religious
356 Article 12.
357 Poulton, 1991, pp. 163-165.
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freedoms of Turks and Muslims. It retained the status of a political movement during 
the post-1989 period.358
Muslims accounted for around 11% of the population of Bulgaria according to the 
census of 1992, which provided the MRF with a substahtial electoral base and has 
allowed them to have continuous parliamentary representation since 1990 as the third 
largest parliamentary force.359 This continuous parliamentary representation has given 
the MRF influence over Bulgaria’s foreign policy making. This influence has been 
exercised in three ways. Firstly, on many occasions the MRF has been part of the 
government and has thus had the opportunity to contribute to foreign policy making. 
The MRF gave parliamentary support to the first UDF government of Filip Dimitrov 
from autumn 1991 to autumn 1992, when the government fell simply because the 
MRF withdrew its support; it supported the interim government of Liuben Berov 
from January 1993 to September 1994 and from July 2001 to June 2005 it has 
supported the NMSU government of Simeon Saxgoburgotski. Secondly, the MRF has 
acted as a ‘security valve’ in the trilateral relations between the Bulgarian state, the 
Muslim minority and Turkey, and helped to smooth Bulgaria’s relations with Ankara. 
Thirdly, through the MRF, Bulgarian Muslims have been able to articulate their 
foreign policy agenda to the Bulgarian parliament and government and international 
forums, such as the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black 
Sea Economic Organisation.
However, as with other parliamentary forces, the MRF’s foreign policy agenda was 
inextricably linked with the political identity that the party sought to build. During its
358 For more information see Chapter V, note 845, p. 355.
359 Access Organisation, 1999, pp. 7-9.
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15 year involvement in parliament, the party’s political identity has gone through two 
phases. The first was from 1989 to the mid-1990s, during which time it sought to 
present itself as the true defender of human rights for Bulgarian Muslims. In doing so, 
it stressed the rebellious activities of its leadership during the Vuzroditelniia Protses, 
and lobbied for political measures such as the restoration of Turkish names which had 
been changed during the Vuzroditelniia Protses, and the freedom to practise the 
Muslim faith.
In terms of foreign policy, the improvement of Bulgarian-Turkish relations was the 
focal point of the MRF’s foreign policy agenda for two reasons. The first was that the 
smoothing of relations between the two states would create a favourable environment 
for the development of economic and cultural contacts between Bulgarian Turks and 
Turkey. This was seen as important since it would provide Bulgarian Turks with the 
economic and ideological resources needed to preserve their distinct identity. In 
addition, through these contacts Bulgarian Turks would be able to continue kinship 
relations in Turkey, which dated back to the time of the settlement of the Ottoman 
Turks in the Balkans, and were confirmed by various bilateral treaties signed between 
Bulgaria and Turkey. It was these close ties that Turkey believed gave it the right to 
protest to the Bulgarian authorities when the latter abused the human rights of 
Bulgarian Turks.
The second reason was that an improvement in Bulgarian-Turkish relations was seen 
as having a positive effect on the status of Muslims in Bulgarian society. It was 
believed that a rapprochement between Bulgaria and Turkey would help to undermine 
Bulgaria’s historic suspicion of Turkey, which on several occasions had poisoned
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bilateral relations between the two states and had resulted in measures being taken 
against Bulgarian Muslims.
The rapprochement was regarded as a high priority in Sofia’s foreign policy in the 
initial post-1989 period and dominated all other foreign policy issues, including 
Bulgaria’s integration within Euro-Atlantic structures, which the MRF strongly 
supported because integration presupposed respect of the human rights of all 
Bulgarian minorities, including Muslims. Following the general election in June 
1990, the MRF leader Dogan stated in a press conference that “Bulgaria’s road to 
Europe passes through the Bosphorus”,360 meaning that rapprochement in Bulgarian- 
Turkish relations, and the subsequent improvement in the status of Bulgarian 
Muslims, should be regarded as a necessary precondition for Bulgaria’s entry to the 
EEC.
The identity that the MRF sought to establish determined its regional agenda, as well 
as its relations with Russia and the Arab states. As far as the Balkan region is 
concerned, the MRF favoured relations with Albania and FYROM because these 
states were seen as being on good terms with Turkey and they also included large 
groups of Muslims in their territories with whom Bulgarian Muslims felt a sense of 
either ethnic or cultural proximity.
The MRF leadership viewed Russia as being the protector of Balkan Slavs, and in 
many instances as their mentor in discriminatory policies against Muslims. The 
Vuzroditelniia Protses is an example of such a discriminatory policy in Bulgaria and,
360 Alexandrov, 1997, p. 131.
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according to MRF activists, it was orchestrated by Bulgaria’s communist regime with 
Soviet blessing. The MRF’s leadership pursued a strategy of distancing itself from 
Russia and following a Western foreign policy orientation.
Finally, the MRF was in favour of promoting relations with parts of the Arab world, 
which is the reference point for every Muslim being the land of Mohammed’s birth 
and ministry, where the religion of Islam was developed, and being the destination of 
the Muslim ‘Haj’, the pilgrimage to Mecca which each Muslim must make at least 
once in his life. However, not all Arabic states were seen as being of equal 
importance. The MRF leadership favoured relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
firstly because, unlike states such as Libya and Iraq, their regimes were friendly to 
Western states and to Turkey. Seeking relations with them would not undermine 
Bulgaria’s Western orientation and would also be in line with Turkish foreign policy. 
Secondly, these states, especially Saudi Arabia, were rich enough to invest in the 
construction of mosques and schools in areas inhabited by Bulgarian Muslims.
In the mid-1990s, the MRF began a prolonged course of change with the ultimate 
goal of becoming a liberal party by West European standards, an effort that was 
finally rewarded by acceptance into the Liberal International in February 2002. These 
changes to the party’s identity were undertaken because the Vuzroditelniia Protses 
had lost its mobilizing effect on the electorate of the Muslim minority, as well as on 
the party activists. In the general election of 1994, the MRF obtained only about 5% 
of the national vote, while in the general election of October 1991 it got 7.5%. In the 
first general elections of June 1990 it had won 6%. At the same time, the party saw 
internal struggles. In the mid-1990s leading members, such as Mufti Nedim Gendjev
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and Mehmet Hoja, left the party because in their view the leadership was not giving 
enough attention to the religious affairs of the minority. They were also critical of the 
opulent life styles of their party leader, Ahmet Dogan, and other members of the party 
elite.361 These resignations rendered it necessary for the MRF to review its political 
identity.
In addition, post-1989 Bulgaria’s economic crisis hit the Muslim population hard. 
Many of them emigrated to Turkey in search of employment. It is estimated that in 
1992 alone, around 150,000 Bulgarian Muslims left.362 This seriously diminished the 
electorate of the MRF, and showed that for the minority economic problems were of 
equal importance to the protection of human rights. Thus, the party needed to be able 
to find answers to other issues than the protection of human rights, and to mobilize 
people other than Muslims. In other words, the MRF had to become a conventional 
party, alongside the BSP and the UDF.
Bulgaria’s European orientation started to become a reality with Bulgaria’s 
Association Agreement in 1993, followed by the European Commission’s (EC) 
invitation in 1999 to begin negotiations over EU membership. The country’s 
European orientation, as shown in the next chapter, led the Bulgarian parties to seek 
some ideological reference with one of the groups of parties represented in the 
European parliament. The MRF sought this reference in the European liberal parties, 
the other two major European parties, the European Socialists and People’s parties 
being an ideological reference for the BSP and the UDF respectively. Also, the 
MRF’s record of being the Bulgarian political party that emphasized issues such as
361 Bell, 1997, p. 387.
362 Insider, January 1993, p. 20;EIU, N o l, 1993, p. 25
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respect for human and minority rights and freedoms, which were dominant issues in 
almost every European liberal party, made the MRF acceptable to the bloc of 
European liberal parties and paved the way for the MRF’s acceptance into the Liberal 
International in February 2002.
These changes in the political identity of MRF were reflected in the party’s foreign 
policy agenda. Economic problems were the focus of the agenda and determined the 
foreign policy priorities set by the MRF. The highest priority was integration with 
Euro-Atlantic structures, which were seen as improving economic conditions for the 
Muslim minority, as well as Bulgarians generally. In contrast to the first half of the 
1990s, Bulgaria’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions is not now seen to depend 
on the improvement of Bulgarian-Turkish relations because Turkey’s place on the 
foreign policy agenda of the MRF is inextricably linked to the human rights of the 
Muslim minority. More recently, Turkey’s position on the party’s foreign policy 
agenda has been downgraded in favour of Bulgaria’s Western orientation as a way of 
alleviating the economic problems of the Muslims.
The increased importance of the economic issues facing Bulgarian Muslims on the 
party’s foreign political platform is also reflected in aspects of the foreign policy 
agenda concerning the Balkan region and Bulgaria’s relations with Russia. In both 
cases, the MRF favours relations with neighbouring states, such as Greece and 
Russia, because this was seen as crucial to boost the economy of regions inhabited by 
Bulgarian Muslims. The MRF often lobbied parliament over issues such as the 
opening of more check-points on the Greek-Bulgarian border, and improvements to 
transport between the two states to allow the huge number of unemployed Bulgarian
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Muslims in the southern part of the country, more than 90% according to some 
estimates, to seek employment in Greece. The MRF has also been interested in 
promoting Bulgarian-Russian economic cooperation in areas such as tobacco 
cultivation and trade, given that the majority of Bulgarian Muslims in southern and 
north-eastern parts were tobacco growers.
Other Minorities
Apart from the Bulgarian Turks, no other minority has managed to participate in the 
country’s policy making process on a purely autonomous basis. Minority groups such 
as Jews, Armenians and Greeks are not sizeable enough to provide representation for 
any political party on a purely ethnic basis. The Bulgarian Turks account for 9.4% of 
the total population of the Republic of Bulgaria, while according to the 2001 census 
Bulgarian Jews count for only 0.01%, Armenians for 0.14% and Greeks for
0.04%.363Also, due to their small numbers these minorities did not fall victim to 
assimilation campaigns during the communist period, which might have encouraged 
them to seek autonomous political representation through ethnic minority-based 
based political parties.364 As a result, the elites of these minorities prefer to express 
themselves politically through ethnic Bulgarian political parties, such as the BSP and 
the UDF.
Finally, minorities such as the Pomaks or Muslim Romas, though they were affected 
by Zhivkov’s Vuzroditelniia Protses in the 1980s, did not seek to express themselves
363 Appendix, tables 64a-68.
364 Poulton, 1991, pp. 118-119; Access Organisation, 1999, p. 37.
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politically.365 This was because, unlike the Bulgarian Turks, Pomaks and Muslim 
Romas lacked a neighbouring kin-state to ally themselves and a political elite. 
Instead, due to their common religious beliefs, they allied themselves to the MRF.
The Macedonian minority was severely suppressed by the communist regime after the 
Tito-Stalin split of 1948, but like the Bulgarian Turks, it had a neighbouring state 
with which to ally itself, namely Yugoslavia. However, the fact that the existence of a 
Macedonian nation in the Balkans continued to be questioned made this minority’s 
participation in Bulgarian policy making a more complex issue. Two political parties 
have been keen to represent this minority in the post-communist period. One was the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), a political party founded 
in December 1990 by descendants of the Slav refugees who left what is now FYROM 
and northern Greece after the Balkan wars.366 The other was the United Macedonian 
Organisation-Ilinden (UMO-Ilinden), a political organisation founded in April 1990 
by a group of Bulgarian Macedonians.367 The degree of participation of these political 
parties in foreign policy making has been determined by the way in which these 
parties sought to represent the Bulgarian Macedonians, which in turn reflects their 
position on the Macedonian issue.
1. Foreign Policy Agenda o f IMRO
365 Poulton, 1991, pp. 111-118
366 http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria-macedonians.PDF.
367 Stoian Georgiev from Petrich was elected as UMO-Iliden’s first president, later to be replaced by 
Iordan Kostadinov. Of the various political groups, such as the ‘Independent Macedonian Association- 
Ilinden-Pirin’ later renamed the Traditional Macedonian Organisation-IMRO Independent Ilinden, the 
Macedonian Democratic Party and the Union for the Prosperity of Pirin Macedonia, which appeared at 
the end of the 1980s and represented the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, UMO-Ilinden was the most 
radical and active (for more details, see http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria- 
macedonians.PDF ). It is because o f its radical political agenda and its active political involvement in 
the Pirin region that the foreign policy agenda of this particular political group has been selected for 
analysis here.
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IMRO does not recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian nation. It considers 
that Slavic peoples living in FYROM and northern Greece are ethnic Bulgarians, who 
use a dialect of the official Bulgarian language. Therefore, according to IMRO, there 
is no Macedonian minority in Bulgaria.368
As this is also the view of the majority of Bulgarians, IMRO has been able to gain 
real political influence in post-communist Bulgaria. This influence was increased 
through its cooperation in almost every election with the UDF, which, since 1994, has 
allowed members of IMRO to win parliamentary seats, and has allowed it to become 
actively involved in the country’s policy making process. In the 1997 general 
election, two IMRO MPs were elected becoming members of the parliamentary 
committee for foreign policy and integration and the committee for national 
security.369
IMRO’s objective has been to develop the identity of a patriotic political party by 
recognizing the existence of only one nation in Bulgaria. Therefore, in IMRO’s view, 
the Bulgarian state should not recognize minority participation in Bulgarian politics 
on a purely ethnic basis, as it considers this would give neighbouring states the right 
to become involved in Bulgarian politics. Thus, IMRO favoured banning the MRF 
from involvement in politics because the party represented Bulgarian Muslims, and 
thereby involved Turkey in Bulgarian politics.
368 Nedeva & Kaytchev, 2001, p. 178.
369 The two IMRO MPs elected at the 1997 general elections were Anatoli Velichkov and Evgeni Ekov 
see Nedeva & Kaytchev, 2001, p. 178. See also Access Organisation, 1999, pp. 33-35.
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It also opposed the BSP, which it considered was not capable of defending Bulgaria’s 
national interests. The basis for this view was that most BSP members had initially 
been members of the BCP, which, according to IMRO activists, had for 45 years 
served Soviet interests at the expense of Bulgaria’s national interests. IMRO activists 
saw the BCP’s downplaying of such issues as the abuse of the human rights of ethnic 
Bulgarians in northern Greece and western Serbia, which would have created 
problems in the Balkans that could have involved the USSR. IMRO also judged the 
BCP for its failure to censure Belgrade for its attempts to establish a Macedonian 
identity for the citizens of SRM.
IMRO adopted a nationalistic foreign policy agenda for Bulgaria which prioritized 
two objectives. The first was the obligation of the Bulgarian state to protect ethnic kin 
groups living abroad, especially in neighbouring states such as Greece, FYROM and 
Serbia. IMRO saw links with ethnic Bulgarians abroad as a means of promoting 
economic and political interests in the states involved, thereby improving Bulgaria’s 
international position.
The second objective was a full and irreversible solution to the Macedonian question 
on the basis of what IMRO saw as the ‘historical truth’, namely that there was no 
Macedonian nation. The Bulgarian state should seek to reinforce the ‘Bulgarian 
identity’ of the Slavic inhabitants of FYROM by undermining any attempt to create a 
Macedonian identity and by seeking entry to the EU. They did not want to see the 
state of FYROM ceasing to exist; however, they considered it should be merely
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another Bulgarian state with strong political and economic links with Sofia.170 
Integration into the EU would allow the Bulgarian authorities to help FYROM to be 
accepted as a member. Bulgarian and FYROM membership would eliminate 
boundary restrictions between Greece, Bulgaria and FYROM, which would in turn 
allow the first real political, economic and cultural interaction between the Slav 
populations of all three states since the two Balkan wars in 1912-1913.371 In addition 
to increasing ‘Bulgarianness’, this interaction would also increase Bulgaria’s political 
and economic role in the Balkans.
1. Foreign Policy Agenda o f UMO-Ilinden
In contrast UMO-Ilinden acknowledged that there was a Macedonian nation, different 
in every aspect from the Bulgarian nation. At state level, this nation was represented 
by FYROM; while in Bulgaria there was a sizeable Macedonian minority, located 
mainly in south-western Bulgaria, in the area known as Pirin Macedonia.
UMO-Ilinden aspired to represent Bulgarian Macedonians politically. The 1st article 
of its founding statute states that the main political aim of the organisation is to unify 
all ethnic Macedonians in Bulgaria, who on the basis of their place of habitation and 
cultural affinity have been classed as Bulgarian citizens. The 2nd article addressed 
recognition of the Macedonian minority by the Bulgarian state.372 Although the 8th 
article of the statute states that UMO-Ilinden was against secession of the
370 Indeed, IMRO countenanced FYROM’s secession from Yugoslavia-IMRO welcoming FYROM’s 
declaration of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991- and supported the lifting of the Greek economic 
embargo (in place since 1994) on the newly independent state. IMRO viewed the embargo as 
undermining the viability of FYROM. See Nedeva & Kaytchev, 2001, p. 178.
371 Interview with Evgeniy Ekov, secretary of IMRO, by Svetlana Tikhova, Reporter, No 7 in FBIS- 
EEU-94-063, 1 April 1994, pp. 4-5.
372 http://www.ureekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria-macedonians.PDF
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Macedonian region of Pirin from Bulgaria, and articles 9 and 10 renounced any form 
of violence, separatism, nationalism or chauvinism on the part of the organisation’s 
leadership in order to achieve UM O’s political aims, the party radicalized its political 
agenda in 1992-94 and included separatist claims. In September 1992, the then UMO- 
Ilinden leader iordan Kostadinov in an interview with the Skopje based newspaper 
Puls, demanded the withdrawal of what he called Bulgarian occupying troops from 
the Pirin region, the transfer of the Orthodox Church in the region to the authority of 
the Orthodox Church of FYROM, and the banning of all Bulgarian political parties in 
the Pirin region.373
The radicalization of UMO-Ilinden’s political agenda could be explained by the fact 
that ongoing ethnic conflicts in neighbouring Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, raised expectations among UMO-Ilinden’s political leadership that 
some revision to the territorial status quo of the Balkan states was possible and, 
therefore, if the leadership radicalized its political demands in relation to the 
Macedonian region of Pirin, it was possible that this might lead to the secession of the 
region from Bulgaria and its unification with FYROM. This radicalization might also 
be explained by the many internal political conflicts among members of the party 
leadership regarding who would best represent the political interests of the 
Macedonian minority.
In October 1994 UMO-Ilinden split into three different political factions, all of which 
claimed to be the real ideological successor to the UMO-Ilinden party. One faction 
was based in Sandanski; one in Blagoevgrad; and one in Gotse Deltchev, with the
373 Ibid.
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latter being later renamed UMO-Ilinden Democratic Action.374 There was an 
unsuccessful attempt to unify the three branches in July 1997, and soon afterwards 
those of Blagoevgrad and Gotse Delchev, which were the most moderate, merged to 
form the United Macedonian Organisation-Ilinden-PIRIN (UMO-Ilinden-PIRIN), 
applying in February 1998 for registration as a citizens’ association in the 
Blagoevgrad City Court. The aim of the association was to voice and defend the 
rights, freedoms and interests of the populations of Pirin Macedonia and other parts of 
Bulgaria, regardless of their religion, gender, social status and origin. The Court 
refused to grant registration. However, in September 1998, UMO-Ilinden-PIRIN 
applied to the Sofia City Court for registration. The registration was granted and 
UMO-Ilinden-PIRIN became a political party with headquarters in Blagoevgrad, with 
Ivan Iliev Sungartiiski as the Chairman of the party’s National Executive Council.375
Both UMO-Ilinden and UMO-Ilinden-PIRIN believed that entry to the EU would 
help to resolve the Macedonian question by allowing the Macedonian minorities in 
Greece, Bulgaria and elsewhere in the Balkan region to strengthen cultural contacts 
with their motherland, namely FYROM. EU membership was the highest foreign 
policy priority for most of the Balkan states, and the EU, it was believed, would exert 
pressure on these states in the process of accession to improve the human and 
minority rights of their Macedonian minorities, including the right to have cultural 
contacts with FYROM. Even during the radicalization of UMO-Ilinden, the image of 
the EU was positive, mainly because it was believed that any change in the territorial 
status quo in the Balkan region would have more chance of success if it had the
374 http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdt7cedime-se-bulgaria-macedonians.PDF.
375 Ibid.
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authorities suspected that UMO-Ilinden had not abandoned the goal of Pirin 
Macedonia’s secession from Bulgaria, and kept the party under close scrutiny.382
The practice followed by almost all the authorities in power since the creation of the 
modem Bulgarian state had been to discourage ethnic minority groups from 
participation in Bulgarian politics, and more especially foreign policy making, which 
was seen as a highly sensitive area. Such participation was seen as encouraging ethnic 
conflicts and the eruption of secessionist movements led by the political 
representatives of the country’s various national minority groups. However, with the 
creation of the MRF party, things changed: the party received the recognition of the 
Bulgarian state and had an uninterrupted political presence in the Bulgarian 
parliament from the beginning of the 1990s. For the first time since the creation of the 
modem Bulgarian state, an ethnic minority group, namely the Bulgarian Turks, had 
the opportunity to participate in Bulgarian politics through the MRF, and had to 
develop their own foreign policy agenda in the Bulgarian parliament and international 
forums.
The other minorities fall into two categories. In one category are the Armenians, 
Jews, Romas and Pomaks, who are politically represented by the major political 
forces, including the BSP, UDF and MRF, and have not developed autonomous 
political activity through their own ethnically based political parties. The dependence
382 In 1999, for example, 61 members of the Bulgarian parliament, mostly representatives of the BSP, 
submitted a letter to the Bulgarian Constitutional Court in which they claimed that the political 
activities of UMO-Ilinden-PIRIN were counter to the national unity of the Bulgarian state, and thus 
were against the Bulgarian constitution. They asked for the party’s activities to be declared 
unconstitutional, but this was rejected by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. See 
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria-macedonians-PDF.
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of these minorities on the major political parties is reflected in foreign policy making. 
These groups have never had their own foreign policy agenda.
The other category includes the Macedonian minority. IMRO and UMO-Ilinden 
claim to represent this minority, despite their differing views in relation to the ethnic 
origins of the Macedonian minority. IMRO, because it maintains that this minority is 
ethnically Bulgarian, has managed to have elected members. UMO-Ilinden holds that 
the members of the Macedonian minority have a distinct ethnic identity, similar to the 
identity of the Macedonians in FYROM. As a result, the Bulgarian authorities have 
restricted UMO-Ilinden’s political activities and its ability to influence Bulgaria’s 
foreign policy making. Even after official recognition of UMO-Ilinden-PIRIN as a 
political party in 1999, the party’s influence on foreign policy making remained 
limited, mainly because it is a small party with few political supporters and no 
representation in the Bulgarian parliament.
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Making
Democratization has allowed Bulgarian citizens to have some say in foreign policy 
making.383 Under communism, it was the communist party alone that had the right to 
decide on foreign policy issues. In the period of democratization the public is seen as 
being a sovereign political actor with the right to participate in foreign policy. This is 
the result of the new freedom of expression, and free exchange of ideas, which 
distinguishes democratic from non-democratic political systems, and allows the 
public to form its own opinions on foreign policy issues.
383 The term ‘public’ in this section refers to Bulgarians over 18 years old who are eligible to vote and 
participate actively in the country’s political life.
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The public can voice its views through constitutional means, for example through 
plebiscites and referendums. According to the Bulgarian constitution, the President of 
Bulgaria has the right to hold referendums on foreign policy issues, the outcomes of 
which are binding.384 This constitutional provision has never been applied. 
Alternatively, the public can hold peaceful demonstrations. According to the 
constitution, every citizen has the right to protest peacefully, if he or she disagrees 
with state policy on political issues.385 National issues have provoked demonstrations 
from Bulgarian citizens, and particularly those sectors that consider that the ethnic 
communities to which they belong are under threat.
For example, there were demonstrations immediately after the fall of Zhivkov over 
the decision of Lukanov’s government to discontinue the policy of assimilation of 
Bulgarian Muslims, and to restore Turkish names. A substantial number of ethnic 
Bulgarians protested at this because they thought it would encourage Bulgarian 
Muslims to demand territorial autonomy and challenge Bulgaria’s territorial 
sovereignty in the future.
The public can also influence foreign policy making indirectly through a general or 
Presidential election. The previous section showed that a range of foreign policy 
issues, such as Bulgaria’s Western orientation, and relations with both Russia and the 
country’s neighbouring Balkan states, are conceived in a different way by the 
Bulgarian political parties, and that this affects the policy that these parties pursue 
when they come into power. Election results affect the foreign policy agendas of
384 Article 102.
385 Articles 43 and 45.
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losing as well as winning parties. For instance, the BSP and UDF revised their foreign 
policy agendas after losing an election.
The other indirect channel of influence is opinion polls. In every democratic system, 
opinion polls are used to measure public trends in relation to political, economic and 
social issues. The results affect policy making at both government and political party 
levels. In liberal democracies, political power is constitutionally derived from the 
public, and state officials seeking access to power wish to adopt policies that have 
wide public support. The results of opinion polls are used by the Bulgarian political 
parties to shape their strategies. According to opinion polls, Bulgaria’s entry to the 
EU was supported by over 50% of the Bulgarian public throughout the 1990s.386 
Thus, all the political parties have declared that EU membership is high on their 
foreign policy agendas.
However, the foreign policy agendas of the political parties are not always in line 
with the opinion polls. First, as will be shown in the next chapter, political parties are 
not ruled exclusively by the public in the crafting of their foreign policy agendas. 
International organisations or international political groups to which Bulgarian 
political parties belong, also have an influence. Secondly, opinion polls record 
opinions in a “yes” or “no” format, and the responses are often emotionally driven 
and related to the current political situation, or media campaigns. They are not 
coherent proposals for strategies relating to foreign policy. It is the task of the 
political parties or state officials to formulate foreign policy that responds to these 
polls by prioritising some views, and rejecting others.
386 Shikova & Nikolov, 1999, p. 27; BBSS Gallup International, Report 12, 2001.
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For example, over Bulgaria’s entry into NATO, the 1990s opinion polls recorded that 
over half of the Bulgarian population was opposed to the accession.387 Many 
Bulgarians saw NATO as a mechanism that served the USA’s expansionist policies, 
that would endanger Bulgaria’s relations with Russia, and that would involve 
Bulgaria in controversial military conflicts. Nevertheless, membership of NATO 
remained at the top of the foreign policy agendas of all the Bulgarian political parties 
because the party leaders saw accession to NATO being inextricably linked with 
Bulgaria’s Western orientation, especially entry to the EU.
Also, throughout the 1990s feelings of nationalism were strong in Bulgaria. In a 
survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Democracy in 1994, 25% of the 
public were of the view that people who do not speak Bulgarian should not have the 
right to vote, while 47% of the public believed that there were Bulgarian territories 
within the boundaries of other states.388 However, the foreign policy agendas of the 
main political parties do not reflect these views. Party leaders firmly believed that 
policies that would seek the exclusion of ethnic or religious minorities from the state 
policy making process and lay claim to territories in neighbouring Balkan states, 
would negatively affect Bulgaria’s efforts to obtain membership of the EU.
Conclusion
Democratization has changed foreign policy making in Bulgaria in terms of process 
and the actors involved. Foreign policy making involves various mechanisms and
387 BBSS Gallup International, Report 10, 2001.
388 http://www.csd.bg/publications/democ/democ2.htm ; Pouton, 1991, pp. 164-165.
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actors, with special responsibilities. The functioning of these mechanisms and actors 
in democratic Bulgaria is vital and is not restricted to merely rubber-stamping foreign 
policy decisions taken by a single political party as used to be the case under 
communism.
One of the main factors that has affected the outcome of state foreign policy making 
in post-1989 Bulgaria has been the way in which responsibilities have been defined. 
In broad terms, these responsibilities were not well defined as a result of the process 
of institution building which occurred at the beginning of democratization. It is 
believed that the prerogatives of democratic institutions were not rationally defined, 
but came about as the result of a bargaining process between political personalities 
and parties whose motives are in most cases personal or narrow party interests. Such 
a relationship was evident between the President of the Republic and the government 
during the first half of the 1990s. Because at the time that the constitution was being 
written the government and the presidency were controlled by different political 
parties, namely the BSP and the UDF, this led to a round of tough bargaining between 
the two political parties, which was to determine the future political system. The 
UDF, which controlled the Presidency, favoured an empowered President, while the 
BSP, which controlled the government, proposed that the parliament should be the 
stronger partner. The outcome was a poorly defined, semi-Presidential system, with 
the confusion over the prerogatives of these two institutions laying the ground for 
institutional conflicts and confusion over foreign policy issues.
Theoretically, the danger of conflict between the two branches of the executive, 
namely the President and the government, over foreign policy issues, is always
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present, since the Bulgarian constitution has remained unchanged for 12 years. In 
reality, however, institutional conflicts over foreign policy issues were confined to the 
first half of the 1990s and were the result of governmental instability during that 
period, which rendered the President sufficiently powerful to have a personal foreign 
policy agenda which he attempted to impose on the government.
Under communism the BCP was the only actor involved in foreign policy making; 
democratization has allowed other actors to be involved. Political parties, think-tanks 
and ethnic minorities all play a role in foreign policy making. However, their 
influence is not equal. Only those parties that are in power really affect foreign 
policy. The influence of think-tanks is dependent on their ability to obtain a wide 
audience. The influence of minorities depends on whether they are represented by a 
political party and whether their numbers are big enough for any party representing 
them to win a seat in parliament.
Thus, the power to influence seems to be related to the capacity of all these actors to 
gain the support of a substantial part of the Bulgarian public. Indeed, the importance 
of public support demonstrates the increased role of the public in policy making in a 
democracy, in which it is constitutionally regarded as the chief source of power from 
which authority can be derived.
However, despite the importance of the public in the policy making process of 
Bulgaria’s post-1989 democratic system, its influence on state foreign policy making 
since 1989, has never extended beyond indirect actions. No plebiscite or referendum 
on a foreign policy issue has been held since 1989 and although elections have often
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produced changes in foreign policy making, these changes have not been the prime 
motivator for public participation. Few people in Bulgaria vote for a party or a 
candidate in general or Presidential elections solely with a foreign policy agenda in 
mind, with the exception of entry to the EU, which they see as improving their living 
standards.
There were some public protests in the 1990s related to foreign policy issues 
including the decision to allow NATO’s military aircraft to use Bulgarian national 
airspace during the NATO campaign against Kosovo in 1999. However, the effect of 
public demonstrations is not clear since these protests did not make the Bulgarian 
government change the foreign policy decisions already taken.
Thus, it could be argued that Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy making, although it 
has been a more open political process than in the communist period, remains 
generally restricted to those political parties which manage to gain power, and some 
institutions which maintain close links with the political leadership of these parties.
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Chapter III 
From Proletarian to Liberal Internationalism
Introduction
Chapter II examined how the democratization of Bulgaria has changed both the 
process of and the actors involved in foreign policy making. It was argued that, like in 
other domains, decision making on foreign policy has become decentralized. This has 
resulted in the involvement of many actors, each of whom have their own foreign 
policy agenda, which, as a result of the new domestic political environment, can now 
be pursued.
To argue that democratization has been achieved through the new domestic political 
environment would not be entirely accurate: democratization in Bulgaria was in large 
part the result of Perestroika, which lifted the Soviet Union’s veto on Bulgaria’s right 
to autonomous politics.389 Also, as was the case in some Southern European countries 
a few years earlier, the international environment gave context to democratization 
through its influence on the political actors involved.390 After the end of the Cold War, 
the most influential Western states and international institutions exploited the strong 
desire of almost every East European state to develop relations with the West, and 
encouraged them to adopt a system of liberal democracy for governance of internal 
affairs and to enable good international relations. This has been achieved through the 
instrument of political conditionality, according to which influential international
389 Whitehead, 2001c.
390 For the influence of the international environment in previous cases of democratization, see: Powell, 
2001; Tsingos, 2001; Whitehead, 2001a, Whitehead, 2001b.
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organisations and states established political criteria which EES must meet to receive 
economic and political aid. In political terms, conditionality allowed these various 
international actors to intervene directly in the politics of EES, which was perceived 
as necessary in the absence of a functioning ‘civil society’.
This intervention was not restricted to domestic issues, it extended to foreign policy 
and was exercised in two ways: directly, through Bulgaria’s obligations to abide by 
the decisions of international organisations, such as the UN’s in relation to Iraq at the 
beginning of the 1990s. This disrupted the good relations that Sofia had previously 
enjoyed with Baghdad. There was also indirect intervention through economic 
measures such as trade preference and visa regimes, which also damaged relations 
with countries where there had been a good relationship during the time of 
communism. One example is the visa restriction on Russians visiting Bulgaria, which 
was necessitated by Sofia’s association agreement with the EU. As will be argued 
below, this restriction was to have a negative impact on economic relations between 
Bulgaria and Russia and was in sharp contrast to the favourable economic and 
political treatment of the Soviet Union under communism.
Democratization should be conceived as a political process through which EES 
sought to break their relations with the communist past and integrate into the Western 
world. Having abandoned communism, the EES aspired to achieve the political and 
economic standards of the West, which they saw as the only way of securing long 
term political stability and economic prosperity.391 After 1989, EES frequently 
attempted (quite voluntarily) to pattern their policies upon those practised by Western
391 Hyde-Price, 1998, pp. 264-267; Zielonka, 2001, p. 519.
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institutions such as the EU and NATO.392 For Bulgaria in particular, ‘Westernization’ 
was seen as serving another purpose, that of reducing the international isolation 
resulting from Zhivkov’s assimilation campaign against the Bulgarian Turks.393
However, Westernization, as this process of integration into the Western world has 
been called, has not been easy and on many occasions has provoked long and heated 
debate. The problems relate to the ambiguity of the concept of the Western world. 
Firstly, the so-called Western world was seen as the opposite pole to the Soviet 
domain and, therefore, did not include the Soviet Union or, following the dissolution 
in December 1991, the Russian Federation.394 The political systems of both the Soviet 
Union and the Russian Federation were considered to be far removed from the liberal 
democratic systems of most WES, the USA, etc. whose political systems were seen as 
being based on fair and free elections, accountability of the elected state authorities 
and respect for human rights. The political system of communist and post-communist 
Moscow was viewed as a regime in which political authorities had either no, or in the 
case of Russia limited, accountability through free but often unfair elections, and 
where the human rights of its citizens were downplayed.
As a result, the political system of Russia was seen as alien to the political systems 
operating in the West and, on many occasions, was characterized as “non-European”, 
“Asiatic” or, even “barbaric”.395 This alienation led EES to see that continuing close
392 Zielonka, 2001, p. 519.
393 Crampton,, 1997, pp. 209-215; Drezov, 2001, p. 424, 426-428.
394 As is argued below, because of the predominance of the Russian element in almost all aspects of 
Soviet life during communism, Russia came to be regarded by most of the political elite in EES as the 
inheritor of the Soviet past.
395 Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 26/11/2002; Dainov, Evgeni, personal interview, 26/11/2001; 
Ivanov, Andrei, personal interview, 13/11/2001; Kiuranov, Deian, personal interview, 4/12/2001; 
Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001.
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relations with Moscow would have a negative effect on the process of modernization, 
which these states sought through integration with the Western world. However, in 
the case of Bulgaria, this became a particularly contentious issue due to the special 
relations that Sofia had had with Moscow during communism. As a result of its 
communist past, Bulgaria was dependent on Moscow for energy supplies, a fact that 
Moscow on many occasions used to interfere in Bulgarian politics.
In addition, the Western world comprises a number of actors, including both states 
and international organisations, whose influence on Bulgarian politics varies in 
relation to political conditions inside the country and the importance its political elite 
assigns to these actors. Good relations with the EU came to be of primary importance 
for the overwhelming majority of the Bulgarian political elite, exemplified by the fact 
that accession to the EU was given the highest priority in the foreign policy agendas 
of most of Bulgaria’s political parties and almost all Bulgarian governments after 
1989. Accession to the EU has been an open ended political process which has 
exercised tremendous influence on every aspect of Bulgaria’s policy making 
including foreign policy making, and has affected the foreign policy agendas of 
political parties and attitudes towards international organisations, such as the UN and 
NATO, and states, such as Russia, the USA, and some of the Third World countries.
This chapter examines how Bulgaria’s increasing integration into the Western world 
has influenced the country’s foreign policy making. It focuses first on the EU as the 
international actor with most influence on Bulgarian politics and analyses the effect 
that the EU accession process has had on aspects of the country’s foreign policy
160
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States; The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
making: foreign policy mechanisms; relations with international organisations; 
interstate relations especially Third World countries, the USA and Russia.
Westernization Becomes Meaningful through ‘Europeanization’
The dissolution of the Soviet Union affected Bulgaria’s domestic and international 
security. Sofia lost an important patron which had till then guaranteed international 
security and internal political stability by offering constant political backing for the 
BCP, and social support for the Bulgarian people, through economic subsidies, which 
improved welfare and reduced social unrest.
For the majority of the Bulgarian political elite after 1989, the vacuum left by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union could only be filled through Bulgaria’s integration 
into the political and economic structures of the Western world.396 The West, the 
victor in 50 years of bipolar struggle, was seen as the main architect of the post­
communist world order and it was therefore unthinkable for a small state such as 
Bulgaria to ignore it in shaping future security policy. Most of Eastern Europe felt the 
same and thus the broader dynamics of the region also influenced Bulgaria.397
Despite general agreement on the aim of integration into the Western world, at the 
start of democratization, there was dissent among certain circles of the Bulgarian 
political elite over the strategy to be adopted to achieve maximum security benefits.
396 This was the case with the political elite in every East European state, for whom the West 
represented the main reference point for almost every political force. See Zielonka, 2001, p. 513; 
Mendras, 2001.
397 Such influence was the result of the strong links between the transition processes in East European 
countries, and was known as the ‘phenomenon of contagion’. For more details about this phenomenon 
see Whtehead, 2001a, pp. 5-8; Nello, 2001, pp. 76-77; Drezov, 2001, p. 420.
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This dissent arose because of the rather loosely-defined concept ‘Western world’, 
which referred both to a group of nation-states and to a dense matrix of independent 
political and economic organisations, such as the UN, NATO and the IMF. Which of 
the very many actors comprising the Western world should be given priority in 
Bulgaria’s integration strategy? The EEC and the USA were seen as being the most 
influential actors in the matrix of Western political, economic and military 
institutions.398
As argued in detail below, at the beginning of democratization, it was not clear which 
of these two should be given priority. For a substantial part of the Bulgarian political 
elite, mainly supporters of the BSP, it was relations with the EEC that were seen as 
being most important, mainly for geographic and cultural reasons. They argued that 
Bulgaria’s location in South-Eastern Europe limited its potential for establishing close 
economic and political relations with the USA, but offered unlimited opportunities for 
forging close relations with the EEC. In addition, Bulgaria was culturally closer to 
Europe than to the USA, something, which was historically exemplified by the fact 
that Bulgaria, since its existence as a modem nation-state, had sought to acquire a 
European profile and to model the country’s political and economic systems on those 
of the larger European states such as France and Germany.
There was, however, a portion of the political elite who argued that Bulgaria should 
prioritize relations with the USA. In the main, the upholders of this view were 
political activists within the UDF including Stefan Savov and the future Prime
398 Until 1993, the EU was generally known as the EEC. For simplicity, the term EEC is used when 
referring to the period before the creation of the EU.
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Minister Filip Dimitrov.399 They regarded the USA as a potentially very powerful 
partner that would guarantee the country’s domestic and external security. They 
believed the USA would lobby more effectively than the EEC for favourable 
treatment for Bulgaria from international economic institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. This included favourable terms for loans, funding for economic 
projects to reduce the privations of the post-communist period, and sympathetic 
hearings from the London and Paris Clubs, for instance, for renegotiation of 
Bulgaria’s huge foreign debt, standing then at about $12bn. Those who favoured 
giving priority to the USA considered this would give other benefits through 
economic projects and trade agreements which would contribute to a speedy transition 
from the centrally planned economy and improve the people’s welfare, thereby 
securing economic and political stability for the country.
Lastly, by virtue of being the greatest Western military power, and because of its 
leading role in military organisations such as NATO, the USA was seen as offering 
the best military guarantees against states such as Russia and Turkey, which were 
seen as posing the greatest potential threat to Bulgaria’s territorial integrity in the 
future. The threat from Moscow was based on its military might: as well as a 
numerous and well-trained military, it maintained powerful conventional and nuclear 
arsenals.400 Although Russia was acknowledged to be politically and economically 
weak as a result of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, it was still perceived as forces if its 
national security or other interests in Eastern Europe were threatened.
399 Grozev, 1994; Grozev, Konstandin, personal interview, 16/1/2002; Todorov Antoni, personal 
interview, 30/11/2001.
400 Abadzhiev Dimitur, personal interview, 30/11/2001; Dainov Evgeni, personal interview,
26/11/2001; Hinkova Sonia, personal interview, 16/11/2001; Kiuranov Deian, personal interview, 
4/12/2001; Ivanov Andrei, personal interview, 13/11/2002; Rachev Valeri, personal interview, 
16/1/2002; Mladenov Nikolai, personal interview, 18/1/2002.
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For several scholars, the EES exaggerated the military threat posed by Russia in the 
post-communist period,401 which was seen as a psychological problem rather than a 
military reality.402 For these scholars, both the political will and the military ability of 
Russia to pose even a small scale military threat to Eastern Europe were limited 
because any military conflict would be costly for Russia’s fragile political and 
economic systems and because the Chechen conflict had shown the offensive 
capabilities of the Russian Federation to be weak.403
Nevertheless, for a large section of the political elites of EES, including Bulgaria, 
Russia’s perceived military might was a threat. There was a genuine fear that 
instability in Russia resulting from nationalist or communist political forces taking 
power in Moscow, could spread in the region and restore Russia’s imperial powers.
In relation to Turkey, the threat came from Ankara’s military supremacy in the Balkan 
region, a dominance which a sector of the Bulgarian political elite believed Turkey 
could exercise over Sofia whenever it thought that the human rights of Bulgarian 
Muslims were being violated. There was the example of Turkey’s military invasion of 
Cyprus in 1974 under the pretext of protecting the human rights of Turkish Cypriots 
living on the island. Although Turkey had never exercised military supremacy over 
Bulgaria during the Cold War, this was thought to be because Sofia was under the 
protection of the Soviet Union during that period. Any military action against 
Bulgaria would have produced wider conflict between the Soviet and Western
401 Seidelmann, 2001, p. 2001
402 Ibid.
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military blocs. However, this did not mean that Turkey might not exert its supremacy 
now that the Soviet bloc had collapsed and Russia was in disarray.
That Bulgaria should give priority to relations with the USA was also supported by 
those of the Bulgarian political elite who considered that ties with the US, being the 
world’s only remaining superpower, would best guarantee Bulgaria’s full integration 
into the Western world. The USA was considered to be able to influence the decision­
making process of European organisations such as the EEC. The case of Turkey was 
cited as an example. Having forged a strategic alliance with the USA after the WWII, 
the Turkish establishment had frequently managed to secure American economic and 
military aid. In addition, through this strategic alliance Ankara had succeeded in 
overcoming a number of obstacles in its relations with the EEC, such as the Greek 
veto at the beginning of the 1990s on the creation of a Customs Union between 
Turkey and the EEC, and later reluctance to grant Turkey the status of a candidate 
state for membership of the EU.
A small section of the Bulgarian political elite saw the EEC as nothing more than a 
large market. It might ensure economic prosperity and political stability for its 
member states and perhaps could provide the same benefits for those EES that 
established relations with the Union, but it did not offer military guarantees to 
Bulgaria. The USA, however, could do this either alone or as a leading force in 
NATO, whereas the EEC had never pursued an autonomous and effective defence 
policy. The Western European Union (WEU), although viewed as the Community’s 
military branch by a number of Bulgarian politicians, was perceived as an extremely
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weak organisation whose role during the Cold War had been marginal, and which 
could at best only act in tandem with NATO.
Disagreement on whether Bulgaria should give priority to relations with the EEC or 
the USA soon gave way to a political consensus. By the mid-1990s the overwhelming 
majority believed that Bulgaria should prioritize relations with the EU, and that 
membership should be the main foreign policy aim. This consensus was officially 
endorsed by the unanimous parliamentary decision of 14 December 1995, which 
sanctioned an application for membership of the EU. The government memorandum 
that accompanied the application stated: “Membership of Bulgaria in the EU is a 
strategic goal, reflecting the national interest of the country.”404
The decision to give priority to relations with the EEC/EU, however, did not mean 
that those politicians and policy-makers who thought the USA was more important 
had disappeared, and they surfaced with Gulf W ar n ,  which is discussed in detail 
below. However, for the larger part of the 1990s this faction was in the minority and 
could not influence Bulgaria’s foreign policy making and even acknowledged the 
importance for Bulgaria’s joining the EU.
What really lay at the heart of the decision in the mid-1990s to prioritize relations 
with the EEC/EU? A number of political events which occurred during the first half 
of the 1990s contributed. Firstly, unlike other multinational organisations such as 
NATO, the EEC/EU had defined its post-cold war strategy towards Eastern Europe at 
an early stage. In particular, the European Summit of Copenhagen in June 1993 had
404 K issiov, 2002, p. 71; FB1S-EEU-95-231, 1/12/95, p. 2
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decided the EU ’s strategy towards Eastern Europe and provided for long-term 
enlargement of the EU eastwards.403 For the overwhelming majority of the Bulgarian 
political elite of the time, the decisions of the Copenhagen Summit opened up the 
prospect of Bulgaria becoming a full EU member, which became synonymous with 
the process of Westernization or ‘Europeanization’.406 Membership of the EU would 
be tangible proof that Bulgaria had become an equal in the so-called ‘first world’. The 
country’s direct participation in the decision-making of the Union was deemed to 
compensate for the loss of state sovereignty.407
Secondly, the majority of the Bulgarian political elite came to realize that, in the post- 
Cold W ar international environment, the greatest risks to state security lay within the 
state. There was the example of the neighbouring SFRY, where economic crisis and 
ethnic strife had eroded the foundations of the federal state, leading to its dissolution. 
In such an environment, it was believed that what Bulgaria needed was not a patron- 
state such as the USA, able to guarantee Bulgaria’s territorial integrity, but economic 
growth and consolidation of the newly established system of liberal democracy, so 
that social and ethnic tensions that could jeopardize state security would be avoided. 
Bulgaria’s integration into the EU was deemed to achieve this; there were the 
examples of Greece, Portugal and Spain, all countries with fragile economic and 
political systems, which had achieved economic growth and political stability after 
becoming members of the EEC.408
405 European Council in Copenhagen 21-2 June, Conclusions of the Presidency, S N 180/93, p. 13
406 Seidelman, 2001, p. 124, 137.
407 Seidelman, 2001, p. 133.
408 Whitehead, 2001b; Smith, 2001, p. 44.
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Thirdly, whether priority should be given to relations with the EEC/EU or the USA 
was related more to the initial bewilderment caused by the collapse of the communist 
bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet Union than to political reality. This 
bewilderment affected both the Bulgarian political elite and the USA and EEC/EU. 
Bulgaria needed to redefine its foreign policy priorities; the West had to establish a 
new strategy for Eastern Europe. It eventually became clear that, despite some 
differences, both Washington and Brussels had the same political goals, namely 
economic liberalization and democratic consolidation.409 The two Western actors 
worked collectively in international forums without major dispute and were thus able 
to maintain the balance between ‘Europeanism’ and ‘Atlanticism’.
This agreement and cooperation over political goals generally convinced the 
Bulgarian political elite that these two actors were not so much competitive as 
complementary, and that establishing relations with one did not preclude cooperation 
with the other. In an interview in the Bulgarian news weekly ‘Antneni’ in July 1991, 
the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Viktor Vulkov, when asked whether excessive 
reliance on the USA’s friendship might not cause Bulgaria to lose its way on the road 
to a United Europe, replied that seeking relations with the USA was not a 
contradiction to, but an extension of Bulgaria’s relations with Europe.410
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the USA had recognized that the integration of all 
the Balkan states into the EU would best serve the region’s long-term stability and 
security. To this end the American administration embarked on a series of economic 
projects, including the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), known also
409 Smith, 2001, p. 31.
410 Interview with Foreign Minister Viktor Vulkov, Anteni, No 26, June 1991, p. 9.
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as the ‘Schifter Initiative’.411 These projects were designed to consolidate the fragile 
democratic institutions of the Balkan states and bring economic growth by improving 
the regional infrastructure, which would also contribute to the region’s easier and 
quicker integration into the Union. While, for most of the 1990s, these American 
initiatives ran in parallel with initiatives undertaken by the EU, by the end of the 
decade, the USA had begun to decrease its commitment to the region, and bowed to 
the EU’s decisions about most of the projects in the region. An example of this is the 
implementation of the ‘Stability Pact’, the most all-embracing regional project, which 
was launched in 1999 in the aftermath of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo 
and set up under the guidance of the EU.412
The USA’s disengagement with the region was the result of a debate in American 
policy making circles that had begun at the end of the 1990s during NATO’s military 
involvement in Kosovo. This debate concerned the degree of American political and 
economic commitment in the Balkan region. The prevailing view was that the USA 
and the EU should share the economic burdens that political stabilization and 
economic reconstruction of the Balkan region would entail on an equal basis. The 
USA had borne the brunt of the military offensives in Kosovo in 1999, and it was now 
the EU’s turn to shoulder the economic burden of post-war reconstruction. In 
addition, a number of American officials feared that any post-war role in the region 
would be difficult, due to the widespread anti-American feeling in the Balkan region 
resulting from NATO’s military involvement in the former Yugoslavia.
41lSchifter, 1998; Hinkova, 2002, pp. 13-14 and p. 21.
412 Hinkova, 2002, pp. 16-20. For more details about the Stability Pact and its impact on Bulgaria’s 
regional policy see, pp. 332-333 below.
169
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
This disengagement from the region enforced the Bulgarian political elites’ belief that 
the EU would be the most influential international actor in the Balkan region in the 
future. As Anastasakis and Bechev put it: “with decreasing US commitment to the 
Balkans, the EU has become the only game in town.”413
The consensus on giving priority to relations with the EEC/EU was also related to 
public enthusiasm for rapprochement with Western Europe, which the Bulgarian 
political elite could not ignore. This enthusiasm was rife throughout Eastern Europe 
and illustrated by the slogan ‘Return to Europe’ which had captured the public’s 
imagination and had inspired the 1989 anti-communist revolutions in East Central 
Europe and Romania.414
In East Central Europe and Romania, ‘Return to Europe’ demonstrated the wish of the 
people for breaking relations with the Soviet Union and the establishment of closer 
links with the WES. The West European political and social model was very attractive 
to East Central European societies. This model had the characteristics of political and 
social systems common to all the WES, such as liberal democratic governance, 
welfare societies and social market economies, which the East Central European 
public considered would bring them out of the social and economic stalemate that was 
the result of nearly 50 years of communist rule.415
In the case of Bulgaria the slogan ‘Return to Europe’ did not imply feelings of anti- 
Sovietism or anti-Russianism, as it did in the case of East Central European states and
413 Anastasakis & Bechev, 2003, p. 4.
414 Hyde-Price, 1998, pp. 264-267. In this chapter, the term ‘East Central Europe’ refers to the 
following states: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.
415 Hyde-Price, 1998, p. 264
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Romania. Russia still had a positive image in Bulgaria even after 1989 due to the long 
term relations with the Soviet Union and the economic benefits it had received. The 
latter had meant that living standards in Bulgaria were at a higher level than they had 
been before WWII. The Bulgarian communist regime did its best to continue a good 
image for Russia to support their cause.416
In the post-1989 period, for the majority of Bulgarians, Russia was seen as a 
protector: based on common Slavic origins, Bulgaria could expect support if its 
security was threatened. The fact that the image of Russia has continued to be positive 
among the Bulgarian public since 1989 is reflected in the many opinion polls 
published throughout the 1990s.In a Gallup poll conducted in 1995 about 65% of the 
Bulgarian public reacted positively to the idea of Sofia maintaining close relations 
with Moscow, and ranked Russia as the second most favoured international partner, 
the first being the EU, which in the same Gallup poll received 72% support.417 Russia 
also ranked second in the public’s estimation over which international actor should 
enjoy Bulgaria’s foreign policy priority. In an opinion poll conducted at the end of 
1996 only about 20% of the Bulgarian public believed that Russia should be 
Bulgaria’s top foreign policy priority, with 48% responding that Bulgaria should give 
priority to its relations with the EU.418
The question that arises is that if Russia’s image had been good since 1989, then what 
did the slogan ‘Return to Europe’ represent for Bulgarians? ‘Return to Europe’ 
concerned the economic benefits that the Bulgarians expected to gain from the 
country’s rapprochement with WES. Indeed, for the majority of Bulgarians, Western
416 See pp. 28-49 above.
417 Appendix, tables 29-30 & 54a-55b.
418 Appendix, tables 55a &55b.
171
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
Europe was seen as an economic paradise, which, by offering aid to Bulgaria, could 
alleviate the hardships that the people were suffering in the post-1989 period through 
the loss of East European markets and Soviet economic subsidies.419 In other words, 
for the Bulgarian public, the slogan did not symbolize a demand for a radical 
reorientation of the country’s foreign policy, but a change to Western Europe 
becoming the guarantor of Bulgaria’s economic prosperity.
This could explain the fluctuations in public opinion towards the EU throughout the 
1990s. Immediately after 1989, approximately 50% of the Bulgarian public were 
positive about the EU.420 This rate, moderate in comparison to attitudes in the East 
Central European states, dropped to below 40% between 1994 and 1996.421 In 1995, in 
particular, only 27% supported the EU.422
After the initial period of euphoria towards the EU, came a period of dissatisfaction as 
a result of the social and economic conditions that the transition to democracy had 
brought. In broad terms, there were high levels of criminality, insecurity and poverty, 
which produced some nostalgia for the communist past.423 There was a general feeling 
that the EU had failed to meet the initial high expectations of the Bulgarian public.424 
The gravy train that had been envisaged did not exist.
419 See pp. 60, 82 above.
420 Appendix, tables 30-32 &56a -58 .
421 Ibid.
422 Ibid.
423 With reference to the nostalgia o f the communist past see also p. 101.
424 Shikova & Nikolov, 1999, pp. 28-9.
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In the latter half of the 1990s opinions changed and in almost all the post-1997 
opinion polls the EU received more than 70% support from the Bulgarian public.425 
This change came about in response to the economic crisis of 1996 which resulted 
from the reluctance of post-1989 Bulgarian governments to introduce painful, though 
necessary, economic reforms in line with the recommendations of Western 
governments and international organisations, including the E U .426
Delay turned to negligence when the socialists came into power in 1996. Under the 
leadership of Zhan Videnov the socialists refused to introduce any of the 
recommended economic reforms and came into conflict with the IMF, thus leaving 
the country once again isolated. Zhan Videnov’s government embarked on an 
ineffectual project designed to restore the network of economic relations which 
Bulgaria had enjoyed during the communist period. The socialists thought that by 
restoring economic relations with their erstwhile communist partners they could 
alleviate the economic pains of transition more effectively than by following the 
economic remedies offered by the West.
The 1996 crisis brought down Videnov’s government and put an end to nostalgia for 
the communist past. The economic pains the crisis inflicted on Bulgarians made them 
realize that restoration of the relations of the communist period was an infeasible 
dream. The only way out was to adopt the W est’s reforms. This was the first step 
towards restoring the E U ’s image among the Bulgarian public. The second and most 
decisive step came with the accession to government of the UDF.
425 Appendix, table 69.
426 For more details about the economic crisis see pp. 105-107; Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 89-92; Stefanov, 
1999.
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Under the leadership of Ivan Kostov, the new UDF government embarked on the task 
of promoting economic reforms in line with the recommendations of international 
organisations, to enable Bulgaria to be awarded membership of the EU at some time 
in the future. These measures pulled the country out of economic crisis,427 and the 
economy soon began to show signs of recovery.428 The popularity of the EU increased 
further with the decisions at the Helsinki European Summit in December 1999, which 
allowed Bulgaria to start negotiations with the EC for full EU membership.429
Despite the fluctuations during the 1990s, in most cases public opinion ranked the EU 
higher than the US. For example, in 1995, when positive opinion about the EU was at 
its lowest ebb, only 47% of Bulgarians thought that Bulgaria should establish close 
relations with the USA, compared with 72% for the EU and 65% for Russia.430 A 
Gallup poll conducted in 1996 indicated that 7% of Bulgarians believed that top 
priority should be given to relations with the USA,431 while 48% were of the view that 
their country should give first priority to its relations with the EU, and 20% that it 
should be Russia.432
The reasons the USA had a less favourable image than the EU were that among the 
public, the USA was seen as the enemy of Russia, which the EU was not. Having no 
autonomous foreign and military policy the EU was regarded as an economic rather 
than a political institution. Also Soviet Perestroika had served to put the EU in a
427 Vesselinov, 2002;
428 Shikova & Nikolov, 1999, p.30.
429 Ibid;
430 The discrepancy between the low rate of positive opinions towards the EU (27%) and the high 
percentage o f people (72%) who believed that Bulgaria should establish close relations with the EU is 
because a large part o f the Bulgarian population, though having a negative view of the EU, thought that 
Bulgaria had no alternative but to establish close relations with it.. Appendix, tables 54a-54b.
431 Appendix, tables 30, 55a-55b.
432 Ibid.
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friendly light for the EES populations and especially Bulgarians, whose political and 
social life was highly intertwined with that of the Soviet Union. Under ideas such as a 
‘Common European Home’, Western Europe came to be seen not as a member of a 
hostile camp, but as a member of the same continent that encompassed the EES and 
the Soviet Union. The coexistence in the same continent of EES and WES meant 
there were common security concerns, which could be overcome through 
rapprochement and cooperation.
The USA’s negative image was also related to NATO’s two military interventions in 
the former Yugoslavia, which had produced feelings of insecurity among the 
Bulgarian public, who were concerned that ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia 
would be exacerbated and spill over into the whole Balkan region. The fact that the 
USA had bom the brunt of the military activities in Kosovo in particular provoked the 
Bulgarian public into expressing their feelings of anti-Americanism through street 
protests and responses to opinion polls.
Bulgaria’s Route to the EU: Does It Affect the Scope of the EU’s Political 
Influence on the Country?
The political consensus to give priority to relations with the EU was mainly 
determined by Brussels’ declared intention to accept Bulgaria as a full member of the 
Union in 2007. Since 1989, Bulgarian governments have not always been consistent 
in their application of EEC/EU directives on how to liberalize the economy and 
consolidate the democratic system, but neither has the EEC/EU been consistent in its 
desire for Bulgaria to join the Union. Should Bulgaria’s entry to the Union be
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postponed from 2007, the pro-EU consensus might be eroded. We now examine the 
factors that have influenced Bulgaria’s integration into the EU thus far, and analyse 
how expected integration has affected the country’s foreign policy making. By 
analysing the factors that have determined Bulgaria’s relations with the EU since 
1989, we can assess the grounds on which Bulgaria’s pro-EU political consensus has 
been based since 1989, and how this will affect the EU ’s influence on Bulgarian 
foreign policy making.
In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, there is a strong belief that accession to the EU 
will happen in either 2007 or 2008. The first formal links with Brussels came within 
three years of the end of the Cold War, Sofia and Bucharest had signed a Association 
Agreements with Brussels, which defined preferential trade regimes with the EU. In 
December 1999, in line with the decision taken at the European Council in Helsinki 
they had been invited to begin negotiations with Brussels for EU membership. In 
October 2002, the European Council declared its intention - reiterated at succeeding 
European Council Summits - to complete by the year 2004 the negotiations which the 
Union had begun with Sofia and Bucharest in the aftermath of the European Council 
Helsinki Summit and to accept Bulgaria and Romania as full members of the Union in 
2007; a prospect that for Bulgaria has seemed more real since June 2004 when Sofia 
completed its accession negotiations with Brussels.
However, there is no guarantee that Bulgaria will become full member of the EU by 
the end of the decade. The accession process is a very complicated procedure which is 
not depending only on the progress that a state makes to reform its economy or its 
political system in line with the guidelines from Brussels. The process also depends
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on all EU member states agreeing to a country’s accession. Events in any of the 
twenty-five existing member states that might lead to political or public opinion being 
negative to the project of EU enlargement per se would be enough to block 
membership even if negotiations were almost complete. In addition, member states 
have the right to hold referenda, and if opinion in any of these states were to go 
against EU enlargement then the treaty would not be ratified.433
Bulgaria’s EU accession process also depends on the international environment, 
which has played a decisive role in the country’s bid for membership of the EU since 
1989. Throughout the period of democratization, the pace of political and economic 
reform influenced Bulgaria’s accession to the Union less than did international events 
such as the Soviet coup of August 1991 or the wars in the former Yugoslavia because 
EU policy-makers judged that such events might derail the democratization and 
Western orientation to which Bulgaria aspired. This gave a momentum to the 
accession process on the part of Brussels so as to minimize the influence of these 
events on Bulgaria’s political life.
433 It is noteworthy that the EU constitution, signed on 29 October 2004 by the heads o f the EU 
member states and meant to have been ratified by all 25 states of the Union within two years after the 
time of its signing, was rejected in France by 55% of the popular vote in May 2005 and in the 
Netherlands by 62% of the vote in June 2005 after referendums were called in both states for the 
purpose of its ratification. The primary reason of the rejection of the EU constitution has to do with 
insecurities that the 2004 EU enlargement has caused within a large section o f the EU public, including 
the majority o f public opinion in France and the Netherlands, which sees that the EU enlargement in 
2004 has diminished the political influence of their member states within the Union and has had 
negative economic consequences in terms o f unemployment and low wage increases due to migration 
from the new member states. These insecurities have increased from plans to include new member 
states in future, particularly countries with a large population such as Turkey, which the EU 
constitution does not impede. The result o f the referendums in France and the Netherlands in May and 
June 2005 respectively has raised the issue o f postponing Turkey’s EU membership for the foreseeable 
future at least, and of delaying EU membership for Bulgaria and Romania so that the political elites of 
EU member states reflect on the result o f the May and June 2005 referendums and decide on how to 
proceed with the project of EU enlargement. http://www.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/3954327.stm
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The importance of the international events can be seen in how they affected the 
signing of the Association Agreement between Bulgaria and the EU on 22 December 
1992; and the decision taken by the European Council in Helsinki on 10 December 
1999 to invite the Bulgarian government to initiate negotiations for EU membership.
The Association Agreement o f Decemberl992
After the fall of Todor Zhivkov, the new Bulgarian government moved quickly to 
restore relations with the EEC, which had been frozen since May 1989 as a result of 
the communist regime’s policy of Vuzroditelmia Protses.434 Thus, in a letter to the 
then President of the EC, Jacques Delors, dated 1 December 1989 the Bulgarian 
Prime Minister Atanasov informed the President of the Commission that the 
Bulgarian government had taken measures to restore their Muslim names to the 
Bulgarian Muslims and asked for a resumption of negotiations over the Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement, which had been discontinued in May 1989.435
Atanasov’s request was received sympathetically by the Commission, and 
negotiations were resumed in March 1990. In less than a month, on 3 April 1990, a 
Trade and Cooperation agreement between the Bulgarian government and the EC was 
signed. This agreement was one of the first generation of agreements which the EU 
was to eventually conclude with most EES. It provided for limited trade liberalization 
between the two parties, but excluded agricultural products and steel, which the EEC 
considered to be economically sensitive.436
434 See pp. 68-72 above.
435 Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 129.
436 Ibid., pp. 24-29.
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After the signing of the Trade and Cooperation agreement, relations with Bulgaria 
deteriorated as a result of the general election held on 10 June 1990. The electoral 
victory of the BSP cast doubts over whether democratic reforms would be introduced. 
Under communist rule, the majority of BSP cadres had enjoyed political and 
economic privileges which any attempt to introduce democratic reforms would 
undermine.
The first signs of the EEC’s unease were exhibited before the June election. In May 
1990 the European Parliament issued a document declaring that the Bulgarian 
government had discriminated in favour of the BSP during the electoral period and 
urging the European Council to make the strengthening of Bulgarian relations with 
the EEC conditional on the promotion of democratic reforms.437 The political turmoil 
that resulted from this unfair election deepened the breach in relations with the EEC. 
There was a general feeling in Brussels that Bulgaria would not easily manage to 
overcome this political crisis and proceed with the reforms aimed at democratizing the 
country’s political system and liberalizing the state economy. As a result, Bulgaria 
was not included in the first wave of EES to begin negotiations over contractual 
agreements with the EEC, known as Association Europe Agreements. These 
agreements were an enhancement of the previous Trade and Cooperation Agreements. 
They provided for trade concessions for all categories of East European products in 
exchange for a commitment on the part of EES to pass reforms aimed at 
democratizing their political systems and liberalizing their economies.438
437 Ibid, p. 129.
438 Ibid., pp. 29-46.
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In a report issued in August 1990, the EC showed its readiness to open negotiations 
over Association Agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria 
was excluded on the grounds that it had made insufficient progress towards 
democratizing the political system and liberalizing the state economy.439
By the end of 1991 the E C ’s position had softened and it wrote to the European 
Council on 13 February 1992 urging it to authorize the Commission to start 
negotiations with Bulgaria over an Association Agreement.440 The Council gave its 
authorization on 11 May 1992 and negotiations began a few days later.441
It is interesting to know what had changed the EEC’s view. In the short period which 
had elapsed since August 1990, Bulgaria had not made spectacular progress in either 
political or economic reforms. The political system was still unstable due to a 
polarizing political climate which prevented the parliamentary forces from 
establishing any basic political dialogue. Even in the October 1991 general election, 
the BSP repeatedly contested the right of the MRF to participate on the grounds that 
the MRF represented the Muslim Minority and, thus, contravened the constitution that 
prevented the formation of parties on the basis of ethnic and religious affiliation.442 
Economically, the only significant reform that had been introduced by the end of 1991 
was a partial deregulation of prices. A couple of laws concerning the privatization of 
large state-owned companies and the de-collectivization of state collectives had been 
passed, but had not been applied.443
439 Ibid, p.72 and 130.
440 Ibid., p. 140; Zhelev, 1998, pp. 60-64.
441 Ibid.
442 Crampton, 1997, p. 223.
443 Ibid., p. 222.
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The EEC’s change of heart was due to the Soviet coup of August 1991 which alarmed 
the policy-makers in Brussels, and showed that the process of democratization in 
Eastern Europe was not irreversible. The newly established democratic systems in this 
region were very weak and there was always the danger that a coup might overthrow 
them and result in authoritarian rule similar to the communist regimes of the past.444 
This was especially true for Bulgaria, where the ex-communist BSP continued to be 
powerful after 1989 and remained uneasy about reform.
After the Soviet coup the EEC decided that the only way to ensure continued 
democratization in Bulgaria was to accelerate the start of negotiations over an 
Association Agreement. It considered that any prolongation of the period of non­
negotiation would increase feelings of disappointment and discontent among the 
Bulgarian public, who might begin to think that the EEC was not interested in 
including Bulgaria and, that therefore, there was no need for the country to undergo 
painful economic and political reforms. In such an atmosphere, pro-reform and pro- 
Western political forces would have been marginalized, while any anti-reform and 
anti-Western ones would have gained power at the expense of the country’s 
democratization and regional as well as international security.
Also, with the signing of an Association Agreement the EEC would be in a better 
position to promote democratization in Bulgaria. The agreement would bind Bulgaria 
to promoting political and economic reforms, and would provide institutional 
mechanisms through which the Community could supervise Bulgaria’s progress, for 
example through, the Joint Bulgarian-EEC/EU Association Council and the Joint
444 Papadimitriou, 2002, pp. 122-3, 128-131; Dimitrov, 2001a, pp. 44-59.
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Bulgarian-EEC/EU Parliamentary Committee. The former would bring together 
Bulgarian governmental and Commission officials on an annual basis, while the latter 
would provide a forum where parliamentarians from both sides could meet on a bi­
annual basis. In these meetings EEC officials would monitor the progress of 
Bulgaria’s democratization and intervene if they thought progress was unsatisfactory 
by giving advice of what should be done to accelerate democratization. It was 
believed that this would achieve swifter democratization than waiting for Bulgaria on 
its own to meet the EEC’s criteria before concluding an Association Agreement.
The content of the EEC’s Association Agreement with Bulgaria differed from the 
Agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.445 The Association 
Agreement with Bulgaria made specific reference to the protection of human rights 
and minority groups, and not all trade provisions were favourable for Bulgaria. These 
provisions, which were included in the Association Agreements with the Visegrad 
states,446 excluded a range of Bulgarian products, such as steel and agricultural 
products, from immediate access to the markets of the EEC.
These differences can perhaps be explained by the different international environment 
in which negotiations with Bulgaria occurred. At the time of the Bulgarian 
Association Agreement negotiations violent conflicts were taking place in the former 
Yugoslavia, which highlighted the need for a strong human rights component.447 
Because of Bulgaria’s sizeable ethnic minorities and its past record of abuse of 
minority rights such a component was seen to be of particular importance for Sofia.
445 Papadimitriou, 2002, pp. 147-157.
446 The term Visegrad states refers to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The term refers to both 
constituent parts of Czechoslovakia, namely the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
447 Papadimitriou, 2002, pp. 141-145.
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To guarantee observance of this provision, there was a clause providing for automatic 
suspension of the agreement in the event that either of the two contractual parties 
failed to fulfill their obligations. This provision, though referring to both parties 
obligations was aimed at Bulgaria’s treatment of its ethnic minority population.
With reference to the provisions excluding Bulgarian agricultural and steel products, 
this was the result of pressure from powerful lobby groups on the governments of 
many WES. These farming and steel industry lobby groups felt their interests would 
be threatened if the Association Agreements being concluded with EES provided for 
free access of East European agricultural and steel products to West European 
markets. East European agricultural and steel products were cheaper than comparable 
West European products; thus their availability in the market would result in 
economic losses for the agricultural and steel sectors of the EEC. Although these 
same lobby groups had put pressure for the inclusion of similar clauses in the 
Association Agreements with the Visegrad states, they had been unsuccessful. 
Because of this, at the time of the EEC’s negotiations with the second group of states, 
namely Bulgaria and Romania they increased their activities and were successful.448
Bulgaria as a Candidate State fo r EU Membership
Since the beginning of the 1990s the EEC had made it clear that Association 
Agreements with EES should be regarded as having intrinsic value and were not 
necessarily steps along the way to future membership of the European
448 Ibid., pp. 145-151.
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Community.449Nevertheless, the signing of Bulgaria’s Association Agreement in 
December 1992 raised high expectations among the political elite that Sofia would 
become a full member of the EEC. These expectations were further boosted when, 
less than a year after the conclusion of this agreement, the EEC at the European 
Council Copenhagen summit in June 1993 decided to increase the number of 
Community members and, to this end, the Association Agreements were to be 
considered as part of the broader framework of a pre-accession strategy.
However, in autumn 1995 the Bulgarian government of Zhan Videnov decided to 
apply for Bulgarian accession to the EU after an overwhelming majority in support of 
this decision from the parliament. An official application was submitted to the EU at 
the European Council summit in Madrid on 16 December 1995.450 It seems somewhat 
surprising that Bulgaria’s application for membership coincided with opinion polls 
recording their lowest support for the EU. However, as mentioned above the majority 
(approximately 72%) acknowledged that, in terms of Bulgaria’s foreign policy 
priorities, EU membership was necessary.451 Also, Videnov’s government hoped that 
should Bulgaria’s application be successful, the country’s economic problems would 
be more efficiently dealt with because it could be used as justification for tough 
economic policies.452
449 Ibid, p. 185.
450 Shikova & Nikolov, 1999, p. 38.
451 Appendix, tables 54a-54b.
452 At the time Bulgaria applied for EU membership the Bulgarian government was facing huge 
economic problems which culminated in the economic crisis o f 1996. The economic losses o f state- 
owned enterprises amounted to 15% of GDP and this situation was exacerbated by the fact that these 
losses were being absorbed by the state owned banking sector. In addition, Bulgaria had a $303m trade 
imbalance at a time when state foreign exchange reserves amounted to $ 1.236m and the government 
seemed unable to accumulate the level of reserves that would enable it to meet the repayment o f more 
than $lbn of its foreign debt in 1996 without IMF support. Such support seemed unlikely unless the 
government took socially costly economic measures aimed at privatizing inefficient state companies 
and banks and reducing its control o f the market. See Dimitrov, 2001a, pp. 81-86.
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The EU ’s response to the Bulgarian application came from the EC about eighteenth 
months later. In a report issued by the Commission on 16 July 1997, Bulgaria was 
assessed as a candidate for EU membership in the future, but the EU was not yet 
prepared to begin negotiations. This, according to the report, was because Bulgaria 
had not implemented the necessary economic reforms, to enable its economy to cope 
with the EU ’s competitive economic environment. At the time of the EU ’s reply, 
Bulgaria was just emerging from the autumn 1996 crisis, which had paralyzed the 
country’s economy and toppled Videnov’s government.
In addition, the EU was also unsatisfied with Bulgaria’s progress in the area of 
political reforms. Although over its six year lifespan, the country’s democratic system 
had proved stable, the economic crisis of 1996 showed that there was corruption in 
the state apparatus, which posed a direct threat to this stability. The EU authorities 
had expressed their concerns in various ways. On 25 September 1995 at the summit of 
the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs of the EU in Brussels, a decision 2317/95 
was adopted which required the nationals of certain East European countries of which 
Bulgaria was one, to obtain a visa in order to enter EU countries.453
The European Council of Luxembourg ratified the Commission’s July 1997 report in 
December. According to this report only five states, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the 
Czech Republic and Cyprus, were ready to begin negotiations for membership of the 
EU. However, less than two years later in December 1999 the European Council of 
Helsinki reassessed this decision and allowed other EES, including Bulgaria, to begin 
negotiations with the EC to join the Union. Despite all the efforts of the UDF
453 The visa regime for Bulgarian citizens was terminated with a decision taken by the Council of 
Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs on 1 December 2000.
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government to promote liberal economic reforms, the country’s economy was still 
beset by the aftermath of the 1996 economic crisis and was far from being able to 
withstand the pressures of the competitive environment of the EU market.454
Once again it was the international environment that had influenced the decisions of 
the EU. The European Council’s decision came immediately after NATO’s military 
activities in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, during which both the Romanian and the 
Bulgarian governments had adopted a clear pro-NATO stance and offered logistical 
support to the alliance as well as allowing it to use their national airspace. This 
support brought these two governments into conflict with the majority of public 
opinion in their countries, which was strongly opposed to NATO’s military 
intervention in Kosovo. Bulgarian opinion polls at the time showed that some 80% of 
the public was against NATO military involvement in Kosovo and the picture was 
similar in Romania.455
This public opposition to NATO military operations in Kosovo alarmed European 
officials, and the British Ambassador to Romania, Christopher Crabbie, feared that 
the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR) would capitalize on the public’s 
opposition and seek to undermine the political power of the Romanian government of 
Radu Vasile, which would have detrimental effects on Romania’s pro-Western 
foreign policy agenda and the political and economic reforms being implemented. On 
3 May 1999 the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, visited Romania as a part of an 
official tour of the Balkan countries which had given help to NATO during the 
Kosovo crisis, and Crabbie, who had long disagreed with the official policy of the
454 Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 92-4.
455 Giatzidis, 2002, p 144-5; Karadjov, 1999; Zheliaskova, 1999.
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UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Romania’s NATO and EU aspirations, 
persuaded him to announce a change to the U K ’s negative position on Romania’s 
readiness to be invited to begin negotiations with both NATO and the EU.456 The 
speech which had been prepared for delivery to the Romanian parliament on 4 May 
1999 was rewritten overnight: the new one was in line with the change to Britain’s 
official policy agreed the previous day. Accordingly the British Prime Minister 
pledged his country’s support to ease Romania’s passage into NATO and the EU.457 
With reference to Romania’s accession to the EU in particular, Tony Blair said that: 
“At the Helsinki European Council in December [1999] Britain will support an 
invitation to Romania to begin negotiations to accede to the EU”.458
The change in British policy towards Romania, drove the UK to adopt a similar policy 
on the issue of Bulgaria’s joining NATO and the EU. At the end of M ay 1999, Tony 
Blair, as part of his official tour, visited Sofia. During his meetings with Bulgarian 
officials including the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ivan Kostov, and the President of the 
Republic of Bulgaria, Petur Stoianov, the British Prime M inister pledged Great 
Britain’s support for Bulgaria’s admission to NATO and the EU.459 Tony Blair 
promised that his country would give support to an invitation to Bulgaria to begin 
negotiations for EU membership, at the Helsinki European Summit in December 
1999. This statement was in sharp contrast to Great Britain’s official policy on the 
issue of Bulgaria’s joining NATO and the EU which until then had been that Bulgaria 
was in no state to be invited to begin negotiations.460
456 Meixner, 2004, note 67, p. 47.
457 http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk_politics/334543.stm
458 http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Pagel312.asp.
459 http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/05/180599.
460 Ibid.
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This change of heart on the part of the U K ’s prime minister occurred for a number of 
reasons. The domestic political scene in Bulgaria during NATO’s military operations 
in Kosovo was quite similar to that in Romania. There was a strong public opposition 
for NATO’s military operations and a fear among Bulgarian and European officials, 
including British diplomats in Sofia,461 that anti-reform political parties such as the 
BSP could capitalize on the public opposition and direct it against the pro-Western 
foreign policy agenda and the political as well as economic reforms which the UDF 
government of Ivan Kostov had initiated. In addition, there was a widespread view 
among many European officials, including several British diplomats that for the 
process of integration into the EU Romania and Bulgaria should be treated as one 
case.462 They were seen as two Balkan states with similar economic and social 
structures that were different from those of other East European candidate states. 
They had also followed similar paths in their post-1989 relations with the EU - for 
instance they both signed Association Agreements at approximately the same period 
and in due course both were excluded from the first wave of East European 
applicants.463 Therefore, it was thought that any decision to accelerate Romania’s 
accession to the EU should extend to Bulgaria.
The change in British policy on Bulgaria joining the EU was to have a decisive effect 
on Sofia’s EU aspirations. At that time the British Prime Minister had considerable 
influence in European politics. The Labour Party, which was in power in Great 
Britain, was the ideological partner of the French Socialist Party and the Social 
Democratic Party in Germany as well as a coalition of leftist parties in Italy. In
461 Personal interview with a diplomat who wishes to remain anonymous, 25/1/2002.
462 Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 181.
463 Personal interview with a diplomat who wishes to remain anonymous, 17/6/2004; Papadimitriou,
2002, p. 181.
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addition, Tony Blair was much admired by most of his European counterparts mainly 
due to the fact that he favoured a more active and deeper British engagement in 
European politics than had been the case prior to his party coming to power in 1997. 
Blair’s position on Kosovo also played a role. This position was seen as a success and 
partly as a result of his ‘strong’ leadership. After his tour of the Balkans in late spring 
1999, B lair’s government at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 
lobbied for Romania and Bulgaria to be invited to begin negotiations over EU 
membership.
The views of the British government were well received by other EU officials 
including the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Guenter Verheugen, 
the Commissioner responsible for EU enlargement and formerly German Minister for 
Europe in Schroeder’s government, which, like the British government, believed that 
the Romanian and Bulgarian governments should be rewarded for their support of 
NATO in the Kosovo conflict. These officials feared that otherwise the political 
power of the Bulgarian and Romanian governments could be undermined by the pro- 
Western foreign policy agendas which both governments were promoting. 
Furthermore, both countries were sources for the fuel being smuggled into Yugoslavia 
after economic sanctions were imposed on Belgrade, and it was thought that the 
prospect of membership would encourage a tighter regulation of borders to make sure 
oil supplies did not get through to Serbia.464In addition, the EC at the time was 
positive about the prospect of Romania and Bulgaria being invited to begin 
negotiations for EU membership because they felt this freed them from the danger of 
accusations of discriminatory practices against Romania, Bulgaria and other countries
464 http://www.news.bbc.co.ukyi/hi/uk politics/334543.stm
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such as Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had been excluded from the first wave 
of East European applicant states.463
Thus, the EC reached the conclusion that at the European Council summit in Helsinki 
the decision taken at the European Council in Luxembourg in December 1997 should 
be changed and the Commission ordered to begin immediate negotiations with 
Bulgaria and Romania,466 and in December 1999 they were invited to begin 
negotiations for membership to open in March 2000.467
It was expected that this decision would boost the morale of the Bulgarian public 
through conviction that membership of the EU was not far away and the quality of 
their lives would be greatly improved. The UDF government hoped to capitalize on 
this euphoria by claiming that the EU ’s decision was the result of the government’s 
implementation of political and economic reforms and adherence to a pro-Western 
foreign policy. This would boost the UDF’s public image and confront public 
opposition to the government’s stance on NATO military operations in Kosovo, and 
the efforts of its political opponents to capitalize on this opposition. In addition, the 
government would be enabled to continue with its economic and political reforms in 
the face of little resistance from the public or opposition parties.
Although the decision did create a degree of euphoria among the Bulgarian public, it 
did not save the UDF from electoral defeat in the parliamentary elections of June 
2001. In those elections the UDF received only 18% of the vote with the newly 
formed NMSII party receiving 43% and topping the poll.
465 Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 184.
466 Papadimitirou, 2002, p. 184& 186; Anastasakis &Bechev, 2003, p. 6.
467 Ibid.
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The decision to invite Bulgaria to begin negotiations for EU was also a political move 
on the part of the European Council which wished to see the UDF continue its 
programme of political and economic reform. Despite the hopes the decision had 
raised, the Union however was not prepared to grant membership to Bulgaria in the 
immediate future, as was made clear at the summit of the European Council in 
Gothenburg on 14 June 2001. At this summit the European Council decided that, in 
the short term, the Union was prepared to grant membership only to ten out of the 
twelve states that were currently conducting negotiations with the EC. The states that 
would be successful would be those that completed negotiations by the end of 2002.468
The decision of the European Council to restrict EU membership to only ten states 
was taken for two main reasons. Firstly, the European budget was not sufficient for 
accession of more than ten countries by 2006, which meant that de facto the two states 
lagging further behind in the negotiations could not be offered membership until after 
2006, even in the event that they had completed negotiations with the Union by 2002. 
Secondly, the Council wished to allow those countries that were to be granted 
membership to participate in the European parliamentary elections in May 2004. 
However, because of the EU ’s cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, in order to be 
eligible to participate in the European parliamentary elections of M ay 2004, the ten 
candidate states would have to have completed negotiations with the Union 18 months 
before the election date.
468 EC's Report IP/01/1566, Brussels, 13/11/2001.
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Bulgaria it was decided would not be included in the group of ten states which would 
finalize negotiations with the EC by the end of 2002. The period following the 
European Council in Helsinki was not long enough for the Bulgarian government to 
catch up with the EES which had begun negotiations for EU membership after the 
European Council summit in Luxembourg in 1997. By the end of 2002, Bulgaria had 
managed to close only 23 out of the 30 chapters which comprised the negotiations 
between the EU and the candidate states. In a report sent to the European Council on 
9 October 2002 the EC stated that Bulgaria would not be ready to join the EU by 2004 
and that the possibility of membership should be postponed until after 2006.469 The 
Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 adopted a detailed timetable on 
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, dubbed the ‘Roadmap for Accession’, according to 
which Bulgaria could expect to join the Union in 2007. On 15 June 2004 the 
Bulgarian government of Simeon Saxkoburgotski completed all parts of the 
negotiations with the EU, and Bulgaria is currently waiting for the EU to fulfill its 
promise to accept it as a full member state in 2007.
If the time period after the summit of the European Council at Helsinki was deemed 
too short for Bulgaria to complete negotiations with the EC by 2002, why was it 
considered to be sufficient for Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, which were included in 
the ten countries to be admitted? Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia had been excluded 
from the group of states that started negotiations with the Commission after the 
European Council summit in Luxembourg in 1997 on political grounds. For Slovakia, 
these applied mainly to the poor democratic credentials of the government of
469 See conclusion o f the report at http://ww\v.europe.eu.int/C.ornm/enlargement/report2002/bu en.pdf
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Vladimir Meciar which was then in power.470 With reference to Latvia and Lithuania, 
despite the many economic problems that these two states faced such as the 
omnipresence of the state in the country’s economic life, an extremely weak private 
sector and the existence of labyrinthine procedures that could also question the 
existence of a market economy, the main reasons for their exclusion were problems 
concerning the respecting of minority rights, as well as a fear on the part of the Union 
that starting negotiations for membership with all the Baltic states would not be well 
received by Yeltsin’s Russia.471 The fact that the European Council at Luxembourg 
decided to start negotiations with Estonia immediately was not because Estonia was 
further ahead in the fulfillment of EU membership conditions than its Baltic 
neighbours, but because the Council wished to mitigate the effects of Estonia’s 
exclusion from NATO at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997, a few months 
prior to the Luxemburg European Council in December 1997.472
By the end of the 1990s, the EU had fewer reasons to object to the membership of 
these three states. In Slovakia, M eciar’s government had fallen in the general election 
in 1998 and the newly elected government of Mikulas Dzurinda had started to reverse 
the democratic deficit.473 In Latvia and Lithuania, under the guidance of Western 
institutions such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, governments had made 
progress in the field of minority rights. In addition, the election of Vladimir Putin as 
President o f Russia in March 2000 was to dispel the EU’s fears that Russian-EU 
relations would deteriorate in the event that Latvia and Lithuania were offered
470 Smith, 2001, p. 44; Haughton, 2003; Samson, 2001.
471 Smith, 2001, p. 45; Pettai, 2001; EIU (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), 1998, p. 21 & 34, pp. 27-32 & 
43-47; http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 11 98/pdf/en/latvia en.pdf; 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 11 98/pdf/en/lithuania en.pdf; 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 11 98/pdf/en/estonia en.pdf.
472 Ibid.
473 Samson, 2001, p. 381.
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membership of the EU. This was mainly because under Putin, Russia’s foreign policy 
became friendlier towards the West than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. Not only did 
these events lead the EU to revise the decision taken by the European Council in 
Luxembourg, they also helped to ensure that their negotiations with the EC were 
given precedence over Bulgaria’s.
Bulgaria’s exclusion from the first group of states to start negotiations was not based 
so much on political grounds as on economic grounds.474 Despite the efforts made 
after 1997 by Rostov’s government to tackle the country’s problems, Bulgaria still 
had a long way to go to meet the economic criteria set by the Union. This is not to say 
that the other three states succeeded in meeting these economic criteria. In fact, if 
Bulgaria’s economic situation in 2002 is compared with that of Lithuania and Latvia, 
the reasons why the latter two countries were included in the first group of accession 
states are not clear.475
According to Papadimitriou, since 1989 some of the EU members had developed 
patron-client relationships based on historical links or cultural proximity with one or 
more EES.476 The client states have repaid their patrons by introducing economic and 
political reforms representing their interests regionally and internationally.
Latvia and Lithuania’s membership was promoted by Finland and Sweden, and 
Slovakia was backed by Germany, but throughout the 1990s Bulgaria did not have 
any such relationship. The only effective help came from the British government after
474 EC, 1997.
475 http://www.europe.eu.int/Cornm/enlargernent/report2002; Report IP/01/1566, Brussels, 13/11/2001; 
EIU (Bulgaria), 2002; EIU (Estonia, Latvia & Lithuania), 2002.
476Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 89.
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the Prime M inister’s visit to the Balkans in late spring 1999. The fact that no state put 
themselves forward to be a patron for Bulgaria was probably because influential 
countries in the European North such as Germany, Britain or the three Scandinavian 
states that were members of the Union were more interested in promoting the 
membership of the Visegrad and Baltic States because the economic stakes were 
higher in these.477 The volume of trade and investment from the states of the European 
North to the Visegrad and Baltic regions were much higher than to the Balkan 
Peninsula throughout the 1990s.478 In addition, due to the military conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia, a number of policy-makers in North European states believed that 
the Balkan Peninsula was unstable and admission of any Balkan states to the Union 
posed the risk that Brussels would become embroiled in a future Balkan crisis.
Secondly, EU members such as France were sceptical about EU enlargement in 
general479 because they believed that priority should be given to deepening 
cooperation amongst the existing EU members through a strengthening of the 
institutional infrastructure of the Union and the participation of as many member 
states as possible in the newly launched European Monetary Union (EMU) project. It 
was believed that widening the Union eastwards without prior strengthening of the 
existing institutional infrastructure and securing the success of the EMU would result 
in a multi-tiered Union with weak decision-making mechanisms, which, in turn, 
would hamper cooperation amongst EU member states and the Union’s ability to 
blossom into a powerful international actor with its own foreign and defence policy.
477 The British government’s lobbying for Romania and Bulgaria to be invited to start negotiations for 
EU membership by the Helsinki European Council was only temporary. It was based on security 
considerations related to the two countries and the entire Balkan region resulting from NATO’s 
military operations in Kosovo. It was influenced by Great Britain’s diplomatic staff in Romania and 
Bulgaria and was in sharp contrast to the views of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
478 Papadimitriou, 2002, pp. 90-3, pp. 97-100, pp. 104-6, p. 110.
479 Ibid, pp. 97-103.
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The only EU member states with an interest in Bulgaria’s accession to the Union were 
Italy and Greece, mainly due to the leading role that both states wished to assume in 
the Balkans after the end of the Cold War. However, in both states there were 
powerful lobby groups already at work, such as the farming unions that opposed EU 
membership for Balkan states such as Bulgaria because they believed that it would 
prove detrimental to their interests because of the overlap of agricultural exports to 
the EU. Wine, fresh fruit and fresh vegetables, for instance, which constituted almost 
40% of Bulgarian agricultural exports to the EU also accounted for 30% of Greek and 
Italian agricultural production.480 As a result of this overlap, Bulgaria’s admission to 
the Union would be disadvantageous for Greek and Italian farmers since their 
products would have to compete with much cheaper Bulgarian production.
Also, Greece’s ability to advocate Bulgaria’s accession to the EU was limited by 
Athens’ weak institutional position within the Union for the greater part of the 1990s. 
This weakness was related to the poor state of the Greek economy and to its foreign 
policy towards the Balkan region. Throughout the 1990s, Greece was seen as 
something of a ‘sick man of Europe’ because most Greek governments up to 1996 had 
failed to follow EU directives aimed at invigorating the state economy, which had 
been on the brink of bankruptcy.
In terms of its foreign policy for most of the decade Athens had followed a nationalist 
line towards the Balkans aimed at restricting Turkey’s influence in the region and 
preventing the newly created state of the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
480 Ibid., p. 112.
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(FYROM) receiving recognition as the Republic of Macedonia. According to the 
Greek authorities, the name Macedonia was linked to the ancient history of Greece, 
since it was the name given to the Kingdom of Alexander the Great and, therefore, no 
modem state other than Greece had the right to use it. The Greek government forged a 
special relationship with the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic, which was 
international isolated because of its active involvement in the ethnic conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia.481 This special relationship apparently even extended to the 
political authorities of Belgrade requesting political and military assistance from 
Greece in early 1992 in order to implement a plan which firstly aimed at the political 
destabilization of FYROM with the view to eventually partitioning it territorially 
between Greece and Serbia.482 However, Greece refused the Serbian offer because it 
realized that any engagement in discussions aiming at FYROM ’s political 
destabilization would have a negative effect on Athens’ international image and bring 
the country into sharp political conflict with its EU partners.483
Greece’s Balkan policy went against the efforts of the EU to put an end to ethnic 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and secure peace in the region by promoting liberal 
democratic systems in, and multilateral cooperation between, the Balkan states. 
Conflicts arose both behind closed doors in meetings of the European institutions, and 
in the public arena, leaving Athens isolated from the other members of the Union and, 
thus, undermining Greece’s potential to exercise any influence on the E U ’s foreign 
policy decision-making in relation to the Balkan region.
481 Lampe, 2002, pp. 369-457; Ramet, 2002, pp. 151-174, 203-252, 316-336.
482 Takis Michas, 2002, pp. 48-56.
483 Ibid.
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Greece’s institutional position within the EU has improved since 1996, when a change 
of government took place. The former Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, resigned 
for health reasons and the parliamentary group of Greece’s ruling party, PASOK, 
elected Costas Simitis as his successor. Under Simitis’ premiership the Greek 
government reconsidered its economic and foreign policy.
The Simitis government set itself the difficult task of entering the EMU by 2002. In 
order to achieve this objective, the Greek government was obliged to follow the 
Brussels directives and adopt economic measures in line with the economic criteria 
set by the Union for membership of the EMU. At the same time, the Greek 
government also began to distance itself from the Milosevic regime and align itself 
with EU efforts to promote peace and multilateral cooperation in the Balkan region. 
By doing so, Greece hoped to increase its credibility within the Union as a member 
state interested in promoting EU interests in the region and influence the EU ’s foreign 
policy decision-making in relation to the Balkan region.
However, despite this, Athens has done little to advocate neighbouring Bulgaria’s 
accession to the EU. Firstly, after 1996 Greece was preoccupied with securing the 
country’s entrance into the EMU by 2002 as well as with promoting Cypriot 
membership of the EU by 2004. These two issues were top foreign policy priorities. 
Secondly, several Greek policy-makers did not favour EU enlargement eastwards, 
because they believed that this would entail a substantial cut in the amount of EU 
Structural Funds given to Greece as a result of the EU ’s policy of helping the 
economic convergence of its poorest and richest members by reallocating funds to the 
more economically disadvantaged EES.
198
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
Sofia also had no Western style influential lobby groups able to promote its interests. 
Indeed, as many Bulgarian officials have often admitted, in order to gain support for 
state interests, such as the promotion of the country’s membership of NATO and the 
EU, Bulgarian governments have had to work closely with lobby groups in Europe 
and America that have close links with other groups, such as the Jewish and the Greek 
communities in the USA.484 Bulgarian governments have acknowledged the lack of 
influential lobby groups as a serious problem in Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy 
making. As a result, in April 2000 the UDF government of Ivan Kostov took the 
initiative to invite some 300 Bulgarians living abroad to meet in Bulgaria, in an 
attempt to establish a network of people who could assist the Bulgarian government in 
promoting liberal political and economic reforms in the country by offering their 
know-how. This network could also be exploited to lobby for support for Bulgaria’s 
national interests abroad.485 Many of the Bulgarians who participated in this initiative, 
such as the former heir to the Bulgarian throne Prince Kyril of Preslavski, enjoyed a 
high social status in their host countries and the Bulgarian government gained from 
their professional experience as well as their position in their host countries. This 
initiative became known as Bulgarski Velik Den (Bulgarian Easter) because it took 
place during the period of Orthodox Easter. The participants met in the National 
Palace of Culture in Sofia where they split into six working groups based on their 
different interests, and discussed topics related to Bulgaria’s accession to NATO and 
the EU. During these talks, the Bulgarian M inister of Foreign Affairs, Nadezhda 
Mihailova, and the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ivan Kostov, appealed to the 
participants to present the Western societies in which they lived with arguments
484 Ilchev, Stanimir, personal interview, 7/12/2001; Zhelev, 1998, pp. 215-219.
485 Insider, Vol. 10, No.3, 2000, pp. 12-18.
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favouring the enlargement of NATO and the EU, and to assist Bulgaria by every 
possible means to become a full member of these two Western organisations.486
However, the Bulgarski Velik Den initiative was not successful. The costs were borne 
by various state companies including the ‘Bulgarian Telecommunications Company’, 
‘Mobikom’, and the ‘International Events Department of the Plovdiv Fair’. This 
sponsorship coupled with the fact that there was an atmosphere of secrecy 
surrounding the project, the organisation and the purposes of the entire initiative, with 
the Prime M inister’s office being mainly responsible for its organisation, made a large 
part of the press and the political elite very suspicious about its real motives, and it 
lost their support.487 The government was accused of having used state funds to hold 
an event which did little more than boost its public image, and there seems to be some 
truth in this accusation. Two months before Bulgarski Velik Den the director of the 
Prime M inister’s office, Mihail Mihailov, was forced to resign under allegations of 
corruption.488 Also many of the participants in the initiative were highly critical of the 
government’s economic policies which had a negative effect on the government’s 
public image and made Ivan Rostov’s cabinet and that of Simeon Saxkoburgotski, 
which succeeded it, less enthusiastic about this, or any similar initiative.
However, the NMSII government of Simeon Saxkoburgotski did recruit some of the 
participants for government office, including the current deputy Prime M inister and 
Minister of Transport, Nikolai Vasilev. Vasilev, in particular, was one of the most 
enthusiastic supporters within the NMSII cabinet for retaining the annual meetings of
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid; Kaytchev, Naum, personal interview, 25/11/2004; Abadzhiev, Dimitur, personal interview,
30/11/2001; Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 7/12/2001; Gaitandzhiev,Ivan, personal interview, 
24/1/2002; Borisov, Boiko, personal interview, 6/11/2001.
488 Ibid.
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the participants. As a result of the efforts of government officials, such as Vasilev, 
since 2004, the Bulgarski Velik Den initiative has become a non-governmental legal 
entity which has been registered as a foundation in the district court of Plovdiv under 
the name the ‘Bulgarian Velikden Movement Foundation’.489 Annual meetings still 
take place, but the foundation does not have the same degree of government support 
and its political influence on foreign policy is dubious.490
Bulgaria’s exclusion from the first group of EES to join the EU did not change the 
Bulgarian public’s image of the Union. Opinion polls published since 2002 show that 
the overwhelming majority of the public still favoured Bulgaria joining the EU even 
though not until 2007.The Bulgarian government and the President of the EC, 
Romano Prodi, who referred to it in a speech in Athens on 16 April 2003 at the 
signing ceremony of the treaty of accession of ten new members, were confident that 
their country would be ready to join by 2007.491
The Bulgarian government completed negotiations for EU membership on 15 June 
2004 and, provided that the pace of economic and political reforms continues at the 
current rate, the target seems to be realistic. Nonetheless, it is too early to say 
absolutely that Bulgaria will be an EU member state in 2007. The date of its 
admission to the Union is not only determined by whether Bulgaria meets the 
Copenhagen criteria. As argued in the earlier part of this chapter the international 
environment in which negotiations take place is equally important for Bulgaria, which 
was affected by the Soviet coup of August 1991 and the Kosovo conflict in 1999.
489 http://www.bgvelikden.orjg/rnodules?php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=245
490 Kaytchev, Naum, personal interview, 25/11/2004; Ilchev, Stanimir, personal interview, 7/12/2001.
491 DN:SPEECH/03/203, Brussels, 16/4/2003.
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The fact that international events also worked to accelerated Bulgaria’s accession to 
the EU does not mean that this will always be the case. It could be that an 
international event might delay Bulgaria’s accession to full membership, and one such 
occurred in February 2003. At that time the world was being drawn into an 
international crisis that split the Western states into two opposing camps. The crisis 
was over whether the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass 
destruction and, in the event that it did, how the international community should act. 
On the one hand, countries such as the USA and Great Britain alleged that Iraq did 
possess weapons of mass destruction and, therefore, argued that the international 
community should take immediate military action against Iraq. These states declared 
their determination to undertake such action even in the absence of approval from the 
UN Security Council. On the other hand, states such as France, Germany and Russia 
suggested that the international community should not take any action against Iraq 
before the inspectors, whom the UN had in the meantime appointed to investigate the 
matter, had submitted their final report on this issue.
Sofia sided with the British and the Americans and expressed its support for the 
Anglo-American view in the many discussions that took place on this issue at the UN 
Security Council, which Bulgaria was presiding over at the time of the Iraq crisis. 
Also, on 5 February 2003 Bulgaria, along with nine other EES signed a declaration 
supporting the Anglo-American position. In addition, in the event of an Anglo- 
American military operation in Iraq, the Bulgarian government declared its intent to 
assist the operation by all means, including supplying an infantry battalion consisting 
of 69 military officers, 109 non-commissioned officers and 300 professional soldiers 
including 13 women, which was included in the ‘Center-South’ Multinational
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Division under Polish command.492 The main tasks of the Bulgarian battalion would 
be to maintain order and assist the restoration of infrastructure in the region 
surrounding the Iraqi town of Kebala.493
Sofia hoped that through a regime change in Iraq the country would receive the 
$1.6bn Baghdad owed to Bulgaria from communist times.494 The bulk of this debt had 
been accrued through the supply of arms purchased from Sofia during the Iran-Iraq 
war in the 1980s. After the end of the Cold W ar Bulgaria had sought repayment of 
this debt, but the Saddam Hussein regime constantly refused as retaliation for the 
support that Sofia had given the UN in its activities against Iraq after the invasion of 
Kuwait in 1991.
The Bulgarian decision to side with the British and Americans over Iraq is related to 
the strong pro-American feelings of certain cabinet members, including the Bulgarian 
Foreign Minister Solomon Pasi and the Prime M inister Simeon Saxkoburgotski. The 
former, before assuming the office of Bulgarian Foreign Minister, was the President 
of the Bulgarian Atlantic Club in Sofia, an NGO aiming mainly at promoting a 
positive image for NATO and the USA among the traditionally Russophile Bulgarian 
public. The latter during his exile in Spain had forged strong links with the Spanish 
political elite, particularly the Spanish conservative party, known as the People’s 
Party, which was in power at the time of the Iraqi crisis, and offered Spain’s support 
for the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
492 http://www.md.izovernment.bg/ en /iraq.html
493 Ibid.
494 http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/11-98/22-11-l.htm
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As a result, once in power, the government of Simeon Saxkoburgotski’s priority was 
to secure Bulgarian membership of NATO. This is not to say that Saxkoburgotski’s 
government was less concerned with membership of the EU, but that at the time it 
came to office in June 2001, admission to NATO seemed to be a more immediate and 
easier objective. A NATO summit was due to take place in Prague in November 2002 
where the countries that would be included in the coming NATO enlargement in 2004 
would be decided, and the possibility of Bulgaria being included was quite strong.
Although the government’s efforts were rewarded and Bulgaria was invited to join 
NATO at the summit in Prague, this invitation did not secure admission to the 
organisation. In order to become a full member, the decision had to be ratified by all 
the national parliaments of the existing NATO’s member states. This process it was 
expected would take about two years; according to many governmental officials, 
during this time Bulgaria should always act in close alliance with the most influential 
member state of NATO, namely the USA and behave as if the country were already a 
full member. Otherwise, it was possible that Bulgaria’s admission might be blocked. 
This was a deciding factor in the Bulgarian government’s decision, along with many 
NATO members, to support the American-British position over Iraq in 2003.
Bulgaria’s stance on the Iraqi issue cast a shadow over the country’s relations with 
France and Germany and other EU member states which had aligned themselves with 
the Franco-German position. The decision of the Bulgarian government only a few 
days after an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Brussels which had 
decided the EU ’s official position on the Iraqi issue which was to sign the declaration 
of support for the British and Americans seriously annoyed policy-makers in Paris
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and Berlin. The European Council’s official position was a compromise between the 
American-British and the Franco-German views, and Bulgaria’s decision to distance 
itself from this position by signing the declaration was seen as Sofia showing 
contempt for the EU ’s highest institution.
The fact that nine other states had signed the declaration did not reduce the annoyance 
in France and Germany towards Bulgaria. Sofia’s attitude was judged to be especially 
provocative because, while countries such as Poland or Hungary had completed 
negotiations with the EC for EU membership and, thus, their admission to the EU 
seemed to be irreversible, Bulgaria, and also Romania’s admission was still in the 
relatively early stages of negotiation and therefore more compliance was to have been 
expected. As a result a number of government officials started questioning whether 
Bulgaria and Romania would become members in 2007. One of these was the French 
President, Jacques Chirac, who at a press conference on 18 February 2003 stated that 
“ ...Bulgaria and Romania, currently expected to join the EU in 2007, had been 
particularly thoughtless to sign such a declaration and could not have chosen a better 
way to spoil their chances of joining the EU”.495
This statement shows that admission is far from guaranteed. Although Sofia’s stance 
on the Iraqi issue might not have damaged its prospect of becoming an EU member 
by 2007, another similar event could well complicate Bulgaria’s relations with the EU 
and postpone the country’s admission to the Union indefinitely. How might such as 
postponement affect Bulgaria’s foreign policy making?
495 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2781369.stm ; http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/2774139.stm
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Though it is difficult to predict the exact impact that a postponement of Bulgaria’s EU 
membership would have on foreign policy making, it could be argued that a 
postponement would erode the political consensus developed since 1989 that the 
future of their country is irrevocably tied to membership of the EU. A Euro-sceptic 
public opinion could emerge, which, as Drezov remarks, “might one day grow tired of 
leaders that promise something as elusive as communism - in this case, membership 
in the Western club” .496 The rise of Euro-scepticism among the public might in turn 
reflect on the political elite of the country and might give rise to Euro-sceptic and 
nationalist political forces that would seek to reorient Bulgaria’s foreign policy by 
restricting the EU ’s influence on Bulgarian foreign policy making.
The Impact of Europeanization on Bulgarian Foreign Policy Making
It has been argued that, throughout the period of democratization, a political 
consensus developed among the majority of the members of the Bulgarian political 
elite and the public that Bulgaria’s future is tightly interwoven with that of the EU. 
This consensus has been the vehicle for the EU ’s influence on Bulgarian politics. 
What will determine the scope of the EU’s influence on Bulgarian political life in the 
future will be the extent to which such a consensus continues to exist.
This section examines the influence that the EU has exercised on Bulgarian foreign 
policy making. It is argued that, like other areas of society, the Union has legitimized 
its interference in foreign policy by ‘democratic conditionality’. Through this 
principle, which is analysed extensively below, the EU has affected three areas of
496 Drezov, 2001, p. 436.
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Bulgaria’s foreign policy: a) decision-making mechanisms; b) relations with 
international organisations; and c) interstate relations.
The Issue of Democratic Conditionality
The principle on which the EU has legitimized its interference in Bulgarian politics is 
‘democratic conditionality’, also known simply as ‘conditionality’. This principle was 
fleshed out by the EC in April 1990 and linked the timetable of the Association 
Agreements of EES with the promotion of political reforms that would make the 
process of democratization in these states irreversible.497 In general, these reforms 
aimed at establishing: a) free and fair multi-party elections; b) the respect of law and 
human rights as inviolable principles; and c) liberal market economies. However, the 
exact content of the reforms required to be adopted varied from state to state, and 
were mainly determined by EU institutions. As is argued below, the actual input of 
the EES authorities into these reforms was minimal and mainly confined to applying 
them in practice.
Besides the calendar for the Association Agreements, the principle of democratic 
conditionality also came to determine membership of the EES. According to the 
decision taken by the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993, the promotion 
of democratic reforms that would guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
and respect for and protection of minorities, along with the establishment of a 
functioning market economy able to cope with competitive pressures and market 
forces within the EU and the ability to take on the obligations of membership,
497 Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 173.
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including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union, were 
necessary preconditions for the accession of EES to the EU.498
Although it determined the criteria for EU membership, the Copenhagen European 
Summit did not lay down an exact schedule for the process by which EES would 
become EU member states. In reply to political pressure from EES, the Essen 
European Council in December 1994 adopted a pre-accession strategy for all EES that 
had signed Association Agreements with the EU. According to this strategy, 
institutional structures and mechanisms between the EU and the associate EES were 
established which aimed at assisting these states to incorporate the acquis 
communitaire and proceed with all the necessary political and economic reforms that 
would enable the associate EES to become well integrated into the single European 
market without negative consequences on their domestic political and economic 
systems.499
The European Councils such as that held in Florence in June 1996 decided to 
accelerate the process of EU enlargement eastwards, but since not all the associate 
EES were thought to meet the membership criteria laid down by the Copenhagen EU 
Council, each associate EES was to be individually judged in relation to whether or 
not it met the criteria, which, in other words meant that the time of EU accession for 
associate states would vary.500 At first, this differentiation was believed to make the 
application of the principle of democratic conditionality to associate EES more 
effective, because it was assumed the differentiation would create a competitive 
environment, with each of the associate states competing to be among the first EES to
498 Smith, 1999, pp. 118-120.
499 Ibid., pp. 120-128.
500 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
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join the EU. This it was thought would spur further progress on political and 
economic reforms and the adoption of the acquis communitaire by these states.501 But, 
since differentiation also meant that some of the associate EES would be left out of 
the first and perhaps even the second round of EU enlargement, this was seen as 
having economic, political and security implications for those states that were 
excluded. In other words, while new EU member states would enjoy the political and 
economic advantages associated with EU membership, excluded states could feel 
isolated which might have a destabilizing political effect on them and their immediate 
regions and create tensions between the new EU member states and the excluded 
associate countries. As a result, Brussels looked for other options that could reduce 
the negative implications of being left out of any stage of EU enlargement, which are 
reflected in the decisions taken at the European Council of Luxemburg in December 
1997.
The Luxemburg Council, while it invited only five associate EES to begin accession 
negotiations with the EU (namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia), thus formalizing the principle of differentiation among associate EES 
introduced by the Florence European Council, also offered the opportunity to 
excluded associate states such as Bulgaria to join the first group of invitees if they 
made substantial progress in applying the criteria set by the Copenhagen Council in 
the future.502 This was achieved through the setting of a pre-accession framework 
based on the conclusion of bilateral agreements, known as ‘Accession Partnerships’, 
between the EU and each of the associate EES that had applied for EU membership. 
These agreements would contain a precise national programme for the adoption of the
501 Ibid., p. 129.
502Ibid., pp. 130-33.
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acquis communitaire within a set timetable. The EU would provide the applicant 
countries with pre-accession economic aid aimed at assisting them to make the 
necessary institutional and legal adjustments required by the EU, but the provision of 
that aid would be conditional on the applicant country’s ability to comply with the 
principle of democratic conditionality which came to be defined as the adoption of 
any political and economic objectives set by the EU.503 Membership negotiations with 
any applicant country could be opened, or be interrupted, according to whether that 
particular country met the Copenhagen criteria as tracked in annual reviews published 
by the EU Commission. Both Bulgaria’s invitation by the Helsinki Council in 
December 1999 to begin negotiations for EU membership and its exclusion by the 
Copenhagen EU Council in 2002 from the group of the first eight EES that would 
join the EU in May 2004 were based on the principle of differentiation which was 
introduced by the Florence EU Council and formalized by the Luxembourg EU 
Council, which allowed the EU to apply the principle of democratic conditionality 
differently from one EU applicant country to another.
The principle of democratic conditionality has always been an important factor in 
determining EU relations with both member states and non-member states. It is 
important to note that on many occasions the EEC, froze its relations with certain 
states either because the democratic systems in them had been overthrown or because 
certain democratic values had been violated. For instance, in 1967 the EEC suspended 
the Association Agreement it had signed with Greece in 1961, because the democratic 
regime was overthrown by a military coup organised by a group of middle ranking
503 This definition is because any political and economic objectives set by the EU were deemed to 
specify further the membership criteria as these were determined by the Copenhagen Council.
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military officials^04 and in 1989 the EEC interrupted negotiations over the conclusion 
of Trade and Cooperation Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania because violations 
of human rights had occurred in these two states.505
The importance of democratic conditionality derives from the fact that behind the 
policy lies the Kantian notion that liberal democratic regimes are more likely to 
engage in peace-oriented and cooperative policies, which the Union has always 
aspired to for its member states. This notion does not apply to other regional 
multilateral organisations that are similar to the EU, for instance, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), whose charter does not include notion of promoting 
liberal democracy or any democratic values among its members.506
However, if democratic conditionality has always been an important factor in 
determining the EU ’s relations with both member and non-member states, before 
1989 it meant nothing more than the existence of free and fair elections or respect of 
human rights. In the post-1989 period, both the meaning and the way that the EU 
applied the principle of democratic conditionality changed. In addition to fair and free 
elections and the respect of human rights, democratic conditionality also came to 
mean respect of the rule of law and the existence of a market economy.
And instead of a principle aimed at securing the minimum of democratic credentials 
on the part of the states with which the Union wished to establish relations, 
democratic conditionality has come to be an instrumental mechanism that the EU uses 
to intervene in the political life of those states that wished to gain EU membership to
504 Tsingos, 2001, pp. 317-320.
505 Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 123 & 129.
506 Sheehy, 1993;
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create liberal democratic systems modeled on those in existing EU member states. In 
Bulgaria’s case, this intervention has been expressed in three ways. First through 
committees such as the Association Council Bulgaria-EEC/EU or the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee Bulgaria-EEC/EU where both sides, namely Bulgaria and 
the EEC/EU, are represented. These committees were provided for by the Association 
Agreement and are the official forums used by the EEC/EU to monitor the progress of 
democratic reform. Second, through regular reports issued by the EC which assessed 
Bulgaria’s progress based on the Copenhagen criteria, and on which the European 
Council, the EU’s highest political organ, decides whether to upgrade EU relations 
with Bulgaria or not. Therefore, the recommendations made in these reports were seen 
as important by the Bulgarian political elite. Third, through bilateral negotiations for 
EU membership, through which the EC highlighted the areas of the Bulgarian legal 
system that needed to be adjusted to the European acquis communitaire and 
monitored this adjustment. W ithout these adjustments being made, it would be 
difficult for negotiations to be finalized and for Bulgaria to be accepted as an EU 
member.
These changes in the interpretation and application of democratic conditionality were 
due to the EU ’s desire to build long term political and economic stability in Eastern 
Europe.507 At the beginning of the 1990s, a number of plans were discussed in relation 
to how the Union could best secure stability in Eastern Europe. One provided for 
continuation of the Council of CMEA and measures that would intensify economic 
cooperation between the EEC and CMEA.508 This plan was supported by the then 
President of the EC, Jacques Delors. Another plan provided for the creation of an
507 Sidelman, 2001, p. 116; Smith, p. 35.
508 Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 182.
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organisation similar to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
which had been responsible for the management of the Marshal plan in post-War 
Europe. This type of organisation was seen as a useful mechanism to administer 
economic aid to Eastern Europe and, therefore, important for promoting political and 
economic stability.2,09
However, most of the policy-makers in Brussels had little confidence that these plans 
would ensure long-term political and economic stability in Eastern Europe. Firstly, 
these plans were not attractive to the majority of EES. They did not like the idea of 
establishing cooperation with the EEC through multilateral schemes such as the 
CMEA, which most EES saw as a remnant of the communist past with which they 
had broken.510Most EES favoured establishing direct relations with the EU on a 
bilateral basis with the view to one day becoming members. In addition, plans to 
create an organisation similar to the OEEC were jeopardized as much by the very 
small amount of economic assistance that the EEC/EU was willing to offer Eastern 
Europe at the time as by the lack of expertise in EES to administer a Marshal plan- 
type assistance programme.511 Secondly, it was deemed that, rather than reconstituting 
multilateral forums, promoting bilateral relations with each of the EES on the basis of 
democratic conditionality was the best way for the EU to ensure irreversibility of the 
democratic reforms which had begun to be introduced post-1989 and in this way to 
secure political and economic stability.
510 It should be noted that Bulgaria was not among these EES. The Bulgarian government at the time 
favoured a scheme which would preserve CMEA and strengthen cooperation between CMEA and the 
EEC. However, it was in the minority among EES. This, along with the fact that, Bulgaria was viewed 
with suspicion because of the ex-communists being in power, reduced the value of Sofia’s opinions in
Brussels. See Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 190, n. 1.
511 Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 182.
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However, as it was shown earlier in this chapter, political and economic stability in 
Eastern Europe was so important to the EU that, on many occasions, in order to 
maintain stability, Brussels violated the principle of democratic conditionality. Thus, 
although in December 1999 Bulgaria did not meet the Copenhagen criteria, the 
European Council summit held at in Helsinki decided that Bulgaria was ready to start 
negotiations for EU membership. This was mainly because the Council thought 
allowing negotiations to begin would boost the image of the UDF government, which 
in turn would enable it to promote democratic reform which would help to ensure 
political and economic stability in Bulgaria and the Balkan region as a whole.
However, such cases did not diminish the importance of democratic conditionality as 
the main instrument through which the EEC/EU influenced Bulgarian politics after 
1989. Indeed, all post-1989 bilateral negotiations between Sofia and Brussels have 
been conducted on the basis of democratic conditionality and all the EC’s reports on 
Bulgaria refer to the progress made by the Bulgarian government to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria.
The other reason for the different interpretation of democratic conditionality is related 
to the outcome of two debates that took place in the W est during the Cold W ar period. 
The first debate was over the relationship between liberal democracy and a market 
economy. Since WWII, the views of Western scholars on this subject have diverged.
Scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter argued that there is a strong link between liberal 
democracy and a market economy,512 and that liberal democratic systems are based on
512 Schumpeter, 1950, pp. 297-8; Almond, 1991.
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the freedom of choice of their citizens. Freedom of choice is not restricted only to the 
political field, but applies also to the economic field, meaning citizens should have the 
right to develop activities related to business and trade. This freedom of choice creates 
an environment of economic competition within the state, which scholars such as 
Schumpeter saw as a necessary precondition for the consolidation of a liberal 
democratic system. First because an environment of economic competition sets the 
conditions for the economic development of a state that should ensure economic 
prosperity for its citizens, thereby reducing the social tensions that, otherwise, would 
be transferred to the political level.513 Second, because economic competition sets the 
conditions for the formation of strong civil societies, which were seen as being 
important for consolidating democratic regimes.514 Competitive economic 
environments are believed to help a strong private economic sector to emerge, whose 
interests are inextricably linked with the existence of a liberal democratic 
environment through which it can prosper. This private sector becomes an important 
actor lobbying the political authorities of the state to take measures aimed at 
consolidating the liberal political and economic environment. Such lobbying is 
exercised by various means such as sponsoring political parties and political activists 
who favour liberal political and economic ideas, by controlling the mass media and 
the press, or by sponsoring NGOs, workshops and seminars to familiarize citizens 
with these ideas and help them avoid falling prey to policies that would act against 
this liberal environment.
These views influenced and were influenced by historical developments in the 
Western world immediately before and after WWII, and particularly by the pre-war
513 Fukuyama, 1992, p. 108; Lipset, 1959; Lipset et al., 1993; Maravall, 1997; Moore, 1996.
514 Lipset, 1993, p. 47, Schumpeter, 1950, p. 283.
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collapse of West European democratic regimes, which they explained as being the 
result of the economic crisis of 1929. These in turn were highly influential on post- 
W ar political projects such as the development of welfare states in Western Europe.515
A series of military coups that occurred across a number of Latin American and South 
European states led to a questioning of Schumpeter’s view that economic 
development consolidates liberal democratic regimes. Many of the states where 
military coups occurred after 1965, such as Greece, were experiencing periods of 
unprecedented economic development. In addition, more authoritarian regimes such 
as China have been experiencing economic development, which also goes against 
Schumpeterian views that it is only liberal democratic regimes that set the conditions 
for economic development. Thus, scholars came to the conclusion that there was no 
relation between liberal democracy and economic development in a market economic 
environment,516 and that economic development in developing countries such as those 
of Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia, could be best assured by strong states 
under the tutelage of powerful authoritarian regimes.517
However, a number of developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s undermined 
the view that authoritarian regimes could assure economic development.518Failures 
occurred in the vast majority of authoritarian regimes in Africa, Latin America, and 
Eastern Europe demonstrating that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes could not be 
guaranteed to successfully promote sustained economic growth. This view was 
strengthened by the fact that a number of newly democratized countries such as
515 Lipset, 1993, p. 43.
516 Dahl, 1971.
517 Robinson & White, 1996, p. 1.
518 Ibid.
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Botswana and South Korea had undergone unprecedented economic growth, despite 
the fact that the democratic systems in these states were fragile and bore no 
resemblance to the established democratic systems of ‘first world’ countries. The 
worldwide trend towards Westem-style liberal democracy that began in the early 
1970s with a series of democratic transitions in southern Europe and Latin America 
and culminated in the political changes in Eastern Europe, meant that authoritarian 
rule was not a possibility for many developing countries.519
These trends allowed the argument that liberal democracy and market economy are 
related to reappear in the late 1980s. During this period, a number of Western scholars 
such as Schmitter and Karl argued that although a number of authoritarian systems 
coped with the market economic systems of their states in the short term, overall, 
experience shows that the relationship between liberal democratic regimes and market 
economies is both compatible and mutually reinforcing. 520 This is not to say that the 
arguments against a clear relationship between liberal democracies and market 
economies have disappeared.521 In fact, scholars such as Bollen argue that the 
relationship between liberal democracy and market economy is less straightforward 
than scholars such as Schmitter, Karl or Olson claim. This is because there are several 
models of both liberal democratic regimes and market economies, which complicate 
the analysis of the links between the two.522 However, since the end of the 1980s, 
Bollen’s and similar views have been less influential on the policy making of Western 
governments and international aid agencies, such as the IM F or the W orld Bank, than 
those of Schmitter and Karl. This can be seen in the policy prescriptions offered by
519 Huntington, 1991.
520 Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Olson, 1993.
521 Tamas, 1992, p. 73; Berger, 1992, p. 8 and 15; Bhagwati, 1992, p. 41; Prezworski, 1992, pp. 45-59; 
Kyung-won, 1992, p. 25.
522 Bollen, 1990; Leftwich, 1996.
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Western governments and international aid agencies to EES for reform of their 
political systems. These policy prescriptions treat the establishment of robust market 
economies as an integral part of the democratization process.323
The prevalence of the view that liberal democracies and market economies are closely 
related has touched another debate in the Western world and has answered the 
question of whether the West should use economic incentives and sanctions in order 
to promote democratization in Eastern Europe. This debate has run since the end of 
the 1970s and was raised by the difficulties experienced by such states as Poland and 
Romania in managing their debt obligations to the W est.524 For the first time since the 
end of WWII, the W est was in the position of being at an advantage over Eastern 
Europe, and the prospect of being able to offer economic assistance to EES 
conditional on the democratization of their political systems was attractive to many 
Western policy-makers.525
This view was strengthened by the second oil crisis at the end of the 1970s, which 
plunged the W est into economic recession and limited the ability of many Western 
commercial banks and international organisations such as the IMF and the World 
Bank to offer the generous economic assistance of the past to EES.526Also, despite the 
generous economic support that many Western states and international economic 
organisations had given to a number of East European and Third W orld countries 
after the first oil crisis in 1973-4, it had not enabled these states to overcome their
523 Robinson & White, 1998, p. 2.
524 Kohn, 1989, pp. 19-20.
525 Ibid.
526 Many Western commercial banks and international organisations such as the IMF and the World 
Bank showed great eagerness to lend to East European and Third World countries after the first oil 
crisis o f 1973-4 under the pressure to recycle funds placed with them by member states o f the 
Organisation o f Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). See Kohn, 1989, pp. 17-8.
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economic problems.527 Increasingly Western policy makers came round to the belief 
that this was mainly due to the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in these states, 
which were not accountable, were corrupt and had mismanaged the economic aid they 
had received. The view hardened that the only way for these East European and Third 
World states to overcome their economic problems was to overthrow their 
authoritarian governments and becoming liberal democracies along the models of the 
Western world.
In this debate, American policy-makers propounded the view that any economic aid to 
EES should be conditional on the promotion of liberal democratic reforms by their 
communist regimes. In particular, the American authorities were interested in 
discouraging communist regimes from violating the human rights of their citizens and 
the Regan Administration, which was then in power, introduced a number of 
economic measures aimed at forcing the communist regimes in Eastern Europe to 
improve their human rights records.528 The Reagan administration believed that 
loosening the control of communist regimes over their citizens would create the right 
conditions for strong civil societies to emerge, which in the long run would undermine 
these regimes. The Americans also considered that violation of the human rights of 
certain sectors of the populations of EES, such as ethnic or religious minorities, posed 
a security threat. This was particularly true in the case of the Bulgarian Muslim 
minority, the abuse of whose human rights could easily be envisaged as leading to 
military conflict between Bulgaria and Turkey and, through them, NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact countries.529
527 Kohn, 1989, p. 19-20.
528 Hassner, 1991, pp. 59-64.
529 Mastny, 1991, pp. 5-15.
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On the other hand, European policy-makers, particularly the West Germans, insisted 
that economic means should not be used to achieve political objectives.530 They 
argued that the use of economic sanctions to promote democratic reform in 
communist states was risky, since it might evoke negative feelings from the citizens 
of these states, which the communist regime could motivate to gain public support 
and keep itself in power.531 This view was in line with the West German foreign 
policy of Ostpolitik which Bonn pursued from the early 1960s onwards. It provided 
for the FRG’s active economic engagement in Eastern Europe by providing financial 
loans and investment in infrastructure projects. The assumption was this would loosen 
any ties of political and economic loyalty that these states had with the Soviet Union. 
Bonn would then be able to isolate the GDR inside the Eastern bloc as well as 
internationally and dictate the future terms of any relationship between the two 
German states.532
This also mirrored the political practice followed by the EEC in establishing 
economic relations with non-EEC member states. The EEC did not make the 
promotion of economic relations with these states dependent on whether they met 
certain political criteria, and this is exemplified by the many economic agreements 
which the EEC entered into with non-EEC member countries. Few of these 
agreements with states aiming to become full EEC members, were conditional on the
530 Hassner, 1991, p. 60.
531 Ibid.
532 It should be noted that, due to the foreign policy o f Ostpolitik, the FRG did not participate in any 
sort of economic sanctions that the West imposed on the Eastern Bloc after the beginning o f the 1960s, 
even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of the 1970s and the second Cold War period 
during the 1980s. In addition, throughout this entire period, Bonn provided massive doses o f economic 
aid to Third World states in order to buy their cooperation and prevent them from establishing any sort 
of diplomatic relations with the GDR. See Joffe, 1989, p. 104, 110.
220
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
existence of a democratic regime and even if conditions deteriorated the EEC was 
reluctant to punish the state involved by completely interrupting economic relations.
In Greece in 1967 the colonels’ coup led the EEC to freeze the Association agreement 
it had concluded with Greece in 1961. However, as Loukas Tsoukalis points out 
“ [despite the freezing of the Association agreement] both sides continued to adhere to 
the [association treaty’s] timetable for the elimination of tariffs...and in the end the 
freezing was not at a particularly low temperature”.533 In addition, in evaluating the 
democratic records of states, the EEC was mainly interested in whether they had 
conducted regular free and fair elections, and tended to ignore the other components 
of a liberal democratic regime such as respect of human rights or respect for the rule 
of law. Greece, for instance which became a member of the EEC in 1981, has had a 
bad human rights record, especially in relation to ethnic and religious minorities.534
By the end of the 1980s, however, the American view had clearly prevailed, and the 
EEC came to accept that any future economic assistance to EES should be conditional 
upon political objectives. Indeed, since the end of the 1980s, almost all the economic 
agreements which the EEC signed with EES were conditional on the promotion of 
democratic reform. This can be seen in the provisions of economic treaties such as the 
Trade and Cooperation Agreements or the Association Agreements, which all linked 
EEC economic assistance with the pace of democratic reform. The EEC was not only 
interested in the freedom and fairness of elections, but also focused on respect, or lack 
thereof, of human rights and the rule of law, and the promotion of liberal economic
533 Tsoukalis, 1981, p. 31.
534 Poulton, 1993, pp. 173-192.
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reforms, all of which are now seen as necessary components of a liberal democratic 
state.
The shift in the EEC’s position should not be attributed purely to the fact that by the 
end of the 1980s an increasing number of Western scholars and policy-makers were 
of the view that liberal democracy and a market economy were interrelated. A series 
of other developments throughout the 1980s influenced Brussels’ policy making. 
First, the W est was emerging as the victorious pole in the Cold War and this boosted 
the USA’s image and increased its political influence in world politics. Second, 
throughout the 1980s, the most influential states in the EEC, namely the FRG, France 
and Great Britain, were under conservative rule by parties whose foreign policy 
agendas concerning Eastern Europe were closer to the agenda of the Reagan 
government in the USA than to those of their political opponents, the left-wing 
parties.
Third, almost all communist regimes in Eastern Europe had a history of violation of 
the human rights of their citizens, especially those of ethnic and religious minorities. 
This issue was of grave concern for many European officials throughout the 1980s 
and the first years of the 1990s, because, at that time, in EES such as Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria and Romania, abuses of human and minority rights were sparking unrest, 
which was seen to pose a direct threat to the domestic political stability of these states 
and the stability and security of the immediate Balkan region and the wider European 
continent.535
535 Papadimitriou, 2002, pp. 124-128, 144-145; Smith, 1999, pp. 60-63.
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The EEC was unable to intervene and put a stop to ethnic unrest in the EES. This was 
due among other things to the fact that the bilateral agreements which the EEC had 
signed with EES did not contain any provisions which might have allowed Brussels to 
exert leverage to defuse such conflicts. In 1980, the EEC signed a Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement with the SFRY which, although it provided for access of 
Yugoslavia products to European markets, did not provide for a rapid unilateral 
suspension of the agreement in the case of human rights violations. As Papadimitriou 
remarked: “the absence of such a rapid suspension clause in the Yugoslav agreement 
proved to be very costly when the crisis escalated in the country in early 1991. Unable 
to use the rapid suspension of the agreement as a negotiating weapon for the 
preservation of the Yugoslav state, the EEC found itself offering all the benefits 
emanating from the 1980 agreement to a country that was engaged in a full scale civil 
war.”536 In addition, besides being bound by the bilateral agreements it had signed 
with EES, what also made Brussels reluctant to intervene in situations of ethnic unrest 
such as those in Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War, was that the world was no 
longer bipolar which reduced the threat of a spillover effect from situations of ethnic 
unrest.
The ethnic unrest in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and the ethnic conflicts in 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s changed how EEC policy-makers viewed liberal democracy. 
Many EEC officials at the time believed that the only way to achieve lasting social 
peace would be to establish liberal political and social environments where human 
rights, and domestic and international law would be respected by the authorities of 
these states. The way to achieve this was for the EEC to be actively involved in the
536 Ibid., p. 144.
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politics of EES and making ties with these states conditional on the promotion of 
political reforms aimed at consolidating democratic systems in the states. These 
reforms should not only be aimed at ensuring free and fair elections in these states, 
but also at creating an institutional network that would guarantee respect of human 
rights as well as of domestic and international law by their new democratic 
authorities.
This new attitude towards liberal democracy can be seen in the post-Cold war treaties 
signed between the member states of the EEC. The Maastricht treaty was one such, 
which was signed in 1992 and came into force in 1993. One of the novelties of this 
treaty was the incorporation of Article F which stated that all EEC member states had 
to respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome in 
November 1950.537
Foreign Policy Mechanisms
One of the main conditions of EU membership is that states should adjust their 
administrative institutions to make them conducive to an easy transposition of EU 
legislation into their national legislation. This is considered important for the smooth 
functioning of the Union because it leads to a single institutional framework for the 
whole of the EU with common rules and institutions in each member state. This is one
537 Ibid., p. 143.
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of the criteria of EU membership as specified at the European Council summit in 
Copenhagen in June 1993.338
In line with this condition, since the beginning of the 1990s, almost all EES have 
worked on adapting their institutional frameworks to facilitate interaction with the EU 
and the integration of their national legal systems with the legal system of the Union. 
This adaptation has not only taken place in states such as Poland and the Czech 
Republic whose prospects of joining the EU were clear from the mid-1990s, but is at 
work in states such as Albania whose membership of the Union seems still in 2005 to 
be a far off prospect.539
This task has transformed the existing institutional edifices of EES through the 
development of new institutions and the abolition or the re-orientation of existing 
ones. The transformation varies from one state to another, and depends to a great 
extent on the stage of relations between the state and the EU, and on differences in the 
post-communist political systems of the EES or the opinions of the political elites of 
these states about how existing institutions should be transformed. Nevertheless, this 
transformation has affected decision-making in all areas of political life in these 
states, including foreign policy.
In Bulgaria, this institutional transformation has changed the process of foreign policy 
making in three ways. It has changed the role of the four constitutional actors 
involved in foreign policy making; it has increased the role of actors other than 
political parties; and it has increased the influence of EU institutions.
538 http://www.europa.eu.int/Comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm
539 Demetropoulou, 2002, pp. 188-191.
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The Changed Roles o f the Four Constitutional Actors Involved in Foreign Policy 
Making
The institutional transformation resulting from Bulgaria’s process of accession to the 
EU has changed the role of the state institutions involved in foreign policy making, 
namely the President of the Republic, the government, the national parliament, and 
the Constitutional Court.540 This change has been especially profound since the mid- 
1990s when Bulgaria’s accession process to the EU was accelerated and has been 
expressed in four ways.
• The President of the Republic
Firstly, the Bulgarian constitution of 1991 has attempted to balance the power of the 
government over foreign policy by giving the President the power to participate in 
decision-making on certain foreign policy issues such as the appointment or dismissal 
of Bulgarian diplomats abroad. As was argued earlier, this attempt has been counter­
productive, especially during the first half of the 1990s, since it has often led the two 
political institutions into conflict over foreign policy issues.541 Since the mid-1990s, 
these conflicts have been rare, mainly due to government stability and decreased 
ideological polarization between the two major political parties, which de facto has 
limited the political scope of the President in foreign policy making.542
540 For an extensive analysis o f the constitutional provisions concerning the role of these institutions in 
Bulgaria’s foreign policy making see pp. 84-94 above.
541 See pp. 87-94 above.
542 See pp. 90-94 above.
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In addition, Bulgaria’s integration into the EU has played a significant role in 
reducing the conflicts between the two branches of the executive over foreign policy 
issues for two reasons. Firstly, one of the Copenhagen criteria provides that the 
admission of any state to the EU is possible only if democratic institutions of that 
state such as the government, the parliament or the head of state are both stable and in 
tune with one another.543
However, this presupposes that state institutions such as the government and the 
President of the Republic avoid disagreement over major issues such as foreign 
policy. Frequent institutional conflicts foster an atmosphere of mistrust that can 
undermine smooth cooperation between democratic institutions and engender a belief 
in the wider public that there is an endogenous failure of the democratic system. This 
could open the door to political initiatives, contra to the state constitution.
Once Bulgaria had declared its intention to become an EU member state, it needed 
good relationships between government and the President of the Republic. The short 
post-1989 history of the country showed that what prevented a good relationship was 
the Bulgarian President’s power to intervene in government politics. Zheliu Zhelev, 
the President of the Republic of Bulgaria at the time, was a powerful personality and 
his legitimacy in part derived from his strong anti-communist credentials. He was one 
of the few Bulgarian intellectuals who had opposed communism and struggled for the 
liberalization of Bulgarian politics since the end of the 1970s.544 He had a reputation 
that went far beyond the narrow electoral body of the UDF, the political party to 
which Zhelev belonged.
543 http://www.europe.eu.int/Comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm.
544 See pp. 90-94 above.
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After he became President of Bulgaria, Zhelev often used his reputation to advance 
his own views in parliament and especially through caretaker cabinets, which were 
the majority of Bulgarian governments during his Presidency. His personal 
involvement was more controversial when the cabinets were appointed by the leader 
of the successful political party.545
However, in some cases, Zhelev’s efforts to influence the policy agendas of various 
Bulgarian governments led him into severe conflict with ministerial cabinets, which 
refused to adopt his views. This mainly occurred with cabinets that were formed as 
the result of general elections. One such case was the cabinet formed by the leader of 
the UDF, Filip Dimitrov, following the general elections of October 1991. Zhelev 
came into conflict with the UDF cabinet on several occasions when he attempted to 
impose his own views.546 As a result relations between the President and the cabinet 
deteriorated to the extent that in the late summer of 1992 Zhelev launched an outright 
attack on the cabinet, which led Bulgaria into a political crisis and undermined the 
confidence that the government had enjoyed until then.547 In October 1992, the UDF 
government resigned after losing a vote of confidence in the parliament.548
Zhelev’s policy of interfering in the policy agendas of Bulgarian governments led the 
leadership of the UDF to decide not to nominate him as the party’s official candidate 
for the Presidential elections in November 1996. The UDF leadership hoped in this
545 Ibid.
546 Crampton, 1997, p. 228.
547 Ibid.
548 Ibid., pp. 229.
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way, to revenge themselves for Zhelev’s attack on Filip Dimitrov’s government and 
its subsequent toppling which had kept the UDF out of power for four years.349
Also, by deciding not to nominate Zhelev as Presidential candidate, the UDF 
leadership hoped to get rid of a problematic President and achieve cooperation 
between the two highest institutions of the executive power.550 In the second half of 
the 1990s, the EU would decide about its eastward enlargement and problems 
between the two branches of executive power in Bulgaria would seriously delay the 
country’s accession to the Union; something that the UDF leadership wanted to avoid. 
Also, the UDF leadership set Bulgaria’s joining the EU as a top priority and, on many 
occasions, had clashed with the BSP government which the UDF accused of 
undermining the prospects of the country joining the EU in the near future by 
delaying the promotion of political and economic reforms.
The chances of the UDF winning the forthcoming parliamentary elections were quite 
high. The BSP government had adopted a policy which was leading Bulgaria into the 
worst economic crisis since 1989, the signs of which were visible in autumn 1996. 
This had caused disaffection among the public towards the BSP, which in all the 
opinion polls of the time came well behind the UDF which was recorded as the most 
popular political party. The prospect that the UDF might win the election also 
discouraged the UDF leadership from supporting Zhelev as the party’s candidate in 
the Presidential elections of November 1996.
549 Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; Grozev Konstandin, personal interview, 16/1/2002.
550 Dainov Evgeni, personal interview, 26/11/2001; Abadzhiev Dimitur, personal interview,
30/11/2001; Mladenov, Nikolai, personal interview, 18/1/2002.
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The party leadership chose to nominate the 40-year-old lawyer Petur Stoianov for 
candidate. Stoianov was a young party member quite loyal to the leadership, who had 
been elevated to the party hierarchy five years earlier under the tutelage of the party 
leader Ivan Kostov. Loyalty to the leadership and lack of Zhelev’s overt anti­
communism made him the UDF’s ideal candidate. The UDF leadership believed that 
Stoianov would not easily clash with a UDF government for the sake of promoting his 
own policy agenda, in the event of the party’s winning the election.
However, nomination was not enough to guarantee his election to the presidency. The 
UDF also had to ensure that Zhelev would not participate because this would split the 
electorate, and would benefit the BSP’s candidate. The UDF leadership therefore 
forged an agreement with Zhelev prior to the elections that Zhelev and Stoianov 
would run for primary elections based on the model of the American Primaries. The 
winner of the primary election would then run against the BSP Presidential 
candidate.551 This agreement was concluded with the help of NGOs such as the CLS. 
These NGOs had maintained good relations with both Zhelev and the UDF leadership 
which contributed to the successful outcome of the negotiations.552
The primary election took place on 6 June 1996. Stoianov got 66% of the vote and 
defeated Zhelev. With the support of his party and Zhelev, Stoianov won an 
astonishing 52% of the popular vote in the Presidential elections of November 1996, 
while his opponent, Ivan Marazov, won only 25%. Stoianov’s victory in the 
Presidential elections opened a new chapter in the relationship between the President 
of the Republic and the government. Stoianov’s presidency was marked by a lack of
551 Zheliu, Zhelev, personal interview, 7/1/2002
552 Kiuranov, Deian, personal interview, 4/12/2001; Garnizov, 1998, pp. 90-95.
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conflict between the two branches of executive power,553 and a period of fruitful 
cooperation between the two institutions ensued.” 4
This good relationship was also because for most of the period after 1996, the same 
party, namely the UDF, controlled both the Presidency and the government. However, 
this does not fully explain why relations between the two branches of the executive 
entered a period of calm and cooperation which continued into 2001 when the UDF 
lost control of both branches of the Executive.
In November 2001 the Presidential candidate and leader of the BSP, Georgi Parvanov, 
won the elections, but in the parliamentary elections of June 2001, the newly 
established party of the exiled Bulgarian King Simeon, NMSII was victorious and 
formed a coalition with the MRF. However, despite the two branches of the executive 
being controlled by different political parties, the relationship between the 
government and the President was generally good mostly because Parvanov had a 
non-confrontational style. Even where there was disagreement over foreign policy 
issues, it did not develop into open conflict.
One such disagreement occurred at the beginning of February 2003 over the Iraq 
crisis. The US government, while preparing to invade Iraq and overthrow the regime 
of Saddam Hussein, requested the Bulgarian government to allow over-flight, transit 
passage and the temporary presence of US troops and equipment on Bulgarian 
territory. 555 The request was received differently by the President of the Republic and 
the government. On the one hand, the President maintained that parliament and not
553 Tchanchev Dimitur, personal interview, 18/1/2002.
554 See pp. 90-94 above.
555 BTA, 4/2/2003.
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the government was constitutionally responsible for deciding on this issue because, 
according to article 84 of the constitution of 1991, no foreign troops were allowed to 
make use of either Bulgarian territory or airspace without the prior consent of the 
Parliament. On the other hand, the government argued that it could decide on this 
issue without the prior consent of Parliament because Bulgaria had received an 
invitation at the Prague summit in 2002 to join NATO. Therefore, the American 
troops should be regarded as allied troops, to whom article 84 did not apply. The 
President called on the Constitutional Court to decide on the matter and on 4 February 
2003 the Court declared that the government was in the right.556 The ruling of the 
Constitutional Court was accepted by the President and the issue was resolved.
However, what explains the good relationship between the two branches of the 
executive after 1996 is more complex. The good relationship between the President 
and the government was perhaps due to the influence of democratic conditionality on 
the Bulgarian political elite which intensified after 1996 because membership of the 
EU seemed to be a real possibility. Once Bulgaria became involved in these 
negotiations in the second half of the 1990s, the institutional prestige of the President 
was diminished, because it was the government which the EU recognized as its main 
interlocutor and not the President. The course of negotiations was monitored by a 
Presidential office, but neither these officials nor the President himself were directly 
involved in negotiations. The government’s role in negotiating Bulgaria’s 
membership of the EU confirmed the views of the public and the political elite that it 
was the cabinet that should decide on foreign policy, which further limited the 
President’s influence in this sphere.
556 BTA, 4/2/2003.
232
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
• The Ministry o f Foreign Affairs
The institutional transformation that Bulgaria had to undergo in order to integrate 
European legislation into its national legislation undermined the monopoly of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs over foreign policy. Other institutional mechanisms were 
established to deal with negotiations with the EU and given that the outcome of these 
affected a wide range of foreign policy issues, such as the legal regime for the 
movement of goods or people between Bulgaria and non-EU states, it can also be 
argued that the influence of these institutional mechanisms extended to much of the 
government’s foreign policy agenda.
The structure and responsibilities of the institutional mechanisms involved in the 
negotiations with the EU changed many times during the 1990s. In the course of 
integration, new institutional mechanisms were formed, others were abolished or saw 
their responsibilities re-orientated, according to the changes the government saw as 
best serving the country’s needs in its negotiations with the EU. The structures and 
responsibilities of the main institutional mechanisms were determined by government 
decree No. 47 of 10 March 1999, and decree No. 3 of 20 January 2000.557 According 
to these decrees, the main institutional mechanisms involved in the negotiations with 
the EU are: a) the Council of European Integration; b) the Chief Negotiator for EU 
Affairs; c) the Minister of EU Affairs; d) the Coordination Council; and e) the Core 
Negotiations team.558
557 Dimitrova, Ralitsa, personal interview, 15/1/2001.
558 Appendix, table 71; http://www.evropa.bg
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Affairs and the Ministry of European Affairs, the Ministry of the National Economy 
which is responsible for the free movement of goods and people from Bulgaria to 
non-European countries and vice versa, and the Ministry of Agriculture which is 
responsible for managing funds that Bulgaria receives from the SAPARD European 
project.561
The major functions of the Council of European Integration are to assess Bulgaria’s 
negotiating position with the EU, to monitor the negotiation process and to make 
suggestions concerning the adoption by the government of priority actions on EU 
integration issues. Among the responsibilities of the Council is the creation of 
Bulgaria’s Core Negotiating Team for EU affairs and the establishment of its remit.
• The Chief Negotiator fo r  EU Affairs
The responsibilities of the Chief Negotiator for EU Affairs are to represent the 
country at intergovernmental conferences on EU negotiations. The Chief Negotiator 
also manages the Core Negotiation Team and the Coordination Council, whose 
responsibilities are analysed below, and informs the parliamentary Commissions of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration on the preparation, the outcomes and the 
progress of the negotiations with the EU. The Bulgarian Chief Negotiator after NMSII 
took power in mid-2001 was Ms Meglena Kuneva.
• The Ministry o f European Affairs
561 The SAPARD project is a European project which provides financing for a wide range of measures 
for structural adjustment in Bulgarian agriculture and rural development. See for more details: 
http://www.mzgar.government.bg/mz eng/Sapard/sapard.htm
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On 15 August 2002, the NMSII government created the Ministry of European Affairs, 
which was an institutional upgrading of the post of Bulgaria’s Chief Negotiator for 
EU Affairs.562 The M inister of European Affairs had the same political responsibilities 
as the Chief Negotiator for EU Affairs had had, and together with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, was responsible for the submission of drafts, reports and proposals 
relevant to EU issues.563 Meglena Kuneva, the then Bulgaria’s Chief Negotiator, was 
given the post of M inister of European Affairs, while continuing as the country’s 
Chief Negotiator with the EU.
The decision to create a Ministry of European Affairs was symbolic and allowed the 
Bulgarian government to show both the public and the political elite that joining the 
EU remained the government’s top policy priority. The government had reasons for 
wanting to boost its EU credentials with the public and the political elite. In meetings 
with NATO officials, the government had been assured that Bulgaria would be invited 
to join NATO at the summit in Prague in November 2002. However, joining NATO 
did not mean joining the EU. At the time of the NATO summit in Prague, the EC was 
due to issue reports determining which EES would be eligible to join the EU by 2004. 
These reports would be in line with the decision taken by the European Council in 
Gothenburg in June 2001, according to which the ten EES that had completed 
negotiations with the EU by the end of 2002 would join in May 2004. Bulgaria was 
not included in the group of EES destined to join in May 2004.
562
563
http://www.government.bg/English/Europe/News/2002-08-16/787.html
Ibid.
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This decision could have brought the Bulgarian government into conflict with both 
the public and the political elite. The latter might have accused the government that 
failure to win admission to the EU in 2004 was the result of a badly balanced foreign 
policy which gave greater emphasis to Bulgaria’s admission to NATO than to the EU. 
Before he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the NMSII government, Solomon 
Pasi had been a President of the Atlantic Club of Sofia, an NGO whose aim was to 
familiarize Bulgaria’s Russophile public with NATO activities; therefore, Pasi would 
likely have been more interested in seeing Bulgaria join NATO than the EU.
The government saw the creation of a Minister of European Affairs as the best way to 
combat any such accusations since this would demonstrate that the government was as 
interested in Bulgaria’s joining the EU as joining NATO. The fact that the country’s 
membership of NATO would precede membership of the EU was simply because the 
criteria and the admission processes of the two organisations were different.
• The Coordination Council
The Coordination Council is chaired by the Chief Negotiator and its members are the 
heads of 30 W orking Groups. These groups prepare the negotiating positions of the 30 
sections, also known as chapters, into which negotiations with the EU are divided. 
The Coordination Council sets the general directions of the Working Groups’ 
activities and monitors the progress of the process on a regular basis.
• The Core Negotiations Team
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The Core Negotiations Team comprises two deputies from the Chief Negotiator’s 
office, deputy ministers from the ministries involved in EU negotiations and leading 
experts in the field of EU integration. The main responsibilities of the Core 
Negotiations Team include analysing the information on the commitments that have 
been undertaken over the course of the negotiation process, and making 
recommendations to the institutions involved in the planning and scheduling of the 
country’s participation in EU pre-accession projects. In particular, the Core 
Negotiations Team is responsible for assessing the conditions under which EU pre­
accession funds are provided to Bulgaria and recommends how these funds should be 
spent.
•  The National Assembly o f the Republic o f Bulgaria
In general, throughout the democratization period, the role of the Bulgarian 
parliament in the country’s foreign policy making has been passive. This is because 
parliament has been seen more as a political forum that ratifies or rejects political 
decisions taken by the Bulgarian government, than as a forum which actively 
participates, alongside the executive power, in the country’s foreign policy making. 
There is a Committee of Foreign Affairs in the parliament in which all the 
parliamentary political forces are represented and foreign policy issues are discussed, 
but this committee serves more as a first political forum where foreign policy issues 
are discussed before being debated in the plenary session of the Bulgarian parliament 
than as an institutional body which forms state foreign policy with government.
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There are a few cases where it could be argued that parliament can go beyond a 
simple debate on the government’s foreign policy making. According to the Bulgarian 
Constitution of 1991 parliament has a decisive say in foreign policy issues such as 
declaring war or making peace, deciding on the dispatch of Bulgarian troops abroad 
or the admission of foreign troops to Bulgarian territory, and the ratification or 
abrogation of international treaties.564 However, even in these cases the role of 
parliament is more limited than is suggested by the constitution. This is mainly 
because parliament is controlled by the political party or parties that form the 
government and therefore, when parliament is called on to decide on anything, it 
would be unusual for the majority of to vote against the government’s decisions.
However, the institutional transformation that Bulgarian had to go through in order to 
integrate European legislation into the national legislation has increased the role of 
parliament in foreign policy making and allowed it to become actively involved in the 
shaping of European policy and, through this involvement, to influence Bulgaria’s 
relations with EU as well as non-EU states, since generally relations with non-EU 
states are determined by relations with the EU. According to the provisions of the 
Association Agreement, the Bulgarian parliament formed a Joint Parliamentary
564 Article 84, item 2; It is noteworthy that the deployment of Bulgarian troops in the summer o f 2003 
in Iraq, which assisted the Anglo-American military operations in the country’s reconstruction after the 
collapse o f Saddam Hussein’s regime, took place after the parliament ratified in May 2003 a 
government decision on the deployment of the troops. After its ratification by parliament, the decision 
was published in the State Gazette on 3 June 2003, at which moment it became the law of the 
Bulgarian state and gave the green light to the government to proceed with the deployment. 
(http://www.mediapool.bg/site/securitv/2004/05/page en.shtml#more’). On 5 May 2005 the Bulgarian 
parliament decided to pull all Bulgarian troops out of Iraq by the end o f December 2005, with some 62 
Bulgarian soldiers leaving Iraq in June 2005, thus reducing the 462 member Bulgarian contingent 
stationed in the country until then, to 400 in June 2005. The decision was taken after the government 
felt that the fatalities which the Bulgarian troops had suffered in Iraq -  by May 2005, 10 Bulgarian 
soldiers had been killed in the military operations -  had damaged the government’s public image, with 
70% of the public disagreeing with the government’s decision to send troops and supporting an 
immediate pull out of all Bulgarian troops, according to opinion polls published in 2005. 
(http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/news/bulgaria.php: 
http://www.novinite.com/view news.php?id=52607').
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Committee (JPC) within the European Parliament. The JPC meets at least once a year 
and discusses issues relevant to Bulgaria’s integration into the EU. These meetings 
provide the Bulgarian parliament with the opportunity to get information from a 
source other than the Bulgarian government about the process of integration into the 
EU and, in this way, to better monitor the government’s policy on this process. In 
addition, the meetings provide an opportunity for the EU to hear the opinions of all 
the political parties represented in the parliament on issues concerning Bulgaria’s 
accession to the Union either during the negotiation process or in meetings between 
Bulgarian governmental officials and EU officials.
In March 2000 a Committee for European Integration (CEI) was set up in the 
Bulgarian parliament which operates independently from the committee for Foreign 
Affairs. The CEI was created in response to EU suggestions that all the main 
Bulgarian parliamentary political forces participate in the country’s policy making 
with reference to the EU accession process. The Committee regularly calls on 
government officials who are involved in Bulgaria’s negotiations with the EU to brief 
its members on the progress of the negotiation process. In addition, members of the 
CEI often attend meetings of the Coordination Council, which allows them to voice 
their views on issues related to the country’s accession process.
The EC has also encouraged the Bulgarian parliament to assume an active role in 
foreign policy making illustrated in initiatives such as the establishment of a 
Documentation Centre within the Parliament, supported both financially and 
technically by the delegation of the EC to Bulgaria.565 The Centre is designed to offer
565 http://www.parliament.bg/eu/ENDEP doceen.htm
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the members of the Bulgarian parliament documentary support concerning Bulgaria’s 
accession to the EU and, in this way, assists the members of the parliament to monitor 
the government’s policies in relation to the country’s accession to the EU. The Centre 
is also a source of information on Bulgaria’s accession to the EU for citizens and, in 
this way, contributes to the transparency of the state decision-making process. In 
addition, in almost all the annual reports which the EC has issued with reference to 
the progress of Bulgaria’s negotiations with the EU there are references to how much 
the Bulgarian parliament has participated in the state decision-making process.
The encouragement which the EC has given to the Bulgarian parliament to play an 
active role in foreign policy making is in line with a series of policies which the 
Commission has been promoting since 1997. Such involvement by national 
parliaments is considered to contribute to the transparency of the decision-making 
process within EU member states. The EC organised a series of conferences in 
collaboration with the European parliament, which aimed at bringing together 
members of the committees of European affairs of EU members’ national 
parliaments566 with the purpose of setting common rules in all member states that 
would enable the national parliaments to better scrutinize the European policy 
followed by national governments.567
• The Role o f the Constitutional Court
Transformation is also expected to influence the operation of the Bulgarian 
Constitutional Court in foreign policy making, rendering it immune from any
566 http://www.cosac.org/ene/previo ; http://www.cosac.org/eng/previous/athens 2003/rules eng/htm
567 Ibid.
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interference from the executive or legislative powers that might affect its decisions on 
foreign policy issues. Indeed, the way that Bulgaria’s judicial system functions 
provides both the executive and the legislative powers with the potential to influence 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court. This is referred to in the annual reports that 
the EC issues with reference to the progress of Bulgaria’s negotiations with the EU. 
Some of these reports mention that Bulgaria’s judicial system suffers from issues such 
as corruption, bribery and interference from executive and legislative powers in the 
decisions taken by the country’s higher courts.568
Independence of the country’s judicial system is a necessary precondition for 
Bulgaria’s admission to the EU and so far Bulgarian governments have done little to 
bring the country’s judicial system in line with the standards set by the EU. However, 
because Bulgaria has little chance of being allowed to join the EU unless it reforms its 
judicial system it can be argued that the country’s accession to the EU will lead 
Bulgaria’s judicial to become more independent from the executive and legislative 
powers. This, in turn, will be reflected in decisions taken by the country’s 
Constitutional Court on foreign policy issues, as the Court will be less open to outside 
influences.
The Increased Role o f Non-party Actors in Foreign Policy Making
Bulgaria’s institutional transformation has allowed NGOs to become more involved in 
foreign policy making. As a result of the transformation, NGOs have acquired a
568 http://europa.au.int/eomm/enlargement/report2002/bu en.pdf
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significant role in shaping Bulgaria’s policy towards the EU and, in this way, their 
potential to affect Bulgaria’s relations with EU and non-EU states has increased.
NGOs now have the potential to participate in the meetings of government institutions 
responsible for preparing for Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. One such is the 
Coordination Council, whose meetings are attended by members of various NGOs 
who in this way can influence the decisions taken by the Council.
A number of NGO members have joined government officials to sit in committees 
which meet on a regular basis to discuss issues relevant to Bulgaria’s process of 
accession to the EU. These committees provide a forum for informal discussions 
where members of NGOs can express their views on EU matters to government 
officials. The Civic Forum for instance brings together government officials including 
Petur Ropchev and Stefan Russanov, both experts who formerly worked in the 
Bulgarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence respectively, with members of 
NGOs and representatives from academia to discuss accession process matters.569
The EU encourages the involvement of NGOs in foreign policy making. Annual 
reports issued by the EC with reference to Bulgaria’s progress of accession to the EU 
often refer to the extent that NGOs participate in shaping and implementing the 
country’s EU policy and, on many occasions, they call on the Bulgarian authorities to 
take political measures to provide the means for NGOs to be actively involved in the 
country’s EU policy. In the 15th meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
between Bulgaria and the EU that took place in Sofia on 29-30 October 2002 the Joint
569 http://www.parliament.biz/komisii/ei/En Civil forum main.htm
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Parliamentary Committee “encouraged the engagement of NGOs in implementation 
of Bulgaria’s European policies”.570
NGO engagement contributes to the pluralism of views which, is seen as necessary 
precondition for mature and long-lasting decisions with reference to Bulgaria’s 
accession to the EU. Also, because the activities of NGOs are mainly related to 
society, they are seen as mediators between the state and society and, therefore, the 
more that NGOs are involved in the process of decision-making, the more parts of 
society will be seen as contributing to this process.
Although it is controversial how closely-linked NGOs are with Bulgarian society, 
their social activities have often been viewed as serving to familiarize Bulgarian 
citizens with the effect that accession to the EU will have on the country’s political, 
social and economic life._A number of opinion polls have shown that many Bulgarian 
citizens are ignorant about these effects, and that they consider that EU accession is a 
political formality involving the Bulgarian government and the governments of the 
EU member states, which will occur quite soon. In an opinion poll conducted by the 
EU’s official Statistical Service ‘Eurobarometer’ in Bulgaria in 2001 the 
overwhelming majority of the Bulgarians who responded (approximately 70%) said 
they wished to see Bulgaria become a full EU member state by 2005, just four years 
after the E C ’s invitation to the Bulgarian government to start negotiations, while a 
significant proportion (approximately 35%) hoped their country would become a 
member by 2002.571
570 http://www.europa.eu.int/meetdocs/deletiations/bulg/20030422/482103EN.pdf
571 Appendix, tables 42-43.
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This lack of understanding has increased the distrust of the public in its democratic 
institutions. The Bulgarian people tend to view the country’s political authorities as 
only interested in staying in power for as long as possible, and using their position to 
benefit themselves, their families and friends and relatives. They are generally seen as 
having done little to secure economic growth, or improvements in living standards for 
the population. Opinion polls show that Bulgaria’s post-1989 political institutions 
such as the parliament, political parties and the government are those least trusted by 
the Bulgarian public.572
Conclusion
Since Zhivkov’s ousting from power, integration into the Western world has become 
Bulgaria’s top foreign policy priority, with which the majority of the country’s 
political elite and public agree. Apart from any economic benefits such as increased 
living standards through the flow of foreign capital, technical know-how and the 
increase of trade exchanges, Bulgaria’s integration into the West is seen as bringing a 
series of political benefits. For instance, an end to the international isolation of 
Bulgaria since the late 1980s as a result of various political measures taken by 
Zhivkov’s regime, such as the assimilation of the Bulgarian Turks.
However, despite agreement on the country’s integration into the W estern world, in 
the first years after Zhivkov’s removal from power, there was confusion about what 
the terms ‘the W est’ or the ‘Western world’ conveyed. This was because these terms
572 This is in contrast to other institutions such as the army, the police and the church which are trusted. 
See Appendix, table 44.
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included certain international political and economic organisations and states and 
raised the issue of which should receive priority in foreign policy.
Since it was widely recognized that the most influential actors in the W est were the 
EU and the USA, the question soon took the form of whether Bulgaria should give 
priority to establishing close political and economic relations with the USA or the EU. 
In due time, the answer to this question favoured the EU and, therefore, integration 
into the Western world came to be equated with integration into the EU.
Bulgaria’s integration into the EU was to exercise a tremendous influence on the 
country’s foreign policy making mainly because integration was conditional on a 
series of institutional reforms which Sofia needed to introduce in order to become a 
member. These reforms impacted on the entire spectrum of the country’s foreign 
policy and its foreign policy mechanisms. Many of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
responsibilities were distributed across a series of newly created institutions including 
the Ministry of European Affairs. This Ministry became responsible for determining a 
substantial part of the country’s foreign policy along with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. EU integration has also pushed the executive to make the country’s foreign 
policy a more transparent political process making it more accountable to institutions 
such as the Parliament or the Constitutional Court.
The influence of EU integration on Sofia’s foreign policy making in the future is 
conditional on Bulgaria’s accession to the EU within a reasonable time frame and the 
maintenance of strong political links between the EU and the USA. Negotiations for 
Bulgaria’s EU membership were finalized in June 2004 and the country is expected to
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join the Union in 2007. However, conclusion of negotiations does not guarantee the 
exact time of Bulgaria’s membership. The process of accession is a complex political 
process that involves many factors and can be reversed at any stage. If Bulgaria does 
not become a member of the EU within a reasonable time frame, it is quite possible 
that the political consensus over accession being a top foreign policy priority will be 
undermined and that nationalist or Euro-sceptic political forces might seek to provide 
a different orientation and form to Sofia’s foreign policy.
. The maintenance of strong political links between the EU and the USA is important 
for maintaining the political consensus that integration into the EU should be 
Bulgaria’s top foreign policy priority. It is this political consensus which has so far 
given Sofia the momentum to adjust its foreign policy making to fit within the 
political and legal framework set by the EU.
A rupture in the political links between the EU and the US could undermine this 
political consensus and reopen the debate on whether Bulgaria should give priority to 
developing strong political relations with the USA or the EU. A rupture in EU-USA 
political links would be translated into competition in Bulgaria’s political scene 
between the parties seeking to align the country’s foreign policy with the USA and 
others seeking to maintain its alignment with the EU. The Iraqi crisis of 2003, which 
caused a split into factions supporting the USA’s foreign policy towards Iraq and 
those who favoured the EU ’s position on the issue illustrates the dangers of any 
serious rupture occurring.
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Chapter IV
Case Studies of EU Influence on Bulgarian Foreign Policy Relations 
Introduction
Chapter III examined how integration into the EU has for the overwhelming majority 
of the Bulgarian political elite and public become the highest foreign policy priority 
since the end of the Cold War, and discussed the effects of Bulgaria’s process of EU 
accession on the country’s foreign policy mechanisms. This chapter analyses the 
effects of this process on Bulgaria’s relations with international organisations, and 
inter-state relations. In terms of international organisations, emphasis is given to 
Sofia’s post-1989 relations with NATO and the IMF, which are the organisations that 
accession has influenced most
In terms of interstate relations, the focus is on Bulgaria’s post-1989 relations with 
developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America as well as with the 
USA and the Russian Federation. Under communism, Sofia had almost no relations 
with the USA but had, of course, very strong relations with the USSR, including the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia (the official name of what is known now as the 
Russian Federation in the Soviet Union), and a number of developing countries 
including Iraq, Libya and Syria. The aim is to show how Bulgaria’s process of 
accession to the EU has influenced Sofia’s relations with these states.
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Influence on Bulgaria’s Relations with International Organisations
During the communist period, although Bulgaria was a member of the Warsaw Pact 
and the CMEA, whose members were states with communist regimes, Sofia’s 
political presence in international organisations whose members included non­
communist states was small. Bulgaria refused to participate in international 
organisations including the Council of Europe and the IMF because they were seen as 
opposing the fundamental philosophical principles of the political systems in Eastern 
Europe such as lack of political pluralism, and the existence of a command economy.
Even in those international organisations such as the UN or the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that Bulgaria did participate in, its role 
was mainly confined to supporting the political position of the Soviet Union. Thus, 
Sofia’s input was not considered very important, Bulgaria being regarded as 
M oscow’s political puppet.573
This picture gradually changed after 1989. Bulgaria is now a member of almost all the 
main international organisations. In addition to the UN and the CSCE, Bulgaria has 
been a member of the IMF since September 1990, a member of the Council of Europe 
since May 1992, a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since November 
2002 and a NATO member state since March 2004.574
573 Leonard, 2000, p. 531.
574 Zhelev, 1998, pp. 51-60; 107-110; http://press.coe.int/countries/e-bg.htm; 
wysiwyg://6/http://www.wto.org/English/the wto_en/countries_e/Bulgaria_e.htm; 
http://www.government.bg/English/Priorities/Foreign Policy/ 2002-11-21/921 .html; 
http://www.government.bg/English/Priorities/Foreign Policy/ 2002-10-10/820.html: 
http://www.imf.org/external /countrv/bgr/rr/glance.html; http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/03- 
march/e0329a.htm.
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These international organisations give greater credence to Bulgaria which is no longer 
viewed as the puppet of any particular state and is seen rather as a country whose 
political decisions on international issues discussed in international organisations are 
taken solely by the Bulgarian political authorities.575 The Soviet Union and communist 
organisations, such as the Warsaw pact and the CMEA, have been dissolved and 
Bulgaria has denounced the communist system. Sofia has declared its intention to 
follow a foreign policy, free from the influence of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
Federation or any other former communist state. Throughout the post-1989 period, 
Bulgaria has generally voted with the majority in international committees, regardless 
of the political and economic consequences that the committees’ decisions would 
have for the country.
For example, Sofia upheld the decision taken by the Security Council of the UN to 
impose economic embargoes on Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
during the 1990s despite the huge economic cost that they would entail for Bulgaria. 
Observing the economic embargo imposed on Saddam Hussein’s regime, meant Sofia 
was unable to recoup the $1.5bn the Iraqi regime owed to Bulgaria because of 
infrastructure projects conducted by Bulgarian state construction companies prior to 
1989, and arms deals with Bulgarian military companies such as Kintext during the 
period of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.576 The economic embargo imposed on the 
political regime of Slobodan Milosevic cut Bulgaria’s trade routes to Western Europe, 
thus causing inestimable economic damage to the economy.577
575 Zhelev, 1998, pp. 107-110.
576 http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/! 1-98/22-11-1.htm; Bristow, 1996, p. 116; Zhelev, 1998, 37-42; 
appendix, pp 23-4.
5 7 Bristow, 1996, pp. 119-120; Georgiev & Tsenkov, 1993, pp. 38-9; Insider, Vol.9, No 3/4, 1999, p.
11; http://www.eapital.bg/weeklv/99-13/15-13-l.html; Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2000, pp. 109-110; IMF, 
1996, pp. 31-33; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/99-16/32-16-1 .htm;
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As a result of the Bulgaria’s improved image within international organisations since 
1989, Bulgarian representatives have taken on political offices. In May 1994 Bulgaria 
became the first ex-communist state to hold the rotating Presidency of the Council of 
Europe.578 In October 2001 the General Assembly of the UN elected Bulgaria to chair 
the UN Security Council, from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2003.579 In December 
2002 the 10th Ministerial Council of the OSCE convened in Porto unanimously 
approved Bulgaria’s chairmanship of the OSCE for 2004.580
Bulgaria’s positive image could be part of a conscious political strategy to bring the 
country out of the international isolation in which it found itself at the beginning of 
the 1990s as a result of the policy for ethnic assimilation of the Bulgarian Turks 
during the late 1980s. This accentuated the dislocation of the country’s economy 
which, due to its international isolation, Bulgaria was to cope with alone. Bulgarian 
governments are now trying to maintain a positive image in international 
organisations, which should help the country’s access to international funding. 
Funding was seen as necessary to halt the country’s economic dislocation and save it 
from economic collapse.
Successive Bulgarian governments have tried to restore ethnic stability in Bulgaria to 
secure territorial integrity. The OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO’s prime aims 
after the end of the Cold W ar were the prevention and management of military 
conflicts both between and inside states and, therefore, these organisations provided a
578 Callaghan et al., 2000, p. 68.
579 http://www.buluaria2net.com/government/UN/] 81222001 .html
580 http://www.government.bg/english/priorities/foreign policv/2002-12-07/967.html
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framework for Bulgaria to seek solutions to its own ethnic problems which post-1989 
governments had inherited from Zhivkov’s regime.
However, Sofia’s attitude towards international organisations should not be 
inteipreted merely as conscious political strategy designed to break the country’s 
international isolation. If it had been a rational political choice based on the benefits 
which the county would get by participating in and building a positive image in these 
organisations, then it would have needed a consensus among all the political actors 
which has not been the case. There was support for Bulgaria’s participation in the 
Council of Europe, but a large section of Bulgaria’s political elite objected to the 
country’s participation in organisations such as NATO for the most part of the 
1990s.581
Despite Bulgaria’s admission to the IMF in September 1990, most governments 
backed by the BSP had not cooperated with this organisation because it favoured a 
neo-liberal economic model which provided for political measures such as 
liberalization of prices and trade of goods, privatization of state companies and 
generally measures that would reduce state control over the economy. Promotion of 
such measures would have entailed a high social cost with rising unemployment rates 
and reduced living standards for the working classes, and, thus was in sharp contrast 
to the BSP’s efforts to build a public image as the party that cared for the lower 
classes.582
581 http://www.internationalspecialreports.corn/ciscentraliasia/99/bulgaria/10.html: Interview with 
Bulgarian Defence Minister Nikolai Svinarov in wysiwyg://main
16/http://www.md.government.bg/_en_/interview_svinarov.html;
http://www.md.government.bg/ en /sociological study 1999 2001.html: Dainov, 1997; Todorov, 
1997.
582 Petvok, 1999; Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, pp. 81-86, Wyzan, 1998, pp. 108-112.
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However, the EU gives a great deal of importance to the relations that candidate states 
have with organisations that the EU views as fundamental to the smooth functioning 
of both the Union and the international system. These organisations include the IMF, 
the World Bank, the WTO, NATO, and the OSCE.
Having a good relationship with these organisations was a criterion for candidate 
states to join the EU. In the EC’s annual report summarising the progress of 
membership negotiations there is a section that assesses relations with international 
organisations but why is it that the EC sees this as being so important to the accession 
process?
There are two main reasons. Firstly, both the EU as an international entity and its 
member states individually, drive the political agendas of and establish the political 
norms in all the main international organisations and, by requiring candidate states 
such as Bulgaria to maintain good relations with these organisations, the Union can 
align the policies that candidate states follow regarding such international 
organisations with those of the Union and its constituent member-states. Such 
alignment is seen as necessary for the smooth functioning of the EU because it allows 
the Union to have a united political stance towards these organisations. This in turn, 
sets the grounds for the adoption of common political positions in these organisations 
once the candidate states become full members of the Union and thus maintains the 
EU ’s control on the foreign policies of EU candidate and full member states and, 
together with the USA, of international organizations to a large extent.
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Secondly, the EU is itself a multinational political entity similar to such international 
organisations as the UN, the IMF and the OSCE; thus, by participating in these 
organisations, the candidate states become familiarized with the way that a 
multilateral political entity functions, which also contributes to smooth functioning of 
the EU once the candidate states become full members. This familiarization was very 
necessary in the case of EES because they had a different experience of how 
multilateral political entities functioned based on their experience in the Warsaw Pact 
and the CMEA during the communist period. During that time, EES did participate in 
multinational organisations, but in a quite different way. EES were not involved in 
collective decision making but were there only to promote or to ratify political 
decisions taken in Moscow.583
So how has democratic conditionality changed Bulgaria’s relations with international 
organisations since 1989? It could be argued that democratic conditionality has had 
two effects: it has aligned many of the political positions that Bulgaria supported in 
international organisations such as the UN or the OSCE with the EU ’s position. For 
instance, throughout the 1990s, Bulgaria’s position on the respect of human rights in 
countries such as China, Cuba or Iran approximated the positions of the EU.584
The alignment of Bulgaria’s political positions with those of the EU in international 
organisations was the result o f the increased political cooperation between the Union 
and Sofia during the 1990s, which was aimed at harmonizing Bulgaria’s policies and 
institutions with those of the EU, because it was only through such harmonization that 
Bulgaria could become eligible for membership of the EU. Sofia’s political
583 Dimitorv, Vesselin, 2000, p. 1
584 Center for the Study o f Democracy, 1998, p. 106.
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cooperation with the Union was achieved in two ways: a) through institutional 
mechanisms provided by the Association Agreement, e.g. the Bulgaria-EU 
Association Committee and the Joint Bulgarian-EU Parliamentary Committee, which, 
although they were mainly political organs that monitored the application of the 
Association Agreement, also functioned as political forums where European officials 
met with their Bulgarian counterparts and exchanged views on international issues. 
And b) through institutional mechanisms that the EU has established with all 
candidate states within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) which the Brussels had begun to develop in the mid-1990s.
There are three main CFSP institutional mechanisms:585 the meetings of experts that 
take place between the EU member states and the candidate states, including Bulgaria. 
There are approximately ten meetings held every six months. There are also the 
meetings between EU diplomatic representatives and high ranking diplomats from 
candidate states, such as the political directors of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
and the meetings between the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and his 
counterparts in EU member and candidate states in the General Affairs Council.
Although these mechanisms were designed to develop common political positions 
able to represent both member states and candidate states at the international level, 
they were in reality political forums where candidate states were briefed on the 
political positions which EU member states had already adopted during the meetings 
of EU political organs in which only member states participated. The candidate states 
were asked to support these positions in international forums and, in most cases,
585 Ibid, p. 148; Smith, 1999, p. 119, pp.125-126.
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agreed to do so, worried that otherwise they would damage their political relations 
with Brussels and undermine their chances of membership of the Union.586
The only way for a state like Bulgaria to effectively influence political positions 
supported by the EU in international organisations was to become a full member of 
the EU. By becoming an EU member, a state’s potential to influence policy making 
within the Union would extend as far as the ability to veto political decisions which 
were thought to be against the state’s interest.
Democratic conditionality led Bulgaria to establish cooperation with international 
organisations whose relations with the Bulgarian state had been disturbed for a large 
part of the post-1989 period. This can be well exemplified by Sofia’s relations with 
NATO and the IMF which are analysed in the next two sections.
Democratic Conditionality and Bulgaria’s Relations with NATO
Unlike other EES such as Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary which, immediately 
after the fall of their communist systems expressed an interest in joining NATO, in 
Bulgaria the issue of the country’s joining NATO began to preoccupy the Bulgarian 
political elite and public opinion only after 1991. Until that time the idea had been 
inconceivable.
Although the overwhelming majority of the political elite and the public of Bulgaria 
had come to terms with the failure of the communist system, they could not believe
586 Center for the Study o f Dem ocracy, 1998, pp. 151-2.
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that this failure would dissolve the Soviet bloc as a military alliance because the 
collapse of the communist system had left the military might of the Soviet Union 
relatively intact, and Moscow could mobilize it at any time in order to protect the 
territorial integrity of EES. Also, a number of EES were dependent on Moscow in 
terms of arms, military equipment and the training of their army officers, so, despite 
calls for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, it seemed too costly for these states to 
seek its dissolution and admission to NATO.
The Soviet Union still retained a good image among a large section of the political 
elite and the Bulgarian public after 1989, mainly due to the fact that, throughout the 
communist period, Moscow had rewarded Bulgaria’s loyalty by providing economic 
subsidies which had transformed Bulgaria from a poor peasant country to an industrial 
state with high economic growth. Also, unlike other EES such as Poland, the Soviet 
Union had protected Bulgaria’s territorial integrity after the WWII. Although a 
defeated country, Bulgaria did not experience any disadvantageous border changes. In 
fact, as a result of the Soviet Union’s support in the post-war international forums that 
convened to define the world order, Bulgaria’s territory expanded for the first time 
since the Balkan Wars. South Dobrudzha, an area which from the end of the Second 
Balkan W ar in 1913 to the beginning of WWII had belonged to Romania, had been 
annexed to Bulgaria in September 1940 as a result of the Nazi-Soviet cooperation at 
the end of the 1930s, and was allowed to remain Bulgarian territory.587
The issue of Bulgaria joining NATO did not arise, because prior to 1991, NATO was 
neither interested in nor ready to accept new member states from Eastern Europe. In
587 Crampton 1997, pp. 169-170, 188.
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November 1991, NATO concluded an agreement with the former Warsaw Pact 
countries concerning the reduction of conventional arms in Europe and NATO 
officials believed this removed the danger of Soviet military superiority in Europe and 
thus insured NATO against a Soviet military attack. Once the danger of such an attack 
had been removed, NATO officials saw no reason why the alliance should expand 
eastwards by the inclusion of EES members.588
Any NATO expansion eastwards might also create a feeling among political and 
military circles in Moscow that NATO constituted a serious security threat to the 
Soviet Union in the long-term, which, in turn, might bring to power Russian 
nationalist or conservative political forces seeking to halt the liberal political and 
economic reforms that the Soviet Union was implementing under Gorbachev. This 
was something that NATO officials did not want to happen because they feared that a 
possible end to political and economic reforms in Moscow would also have negative 
repercussions on the political and economic reforms that EES were introducing and 
might prolong the political division of Europe with unanticipated consequences for 
the security of the European continent.
At the beginning of 1992 the international environment was totally different from how 
it had been in the aftermath of 1989. Despite initial assessment that the Warsaw Pact 
would remain intact, it was dissolved in July 1991 and the Soviet Union broke up in 
December 1991. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact meant that Bulgaria had lost the 
one international institution on which it could count for national security and
588 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, p. 96; Dimitrov, Dimitur, 2002a, p. 30; De Wijk, 1997, pp. 13-82; Smith 
et al., 2000, pp. 20-49; Rauchhaus 2001, p. 175; Eyal, 1999, pp. 22-34. For a general overview on 
NATO’s expansion to Eastern Europe see also Yost, 1998; Asmus et al., 1995; Brown, 1995; Allin, 
1995.
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territorial integrity. Bulgaria now seemed to be unprotected in an unstable Balkan 
region with ongoing ethnic conflict in neighbouring Yugoslavia and two NATO 
member states to its south, namely Greece and Turkey, each with well-organised 
armies and superior weaponries to Bulgaria’s arsenal.589
For NATO too, the international environment at the end of 1991 had changed. The 
military coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 showed that, despite the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact and the military agreements that NATO had concluded with the 
former Pact countries, these were not enough to secure the political independence and 
territorial integrity of EES from a possible military threat in the future.
After the coup an increasing number of NATO members came to support the view 
that the future mission of NATO in Europe should not be confined to the protection of 
the national security and territorial integrity of WES from a possible Soviet military 
threat. Instead, NATO’s future mission should expand to also include EES, and offer 
them domestic stability and security, as well as guarantees that they would not be left 
at the mercy of any future military threat, be it from the Soviet Union, post-Soviet 
Russia or elsewhere.590
In line with this view, in November 1991 it was decided at a NATO summit convened 
in Rome to establish cooperation with the states of Eastern Europe by creating 
permanent institutional mechanisms in which both NATO member states and EES 
would be included. The declaration, published at the end of the summit, invited all
589 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001 p. 96; Zhivkov, 1993, pp. 150-1.
590 De Wijk, 1997, pp. 49-52.
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EES to establish permanent institutional ties with NATO591 that would allow the states 
of Eastern Europe to exchange information with NATO member states on foreign 
policy issues and, in this way, influence the political and military decisions taken by 
NATO. In response to the declaration at the NATO summit in Rome, nine EES, 
including Bulgaria, along with the 16 NATO member states founded the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991. The task of the NACC was 
to provide a permanent political forum where EES would consult NATO on issues 
relevant to the foreign policy and defence of those states.592 NATO’s cooperation with 
the states of Eastern Europe was not restricted to the creation of the NACC. At the 
January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme 
was established.593 This programme mainly addressed the states of Eastern Europe and 
aimed at establishing cooperation between the military of these states and the military 
units of NATO which would enable both sides to undertake common military action 
in the future.594
Also, in the mid-1990s NATO began to discuss the prospects of eastward expansion 
by admitting EES as member states of the organisation. In December 1994 a summit 
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of NATO decided to 
authorize the NATO Secretariat to construct a policy paper to be published in 
September 1995. This policy paper would define the criteria which EES interested in 
joining the organisation must meet.595 In line with these criteria, in July 1997, the 
NATO summit convened in Madrid decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic and
591 http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020201.htm
592 Ibid.
593 Bulgarian joined the PfP in November 1994.
594 For more details on NATO’s PfP programme see Williams, 1996; 
h ttp:// w w w . nato. i nt/docu/h andbook/2001/hbO 10302. htm
595 http://www.nato.int/document/handbook/2001/hb030101.htm
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Hungary to start negotiations with the organisation. After just under two years of 
negotiations, in March 1999 the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary became the 
first EES to join NATO.
Bulgaria’s participation in every institutional mechanism which NATO established 
with the states of Eastern Europe reflected the Bulgarian authorities’ view that 
participation could resolve the security vacuum in which Bulgaria had been left by the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. However, despite the country’s 
participation in the NACC and PfP, its membership of NATO triggered a long 
political debate, the length and the intensity of which was unprecedented.
On the one hand were political parties such as the UDF, NGO’s such as the Atlantic 
Club of Bulgaria, young military officers, and academics including the political 
scientist Dr. Evgeni DaTnov. According to these parties, Bulgaria should seek 
membership of NATO because this would signify an important step in the process of 
the country’s integration into the Western world,596 as it would be seen as rewarding 
the progress that Bulgaria had made in accepting liberal democratic norms and 
institutions.597 According to the document issued by the NATO Secretariat in 
September 1995, future members of the organisation would be expected to conform to 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.598 Given that these 
principles mirrored the political principles of the EU’s democratic conditionality, a 
substantial part of Bulgaria’s political and academic elite viewed admission to NATO 
as part of the process of becoming a member of the EU.
596 For a summary of the main arguments favouring Bulgaria’s admission to NATO see Ivanov, Ivan 
1997.
597 Ivanov, Andrei, 1997, pp. 15-18; Todorov, 1997, pp. 33-4.
598 Smith, 2001, p. 45; http://www.nato.int/document/handbook/2001/hb03101.htm
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Bulgaria’s membership of NATO was seen as offering a solution to two problems 
resulting from the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The first problem was related to 
Bulgaria’s national security. NATO was seen as being the only international 
organisation able to provide its member states with effective protection. According to 
article 5 of NATO’s charter, a threat to the national security of a NATO member state 
should be viewed as a threat to the national security of its other members, which must 
protect the threatened member even if it meant resorting to military force.599 Unlike 
international organisations such as the WEU which could also resort to the use of 
force to protect their members, NATO was the only organisation that possessed an 
effective military infrastructure.600
Apart from the protection that NATO would offer, a number of young army officers 
considered that Bulgaria’s admission to NATO would help it to strengthen its military 
capacities, which had been in constant decline since the dissolution o f the Warsaw 
Pact. Firstly, admission to NATO would provide the opportunity for a large number 
of Bulgarian military officers to be trained in the military academies of the USA, or 
other NATO members to update their knowledge and expertise.601 This training would 
help the officers involved to achieve rapid promotion in the military ranks and thus 
was supported by young officers.
Secondly, through admission to NATO, Bulgaria would gain access to the necessary 
capital and know-how to enable the state to save the Bulgarian military industry from
599 Pantev Plamen, personal interview, 19/11/2001; Rachev, Valeri, personal interview, 16/1/2002; 
Alexandrov Evgeni, personal interview, 11/1/2001.
600 Ibid; Ivanov, Ivan, 1997, p.72.
601 Ivanov, Andrei, 1997, 24-5; Rachev, 1997; Insider Business & Current Affairs, No. 4, 1997, p. 4.
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the economic decline it had suffered since the end of the 1980s.602 This was seen as 
important for both military and economic reasons. In the 1980s Bulgaria’s military 
industry employed around 12% of the total industrial workforce and produced around 
7% of the country’s exports, adding $500-600m annually to the country’s revenue.603
On the other hand, a substantial part of Sofia’s political, military and academic elite 
favoured ‘neutrality’, as they termed the country’s non-membership of NATO.604 This 
was the view the majority of the political cadres of the BSP, of elderly military 
officers, and academics including the historian Dr Iskra Baeva. Some saw Bulgaria’s 
admission to NATO would mean the country’s shouldering an insurmountable 
economic burden at a time of severe economic recession. Most of the Bulgarian 
army’s equipment had come from former Warsaw Pact countries and a decision to 
join NATO would mean re-equipping the army with equipment from NATO member 
states so that it would meet NATO standards.605 Others thought that admission to 
NATO would entail the presence of foreign military troops on Bulgarian soil, which 
was seen as disgraceful and dangerous. Disgraceful, because the presence of foreign 
troops equated with selling out the sovereignty of the Bulgarian state, and dangerous 
because, in the event that NATO was involved in military operations, the country 
would de facto become a target.606
In most cases, behind all of these objections, was the feeling that Bulgaria should not 
abandon solidarity with Slavic Orthodox countries such as Russia, with whom
602 Ivanov, Andrei, 1997, 23-24; Rachev Valeri, personal interview, 16/1/2002; Behar Nasen, personal 
interview, 16/1/2002; Ganev, Ivan, personal interview, 25/1/2002.
603 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, p. 101; Dimitrov, Dimitur, 2002b;
604 Goranov, 1997.
605 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, p. 98; Interview o f Marshal Viktor Vulkov in Duma, 5/6/1995, p. 3.
606 Dimitrov, Vesselin 2001, p.98.
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Bulgaria had cultural bonds; the majority of Bulgarians were like most ethnic 
Russians, Orthodox Christians, and spoke a language that belonged to the same family 
of languages as the Russian language.607 Due to these cultural bonds, countries such as 
Russia should be more willing to provide Bulgaria with military protection than the 
member states of NATO with whom Bulgaria had little in common.608
This feeling was corroborated by occasional statements from Russian officials aimed 
at discouraging Bulgaria from seeking NATO membership.609 One such was on the 
occasion of an official visit to Moscow by the chairman of the Bulgarian National 
Assembly, Blagovest Sendov, in May 1995. At a joint press conference the chairman 
of the Russian Duma, Vladimir Lukin, stated that, while Russia had no objection to 
Bulgaria’s admission to the WEU, it was against its membership in NATO because 
this would not guarantee national security. To achieve this, according to Vladimir 
Lukin, Sofia should conclude a military alliance with Moscow.610
The political debate over NATO continued until the end of the 1990s. Why it took 
Sofia almost a decade to decide whether to join NATO was because the BSP was 
against joining NATO. Its manifesto made this clear and influenced many Bulgarian 
governments and a large part of the public: for much of the early 1990s 65% to 70% 
of the population did not want Bulgaria to join NATO.611
For almost five out of the seven years following the first post-communist general 
elections in June 1990, the BSP directly or indirectly controlled Bulgaria. The
607 Todorov, 1997, pp. 31-33
608 Genov, 1998, p.44.
609 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, p. 99.
610 BTA, 3/5/1995; FBIS-EEU-95-085, 3/5/1995, p. 3.
611 Dainov, 1997, pp. 51-56; Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 143-145.
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socialist governments of Andre? Lukanov and Zhan Videnov came to power as the 
result of electoral victory of the BSP in the general elections of June 1990 and 
December 1994 respectively, and the BSP also had control of the cabinets of Dimitur 
Popov and Liuben Berov which were in power from December 1990 to November 
1991 and from December 1992 to September 1994 respectively thanks to the support 
of the BSP.612 Being dependent on the parliamentary support of the BSP, it was very 
difficult for these governments to deviate from the party’s political position and seek 
Bulgarian membership of NATO.
In a sense, the general elections of April 1997 set the political preconditions for 
Bulgaria to join NATO. In these elections, the BSP suffered a crashing electoral 
defeat which put the party on the margins of Bulgaria’s politics for years to come. The 
UDF which took power was the first party since 1989 to have full control of the 
country’s Executive. This enabled the UDF to take a series of political measures 
towards the country’s membership of NATO. In December 1997, the UDF 
government decided to upgrade Sofia’s diplomatic relations with the organisation, by 
establishing a permanent Bulgarian diplomatic mission at NATO headquarters in 
Brussels.613
In March 1997 parliament adopted a government decree that admission to NATO 
would be a top foreign policy priority. This became the legal foundation for a series of 
decisions providing political and military support to NATO. The Bulgarian 
government hoped this would promote accession to the organisation. In July 1997, the
612 Alexandrov et al, 1997, pp. 55-66, 86-103; Daskalov, 1998, p. 11; Crampton, 1997, pp. 221-223, 
229-231.
613 The first head of Bulgaria’s permanent diplomatic mission to NATO presented his credentials to 
NATO headquarters in Brussels in March 1998.
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government announced support for the peacekeeping Stabilization Forces (SFOR) that 
NATO had deployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the auspices of the UN, and 
contributed an engineering platoon comprising 31 servicemen, which was later 
followed with a transport platoon comprising 17 servicemen and 20 vehicles to help 
the multinational group BELUGA which was providing logistical support for SFOR. 
In April 1999, Sofia supported NATO’s military activities against the army of the 
FRY in Kosovo by giving NATO military air forces transit passage through its 
airspace. After NATO’s military activities in FRY were concluded Bulgaria supported 
the KFOR peacekeeping force, which had been dispatched to Kosovo under the 
auspices of the UN, contributing a platoon to be led by the Dutch contingent in 
KFOR.
The March 1997 declaration did not signal a consensus among the country’s political 
elite over membership of NATO. Many BSP political activists were still opposed to 
Bulgaria’s becoming a full NATO member state. W ithout consensus the military 
reforms that were necessary could not be completed. These reforms included the 
organisation, training and armaments of the Bulgarian military forces, and their 
standardization with those of other NATO members. Although these reforms had been 
initiated by previous Bulgarian governments, more was needed.614 There was a danger 
that any reforms implemented could be reversed in the event of a change of power, for 
instance to a BSP government.
6,4 It should be mentioned that the delay in the promotion of reforms to the Bulgarian army was one o f  
the reasons that the NATO summit in Madrid rejected Bulgaria’s application. The application had been 
submitted by the caretaker government and the mayor of Sofia Stefan Sofianski, who took power 
immediately after the fall o f the BSP. See
wysiwyg//main.l6/http://www. md.government.bg/_en_reform_ba.html; Dimitrov, Dimitur, 2002a; 
Insider Business & Current Affairs, No. 4, 1997, pp. 2-3.
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A consensus would also have given the government greater credibility. NATO 
officials were unlikely to seriously consider diplomatic efforts to make Bulgaria a 
member state of NATO if they knew that this application was not supported by the 
country’s main political forces. What is important is how did Bulgaria’s integration 
into the EU affect the development of a political consensus on the issue of NATO?
Since the end of WWII the EU had had strong political and military links with NATO. 
The majority of EU member states were members of NATO and, given the absence of 
an EU common foreign and defence policy up to the end of the Cold War, NATO was 
responsible for the national security of most EU member states. Even after 1989, 
when the EU began to develop its own institutional mechanisms for common foreign 
and defence policies, these mechanisms were strongly allied to NATO’s mechanisms. 
This can be seen in the E U ’s support of economic embargoes against Iraq in 1991 and 
against FRY during the Yugoslav wars.615
As a result of the strong political and military links between the EU and NATO, an 
increasing number of Sofia’s policy makers came to view Bulgaria’s accession to 
NATO as an integral part of the country’s integration into the EU and that admission 
to NATO would accelerate the latter process. This view was reinforced when NATO 
and the EU both decided in 1997 to accept new member states from Eastern Europe. 
In June 1997 the NATO summit convened in Madrid decided to invite Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO, and in December 1997 the European 
Council meeting in Luxembourg decided to invite these same countries plus Estonia 
to join the EU.
615 Center for the Study o f  Dem ocracy, 1998, p. 157.
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In addition, good cooperation between the Bulgarian parliamentary political parties 
and the political forces of the European parliament had been established in the late 
1990s. This cooperation was aimed at aligning the structures and the policies of the 
Bulgarian political parties with the structures and policies of the political forces of the 
European Parliament, a necessary precondition for Bulgarian parties to be accepted 
into one of the political forces of the European Parliament when the country became a 
member of the EU.616
The UDF had worked to forge links with the conservative European political parties, 
which were members of the People’s Party in the European Parliament.617 The BSP 
had developed political links with socialist and labour parties, which were members 
of the European Parliament’s European Socialist Party (ESP), and the MRF was 
working closely with the liberal parties, which were members of the European 
parliamentary group of Liberal Democrats.618 The NMSII, after unsuccessful attempts 
to cooperate with the People’s Party due to objections from the UDF, had managed to 
build a good relationship with the Liberal Democrats.619
The Bulgarian political parties saw that by establishing political links with political 
forces of the European parliament, they would be in a better position to compete with 
their political opponents because these links, would give them access to financial and 
technical assistance from Europe’s political forces.620 Also, good relations with the
616 Todorov, 1999, pp. 11-17.
617 Mladenov, Nikolai, personal interview, 18/1/2002; Abadzhiev, Dimitfir, personal interview, 
30/11/2001; Malinov, Svetoslav, personal interview, 28/11/2001.
618 Galtandzhiev, Ivan, personal interview, 24/1/2002; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001.
619 Ilchev, Stanimir, personal interview, 7/12/2001.
620 Todorov, 1999, p. 11.
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political forces in the European Parliament boosted the image of the political parties 
in Bulgaria by demonstrating that their political platforms are based on sound 
ideological principles that go beyond the country’s borders.
At the same time, by developing political links with the Bulgarian political parties, the 
political forces of the European Parliament were seeking to create legitimate 
ideological partners in Bulgaria, which would enable them to extend the influence of 
their ideas and political programmes beyond the borders of the EU. Such partnerships 
would allow Bulgaria to harmonize the country’s political standards with the political 
standards of EU member states and would mean that competition between Bulgarian 
parties would be based on ideological principles, rather than personal differences621
Political cooperation with the parties of the European Parliament came to affect the 
political agenda of the Bulgarian political parties in the latter half of the 1990s. On 
many occasions, it led to the Bulgarian political parties changing their policies and 
political views to reflect those of their political partners in the European Parliament, 
exemplified by the BSP’s reverse on the issue of NATO.
Following the BSP’s electoral defeat in the general elections of April 1997, the party 
leadership revised its political stance on the NATO issue and began to favour 
Bulgarian membership.622 This was confirmed in the political manifesto passed at the
621 Ibid, p. 16.
622 Gaitandzhiev Ivan, personal interview, 24/1/2002; Baeva Iskra, personal interview, 7/12/2001; 
Vigenin, Christian, personal interview, 10/1/2002.
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44th political congress in May 2000,623 which stated that Bulgaria’s admission to 
NATO was one of the party’s top priorities.624
This revision of the B SP’s view in relation to NATO was mainly the result of pressure 
from the ESP in the European Parliament. This proved effective because after the 
general elections of 1997 the BSP had sought desperately to establish ties with the 
ESP, believing that this would enable it to be received into the Socialist 
International,625 which would reduce the marginalization it was experiencing.
The BSP’s change of heart over NATO was decisive in achieving a consensus among 
the political elite. There were still some who were against NATO membership, 
particular conservative party members such as Zhan Videnov, Alexander Lilov and 
Mincho Minchev. However, after 1997, these voices became increasingly 
marginalized.
The political consensus over entry to NATO gradually diffused through to the public. 
According to opinion polls conducted in the latter half of the 1990s, almost 50% of 
the public supported Bulgaria’s joining NATO, and by the end of 2002 this had 
reached 70%,626 contrasting greatly with the 15% that were in favour at the beginning 
of the 1990s.627
623 That the BSP’s political congress in May 2000 was named the 44th reflects the BSP members’ view  
that the BSP was a political transformation of the BCP, and thus the congresses had some continuity, 
reflected by the continuation of their numbering from those of the BCP.
624 http://www.bsp.bg/44kongress en/platform.html
625 Todorov, 1999, pp. 19-21, 30-1.
626 http://www.md.government.bg/ en /sociological study 1999 2001.html; appendix, table 70.
627 http://www.internationalspecialreports.com/ciscentralasia/99/bulgaria/10.htm: Insider, No. 3, 1999,
p. 16.
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Prioritizing membership of NATO was maintained after the UDF lost power in the 
general elections of June 2001 and the new NMSII took office. The Bulgarian Prime 
Minister, Simeon Saxkoburgotski, appointed the President of the Atlantic Club in 
Sofia, Solomon Pasi, to be the new Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
demonstrated his support for NATO.
Pasi accelerated the programme of reforms to the Bulgarian army which had been 
introduced after the 1997 elections. He also continued support for NATO’s political 
and military activities, including military operations against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, offering a contingent of 30 Bulgarian soldiers to take part in 
operation s. 628The army reforms and support for NATO military activities were 
important factors in Bulgaria, along with six other EES, being invited to start 
negotiations for membership of NATO at its summit in Prague in November 2002.
NATO’s decision in Prague was not affected by BSP leader and official candidate, 
Georgi Parvanov, winning the Presidential elections of November 2001. This is 
because the newly elected President followed his party position on the issue, and 
supported Bulgarian membership of NATO, a fact which was stressed on many 
occasions in his speeches and during meetings he had with NATO officials.629
Democratic Conditionality and Bulgaria’s Relations with the IMF
In September 1990 Bulgaria became a member of the IMF, which at the time was 
seen as a way of saving the country’s shaky economy from bankruptcy. The collapse
628 http://www.uovernment.bg/English/Priorities/Foreign Policv/2002-10-21/845.html
629 http://www.president.bg/en/news.php?id=27&St=0
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of the CMEA immediately after 1989 had plunged Bulgaria into deep recession, 
which affected its capacity to repay the almost $12bn debt inherited from communist 
times.630 In March 1990 the socialist government of Andrei Lukanov declared a 
moratorium on debt repayment, which isolated Bulgaria from international capital 
markets because its creditors refused to extend any further economic assistance until 
the debts were repaid.631
As a result of Sofia’s isolation from international capital markets, the IMF became 
extremely important throughout the period of Bulgaria’s democratization. The IMF 
helped in three ways. Firstly, it suggested policy priorities and formulated economic 
programmes to deal with the economic crisis.632 Secondly, by offering economic 
loans, the Fund helped the Bulgarian economy to achieve long periods of 
macroeconomic stability.633 Thirdly, in 1994 through the IM F’s mediation Bulgaria 
managed to reach agreements with its international creditors over a rescheduling of 
the $12bn debt which allowed it to regain access to international capital markets.634
However, despite all this, relations between the Bulgarian governments in the 1990s, 
and the Fund were not good. Up to 1997, the majority of Bulgarian governments 
owed their stay in power to the parliamentary support of the BSP, which did not 
favour long-term cooperation between Sofia and the IMF. The BSP leadership 
considered that Bulgaria would lose its economic independence if it established long­
term cooperation with the IMF, because this would give the IMF the right to intervene
630 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, pp. 69-70; Bristow, 1996, pp. 106-9.
631 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, p. 71.
632 Ibid., p. 72.
633 Ibid.
634 Bristow, 1996, pp. 116-117; W yzan, 1998, p. 108; IMF, 1996, pp. 33ff.
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in economic policy.635 Economic assistance from the IMF was conditional on the 
ability of the government to promote a series of economic and political measures 
determined by the Fund.
The BSP leadership viewed the IMF as an international charity, whose role should be 
confined to offering unconditional economic assistance when asked. This was the 
party’s official position, and was often cited by party officials in official speeches, 
interviews and communiques.636 Why was the BSP against these IM F conditions?
The BSP’s main complaint was that generally the IMF made the provision of any 
economic assistance conditional on the promotion of political measures aimed at 
removing state control of the economy. IMF policy-makers believed that overriding 
state control was the only way for the development of a healthy economic 
environment which, in the long term, would bring economic growth, increase the 
living standards of all citizens and reduce future dependence of the state on economic 
assistance from the IMF and their like. This belief was founded on the neo-liberal 
economic ideas that dominated IMF policy making at the end of the 1980s as a result 
of the collapse of communism and most of the notions of state intervention in the 
economy that had been developed in the West since WWII.637
However, removing state control of the economy meant the privatization of state 
enterprises, the reduction of bureaucracies through mass dismissal of personnel from 
the public sector and the abolition of any type of state protectionism for trade 
including elimination of tariffs and the cancellation of state subsidies to home
635 Baeva Iskra, personal interview, 7/12/2001.
636 Videnov, Zhan, personal interview, 23/1/2002; Videnov, 1996, p. 8; Petkov, 1999.
637 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001 p. 80; Nello, 2001, pp.79-85.
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producers. Application of such measures would inevitably lead to short-term 
economic recession and a rise in unemployment, which would adversely affect the 
BSP leadership’s efforts to present the party as a leftist political force that was 
working in the interests of Bulgaria’s working class.638
Also the Anglo-Saxon origin of the IM F’s neo-liberal ideology made the BSP 
leadership wary of long-term cooperation with the IMF.639 A number of leading BSP 
cadres believed that the USA was attempting to use the Fund as the means to extend 
its economic influence throughout the world.640 Consequently, the saw any long-term 
cooperation with the Fund as raising the possibility of Bulgaria’s becoming an 
American economic protectorate.
The reluctance of most Bulgarian governments throughout the 1990s to cooperate 
with the IMF had negative consequences for the economy. The Fund saw the 
reluctance of these governments to promote the liberal political and economic reforms 
they required as keeping the country behind the Visegrad states in meeting the EU’s 
economic criteria. By promoting reforms such as privatization of state companies or 
the liberalization of state trade through elimination of state control on tariffs, 
Bulgarian governments would have met the preconditions for the creation of the 
strong private sector which would constitute the backbone of a functioning market 
economy, part of the Copenhagen criteria.
638 Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 7/12/2001; Dainov, Evgeni, personal interview, 26/11/2001; 
Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 30/11/2001.
639 Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001.
640 Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 7/12/2001; Lilov Alexandur, personal interview, 4/12/2001.
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But even more crucial was that this lack of cooperation throughout the 1990s 
produced economic crises which plunged the already declining Bulgarian economy 
deeper into recession and culminating with the economic crisis of 1997. The socialist 
government of Zhan Videnov, which came into office in December 1994, believed the 
main reason for economic recession was the liberal economic reforms that past 
Bulgarian governments had launched.641
In an attempt to restore the country’s economy to the levels of prosperity experienced 
under communism, Videnov’s government halted many of these reforms and 
increased state intervention in the economy. It is estimated that, as a result of the 
measures taken by Videnov’s government prior to the beginning of 1997, the state 
controlled almost 52% of the prices of goods and services in the country.642
At the beginning of 1996, the IMF reacted to the economic measures taken by 
Videnov’s government by freezing all its economic transactions with Bulgaria and 
refusing economic assistance in the future unless economic measures geared to the 
requirements of the Fund were implemented. This left Sofia unable to comply with 
the repayment terms agreed with international creditors in 1994 which saw a $lbn 
installment of debt due for repayment in the spring of 1996.
This began a chain reaction throughout the economy, and produced the worst 
economic crisis Bulgaria had experienced since the end of 1989. By the end of 1996, 
the Bulgarian GDP had shrunk by 10% and annual inflation had reached 300%.643 
Between January 1996 and January 1997, average monthly salaries fell almost tenfold
641 Videnov Zhan, personal interview, 23/2/2002.
642 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, pp. 80-85.
643 Ganev, 1997, p. 131.
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from $110 to $12, while average pensions went from $37 to $4 a month over the same 
period.644 The crisis caused political and social chaos with regular mass 
demonstrations and strikes which led Prime Minister Zhan Videnov to convene an 
extraordinary party conference in December 1996 at which he was forced to resign 
from the party leadership and the premiership of the government. The conference 
elected the forty-year-old historian and vice-President of the BSP, Georgi Parvanov, 
as the new party leader, who, after his election, replaced Videnov as head of the 
government.
Once in office, Parvanov declared his intentions to negotiate an economic programme 
with the IMF that would release the country from its crisis. However, despite 
intentions to restore macroeconomic stability, it was difficult for the new government 
to deal with the political and social environment at the time. The majority of the 
Bulgarian public had lost faith in the BSP and believed that a new government backed 
by the socialist party, as Videnov’s government had been, would find it impossible to 
reach agreement with the IMF. The public demonstrations and strikes continued and 
there was no optimism that Bulgaria would emerge from political and social chaos in 
the foreseeable future.
Unable to resolve the situation, Parvanov resigned in February 1997. As a result of 
mediation by the President of the Republic, Petur Stoianov, the Bulgarian 
parliamentary parties concluded a political agreement on 4 February 1997 according 
to which a caretaker government was formed under the premiership of the mayor of 
Sofia, Stefan Sofianski prior to elections being held in April 1997.
644 Ibid.
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From February 1997, Bulgaria’s relations with the IMF entered a new and prolonged 
period of cooperation. In mid-February 1997 the newly formed government of Stefan 
Sofianski created the so-called Structural Reform Council composed of technocrats 
and supervised by the government, which was empowered to conduct negotiations 
with the IMF. In early April 1997, after a couple of weeks of negotiation, the Council 
concluded a stabilization agreement with the Fund. According to this agreement, 
Bulgaria was bound to suspend any protectionist economic measures introduced by 
the government of Zhan Videnov and to promote a package of liberal economic 
reforms aimed at the privatization of enterprises under state control. In return, Sofia 
would receive about $657m in economic aid.645
The UDF government that succeeded Sofianski’s caretaker government in April 1997 
continued along the same lines and all protectionist measures taken by Videnov’s 
government were suspended. An economic programme aimed at eliminating state 
control in the economy through privatization of state enterprises and the liberalization 
of trade was implemented.646
One of the most important aspects of the economic programme of the UDF 
government was the introduction of the Currency Board in July 1997. This was a non­
governmental institutional body whose task was to supervise the flow of currency 
within or into the country by issuing domestic currency and purchasing foreign 
currency at a fixed rate.647 In order to build a stable macroeconomic environment and
645 Dimitrov, Vesselin, 2001, p. 86; Wyzan, 1998, pp. 114-5; 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9715.htm
646 Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 92-106; Wyzan, 1998, pp. 115-16.
647 Wyzan, 1998, pp. 115-116; http://www.capital.bg/weekly/03-26.htm
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to restore some of the optimism lost at the social level as a result of the economic 
crisis of 1996, the Currency Board pegged the Bulgarian Lev (BGL), Bulgaria’s 
national currency, to the Deutschmark (DM) at a fixed rate of 1,000BGL to 1DM.648
Prior to 1997, supervising the issuing and circulation of the national currency and 
purchasing foreign exchange had been the Bulgarian National Bank’s (BNB) 
responsibility. However, due to its tight control over the BNB, governments had often 
manipulated it to advance monies to themselves to finance welfare and protectionist 
policies such as subsidies for domestic products and ‘lame duck’ industries. In 
making the Currency Board solely responsible for the issuing and circulation of 
currency in Bulgaria after 1997, the UDF’s economic programme meant that 
government could not intervene as it had in the past, and thus set the conditions for 
the establishment of a free market economy designed to bring economic growth and 
improved standard of living for the Bulgarian people.649
The cooperation with the IMF continued under Simeon Saxkoburgotski’s government 
which came to power in June 2001, and in February 2002, the executive board of the 
IMF approved a two-year stand-by credit of $299m in support of the government’s 
economic programme.650 At a press conference following a meeting of the IM F’s 
executive board the deputy managing director and acting chairman of the Fund, 
Shigmitsu Sigisaki stated: “The Fund supports the Bulgarian authorities’ economic
648 On 1 January 1999 the Euro replaced the German mark as the national currency o f Germany as well 
as of 11 other EU member states participating in the EMU and, therefore, the Euro replaced the 
German mark as Bulgaria’s peg currency. Please note that Bulgaria re-denominated its currency in July 
1999, dividing it by 1,000. The unit of Bulgaria’s national currency has since July 1999 been called the 
‘New Bulgaria Lev’. See Giatzidis, 2002, note 15, p. 108.
649 Ibid., pp. 116-118; Guide, 1999.
630 http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/2002/pr.Q212.htm
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programme. This programme offers good prospects for sustained economic growth, 
sound external imbalances, low unemployment and reduced poverty” .6-’1
So why did Sofia’s relations with the Fund become easier after 1997? Was it because 
socialist governments were no longer in power or was it a result of the prudent actions 
of governments in reply to the economic crisis of 1997? Neither of these seems 
sufficient reason for the change in attitude towards the Fund.
That the UDF and NMSII were the ruling powers after 1997 was an important factor 
in smoothing relations with the Fund. Both parties disapproved of state intervention in 
the economy. However, the BSP reviewed its political stance towards the IMF after 
1997, which would suggest that a BSP government would also have followed the 
same course as that followed by the UDF and NMSII governments and sought the 
Fund’s cooperation to resolve the country’s economic crisis and build long-term 
macroeconomic stability. The severity of the 1997 economic crisis forced the BSP 
leadership to acknowledge that weak economies such as Bulgaria’s, could not survive 
without the IM F’s active economic support.652
This can be seen in Parvanov’s readiness to negotiate with the Fund when he came 
into office after Videnov’s resignation in December 1996. It can also be seen in the 
party’s political manifesto agreed at the 44th conference in May 2000, which stated 
that although the BSP favoured an economic system that allowed the state the right to 
intervene in the economy by taking measures for the protection of the working class, 
it recognized that the state’s right to intervene should not exceed the limits set by the
651 Ibid.
652 Gaitandzhiev, Ivan, personal interview, 24/1/2002; Vigenin, Christian, personal interview,
10/ 1/2002.
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international economic environment and the economic capacities of the state.653 Such 
a statement had not been included in previous party declarations.654
In addition, even if the way that the UDF cooperated with the IMF after the party 
came into power in 1997 is compared with how it cooperated between November 
1991 and December 1992, the difference is huge. When it first came to power at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the UDF government was a more credible partner for the IMF 
than other governments that either preceded or succeeded it. However, this first UDF 
government, like the socialist ones, did little to promote the large-scale privatization 
of state enterprises. Instead, at the beginning of the 1990s the UDF was mainly 
preoccupied with the restitution of land that the communist regime had collectivized 
after WWII, to its pre-War owners.
It could be argued that, although Bulgaria had not experienced a similarly severe 
economic crisis before 1997, this in itself was not enough to promote long term 
cooperation between the country and the IMF. The majority of the Bulgarian political 
elite saw the economic crisis as the result of bad economic management by Videnov’s 
government rather than as the outcome of government’s refusal to cooperate with the 
Fund.655 In other words, the 1997 economic crisis acted to discredit the BSP as a party 
more than to promote the IMF.
What changed the political attitude towards the IMF after 1997 was the EU’s 
democratic conditionality and the influence it exercised on Bulgaria’s political life. 
This influence became stronger after 1997 because, for a large part of the political
653 http://www.bsp.bg/44kongress en/platform.html
654 BSP, 1990, pp. 8-10.
655 Ivanov, Andrei, personal interview, 13/11/2001; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001.
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elite, accession to the EU came to be seen as the only means by which Bulgaria could 
avoid any further economic crisis. The EU was seen as an economic union that would 
guarantee prosperity for its members, a view exemplified by opinion polls conducted 
after 19 89.656
After the mid-1990s, Bulgaria’s becoming a member of the EU seemed to a much 
firmer possibility and therefore policy conditions set by the Union at that time were 
being taken more seriously. One of the conditions Brussels set for Bulgaria was 
cooperation with the IMF, because in the EU’s opinion cooperation with the Fund was 
the only way that Bulgaria could achieve a market economy able to withstand the 
economic competition inside the Union once the country had become a member.657 
Almost a year after the 1997 economic crisis, on 13 December 1997, in commenting 
on its application for EU membership, the EC had described Bulgaria as lacking a 
market economy able to cope with the economic competition the country will meet 
once it joins the Union, and encouraged Sofia to cooperate with the IMF in order to 
achieve this.658
Democratic Conditionality and Bulgaria’s Inter-state Relations
In addition to international organisations, EU democratic conditionality affected the 
whole network of Bulgaria’s interstate relations built up during the communist period. 
The European legislation, known also as aquis communitaire, the adoption of which 
by Sofia was one of the main preconditions for Bulgaria joining the EU, contained a 
series of agreements and decisions concerning a number o f EU member and non­
656 Appendix, tables 49, 6 la-6 lb.
657 Renzo & Efisio, 1993.
658 EC, 1997, pp. 20-56.
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member states. Bulgaria’s inter-state relations after 1989 were not determined by how 
close certain state political systems were to a particular ideology, as had been the case 
in the communist period, but mainly by EU legislation and the political latitudes that 
this legislation allowed Bulgaria in its relations with certain states. As is argued 
below, Sofia’s adoption of the acquis communitaire affected the country’s post-1989 
political and economic relations with a number of developing states in the African 
continent, the Middle East and Latin America such as Libya, Iraq and Nicaragua, 
which had been strong prior to 1989, and also with states such as the USA and Israel 
with whom Bulgaria had had almost no political and economic relations during 
communist times.
The influence that EU democratic conditionality exercised on Bulgaria’s inter-state 
relations after 1989 can be illustrated by three cases: a) Bulgaria’s relations with 
developing states in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America; b) Bulgaria’s 
relations with the USA; c) Bulgaria’s relations with the Russian Federation.
Democratic Conditionality and Bulgaria’s Relations with Developing Countries in 
Africa, the Middle East and Latin America
Throughout the communist period Bulgaria had developed strong political and 
economic ties with a number of developing states in the Middle East, Africa and Latin 
America, including Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Libya, Iraq, Cuba and Nicaragua. 
All these countries had political regimes modeled on Soviet communism and, through 
political and economic ties with Bulgaria, these regimes aspired to gain a series of 
political, economic and military advantages that would bring economic growth to
282
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
their states, and an increase in living standards for the peoples of their countries and 
thus keep them in power. Most of these political regimes had come to power after a 
populist rebellion or a military coup and, thus, were mostly isolated from the Western 
world -  most Western states have refused or been hesitant to develop political and 
economic ties with them.
Sofia’s communist regime helped the political regimes of these states to maintain 
power by offering arms, military equipment and other products such as foodstuffs or 
clothing. In the mid-1980s, almost 7% of Bulgaria’s total industrial production, 
mostly arms and military equipment, was exported to developing states in the Third 
World, including Iraq, Yemen, Iran and Syria. These exports accounted for more than 
60% of annual hard currency earnings.659
After the end of the Cold War, Bulgaria’s relations with Third World developing 
states started to decline both at the political and the economic levels. In the aftermath 
of Zhivkov’s removal from office, the Bulgarian government of Andrei Lukanov 
downgraded most of the country’s diplomatic missions in these states. According to a 
speech made by the Lukanov’s government’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boiko 
Dimitrov, in the Bulgarian parliament on 23 August 1990, Sofia had reduced the 
number of personnel in diplomatic missions in Third World developing states by 20% 
since November 1989.660
Bulgaria’s post-1989 trade with Third World states followed a similar pattern of 
decline. At the beginning of the 1990s Bulgarian exports to African states constituted
659 Dimitrov, Dimitur, 2002b, p. 17.
660 Dimitrov Boiko, personal interview, 24/1/2002; Records of the Bulgarian parliament, 23/8/1990, pp. 
478.1 /PD/Pr-479/4.
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5.6% of total Bulgarian exports. At the end of the 1990s, this had fallen to only 1.6% 
of the country’s total exports.661 It is remarkable that, according to the UN Statistical 
Yearbook, Bulgaria’s preferential trading partners during communism, such as Libya 
or Algeria, were not even listed amongst the country’s fifty largest trading partners 
after 1989.662
This picture is in sharp contrast to what might have been expected. Since most Third 
World developing states were in debt to Bulgaria at the end of the 1980s, it would 
have been expected that Bulgarian governments would have tried to maintain political 
and economic relations with these states with a view to recouping their debts.663 
Indeed, some of the post-1989 Bulgarian governments did take political initiatives in 
this direction. The government of Zhan Videnov, for example, made an attempt to 
restore Sofia’s relations with Arab states such as Syria, Libya and Algeria in an effort 
to recoup debts. In 1995, Videnov paid a series of official visits to Arab states in the 
Middle East and North Africa where he discussed the issue of these debts with the 
political authorities.664
However, despite these initiatives, Sofia’s relations with Third W orld developing 
states have never recovered. Even Videnov’s government’s increased trade with some 
Arab states was not sustained after the fall of his government. It is noteworthy that 
while imports from Algeria in 1995 reached 1.4% of Bulgaria’s total imports, at the
661 Appendix, table 13.
662 UN Statistical Yearbooks 1990-2002
663 Appendix, pp. 23-24.
664 FBIS-EEU-95-135, 14/7/1995, p. 4.
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end of the 1990s, Algerian imports to Bulgaria counted for only 0.4% of total 
Bulgarian imports.665
One of the reasons for the decline in Sofia’s relations with Third World developing 
states at the beginning of the 1990s was the influence that Bulgaria’s integration to the 
EU was exercising on its foreign policy through the EU ’s democratic conditionality. 
This affected relations with these states in three ways. The EU did not have good 
relations with a number of Third World developing states with which Bulgaria had 
political and economic ties during the communist period because their regimes 
systematically contravened the fundamental principles of the UN Charter in violating 
either the human rights of their citizens or the territorial integrity of neighbouring 
states.
The EU had broken off relations with the regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and 
Qaddafi in Libya. In Iraq’s case, relations were frozen as a result of Iraq’s military 
invasion of Kuwait in 1991, reinforced by the regime’s refusal to cooperate with the 
UN over the inspection of Iraq’s suspected nuclear and chemical arsenal in the 1990s. 
In Libya, relations were frozen due to Libya’s refusal to extradite to Scotland two 
individuals suspected of being involved in the Lockerbie bombing in December 1988 
which had killed 270 people.666 As a result, both regimes were subject to an economic 
embargo imposed by the UN Security Council, which the EU  also observed.667
665 Appendix, table 24.
666 http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200309140142.html
667 The embargo was lifted by a UN Security Council decision on 12 September 2003, after Libya 
agreed to extradite the two suspects to Holland where they would be tried under Scottish law. See 
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200309140142.html
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This affected Sofia’s relations with these two states. The post-1989 Bulgarian 
governments could not contravene the UN Security Council’s embargoes on Iraq and 
Libya without undermining the country’s relations with the EU. According to EU 
democratic conditionality, Bulgaria’s relations with non-EU states should be 
compatible with the EU ’s foreign policy towards these states as stated in the EC ’s 
annual reports on the progress of Bulgaria’s negotiations with the EU, and stressed by 
many EU officials in meetings with their Bulgarian counterparts.668
As a result of EU conditionality, Bulgaria aligned its foreign policy with the EU ’s and 
broke off relations with Iraq and Libya. As a result these states refused to repay the 
almost $2bn owing to Bulgaria for arms purchases and funding of infrastructure 
projects during the communist period.669
EU ’s conditionality also affected Sofia’s political relations with Libya and Iraq. 
Official visits between the two sides were discontinued, and Bulgaria downgraded its 
diplomatic missions through personnel reduction at its embassies and consulates in 
these Arab states.
This situation produced some difficult diplomatic crises for Bulgaria. One crisis 
occurred in 1998 and involved Libya. 393 Libyan children in Benghazi Hospital were 
infected with the HIV virus and with hepatitis B and C. The Libyan authorities 
accused four Bulgarian nurses and a Bulgarian doctor working in the hospital of 
deliberately transmitting the HIV and hepatitis viruses to the children as part of a
668 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 2000/bu en.pdf
669 Appendix, pp. 23-24; Bristow, 1996, p. 116.
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political plot orchestrated by the USA and Israel to topple Qaddafi’s regime.670 The 
Bulgarian medical staff have been detained to face trial, and can expect the death 
penalty for having plotted against Qaddafi’s regime.671
The detention of the five Bulgarian medics in Libya caused a diplomatic crisis 
between Bulgaria and Libya.672 The Bulgarian authorities of course supported their 
nationals and made a series of diplomatic overtures to both the Libyan authorities and 
the Arab countries that were friendly to Qaddafi’s regime, such as Egypt, to try to 
ensure that the five Bulgarian nationals, when tried, would not be sentenced to death. 
The Bulgarian authorities believed that the reason why the 393 Libyan children had 
been infected with the HIV and hepatitis viruses was the poor conditions at Benghazi 
Hospital, a view that was supported by various international specialists involved in 
the case.673 The accusation of political plotting was a cover up by the Libyan 
authorities, who were well aware of the poor sanitary conditions in its hospitals, but 
wanted to hide this from the public.
Other problems occurred over arms. A large part of Bulgaria’s trade with the 
developing states in the Third World during the communist period involved arms. 
However, after the end of the Cold War, Bulgaria could not continue this trade at the 
same level.674 This is partly due to the economic recession, and partly because many 
Bulgarian arms specialists and scientists had emigrated in search of a better future,
670 W ysi wyg://3 3/http:// www.aegis.com/ne ws/bbc/2001 /BBO112/9.html; 
http://www.bta.bg/site/libva/index-e.html
671 Ibid.
672 Peev, iordan, personal interview, 29/11/2001.
673 W ysiwyg://33/http://www.aegis.com/news/bbc/2001/BB0112/9.html; 
http://www.bta.bg/site/libva/index-e.html
674 Peev, Iordan, personal interview, 29/11/2001; Tchanchev, Dimitur, personal interview, 18/1/2002; 
Raidovski, Krasimir, personal interview, 11/1/2002; Alexandrov Evgeni, personal interview,
11/ 1/2002 .
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which had deprived the Bulgarian arms industry of the requisite funds and technical 
know-how to render its production competitive with the output of Western arms 
companies, which entered the markets of these states after the end of the Cold War.675
Bulgaria’s inability to continue the arms trade with developing states in Africa, the 
Middle East and Latin America at the same level as during communism was also due 
to the fact that the EU discouraged Bulgaria from involvement in large-scale arms 
trading with these states in an attempt to align Bulgaria with the policies of 
international organisations such as NATO and the UN, which aimed at controlling the 
international arms trade. Through control of the world arms trade, these organisations 
hoped to eliminate national and regional conflicts throughout the world. These 
conflicts were believed to occur because national and regional militant groups had 
easy access to arms from Eastern Europe as a result of the inability or unwillingness 
of the authorities of EES to conduct effective controls on the arms trade.
Furthermore, many of the developing countries of the Third World with which 
Bulgaria used to trade arms during the communist period such as Libya or Iraq, were 
subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo and, therefore, by being involved in 
arms trade with these states, Bulgarian authorities risked coming into conflict with the 
EU, and undermining their prospects of joining the EU in the future. On a number of 
occasions throughout the 1990s, Bulgarian arms did find their way to countries, 
including Sudan and the FRY, which were subject to UN Security Council arms
675 For a general overview o f the problems and the process of restructuring of the Bulgarian defence 
industry during the post-Cold War period see: Dimitrov, 2002b.
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embargoes.676 However, on none of these occasions was the Bulgarian government 
found to be behind these sales.
Finally, there have been no European agreements or decisions to establish a special 
trade regime with states such as Mongolia, Angola, Syria or Iran, which were among 
Bulgaria’s most favoured Third World partners. Such a regime would have allowed 
Bulgaria to reduce trade tariffs and in this way to retain some of the pre-1989 trade 
with these states. On the other hand, the EU has established special trade regimes with 
Morocco, Israel and Egypt, states with which Sofia had either limited or no trade 
relations under communism. Under these trade regimes, Bulgaria recently concluded a 
series of free trade agreements (FTAs) with these states, which should boost its trade 
with them.677
Democratic Conditionality and Bulgaria’s Relations with the USA
The USA’s relations with Bulgaria were cool prior to 1989 due to Bulgaria’s 
participation in the communist bloc and the close cooperation between its regime and 
Moscow on international issues.678 Since the end of the Cold War, almost all 
Bulgarian governments have sought to establish good relations with the USA in an 
attempt to benefit from political, economic and military advantages formerly reaped 
via the Warsaw Pact and Moscow. Furthermore, forging close political and economic 
relations with the USA, would align Sofia’s foreign policy with that of the EU and 
most of its member states which aimed at strong political, economic and military
676 http://www.iansa.org/news/1999/dec 99/cdi bulgaria.html; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/34-98/16- 
34-l.htm : http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/50-98/05-50-1 .htm ; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/99-17/32- 
17-l.htm
677 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 2000/bu en .pdf, p. 80.
678 Clyatt, 1993, p. 29.
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cooperation established with the USA after WWII when Western Europe and the USA 
joined forces to keep Soviet influence both on the European continent and in the 
world in check.
Sofia’s cooperation with Washington since the end of the Cold W ar can be seen in the 
military area. The USA has undertaken the restructuring of most of the Bulgarian 
army through offering training projects for Bulgarian army officers in its military 
academies, supplying armaments and military equipment, and allowing the Bulgarian 
army to participate in military exercises with NATO and other EES within the 
framework of NATO’s PfP programme.679 The main purpose of this restructuring was 
to improve the Bulgarian army’s operational capabilities so that Sofia could 
participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian military missions organised by 
NATO.680
Since 1997, Bulgaria’s political relations with the USA have been further 
strengthened as a result of Bulgaria’s application for admission to NATO, which 
presupposed strong cooperation with the USA in the political and the military fields.
The terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001 and the 
military operations which the USA has since undertaken against states whose political 
authorities incited terrorist activities in the USA and Western world has also 
strengthened relations. These military operations fall under the name ‘Operation (for) 
Enduring Freedom’ and Sofia has offered its unconditional support. In November 
2001, Bulgaria and the USA signed an agreement allowing the over flight, transit and
679 FBIS-EEU-94-]59, 17/8/1994, p. 3
680 Leonard, 2000, p. 534; Moore, Roderick, personal interview, 11/12/2001
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stay in Bulgaria of US troops and military equipment and the troops and military 
equipment of any other country supporting the USA, in their performance of military 
activities related to the ‘Operation (for) Enduring Freedom’.681 It was in line with this 
agreement that on 22 November 2001 the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave 
permission for US cargo aircraft to land at the International Airport in the eastern 
Bulgarian city of Burgas, and for American military personnel to use the nearby 
Sarafovo military base in order to support the American military operations being 
conducted against the Taliban in Afghanistan.682 Bulgaria also dispatched a military 
unit to Afghanistan to support American military troops in their fight against Al- 
Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban regime and, in February 2003, the government 
decided to support the Anglo-American operation in Iraq by sending a contingent of 
462 soldiers.683
Since the end of the Cold War bilateral trade with the USA has doubled. Bulgarian 
exports to the USA, which accounted for only 2% of Bulgaria’s total exports at the 
end of the 1980s, increased to 4% in the 1990s.684 The influx of American investments 
into Bulgaria is another indication of how economic relations with the USA have 
improved since 1989. Since 1989, the USA is ranked first in the list of states investing 
in Bulgaria. A large part of the American investments involve economic assistance 
given by the American government to consolidate Bulgaria’s political and economic 
institutions. For instance in the 1990s, the USA contributed about $7m to Bulgaria to 
combat corruption in the country’s judicial system.685
681 http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/facilitv/burgas-ap.htm.
682 Ibid.
683 http://www.government.bg/English/priorities/Foreign Policv/2003-02-20/116.html: See also 
footnote 559 above.
684 Appendix, table 2.
685 Daskalovski, 1999; Smorgun, 2002, p. 6
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Since the beginning of Bulgaria’s formal accession process to the EU at the end of the 
1990s, Sofia’s relations with the USA were mainly determined by the EU’s 
democratic conditionality. This is to say that, similar to many other non-EU states, the 
corpus of agreements signed by and decisions taken by the EU with reference to the 
USA set the limits of Sofia’s political and economic relations with the USA. For 
example, in the decision taken on 16 June 2003 by the European Council in 
Luxembourg and supported by Bulgaria, the EU discouraged EU member states from 
signing bilateral agreements with the USA giving exemption from appearing before 
the International Criminal Court in the Hague for US soldiers accused of war 
crimes.686 Sofia’s compliance with this decision led Washington to follow the same 
practice with Bulgaria as it had with other EES such as Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia 
and Slovenia over such compliance, that is to freeze military assistance. However, in 
the case of all these EES, including Bulgaria, the effect of the American decision 
would be shortlived because when they became NATO members the USA 
government would be forced by agreements binding all NATO member states to 
unfreeze the ban on military aid. In the event the USA lifted its ban on the EES in 
November 2003, only four months after it came into effect.687 The Bush government 
realized that the ban would impede the completion of projects which were both 
supportive to the process of these states’ accession to NATO and necessary for the 
American military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, a significant part 
of the American military aid to Bulgaria which had been blocked in July 2003 was 
aimed at upgrading the international airport in Burgas and the Sarafovo military base
686 http://www.government.bg/English/Priorities/Foreitin Policv/2003-07-02/1504.html
687 http://www.npwi.org/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=1477.
292
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
in eastern Bulgaria, which the Americans had used for conducting military operations 
as part of the ‘Operation (for) Enduring Freedom’.688
However, the EU ’s democratic conditionality has not always defined Bulgaria’s 
relations with the USA because a substantial part of the country’s political elite, 
which were known as Atlantists, maintained that the USA was not just a Western 
state, but was a world superpower and the leading state of the Western world which 
had been victorious in the Cold War. This faction of the Bulgarian elite supported 
Bulgaria’s seeking to establish strong political and economic relations with the USA, 
and was indifferent to any limits imposed on these relations by EU democratic 
conditionality. Some Atlantists even went so far as to suggest that Bulgaria should 
become the USA’s 51st state, echoing Zhivkov’s political plans in the 1970s to render 
Bulgaria the 16th Republic of the Soviet Union.689 For the Atlantists, it was through 
strong political economic relations with the USA that Bulgaria could best secure the 
country’s national security.
Like some conservative members of the BSP, the Atlantists were convinced that small 
nation states such as Bulgaria needed a powerful military patron-state to protect their 
national security. During the Cold War Bulgaria’s patron had been the Soviet Union, 
but after the collapse of the Soviet bloc every effort should be made to find another 
state to play this role, and that state was obviously the USA because it was the most 
powerful country in the world.
689 Bell, 1998, p. 310.
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Also, throughout the post-Cold War era the USA had occasionally supported small 
nation states when the national security of these states was threatened. For instance, in 
1991, the USA assumed a protagonistic role within international forums, such as the 
UN, in rallying the support of as many countries as possible for military action against 
Iraq which had attacked Kuwait. Such events reinforced the view that strong political 
and economic ties with the USA would protect Bulgaria’s national security 
effectively.
Also, international organisation such as the UN and the EU were seen as being 
ineffective at imposing their decisions on international politics, due to the lack of their 
own military machines. These organisations were dependent on the USA and NATO, 
in which the USA played a leading role, for the effective imposition of their views.
In general, when in power, the Atlantists have rarely challenged the limits set on 
relations with the USA by the EU’s democratic conditionality, mainly because since 
the end of the Cold War, the EU has developed strong political and economic 
cooperation with this part of the country’s political elite and both sides have worked 
towards a common position on most international issues, which they then support at 
international forums such as the UN.
However, there have been occasions when the EU and the USA have taken different 
positions on international issues and the Bulgarian Atlantists in power, have supported 
the American position, thereby violating the EU ’s democratic conditionality and 
threatening Bulgaria’s prospects of joining the EU. One such occasion was the 
decision taken by the government of Simeon Saxkoburgotski in February 2003 to
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support the Anglo-American military operations in Iraq aimed at overthrowing 
Saddam Hussein.
Democratic Conditionality and Bulgaria’s Relations with the Russian Federation
Bulgaria’s official relations with the Russian Federation began after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991.690 Prior to that date, the area that is now known 
as the Russian Federation had consisted of part of the Soviet Union, known as the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia, and was not legitimized by the Soviet 
constitution to have a foreign policy independent from that of the Soviet Union. 
Consequently, prior to December 1991, Sofia’s relations with the Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Russia were determined by the framework set by the Soviet constitution 
which was the same framework that determined Bulgaria’s relations with the other 
Soviet Republics.
In general, Bulgaria’s post-communist political elite attempted to establish good 
bilateral relations with the Russian Federation for several reasons. Firstly, in the 
aftermath of the Soviet dissolution, Bulgaria was economically dependent on the 
Federation as a result of the strong political and economic links that Sofia had 
established with Moscow under communism. At the beginning of the 1990s, almost 
two thirds of Bulgaria’s imports came from the Soviet Union and the majority of 
which were energy supplies, including natural gas from the Soviet Socialist Republic 
of Russia.
690 Zhelev, 1998, pp. 30-37,142-150.
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In addition, most of Bulgaria’s military equipment and armaments came from ex- 
Soviet Republics and therefore, the maintenance of this equipment depended on 
cooperation between the Bulgarian state and various military industries in the Russian 
Federation. Even the equipment and armaments manufactured on Bulgarian territory 
were made under licence from the Soviet Union and, therefore, the patents of many of 
the arms and the military equipment constructed in Bulgaria after 1991 belonged to 
state companies of the Russian Federation.691 Since most of these licences would 
eventually expire, Sofia would need to renegotiate and, in order to do so, needed to 
maintain political links with the Russian authorities.
Also, the Cold W ar had saddled Sofia with a debt of over $100m. This debt was 
mainly the result of imbalances in bilateral trade between the Soviet Union and 
Bulgaria at the end of the 1980s. The debt mostly concerned the Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Russia, and political cooperation between the Bulgarian and Russian 
authorities in the aftermath of the Cold War was necessary if this debt were to be 
collected. Its repayment would bolster the shaky post-communist Bulgarian economy.
Secondly, a large part of Bulgaria’s post-communist political elite viewed the Russian 
Federation as a country most of whose population had cultural characteristics in 
common with the Bulgarian population. Both the Russian and the Bulgarian 
languages, the official languages o f the Russian Federation and Bulgarian Republic 
respectively, are Slavic languages and the majority of ethnic Bulgarian and Russians 
practise the same religion, Christian Orthodoxy. This part of the political elite viewed 
the Russian Federation as a state which, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was
691 Dimitrov, Dimitur, 2002b, pp. 60-63.
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struggling to break away from the communist past and to recapture the spirit of 
Tsarist Russia, which in the past had helped Bulgaria to secure independence and 
reclaim what it saw as being Bulgarian territory from foreign occupiers in the Balkan 
region.
As a result of the common cultural and historical links which Bulgaria shared with the 
Russian Federation, this part of the Bulgarian political elite thought that Bulgaria 
would have much more to gain, in terms of foreign policy, by establishing close 
political and economic links with the Russian Federation rather than with culturally 
alien states such as those of Western Europe or the United States.
In addition, some members of this part of the political elite have come to base the 
establishment of close political and economic cooperation with the Russian 
Federation on the fact that the Federation was viewed as a rising world power, 
capable of curbing what they saw as the expansion of the USA’s influence in the 
world after the end of the Cold War. Such a view, which was supported mainly by 
conservative members of the BSP, was based on the fact that the Russian Federation 
had rich energy sources, a powerful military might that included even nuclear 
weapons and rich experience as a world power; all of which were seen as elements 
that could lead a state to become a world power. Also, there were pre-existing 
personal political links between BSP political cadres, including a number of high 
ranking party officials such as Petur Mladenov, Andrei Lukanov and Zhan Videnov, 
and members of the post-Soviet Russian elite. These links went back to communist 
times when many of the cadres had either studied in Soviet universities and military 
academies or had held offices in the BCP, the government and the state apparatus,
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which allowed them to keep regular contact with Soviet officials and, through such 
contact, to build strong personal relations with these officials.
However, despite all attempts to establish good bilateral relations with the Russian 
Federation, since December 1991 they have been in decline and are not at all 
reminiscent of the strong political and economic links that Bulgaria enjoyed with the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia during the communist period. This can mainly be 
attributed to the process of accession to the EU, which, through democratic 
conditionality has had a negative impact on Sofia’s relations with Moscow.
It has negatively affected Bulgaria’s trade with the Russian Federation because EU 
legislation does not allow the Bulgarian government to conclude free trade agreement 
(FTA) with Moscow. The absence of any FTA meant that tariffs on Russian products 
being imported into Bulgaria and Bulgarian products being exported to Russia 
remained high and discouraged trade. Bulgarian exports to the Russian Federation 
accounted for more than 33% of total exports at the beginning of the 1990s, but was 
only 2% at the end of the decade.692 Imports from the Federation at the end of the 
1990s were 25% of Bulgaria’s total imports, a drop of 25% on the total at the 
beginning of the decade.693
However, democratic conditionality has not been solely responsible for the decline in 
Bulgaria’s trade with the Russian Federation. The adoption of market economy 
mechanisms in both Bulgaria and the Russian Federation has uncovered problems 
which the command economy of the communist period had hidden. For instance, the
692 Appendix, table 21.
693 Appendix, table 26.
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poor quality of Bulgarian products, mostly those of heavy industry such as forklift 
trucks. In a competitive market economy which the economy of the Russian 
Federation started to become after 1991, low quality Bulgarian products could not 
compete successfully with products from Western European countries, the USA, and 
Japan.
Also, EU conditionality had a negative affect on other economic activities between 
Bulgaria and Russia, such as tourism. An EU candidate state had to harmonize its 
national legislation with the EU ’s legislation on the free movement of citizens which 
required Bulgaria to adopt a series of political measures aiming at tightening its 
border controls. The harmonization of Bulgarian legislation with EU legislation on the 
free movement of citizens became especially necessary after September 1995 when, 
according to a decision taken by the EU Ministers of Home Affairs and Justice in 
Brussels, Bulgaria was included in the list of EES whose citizens could not enter the 
EU Schengen area without a visa.694 The decision was based mainly on the fact that 
Bulgaria’s border control regime was not strict; the only way that the country could be 
removed from the list was to adopt a series of political measures to tighten border 
controls to meet the requirements of EU legislation.
After 1995 a series of political measures aiming at harmonizing the national 
legislation on border controls with that of the EU were taken. One such, taken in 
November 2001, required anyone traveling from Bulgaria to Russia and vice versa to 
have a valid visa.695 Such measures had a negative impact on Bulgarian-Russian 
tourism: Russian tourism to Bulgaria fell by about 24% in 2002 over 2001, while
694 See p. 180 above.
695 http://www.government.bg/English/Priorities/Foreign Policv/2002-03-05/315.html; 
http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/02-07/13-7.htm
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Bulgarian tourism to Russia in 2002 was down almost 16%.6% This seems to have 
shocked the Bulgarian authorities who, at the beginning of 2003, rescinded the fees 
for Russian tourist visas for a period of one year from April 2003, in the hope that 
Russian tourism to Bulgaria would recover. In the event that this proved effective, 
there were plans to make Russian tourist visas free of charge in the future.697
The EU vetoed a number of projects which Bulgarian governments had worked out 
with the help of the Russian government in various economic fields based on 
democratic conditionality. Most of the projects were aimed at invigorating the 
production of the Bulgarian military industry and were initiated in the mid-1990s 
under the socialist government of Zhan Videnov. These projects mainly related to the 
construction of automated systems for anti-aircraft defence, the management of 
artillery and the production of radio electronic warfare systems.698 The most 
impressive was a project for a Bulgarian company to repair Russian MiG-29 military 
aircraft in Plovdiv, which was being promoted as a regional centre for the repair of 
similar aircraft.699
However, these plans had to be scrapped after EU and NATO officials warned that 
the promotion of these projects would impede Bulgaria’s prospects of joining both the 
EU and NATO. EU and NATO officials were afraid that these projects would give the 
Russians access to highly sensitive Western military technology. They also saw these 
projects as producing weapons using mainly Russian technology which would reduce
696 http://www.mi. government.bg/eng/tur/stat/docs.htmr?id=72238.
697 Although it is hard to establish it through organised statistical data, official sources both in Bulgaria 
and Russia claim that the removal o f visa fees for Russian tourists made Bulgaria an attractive
destination to Russian tourists throughout 2003. See
http://www.novinite.com/view news.php?id=21704.
698 Dimitrov, Dimitur, 2002b, p. 38; FBIS-EEU-95-054, 21/3/1995, p. 5.
699 Ibid., p. 63.
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Bulgaria’s harmonization with the EU and NATO member states’ equipment. The 
involvement of Russian companies in the production of weaponry and military 
equipment excluded participation by West European military companies in Bulgaria’s 
arms market and, thus impeded the integration of the Bulgarian arms market into that 
of the EU; something which went against EU legislation.
The EU ’s democratic conditionality has given rise to strong anti-Russian sentiments 
among a large part of the Bulgarian political elite and has revived the political 
dichotomy between the Russophiles and Russophobes that existed before WWII. 
These anti-Russian sentiments have been nurtured mainly by members of the UDF, 
who view Russia as a long-standing cultural opponent of Europe, which has become 
synonymous with the EU.
Sometimes these sentiments have taken on metaphysical dimensions. Russia has been 
characterized as an uncivilized, even barbaric country, whose culture is mainly 
Asiatic with nothing in common with the superior, modem and refined European 
culture of which Bulgaria was a part.700 Because of Bulgaria’s membership of this 
superior European culture, it should, through membership of the EU, return to the 
cultural home, from which it had been excluded by almost fifty years of communist 
rule.70’ Membership of the EU thus would mean minimal relations with Russia 
because historically, such relations had resulted in Bulgaria’s being cut off from 
European culture.
700
701
Tsenkov, 1997; Todorov, 1999a, pp. 27-8; Todorov, 1999b.
Ibid.
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It is interesting that during the communist period Sofia was one of M oscow’s most 
loyal allies and as a result received economic benefits which greatly improved its 
living standards after WWII. Thus no strong anti-Russian sentiments had been evoked 
during the communist era. It is possible to argue therefore that the strong anti-Russian 
sentiments of the post-communist period are at least in part explained by EU 
democratic conditionality. This restricted Bulgaria’s relations with the Russian 
Federation through vetoing Sofia’s political and economic transactions with Moscow, 
conveyed the message that membership of the EU was irreconcilable with any 
relations with the Russian Federation. As a result the political elite supported the view 
that Bulgaria should abandon all relations with the Russian Federation for the sake of 
keeping open negotiations for membership in the EU and organisations such as 
NATO.
This was the subject of the political struggle between the two main Bulgarian political 
forces, namely the BSP and UDF, during the first half of the 1990s. Bulgaria’s future 
relations with Russia were an important element of the political identities of the two 
main Bulgarian political parties at that time. The UDF wished to build the image of a 
new political force that sought to pull the country out of the economic swamp that 50 
years of communism had plunged Bulgaria into, and to catch up with the levels of 
economic development that had been achieved by most EU member states. To this 
end, the political platforms of the UDF emphasized that Bulgaria should build strong 
political and economic links with the EU and other states of the developed world such 
as the USA.702
702 Malinov, Svetoslav, personal interview, 28/11/2001.
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On the other hand, the BSP sought to build an image as a political force whose 
members were more experienced at ruling the country, due to the almost 50 years they 
had been in power as members of the BCP. Based on this experience, the members of 
the BSP claimed to be in a better position to serve the country’s national interests than 
their UDF colleagues. In line with this image, the members of the BSP promoted what 
they termed ‘a more balanced’ foreign policy than their UDF colleagues. They argued 
that Bulgaria would gain most from developing strong political and economic 
relations with both the EU and Russia. In respect of the latter this was because there 
were aspects of the country’s relations with Russia that no Bulgarian government 
could neglect, such as its dependence on the Russian Federation for energy.
After the mid-1990s the UDF’s position concerning relations with Russia moved 
closer to that of the BSP. Many UDF political cadres stated that political and 
economic relations with the Russian Federation should be encouraged on the basis of 
an equal partnership which would not render Bulgaria politically and economically 
subservient to Moscow, as had been the case during the communist period. One of the 
reasons for the UDF reversal in relation to Bulgarian-Russian relations was the 
appearance of the NACC in 1997, an institutional mechanism which allowed NATO 
officials to discuss security issues with their Russian counterparts. This challenged the 
view that Bulgaria’s membership of the EU was incompatible with establishing 
political and economic relations with Russia. If EU member states could cooperate 
with Russia through the NACC, then it would not be wrong for Sofia to develop 
political and economic relations with Moscow, within the limits set by EU democratic 
conditionality.
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The general decline in Bulgaria’s economic relations with the Russian Federation has 
affected every aspect of Bulgaria’s economic life to different extents. Bulgaria was 
totally dependent on energy supplies of gas and oil supplies from Russian state 
companies such as Gazprom and Lukoil. For the almost 50 years of communist rule, 
the Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia had controlled a substantial part of the Soviet 
Union’s energy sources and had absolute control over oil and gas deliveries to most of 
the countries of the communist bloc, including Bulgaria.
Sofia’s dependence on energy supplies from Moscow allowed Russian officials to 
interfere in Bulgaria’s post-communist politics to achieve certain political and 
economic goals. These interventions produced political tensions, which often 
escalated into prolonged political crises. These crises represented an additional burden 
on bilateral relations, adding to that of EU democratic conditionality.
In 1996 the Russian state gas company, Gazprom, announced plans to expand its gas 
sales to the Balkans. In order to supply Greece and Turkey,703 Gazprom needed to 
cooperate with the Bulgarian state to get permission to transfer gas across Bulgarian 
territory.704
Gazprom exploited the fact that at the time the BSP was in power and one of this 
party’s priorities was to strengthen political and economic relations with Moscow. In 
May 1995 the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin paid an official visit to 
Bulgaria to sign a set of agreements on economic and military cooperation with the
703 Ilieva, 2001, p. 94; Bonin, 2001.
704 Ibid.; Ganev, 1998, pp. 1-5.
304
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
Bulgarian government.705 One of these agreements dealt with the supply of oil and 
natural gas to Bulgaria and replaced the Soviet-Bulgarian agreement signed in 1986 
which was due to expire.706
One of the provisions of the 1995 oil and gas agreement required cooperation over 
transporting oil and natural gas from Russia to markets in the Balkans and Central 
Europe, which Gazprom wanted to exploit to set up a jointly-owned company for the 
construction of pipelines.707 The new company was to be called Topenergy, and 
Andrei Lukanov, the former Bulgarian Prime Minister, was appointed as its chairman. 
As Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs in the 1980s, Lukanov had negotiated the 
old Soviet-Bulgarian energy agreement and had links with high-level Soviet and 
Russian officials, including Chernomyrdin, who had chaired Gazprom before 
becoming Prime Minister.708 Half of Bulgarian shares in Topenergy were allocated to 
the state-owned gas company Bulgargaz and the rest were given to Multi group, a 
Bulgarian firm created after the end of Zhivkov’s regime by former intelligence 
agents under the aegis of Lukanov, who was then Bulgaria’s Prime Minister.
The Topenegry Project gave Russia, through Gazprom, full control of the transport of 
oil and gas across Bulgarian territory because in addition to holding 50% of the shares 
in Topenergy, Gazprom had other advantages. Having been former Bulgarian 
intelligence agents, many high ranking members of its administration had strong links 
with Russia’s post-Soviet political and economic elite, including members of
705 FB1S-EEU-95-097, 19/5/1995, p. 2.
706 Bell, 1998, p. 314.
707 Ibid, p. 315.
708 Ibid.
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Gazprom’s administration.709 Also, Andrei Lukanov, the chairman of the Board of 
Directors, though a member of the BSP, was not neutral. Lukanov was one of the 
Bulgarian government’s hardest critics and was on bad terms with Zhan Videnov, the 
Bulgarian Prime Minister, while he was on good terms with Gazprom’s 
administration dating back to when he had held the office of the Minister of Foreign 
Economic Relations. He was viewed by many Bulgarians as Russia’s man.710
The control of the transport of oil and gas through Bulgaria by Topenergy created a 
political crisis in Bulgarian-Russian relations which was to last for the next two years. 
The Bulgarian government did not like the idea that a Russian state company had full 
control of the transport of oil and gas through Bulgaria and the government of Zhan 
Videnov sought to undermine the power of Topenergy. In July 1996, after lengthy 
negotiations, the government managed to persuade Gazprom to remove Lukanov as 
Topenergy’s chairman, but was not successful in persuading Gazprom to remove 
M ultigroup’s 25% shareholding and pass it to Bulgaragaz so that the Bulgarian and 
Russian state were equally represented.
The issue became more complicated when, in 1997, the UDF party came to power. 
First, the UDF government adopted a tougher stance on bilateral negotiations than its 
BSP predecessor had done. This culminated in 1998 when, through Bulgargaz, 
Bulgaria refused Topenergy the right to deliver natural gas through Bulgaria’s 
pipelines until bilateral negotiations had been concluded and a solution to the problem 
had been found.711 Second, the Russians attempted to manipulate the situation to put
709 Baeva, Iskra, personal interview, 7/12/2001; Borisov, Boiko, personal interview, 31/10/2001; 
Dainov, Evgeni, personal interview, 26/11/2001; RaTdovski, Krasimir, personal interview, 11/1/2002.
710 Ibid.
711 Bell, 1998, p. 316.
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pressure on the Bulgarian government not to seek NATO membership. In the bilateral 
meetings they had with their Bulgarian counterparts on the issue, the Russians hinted 
that the abandonment of Bulgaria’s plans to seek NATO’s membership would bring 
Russia closer to Bulgaria in the future.
In retaliation for Bulgaria’s refusal to recognize Topenergy’s right to deliver natural 
gas through Bulgaria’s pipelines, Gazprom first reduced its deliveries to Bulgaria, 
thus plunging many Bulgarian regions into darkness and limiting their heating, and 
then threatened to halt them altogether. The UDF government countered by 
threatening to restrict the flow of Russian gas to third countries. By m id-1997 the 
issue of Topenergy had reached deadlock and a state of undeclared warfare seemed to 
prevail. In June 1997 the deputy head of Bulgaragaz was kidnapped by a ‘security 
firm’ that had been contracted to leave him disabled for life, and explosives were 
planted along a road on the outskirts of Sofia which damaged the armoured BMW of 
Ilia Pavlov, the head of Multi group.712 In September 1997, Bulgaria organised a 
meeting of the defence ministers of all the Balkan states, to which it also invited the 
USA, but not Russia, provoking a formal protest from Moscow.713
After an almost two-year stalemate, at the beginning of 1998 the Topenergy issue 
came to an end. The Russian side realized that the Bulgarian government was not 
going to retreat, and that its demands for an equal amount of shares in Topenergy 
would have to be met. Not doing so would be detrimental to Gazprom sales in 
Bulgaria, and to its plans to sell to new markets in the region. As a result, the Russian 
side gave in.
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After a new round of negotiations the two sides reached an agreement which took the 
form of a memorandum of cooperation signed by Bulgaria’s deputy Prime Minister, 
Evgeni Bakurdzhiev and the head of Gazprom, Rem Viakhirev.714 According to this 
memorandum, Topenergy was converted into a wholly owned Russian company and 
any future projects concerning the construction of pipelines on, or the flow of gas and 
oil through Bulgaria’s territory, would be the subject of negotiation between Russia 
and Bulgaria. The signing of this memorandum was to open a new chapter in Sofia’s 
relations with the Russian gas company, and seems to have had positive effect on the 
settlement of unresolved post-1989 issues between Bulgaria and the Russian 
Federation, such as the repayment of Moscow’s $100m debt as a result of Bulgaria’s 
imbalanced trade relations with the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. In March 
1999 Evgeni Bakurdzhiev and Rem Viakhirev signed an agreement which provided 
for increasing deliveries of Russian natural gas through Bulgaria from 19 billion cubic 
metres annually, to 30 billion cubic metres annually. The day after the agreement was 
signed, the Bulgarian Finance Minister, Mikhail Zadorov, announced that Russia had 
agreed to pay off its Cold War trade debt to Bulgaria and, in an attempt to revive 
flagging Bulgarian-Russian post-1989 trade, Moscow had granted most favoured 
trading nation status to Bulgaria, something that reflected Moscow’s political 
intension to adopt more simplified custom duties for all Bulgarian products imported 
to Russia.715 In mid-2003 Gazprom announced that, apart from projects concerning 
mainly the construction of pipelines, its Bulgarian subsidiary company Topenergy 
would also become a gas distribution centre in Bulgaria, and through Bulgaria to
714 http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/17-98/15-17-l.htm
715 The trade turnover between Bulgaria and Russia has fallen more than 90% over the last ten years, 
dropping from $17bn in 1988 to a mere $1.2bn in 1998. See http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/03/1- 
rus/rus-220399.asp
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neighbouring Balkan states such as Greece and Turkey.716 This announcement 
reflected Gazprom’s decision to increase its business activities in the Balkan region 
and beyond in the future.
Indeed, at about the same time as Gazprom’s announcement it became known that the 
Russian company had plans to construct a gas pipeline running from Bulgaria to Italy. 
Moreover, after a meeting with the Bulgarian President, Georgi Parvanov, in 
Bulgaria’s Black Sea city of Vama in June 2004, the chairman of Gazprom’s 
management committee, Alexey Borisvich Miller, announced that the Russian 
company planned to build a new pipeline in Bulgaria leading to Greece and Serbia 
with an annual export capacity of 6 billion cubic metres for Greece and 1.5 billion 
cubic metres for Serbia.717
Conclusion
In addition to state foreign policy mechanisms, Bulgaria’s integration into the EU 
affected both the country’s interstate relations and Bulgaria’s relations with 
international organisations. Interstate relations came to be determined by the EU ’s 
legal framework and by the EU’s common foreign and security policy. As a result, 
Bulgaria’s relations with states such as the Russian Federation and many developing 
countries of the Third World such as Libya and Iraq declined markedly. This was 
because in line with the EU’s legal framework and common foreign and security 
policy, Sofia imposed trade and other economic barriers on these states such as the 
introduction of a visa regime with the Russian Federation in November 2001, and
716 http://www.in-business.info/English/14En/new page 15htm.
717 Ibid.; http://newsfromrussia.corn/world/2004/06/l 1/54379.
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adopted policies such as Sofia’s decision to observe the UN-imposed economic 
embargoes on Libya and Iraq which brought the Bulgarian governments into conflict 
with the Libyan and Iraqi political regimes.
On the other hand, relations with states such as the USA improved greatly due to 
Sofia’s attempts to gain political, economic and military advantages and gain 
protection after the vacuum left by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the 
dismantling of the communist bloc. However, despite any advantages that post-1989 
relations with the USA may have given Sofia, Bulgaria’s process of accession to the 
EU has also influenced Bulgaria’s relations with the USA in the sense that Sofia was 
obliged to harmonize its policies towards Washington with those of the EU member 
states. Thus, Bulgaria followed the decision taken in June 2003 by the European 
Council in Luxemburg and refused to sign bilateral agreements with the USA 
exempting American soldiers and officers accused of war crimes from trial in the 
International Criminal Court in the Hague. As a result, the USA froze its military aid 
to Bulgaria.
Bulgaria’s process of accession to the EU came to align many of the political 
positions which Sofia supported in international organisations, such as the UN or the 
OSCE, with the EU ’s political positions. For example, a number of Bulgaria’s 
positions on issues such as the respect of human rights in China, Cuba and Iran 
approximate those of the EU. Sofia’s alignment with the EU’s political positions in 
international organisations is the result of the political cooperation which Brussels 
established with Sofia during the 1990s as part of Bulgaria’s EU accession process. 
This cooperation has been conducted through institutional mechanisms provided by
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Bulgaria’s EU Association Agreement such as the Bulgarian-EU Association 
Committee and the Joint Bulgarian-EU Parliamentary Committee, as well as through 
institutional mechanisms which the EU established with all candidate states within the 
framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, such as regular meetings 
of foreign policy experts of the EU and the candidate states, and the meetings between 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU member and candidate states in the EU 
General Affairs Council.
Sofia’s EU accession process has improved Bulgaria’s relations with international 
organisations such as NATO and the IMF. The BSP had been unwilling to allow the 
majority of post-1989 governments, whose tenure was dependent on the BSP’s 
parliamentary support, to promote the liberal economic reforms which the IMF 
wanted Bulgarian governments to pursue, or to consent to any plans regarding 
membership of NATO. The improvement in Sofia’s relations with NATO and the 
IMF was mainly achieved as a result of changes in the BSP’s foreign policy agenda at 
the end of the 1990s. Those changes were the outcome of the BSP leadership’s 
aspirations for the party to become a member of the Socialist International, in the 
hope that it could find a new political identity which would enable it to overcome the 
political crisis it had gone through after the defeat in the general elections of 1997. 
The BSP’s aspirations to become a member of the Socialist International, along with 
the close political relations which the party had established with European socialist 
and labour parties from the end of the 1990s, as a result of Bulgaria’s EU accession 
process, rendered the BSP susceptible to political pressures from European socialist 
and labour parties. Both had conditioned their relations with the BSP, and the BSP’s 
membership of the Socialist International, on the party reviewing its negative stance
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towards Bulgaria’s accession to NATO and the country’s cooperation with the IMF. 
Through review of the BSP’s negative stance towards NATO and the IMF, a political 
consensus was established between the major Bulgarian parliamentary force, which 
secured cooperation between the Bulgarian political authorities and these two 
organisations from the end of the 1990s. This political consensus has been significant 
in the country’s being invited to join NATO at the Summit in Prague in November 
2002 .
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Chapter V
Bulgaria’s Accession Process to the Euro-Atlantic Institutions and its 
Effect on Sofia’s Foreign Policy towards the Balkans
Introduction
Although at the centre of the Balkan Peninsula geographically, Bulgaria was 
politically isolated from the region for most of the 20th century. Until the end of 
WWII, this isolation was mainly the result of the Bulgarian political elite’s 
irredentism aimed at restoring the state borders outlined in the San Stefano treaty. 
This treaty was concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in March 1878 
and provided for the creation of a Bulgarian state extending from the Danube river in 
the north to the Aegean sea in the south, and from the Vardar and Morava valleys in 
the west to the Black Sea in the east.718
‘San Stefano Bulgaria’ was drastically reduced in size at the subsequent Congress of 
Berlin but the quest for ‘Greater Bulgaria’, as this state come to be known, pulled 
Bulgaria into four ferocious and devastating wars in the first half of the 20th century. 
Sofia’s participation in both Balkan wars, and the First and the Second World Wars
718 Appendix, map 2; The San Stefano treaty put an end to the war between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire which had begun in April 1877. Fearing that Bulgaria would be a political satellite of Russia, 
Great Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire insisted on the revision of the San Stefano treaty. After 
in depth negotiations between the great powers in July 1878 the San Stefano treaty was replaced by the 
treaty o f Berlin. The Treaty of Berlin reduced the Bulgarian state to the territory between the Danube 
river and the Balkan mountains, turned the area between the Balkan and Rhodopes mountains into an 
autonomous Ottoman province called Eastern Rumelia, and restored the remainder of the territory to 
the Ottoman empire. For more details on these events see Crampton, 1997, pp. 83-86; Crampton, 1987, 
pp. 19-20; Jelavich, 1983, V ol.l, pp. 352-361.
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was driven by the Bulgarian political elite’s belief that when these wars were over 
Bulgaria would regain many of the San Stefano treaty territories.719
These beliefs proved ill founded. Sofia was on the losing side with Bulgaria suffering 
huge loss of life and serious economic consequences. It was also obliged to make 
reparations to its neighbours damaged by these wars. The end of W WI saw Bulgaria 
losing authority in almost nine-tenths of the territories of Macedonia, Thrace and east 
Serbia, areas that Sofia’s political elite had been claiming as Bulgarian since the end 
of the 19th century.720
Apart from the casualties, and economic and territorial losses inflicted on Bulgaria, 
the country’s engagement in war against neighbouring states led the political elites of 
these states to view Bulgaria as an aggressor and a bellicose neighbour whose foreign 
policy was always aimed at upsetting the status quo in the region. This view was 
reinforced by the fact that Bulgaria had not undertaken any serious political initiative 
to establish political or economic cooperation with other Balkan states. A series of 
Balkan conferences organised in the early 1930s had failed to bring any significant 
political or economic cooperation with the other states of the Peninsula because Sofia 
refused to accept that the territorial status quo was permanent.721
As a result, Bulgaria was marginalized in regional politics, which was clearly 
demonstrated when, in the mid-1930s, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey 
decided to ignore Sofia’s refusal to be engaged in any political initiative aimed at
719 Crampton, 1997, pp. 135-147, 171-183; Crampton, 1987, pp. 57-71, 124-135; Jelavich, 1983,
Vol.2, pp. 95-100, 106-133, 255-261; Eldurov, 1994; Markov, 1994.
720 Nikova, 1998, 282; Appendix, maps 1-5.
721 Crampton, 1997, pp. 161-162; Stavrianos, 1964, pp. 230-270; Geshkoff, 1940, pp. 77-139.
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establishing a strong multilateral cooperation in the Balkan region, and concluded the 
‘Balkan Entente’. This was a political alignment which, in February 1934, took the 
form of a military alliance with the signing in Athens of a military pact between 
Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey. The pact aimed at preserving the territorial 
status quo of these four states against future challenges from Bulgaria.722
When the communists came to power after WWII, they proclaimed a complete break 
from the irredentism of pre-W ar Bulgaria and its desire to recreate the Great Bulgaria 
of the San Stefano treaty. The communists denounced those aspirations as ‘bourgeois 
nationalism’ aimed at enlarging the political and economic power basis of the ruling 
elite against the real interests of the working classes. The aspirations of pre-War 
Bulgarian political elites were viewed as having put too heavy a burden on the 
Bulgarian people through the recruitment of soldiers to fight against neighbouring 
Balkan states over territorial borders, and demands for high taxes to cover post war 
reparations.
The Bulgarian communists took a series of political measures aimed at restricting 
chauvinist and irredentist factions within Bulgarian society. The work of pre-War 
writers, historians and other scholars promoting irredentist views was denounced and 
withdrawn from circulation.723 Military marches and patriotic songs were banned 
because they included references to territories belonging to neighbouring Balkan 
states, which, according to the San Stefano treaty, were Bulgarian.724
722 Crampton, 1997, p. 162; Jelavich, 1983, pp. 212-213; Stavrianos, 1964, pp. 238-241; Geshkoff, 
1940, pp. 203-231.
723 Nikova, 1998, p. 282; Oren, 1971, pp. 221-258.
724 Ibid.
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The Bulgarian communists accepted the territorial status quo of the Balkan region 
agreed after WWII. Bulgaria participated in the CSCE talks at the beginning of the 
1970s, which resulted in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This Act 
recognized the inviolability of the post-WWII territorial borders of the European
states.725
Despite political efforts to overcome pre-war irredentism, Bulgaria continued to 
remain politically isolated from the Balkan region even in the communist period. The 
Soviet Union did not support initiatives aimed at promoting multilateral political and 
economic cooperation between the Balkan states because it feared that through such 
cooperation, Moscow would lose political control over Bulgarian politics.726
However, there have been some occasions when the Bulgarian communist regime 
participated in initiatives that promoted multilateral cooperation in the Balkans. 
Immediately after WWII the BCP was part of an ill-fated attempt to create a 
Bulgarian-Yugoslav federal state, with a view to its eventually including other Balkan 
countries.727 Both the Bulgarian and Yugoslav communist parties saw the creation of a 
Balkan federal state as a remedy for the constant controversies among the Balkan 
countries.
Also, Sofia became involved in a series of bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the 
aftermath of a Balkan conference convened by the Greek Prime Minister Constantine 
Karamanlis in Athens in 1976.728 These initiatives aimed at strengthening cooperation
725 Garthoff, 1994, pp. 526-555.
726 Brown, 1970, pp. 263-69.
727 Braun, 1983, pp. 33-39; Jelavich, 1983, Vol. 2, pp. 317-329.
728 See p. 54 above; Braun, 1983, 51-53; Phinnemore & Siani-Davies, 2003, p. 178.
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between the Balkan states in areas such as energy, transport, telecommunications and 
the environment, and with some states even to military cooperation. In 1986 Bulgaria 
signed a declaration of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness with Greece, which 
provided for military cooperation between the two states,729 and consultation between 
them in cases of military crisis.
However, neither of these initiatives, although they lasted some years, reflected any 
real effort by the Bulgarian communist regime to overcome the isolation which the 
country had experienced in the period prior to WWII. Nor did they signal a genuine 
Bulgarian interest in promoting multilateral cooperation among Balkan states. Rather 
they should be seen as attempts on the part of the BCP to promote Soviet interests in 
the Balkan region.730 The project for a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation at the end of the 
1940s was supported by the Bulgarians inasmuch as it had the blessing of the Soviets. 
It was not coincidental that the Bulgarian communist authorities abandoned this 
project immediately after the political conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet 
leaders, Tito and Stalin, at the end of the 1940s.731
The bilateral and multilateral initiatives launched at the end of the 1970s and during 
the 1980s were in line with the Soviet Union’s policy of peaceful coexistence and 
cooperation with the Western bloc countries after the CSCE, and the signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act in 1975. At the Athens Balkan conference in 1976, Bulgaria, in 
line with its policy of discouraging any sort of multilateral cooperation in the Balkan 
region, was against institutionalizing multilateral cooperation between the Balkan 
states through the convening of regular meetings similar to that of the Athens
729 See pp. 71-2 above; RFE/RL Bulgarian SR/7, 29-7-1988, p. 15; Ashley, 1989, p. 141.
730 Brown, 1970, pp. 275-283.
731 See pp. 55-6, 58, 73-4 above; Braun, 1983, p. 36; Jelavich, 1983, Vol.2, pp. 321-29.
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conference. Bulgaria only reviewed this position in November 1981 when, a few days 
after a meeting between the Bulgarian and the Soviet communist leaders, Todor 
Zhivkov and Leonid Brezhnev, in the Crimea, Ukraine, the Bulgarian leader proposed 
a project which provided for a series of multilateral meetings between Balkan states, 
to discuss removing nuclear weapons from the Balkan Peninsula.732
Sofia’s participation in bilateral and multilateral meetings from the end of the 1970s 
did very little to integrate Bulgaria either politically and economically into the rest of 
the Balkan region. At the end of the Cold War, for instance, the bulk of Bulgaria’s 
trade was still mainly directed at the Soviet Union and the rest of the CMEA region, 
with the significant exception of Romania.733 Bulgaria’s political relations with almost 
all the Balkan states were at a low level at the end of the 1980s; with Albania because 
of its regime’s adherence to Enver Hoxha’s policy of international isolation which 
kept Tirana from any political or economic relations with its Balkan neighbours; with 
Romania because of mutual suspicion over Bucharest’s foreign policy, and 
environmental issues, such as pollution in north-east Bulgaria from chlorine emissions 
from Romanian chemical plants on the northern bank of the Danube; with Turkey 
because of the Bulgarian authorities’ decision to force the Bulgarian Turks to change 
their names; and with Yugoslavia because of disputes between the authorities over the 
existence of a Macedonian nation in the Balkans. The only Balkan state with which 
Bulgaria was on relatively good terms at the end of the 1980s was Greece mainly 
because of the hostile relations of both with Turkey, which created a feeling of 
solidarity.
732 RFE/RL Bulgarian SR/14, 23-11-1981, item 1.
733 See pp. 46-9, 79-80 above; appendix, tables 20&25.
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Bulgaria’s Balkan Policy since the End of the Cold War
Bulgaria’s marginalization from Balkan politics prior to 1989 comes in sharp contrast 
to the country’s active involvement in the political life of the Balkan region since the 
end of the Cold War. This involvement has been marked by Sofia’s political efforts to 
promote peace and political stability in the region through the undertaking of and 
participating in political initiatives aimed at establishing long lasting multilateral 
cooperation between the Balkan states.
In this period Sofia successfully avoided being pulled into military conflicts with 
neighbouring countries. Bulgaria reached the brink of domestic ethnic conflict and 
even war with Turkey, at the end of the 1980s as a result o f the country’s abuse of 
human rights of its Turks.734 The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia might also have 
wetted the appetites of nationalist political circles in Sofia for military action against 
FYROM and Serbia.735 After declaring its independence from the Yugoslav federation 
in 1991, FYROM campaigned even more openly and actively for recognition by the 
international community of a Macedonian nation with its own language, history, 
national symbols and ethnic minorities in neighbouring countries such as Bulgaria, 
which was viewed unfavourably by many Bulgarians. Bulgaria was the first Balkan 
country to recognize FYROM as an independent state, although for most of the post- 
1989 period Sofia refused to recognize the existence either of a Macedonian nation in 
the Balkans or of an ethnic Macedonian minority in Bulgarian territory.736
734 Poulton, 1991, pp. 129-161; Hale, 2000, pp. 168-9.
735 Nedeva & Kaytchev, 2001, p. 178.
736 Zhelev, 1998, pp. 151-181;Engstrom, 2002; Crampton, 1997, p. 228; Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 151-3; 
Poulton, 1991, pp. 107-111.
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Due to the international community’s fear that the political independence of FYROM 
from the Yugoslav federation would destabilize the entire Balkan region, either by 
leading Belgrade to take military action against Skopje and thus extending the 
existing ethnic conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia southwards, or by 
causing conflict between FYROM, Bulgaria, Greece and even Albania, it instituted a 
series of political measures aimed at protecting the territorial integrity and stability of 
FYROM. In 1992 the CSCE established a Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje, a 
multinational diplomatic mission whose main task was to protect the territorial 
integrity of FYROM.737 In addition, in line with resolution 743 of the UN Security 
Council, a multinational peace-keeping force was dispatched to FYROM, to monitor 
ethnic tensions between the different groups living in the country, particularly 
Albanians and Macedonians, and to discourage conflict between FYROM and 
neighbouring Balkan states such as Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania.738 Initially 
part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployment force was 
later renamed UNPREDEP.
The refusal of the Serbian authorities to recognize the approximately 30,000 
Bulgarians living around the town of Tsaribrod in eastern Serbia as a national 
minority and to allow the Bulgarian state to establish cultural links with them, was 
seen by some Bulgarians, particularly the IMRO and the UDF, as providing a unique 
chance for Sofia to toughen its stance against Serbia with the view to either forcing 
the Serbian authorities to recognize the existence of a Bulgarian minority within 
Serbia or of annexing the regions around Tsaribrod to Bulgaria. These regions, widely 
known in Bulgaria as the ‘western outlands’, had belonged to the Bulgarian state
737 http://www.osce.org/skopie/overview/; http://www.osce.org/documents/mms/1992/09/520 en.pdf; 
Rubeli, 2000, pp. 6-7
738 Rubeli, 2000, pp. 6-7.
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before the First World War, but were annexed to Serbia for strategic reasons in 
1918/19.739
However, Sofia avoided becoming engaged in any conflict and since 1989, has been 
actively involved in political initiatives aimed at promoting peace in neighbouring 
Yugoslavia and establishing multilateral political and economic cooperation in the 
Balkan region. As a result of Sofia’s active diplomatic involvement in the Balkans, 
the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of all the Southeast European states since 
1990 took place in Sofia on 6 July 1996.740 It had been impossible to hold such a 
meeting between 1990 and 1996 because of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, which 
made it difficult for the former Yugoslav states to sit around the same table, and 
because of the dispute between Greece and FYROM over the name of the new state.741
Reasons for Sofia’s Post-Cold War Balkan Policy
Sofia’s post-1989 policy of promoting peace and multilateral cooperation in the 
Balkans surprised many scholars and policy makers both in the W est and in the 
Balkans, who came to refer to Bulgaria as “the island of stability”, “an oasis of the 
Balkans”, “the good pupil of the Balkans” .742 What prompted this change in Sofia’s 
Balkan policy in the 1990s?
739 Nikova, 1998, p. 298; Crampton, 1997, 148-9, 150; appendix, maps 4-5.
740 Hinkova, 2002, pp. 14-15.
741 Greece’s dispute with FYROM over the name of Republic of Macedonia, which FYROM would 
have been represented by in international forums was temporarily resolved in April 1993 with the 
compromise forged by the European members o f the UN Security Council which allowed the former 
Yugoslavian state to be admitted to the UN under the name ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ 
until a permanent agreement could be reached between the two sides. See Michas, 2002, p. 47.
742 Nikova, 1998, p. 299; http://wwwl.cs.columbia.edu/~radev/service/bas/eag/eb.doc: 
http://www.loc.gov/bicentennial/abstracts mihailova.html:
http://www.harbus.org/news/2002/05/06/News/Mr.Nikolav.Vassilev.Deputy.Prime.Minister.And.Minis 
ter.Of.Economv.Of.Bulgaria.W-25Q177.shtml .
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First, Bulgaria’s post-1989 Balkan policy was mostly dictated by the country’s weak 
economy. Involvement in any war would have devastated the already weak Bulgarian 
economy and plunged the country into social chaos, which no post-1989 government 
would have been able to cope with. Also, the country’s position at the centre of the 
Balkan Peninsula surrounded by other Balkan states, meant that Sofia had more to 
gain from following a policy aimed at promoting peace, regional stability and 
cooperation, a policy that would improve Bulgaria’s image in the Western world, 
which viewed the region generally as being politically unstable and, thus a highly 
risky economic environment. The wars in the former Yugoslavia had promoted this 
image and had serious economic effects on Bulgaria since Sofia had difficulty in 
attracting the investments necessary for the country’s economic development. As a 
result, Bulgaria’s levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were low throughout the 
post-1989 period.743 Furthermore, a foreign policy aimed at promoting peace and 
regional stability in the Balkans would guarantee Bulgaria’s trading routes to the 
Western world remaining open. For much of the post-1989 period, as a result of the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia and the economic sanctions which the UN Security 
Council imposed on Serbia, these routes had been closed.744
The Bulgarian state had suffered economically from disruption of its trading routes 
with Europe and the negative image imposed by the Yugoslav wars on the Balkan 
Peninsula, although some sectors of Bulgarian society, such as those working with the 
Customs authorities, had exploited the fact that trade routes to Yugoslavia were
743 Rizopoulos, 2001, pp. 80-83, 86-88; Nikova, 1998, p. 296; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/99-04/31- 
04-l.htm ; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/20-98/36-20-l.htm
744 Bristow, 1996, p. 120; IMF, 1996, pp. 31-33; Georgiev & Tsenkov, 1993, pp. 38-44; Pavlov, 1995, 
p. 21; Dinkov, 1995, pp. 28-9; Insider, Vol. 9, No. 3 / 4 ,  1999, pp. 11-16; 
http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/99-16/32-16-l.htm
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closed, and had made huge profits from illicit trade and smuggling.745 Although it is 
difficult to exactly quantify the economic losses which the wars in former Yugoslavia 
produced, some estimates put them at around $6bn for the m id-1992 to m id-1994 
period alone.746
However, Bulgaria’s post-1989 weak economy does not completely explain the 
country’s policy of peace and regional cooperation in the Balkans after 1989. In the 
period before WWII, Bulgaria’s economy was also weak, but the country’s regional 
policy was far from one of peace and multilateral cooperation.
Also, the period of economic stability that the country experienced for most of the 
communist period was mainly the result of generous economic subsidies which Sofia 
received from Moscow in return for Bulgaria’s political loyalty to the Soviet Union 
and not the outcome of any policy of inter-state cooperation.747 Even at the beginning 
of the 1980s, when the country’s economic stability was coming to an end, Sofia, 
instead of following policies that would contribute to peace and cooperation between 
the Balkan states, resorted to political measures, such as the ethnic assimilation of the 
Bulgarian Turks in the mid-1980s.748 These measures could have pulled the country 
into an ethnic conflict similar to those that neighbouring Yugoslavia would 
experience and might even have led Bulgaria into a war with Turkey.749
745 It is estimated for example that during the UN economic sanctions against the FRY, more than 200 
cars daily passed between Bulgaria and Serbia carrying almost 10,000 litres o f gasoline across the 
border with the FRY. See Center for the Study o f Democracy, 2002, p. 36.
746 Bristow, 1996, p. 120; IMF, 1996, pp. 31-33; Georgiev & Tsenkov, 1993, pp. 38-44; Pavlov, 1995, 
p. 21; Dinkov, 1995, pp. 28-9; Insider, Vo. 9, No. 3 / 4 ,  1999, pp. 11-16.
http://www.capital .bg/weekl v/99-16/32-16-1 .htm
747 Braun, 1983, pp. 199-208; Braun, 1983, pp. 100-116,199-208; Brown, 1970, p. 51
748 Dimitrov, 2001a; Borden Savova-Mahon, 2001, pp.280-307.
749 Dimitrov, 2001a; Borden Savova-Mahon, 2001, pp. 303-305; Poulton, 1997, pp. 290-2 & 299-302; 
Hale, 2000, 168-9.
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Why did Bulgaria’s weak economy not have the same effect on foreign policy before 
1989? The weak economy answer takes for granted that government decisions are the 
outcome of rational choices determined by the economic interests of the country. 
However, this view is problematic for the following reasons. First, government 
decisions are not always determined by economic interests as can be seen in 
M ilosevic’s decisions to embroil Serbia in military conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia- 
Hercegovina and Kosovo during the 1990s.750 Serbia would have gained more 
economically if the regime had pursued a peaceful dissolution of the Yugoslav 
Federation and built strong political and economic links with the states that resulted.
Second, the foreign policy decisions determined by economic interests differ 
according to the political actors in power. The foreign policy priorities of the BSP 
were not the same as those of the UDF. The BSP government of Zhan Videnov, as 
argued earlier, decided to foster political and economic relations with the Russian 
Federation and Third World developing countries such as Libya, Syria and Iran. The 
UDF government of Filip Dimitrov, on the other hand, gave priority to political and 
economic relations with the Western world. So why did post-1989 Balkan policy 
follow the path of peace and multilateral cooperation with the other countries of the 
region, regardless of who was in power?
It has often been argued that what explains Sofia’s post-1989 Balkan policy is the 
country’s political system.751 Post-1989 Bulgaria was liberal democratic with a 
pluralistic party system, division of power, a free press and active public opinion, 
similar to the democratic systems in most countries of the Western world after
750 Thomas, 1999.
751 Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 148-157.
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W W II.752 As was the case for these countries, Bulgaria’s post-1989 democratic system 
is considered by a number of scholars and policy-makers to be responsible for this 
policy of peace and cooperation:753 liberal democratic regimes are seen as pursuing 
qualitatively different foreign policies from those pursued by illiberal democratic or 
non-democratic regimes.754 It is believed that liberal democratic regimes are the only 
political systems that actively involve the public in decision-making through general 
elections and political means such as referendums, protests or strikes, which 
determine the direction of state policy. The state authorities are accountable to the 
public for the political decisions they take and their remaining in power is determined 
by whether the public is satisfied with their policies.
This is a simplification of the extent of the public’s engagement in state foreign policy 
making though. Even in mature democratic systems such as those of Great Britain and 
the USA foreign policy decisions are often taken without the involvement of the 
public. For instance, the decision to support the American military operations of 2003 
in Iraq was opposed by a large proportion of the British public.755
The accountability of state authorities is believed to have a major effect on the foreign 
policies of states with liberal democratic regimes. The public are generally viewed as 
being peace loving and their involvement in the state’s policy making leads to the
752 Nikova, 1998, p. 283.
753 Ibid; Gatzidis, 2002, pp. 148-157; Abadzhiev Dimitflr, personal interview, 30/11/2001; Hinkova, 
Sonia, personal interview, 16/11/2001; Dainov, Evgeni, personal interview, 26/11/2001; Kiuranov, 
Deian, personal interview, 4/12/2001; Malinov, Svetoslav, personal interview, 28/11/2001.
754 Clark, 1989, pp. 147-8.
755 http://www.coldtvpe.net/Assets.04/Voices.04/voices.38.04.pdf; 
http://www.medialens.org/alerts/2004/040318 bombing protectors.htm; 
http://www.indvmedia.org.uk/en/regions/oxford/2004/02/284900.html; http://www.independent- 
media.tv/item.cfm?fmedia id=2925&fcategorv desc=Under%20Reported.
325
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
avoidance of conflict.756Academic scholars, such as Howard757 following the ideas of 
Kant, see war as resulting from policies followed by non-democratic governments, 
which aim at expanding their power and wealth through territorial conquests. The 
public is seen as having nothing to gain from aggressive foreign policies. Any profits 
from wars go to the military industries as a result of the extra weapons and the 
military equipment required, or to the non-democratic regime, which, in the event of 
victory, improves its public image and prolongs its tenure.738 This view seems to 
ignore situations where governments have been driven to engage in military conflicts 
with neighbouring states in response to popular pressure. For example, the Deliyannis 
government’s decision to respond to Greek public pressure in early 1897 and dispatch 
ships and troops to Crete in an attempt to annex the island to Greece. This decision 
brought the Greek state into war with the Ottoman Empire, of which Crete was part at 
that time. Greece suffered an overwhelming defeat and it was only due to the political 
influence that the great powers of the time, namely Great Britain, France, Russia, 
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, exercised on the political authorities in Istanbul 
that the peace settlement made after the war was relatively lenient towards Greece.759
Also, states with liberal democratic regimes are viewed as being unique in their ability 
to establish sound institutionalized political and economic relations between each 
other. This ability is believed to result from common democratic principles such as 
commitment to the rule of law, respect for human rights and equality before the law, 
on which the political institutions of liberal democratic states are founded.760 The 
reciprocal recognition of these common principles helps liberal democratic regimes to
756 Howard, 1978, p. 31; Reiss, 1970, p. 100; Burchill, 2001, pp. 32-37.
757 Howard, 1978, p. 31.
758 Ibid.
759 Clogg, 1979, pp. 92-94.
760 Doyle, 1986, p. 1151; Fukuyama, 1992, p. xx; Rawls, 1999, p. 49.
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find a common language which allows them to avoid military conflicts through 
bargaining, which is one of the cornerstone of modem democratic politics.761
States with liberal democratic regimes are also seen as willing to liberalize their 
economies by talcing measures to promote free trade with other states and encouraging 
foreign investments and tourism because they are not preoccupied with preserving 
power and seek to promote the well being of their citizens. They seek to increase the 
flow of goods and foreign capital into their territories.762 This liberalization of state 
economies encourages links across frontiers and shifts the loyalties of the public away 
from the nation-state.763 Eventually both political leaders and the public recognize 
that the benefits of sound political and economic cooperation with neighbouring states 
outweigh what might be the results of engagement in military conflicts with them.764
The belief that states with liberal democratic regimes pursue qualitatively different 
foreign policies is shared by many 20th century academic scholars and policy-makers 
and has been the guiding principle of most Western states’ foreign policy since the 
end of the Cold War. After 1989, US foreign policy gave priority to the expansion of 
the geographical zones of states that had a liberal democracy on the basis that, 
through such expansion, the possibility of these states becoming involved in military 
conflict would be diminished and trade would increase.765 But can the change in 
Bulgaria’s Balkan policy after the end of the 1980s be seen as the natural outcome of 
the country’s democratization?
761 Ibid.
762 Howard, 1978, 20; Burchill, 2001, pp. 37-39; Walter, 1996.
763 Howard, 1978, p. 29; Walter, 1996.
764 Ibid.
765 Talbot, 1996.
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Sofia’s post-1989 Balkan policy cannot be seen as a direct effect of the country’s 
democratization because it was not always the case that the public wanted no 
involvement in military conflict. Although opinion polls after 1989 reveal that the 
majority of the Bulgarian public did not nurture any territorial claims against 
Bulgaria’s Balkan neighbours, there were occasions when the public was ill disposed 
towards its neighbours.766
After Todor Zhivkov’s fall from power, the Bulgarian government’s decision to 
restore to the Bulgarian Turks their Muslim names, which Zhivkov’s regime had 
robbed them of during the second half of the 1980s, caused protests and provoked 
mass demonstrations from a large number of ethnic Bulgarians, especially those living 
in ethnically mixed areas.767 Some viewed Bulgarian Turks as an alien ethnic group 
that should be assimilated for the sake of the country’s national security. Others 
profited materially from the cheap housing and land that were the result of the mass 
exodus to Turkey in 1989 resulting from Zhivkov’s policy of forced ethnic 
assimilation.768 The situation was resolved after ‘The Public Council on the Various 
Aspects of the Ethnic Issue’ was held at the Bulgarian National Assembly in January 
1990 between members of the MRF and human rights organisations such as the 
Independent Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Bulgaria (IADHR), and 
nationalist organisations such as the Committee for the Defence of National Interests, 
which was active in ethnically mixed areas such as Smolyan, Shumen and Ruse.769 
The Council confirmed the government’s decision to restore their Muslim names to 
the Bulgarian Turks, but to appease the nationalists, it decreed that Bulgarian should
766 Nikova, 1998, p. 283.
767 Borden Savova-Mahon, 2001, pp. 405-411.
768 Poulton, 1991, pp. 164-5; Crampton, 1997, p. 217.
769 The chairman of the Committee for the Defence of National Interests was Mincho Minchev, a taxi 
driver from Kurdzali, a member of the BSP and a former intelligence agent during communist times.
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be the official language and made a general recommendation that any political 
organisations challenging the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian state be banned, as 
should public displays of the Turkish flag.770
However, this response threatened Sofia’s relations with Ankara which considered the 
Bulgarian Turks to be a kin ethnic group whose human rights was of concern to 
Turkey. Various Bulgarian-Turkish bilateral treaties had been signed in the past, 
acknowledging the ethnic kinship of the Bulgarian Turks with Turkey, and decrying 
human rights abuses against Bulgarian Turks.771 Ankara froze its political and 
economic relations with Bulgaria after the policy on name changes. Continuation of 
this policy would have risked Bulgaria and Turkey into a prolonged political crisis, 
with consequences for the stability of the entire Balkan region.
The Bulgarian public’s role in post-1989 politics was little different to that of citizens 
in other democratic states, that is it was generally confined to participation in general 
and Presidential elections every few years. Most major political decisions throughout 
the almost fifteen years of Bulgaria’s democratization, such as approval of the post- 
1989 constitution, Bulgaria’s application for admission to the EU and NATO, and the 
introduction of the Currency Board in 1997, were taken by the country’s political elite 
without much public consultation.
In addition, the view that democratic regimes are more willing to liberalize their 
economies, which shifts loyalties away from the nation state, does not fully explain 
the changes in Sofia’s Balkan policy. In spite of intermittent political efforts on the
770 Ibid.
771 Poulton, 1991, pp. 129-161; Crampton, 1990; Eminov, 1990; Karpat, 1990; Simsir, 1988; Eminov, 
1997.
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part of the Bulgarian authorities to liberalize the country’s economy, the post-1989 
Bulgarian economy cannot be called a liberal economy. Up to 2002, the EC’s annual 
reports on candidate states for EU membership assessed the Bulgarian economy as not 
being a free market economy and, therefore, it did not meet the criteria for entry to the 
EU.
With the exception perhaps of Greece and Turkey, the Bulgarian economy has not 
been sufficiently opened to the Balkan region to allow the creation of an economic 
network between Bulgarian society and the societies in neighbouring Balkan states. 
Such a network could have justified the Balkan policy which Bulgarian governments 
had followed since 1989 in the sense that the sections of Bulgarian society with 
economic links with neighbouring Balkan states could have lobbied the governments 
to avoid military conflict in the region and promote a policy of political and economic 
cooperation with its Balkan neighbours. However, the level of Bulgaria’s official 
interactions with most of its neighbours since 1989 was not enough to establish such 
an economic network. Trade with the Balkan region, although slightly higher than 
pre-1989 levels, remained fairly insignificant, with imports from and exports to the 
region accounting for less than 10% of total Bulgarian imports and exports.772 Most of 
the country’s economic interactions with its Balkan neighbours were restricted to 
unofficial economic networks which had been developed during the war in former 
Yugoslavia and which involved the black-market. Thus, their influence on official 
state foreign policy making is questionable.773
772 Appendix, tables 20&25, p. 15; Jackson, 2001; Tzarevsky, 2001.
773 Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002.
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However, with Greece and Turkey official economic interactions have increased since 
the beginning of the 1990s as a result of these countries’ political and economic 
integration into the Western world and the economic opportunities that interaction 
seemed to offer to the public and the state of Bulgaria.774 In addition to increasing 
bilateral trade, around 150,000 Bulgarians were working in Greece in 2004 and 
150,000 to 200,000 Bulgarian Turks were working in Turkey in 2000, most of whom 
had fled to Turkey at the end of the 1980s.775
The ability of democratic regimes to establish strong political and economic 
institutions through which they manage political, economic and military differences 
with other states does not apply to post-1989 Bulgaria. It is true that almost all 
Bulgarian governments after 1989 took political initiatives aimed at developing 
regional institutions, through which the Balkan states would work out compromises 
over their political, economic or military differences. Such institutions include the 
Balkan Conference on Stability, Security and Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, 
which was established by the Bulgarian government of Zhan Videnov in Sofia in July 
1996. The Conference was attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of all Balkan 
states and instituted regular meetings among the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the
774 Bulgarian exports to Turkey amounted to around $8bn in 2002, while in 1995 they amounted to 
approximately $5.5bn. Bulgarian imports from Turkey from approximately $5.2bn amounted in 1995 
reached the amount of $5.5bn in 2002. (http://www.deik.org.tr/bultenler/turkev2003-VI- 
ForeignTrade.pdf; http://www.econwpa.wust/.edu:8089/eps/it/papers/0501/0501055.pdf). The total 
value of Bulgarian exports to Greece increased from $ 3 16.7m in 1994 to $347.2m in 1999, while the 
total value of imports from Greece declined from $414.3m in 1994 to approximately $410.8m at the 
end o f the 1990s (http://www.statistics.gr/gr tables/s700)
775 Siadima, 2001; ‘Statistical Data on Immigrants in Greece: An Analytical Study of Available Date 
and Recommendations for Conformity with EU Standards’, a study on Greece’s Migration Policy 
conducted by the Mediterranean Migration Observatory (UEHR), Pandeion University o f Athens, 
15/10/2004, available on http://www.mmo.gr:
http://www.econwpa.wust/.edu:8089/eps/it/papers/0501/0501055.pdf: By 2001 the total amount of 
Greece’s FDI to Bulgaria was estimated at $1.5bn, which corresponded to approximately 10% of the 
total FDI in Bulgaria, while the level o f Turkey’s FDI in Bulgaria since 1992 has been at around 
$128m. Tsardanidis, 2001; http://www.econwpa.wust/.edu:8089/eps/it/papers/0501/0501055.pdf. 
http://www.mfa.gr/greek/foreign policv/europe southeastern/balkans/Bulgaria.html:
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Defence Ministers and the heads of state and governments of all the Balkan 
countries.776 These meetings would be aimed at fostering political and economic 
cooperation and would provide a forum for state authorities to air their grievances on 
political, economic or other problems.
One outcome of these meetings was the Multinational Peacekeeping Force of South- 
Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), a rapid reaction force comprising military forces 
from Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Greece, Italy, Romania and Turkey.777 SEEBRIG 
has been operational since December 1999 and its main purposes are to strengthen 
military cooperation among Balkan states in order to avoid military conflict and to 
forge links between the armed forces of the Balkan states and the armies of NATO 
member states through the participation of SEEBRIG in NATO’s international 
humanitarian activities. It increased the operational capacity of the armed forces of 
the Balkan states and helped pave the way for Bulgaria and Romania to join NATO.778
However, by itself, the network of regional institutions that has been developed in the 
Balkans after 1989 has limited capability to influence Sofia’s foreign policy making. 
For instance, the BSEC is a regional forum, which was established at the beginning of 
the 1990s as a result of the active diplomatic initiatives of the Turkish government 
under the premiership of Turgut Ozal. Its aim was to bring economic growth and 
foster long-standing peaceful relations among its members.779 This would be achieved 
through the elimination of trade barriers and the BSEC states’ involvement in
776 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Frame/frame3index.htm
777 Ibid; wysiwyg://main. 16/http://www.md.government.bg/_en_/D_MMSUIE.html
778 Ibid.
779 The member states of the BSEC are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. See Sayan, 2002, p. 31; Hinkova, 
2002, pp. 9-10; Ayback, 2001, pp. 31-33; Pavliuk, 1999, pp. 144-147.
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multilateral economic activities, such as regional infrastructure projects and 
tourism.780
The failure of BSEC to influence post-1989 Bulgarian foreign policy was due to 
several reasons. First, a large section of the Bulgarian political elite, mainly members 
of the UDF, viewed the activities of this organisation with suspicion. Participation in 
BSEC was believed to undermine the country’s prospects of joining the EU: the 
Russian Federation and Turkey were leading members of BSEC, which allowed them 
to promote policies that might not be acceptable to the EU.781 Both Moscow and 
Ankara were considered to have good reasons for blocking Bulgaria’s membership of 
the EU. Moscow saw the EU and NATO as competing international actors, seeking to 
undermine Russia’s international influence by their inclusion of EES.782 Ankara, 
although a loyal ally of the Western bloc during the Cold War, could see no prospect 
of its becoming a full EU member state in the foreseeable future and, thus seeing 
Bulgaria an ex-communist state and a historical rival being in a position of becoming 
a member made the Turkish political elite both embarrassed and envious.783
As a result, for most of the 1990s, Sofia refused to consent to the idea supported by 
certain BSEC states that the BSEC should become an organisation whose decisions 
would be legally binding.784 Instead, the Bulgarian authorities insisted that the BSEC 
should continue to be the intergovernmental regional forum it had developed into, 
where member states could discuss political, economic or other issues, without any
780 Sayan, 2002, pp. 26-31; Hinkova, 2002, pp. 9-10.
781 Hinkova, 2002, p. 9; Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/200 l;Todorov, Antoni, personal 
interview, 3/12/2001; Minchev, Ognian, personal interview, 2/11/2001.
782 Hinkova, Sonia, personal interview, 16/11/2001; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001; 
Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001.
783 Ibid.
784 Hinkova, 2002, p. 9; Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001.
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decisions being legally binding for member states. In line with this position, until the 
mid-1990s, the Bulgarian authorities were not active in the BSEC apart from 
attendance at intergovernmental meetings and working groups related to the 
preparation or the implementation of decisions taken at these meetings. Between 1993 
and 1998 neither Bulgaria, nor Greece participated in the activities of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC, an institutional branch of the BSEC established 
in 1993 to coordinate the parliamentary assemblies of BSEC member states in 
adopting common resolutions and declarations on international issues.785
BSEC did not have the resources to finance major infrastructure projects in the Black 
Sea region and was dependent for their implementation on economic aid coming from 
state and private actors outside the region including the USA, the EU, the IMF and 
multinational companies (MNC).786 The majority of BSEC member states were ex- 
communist countries which had acute economic problems and lacked a strong private 
economic sector able to co-finance infrastructure projects with state authorities.
However, the BSEC’s inability to finance major projects seriously diminished its 
scope of influence on Bulgaria’s foreign policy making after 1989 and diminished its
785 Sayan, 2002, p. 30; Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001; Hinkova, Sonia, personal 
interview, 16/11/2001.
786 Lacking financial resources BSEC’s interest in interacting with other international organisations had 
grown significantly by 1996-7. In the first years o f the BSEC’s existence there were only irregular 
contacts between the BSEC and other international organisations and sub-regional groups. The 6th and 
7th BSEC meetings o f Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Chisinau in November 1995 and in Bucharest in 
April 1996 requested the Permanent International Secretary of the BSEC in Istanbul to develop an 
exchange o f information with sub-regional and international organisations interested in the BSEC. 
Following an invitation from the Permanent International Secretary o f the BSEC, representatives o f the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the EC, and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) held consultations with the directorate o f the 
Permanent International Secretary, which resulted in some projects. For example, an OECD-BSEC 
workshop was organised with the purpose of highlighting policies for combating corruption. A 
proposal for cooperation with and assistance to the BSEC was put forward by the UNECE and by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in areas such as transport, energy, 
environment, trade facilitations and the simplification o f border crossing procedures. See Pavliuk, 
1999, pp. 144-7.
334
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
prestige in the eyes of the political elite and the public. Unlike the EU, the BSEC 
came to be perceived as an international entity offering little economic benefit to the 
country and thus has had little influence on foreign policy decisions. Its lack of 
financial resources also meant that it could not create a strong intra-state network of 
economic interests.
The role of the BSEC has been mainly confined to promoting policies aimed at 
eliminating trade barriers thus its activities have overlapped with those of other 
institutions such as the EU.787 Nevertheless, interregional trade after 1989 was at a low 
level and a network of trade relations between the BSEC member states remained a 
distant prospect. The proportion of trade with BSEC countries such as Romania or 
Turkey was small compared to total Bulgarian trade, and any increase in trade with 
these countries after 1989 was related more to the liberalization of Bulgaria’s trade 
regime as a result of the implementation of EU trade policies than to BSEC policies to 
eliminate trade barriers.788
There were, though, other political initiatives that have influenced Bulgaria’s foreign 
policy. These include the European Royaumont Process, the South East European 
Cooperative Initiative (SECI), generally known as the ‘Schifter’ Initiative after its 
architect Richard Shifter, the US President’s special representative and a member of 
the American National Security Council, and the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
The Royaumont Process was launched in September 1995 within the framework of 
the Paris Peace Conference on Bosnia and Hercegovina with the participation of all
787 Sayan, 2002, pp. 26-31; Aybak, 2001, 37-43.
788 Jackson, 2001, pp. 53-61; Appendix, tables 20 & 25.
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the Balkan states, the EU countries, Hungary, the USA and Russia.789 This initiative 
envisaged the development of regional cooperation in the Balkans under the auspices 
of the OSCE. This was seen as a long-term goal that would be achieved after the 
building of civil society structures in the Balkan countries.790
The SECI was launched by the USA in March 1996 and all Balkan states plus 
Slovenia and Hungary took part in the ‘organisational meeting’ held in Geneva in 
December 1996.791 SECI sought to sustain regional stability through the promotion of 
regional inter-state cooperation in the areas of the economy and environmental 
protection.792 Since 2000 there has been close cooperation between SECI and the 
Stability Pact with the view to a merger between the two.793 A merger was desirable 
because of the overlap between some of the activities of the two initiatives and would 
make the merged organisation, known as the Stability Pact, more efficient. In June 
2002, Erhard Busek, the then Coordinator of SECI, replaced Bodo Hombach as 
Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Several 
individuals were coordinators in both the SECI and the Stability Pact, so the dates of 
meetings of the two projects were closely coordinated to avoid overlap. At the 
beginning of 2003 some of the committees of the two projects, including the Business 
and Advisory Councils, were merged to allow the resources directed to regional 
projects and managed by the Stability Pact to be channeled through SECI’s office in 
Vienna in preparation for an eventual merger.794
789 For more details on the Royaumont Process see Hinkova, 2002, pp. 12-3; 
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/shtonova.pdf
790 Ibid.
791 For more details on SECI see Schifter, 1998.
792 Ibid.
793 http ://www.secinet.org/index.php‘?BswAgenda=l&scat=0&Tcat=94&doclD=407.
794 http ://www.secinet.org/index.php?BswAgenda=l&Scat=0&Tcat=94&docID=364: 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/whois/busek.htm:
http://www.secinet.org/index.php?BswAgenda=l&Scat=0Tcat=94&docID=424.
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The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was a complex political project shaped 
by the EU after the Kosovo conflict in spring 1999 and officially launched at a 
conference in Cologne, Germany, convened by the German government, which held 
the EU presidency at the time. The conference included Foreign Ministers of the EC 
countries, the G8, Southeast European states, and representatives of the OSCE, the 
Council of Europe, UN, NATO, the World Bank, the IMF, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
other institutions.795 The aim of the Stability Pact was to become a mechanism 
replacing the policy of reactive crisis intervention in South-Eastern Europe, of 
comprehensive long-term conflict prevention policy to ensure permanent peace, 
economic prosperity and stability in South-Eastern Europe.796 This it was believed 
would be achieved through the implementation of regional projects involving all the 
participants in the Pact. Each project was overseen by a special committee, known 
also as a ‘Working Table’, whose task was to monitor the progress of the projects. 
Working Table I monitors projects related to democratization and human rights and 
focuses on issues such as inter-ethnic dialogue, cross border cooperation, refugees, the 
media, education and youth issues.797 Working Table II manages projects related to 
economic reconstruction, development, the infrastructure, trade and investment. 
Working Table III is concerned with projects relating to security issues such as 
demobilization of army personnel, small arms control, police training, organised 
crime, corruption, etc. All three Working Tables are coordinated by the Regional
795 For more details about the Stability Pact for South-East Europe see Phinnemore & Siani-Davies, 
2003; Hinkova, 2002, pp. 16-20; Becker &Jurkeit, 2001; Seideneck, 2000; Gavranovic, 2001; Meurs, 
2000.
796 http://www.stabilitvpact.org/stabilitv-pactcgi/catalog/cat descr.cgi?prod id=1806
797 Phinnemore & Davies, 2003, p. 176.
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Table, which is chaired by a Special Coordinator and meets annually at the year 
end.798
Despite the active involvement of many Balkan states in these political initiatives, 
they had mainly been conceived and promoted by actors outside the Balkan region. 
The reasons that the Bulgarian political elite was keen on Sofia’s involvement in these 
political initiatives were the practical economic gains from infrastructure projects on 
Bulgarian soil, and because these initiatives were supported by powerful international 
actors such as the EU and the USA, opting out of them might have led the West to 
question the level of Bulgaria’s democratization, and deny its accession to the EU and 
NATO. Sofia’s participation in these initiatives was seen as offering the opportunity, 
through projects aiming at modernizing the country’s judicial system and the public 
sector, to entrench democratic norms in Bulgarian society and state, and thus 
consolidate the country’s post-1989 democratic system. And finally, for some 
members of the Bulgarian political elite, taking part in initiatives with the political 
and economic support of the W est gave some reassurance that Bulgaria was becoming 
accepted into the Western world.
Bulgaria’s Post-1989 Security Vacuum and its Effect on Sofia’s Balkan Policy 
after the End of the Cold War
If neither Bulgaria’s economic weakness nor democratization explains the country’s 
foreign policy towards the Balkans, then what was it that influenced it? It could be 
argued that Sofia’s post-1989 Balkan policy was greatly influenced by the security
798 Ibid.
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Bulgaria’s loyalty to Moscow earned it the military protection of the Soviet bloc 
which guaranteed territorial integrity against military attacks from its Balkan 
neighbours for almost fifty years after the end of WWII.804
The dissolution of the Soviet bloc after 1989 deprived Bulgaria of the economic 
subsidies and the huge trade markets which had fed the Bulgarian industrial economy 
and had sustained the relatively high living standards of the Bulgarian population for 
the previous forty-five years. The loss of the economic benefits which Bulgaria’s 
participation in the communist bloc had brought was compounded by the collapsing 
economy, which could not be sustained for systemic reasons. The country was 
plunged into an acute economic crisis with high levels of inflation and 
unemployment. The economic crisis threatened to undermine the social peace that 
Bulgaria had enjoyed for much of the post-WWII period. Also it occurred at a time 
when the ethnic tensions caused by Zhivkov’s policy of assimilating the Bulgarian 
Turks into the ethnic majority were still healing, and thus could have produced more 
tensions, thus posing a direct threat to Bulgaria’s territorial integrity.
After 1989 Bulgaria was left without any patron state or institutional structure to 
protect it. In July 1991 the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet bloc’s military branch, was 
dissolved followed by the Soviet Union in December 1991. The Russian federation, 
which appeared to be the strongest of the successor states of the Soviet Union, was 
both unable and unwilling to commit itself to political or military projects such as 
guaranteeing Bulgaria’s national security. Post-Soviet Russia, despite the huge and 
powerful military might inherited from the Soviet Union, was facing acute economic
804 Ashley, 1989;
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problems and there were secessionist political movements on its territory which did 
not allow Moscow to become engaged in large scale economic or military 
commitments outside its borders.
However, in the volatile post-1989 political environment of the Balkan region 
Bulgaria’s national security was at high risk. Apart from acute economic problems 
and ethnic tensions, Sofia also had to cope with a war in neighbouring Yugoslavia 
which threatened to destabilize the whole Balkan region and created conditions for a 
flourishing black-market, and with the increased military might of its two NATO 
neighbours, Greece and Turkey. The Bulgarian army had always been weaker than 
those of neighbouring NATO countries, and the lack of any outside support meant 
that in the event of a military attack from either Greece or Turkey, it would be unable 
to defend itself.805 This military imbalance increased after 1989 because part of 
NATO’s weaponry from the north-west European member states of NATO such as 
Germany and France was either transferred or sold to Greece and Turkey.806
The solution to all this seemed to be integration into Euro-Atlantic political, economic 
and military institutions,807 which would also give access to Western economic 
funding and technical know-how, and would help Bulgaria to overcome its economic 
crisis and secure long-term economic development and stability. Integration with 
Euro-Atlantic institutions would also protect territorial integrity by improving the 
operational capacities of the Bulgarian army and through the security guarantees that 
the legal documentation of these institutions provide to member states. Such 
guarantees include security clauses which bind NATO member states to offering
805 Dimitrov, 2001b, p. 96; Zhivkov, 1993, pp. 150-1.
806 Mitkov, 1994; Pavlov, 1995, pp. 21-22; Nikova, 1998, p. 285;
807 Bell, 1998; Lefebvre, 1995, p.453.
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political, economic or military assistance to other NATO member states. Furthermore, 
Sofia would belong to the same security organisation as neighbouring Greece and 
Turkey, which would theoretically reduce the risk of conflict with these two states.
Accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions was a long-term political process conditioned 
on Bulgaria’s fulfilling certain political and economic criteria. This process has come 
to affect every aspect of Bulgarian politics, including foreign policy making, and 
particularly in three areas explaining the desire for regional stability and cooperation. 
The three areas of Sofia’s post-1989 foreign policy affected by the process of 
Bulgaria’s accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions are discussed in detail below: a) 
Bulgaria’s territorial policy towards its Balkan neighbours; b) Bulgaria’s policy 
towards ethnic minorities in its territory and Bulgarian ethnic minorities abroad; c) 
Sofia’s diplomatic activity in the Balkan region.808
Bulgaria's Post-1989 Territorial Policy towards its Balkan Neighbours
After the end of the Cold W ar Bulgaria remained faithful to the territorial policy that 
the country’s communist regime had followed. It renounced any territorial claims on 
its neighbours and recognized the status quo formulated at the end of WWII. 
Territorial claims against neighbouring Balkan states could have involved Bulgaria in 
military conflicts similar to those that Milosevic’s Serbia had become embroiled in 
with neighbouring Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.809 The Bulgarian state economy 
was in crisis and too weak to fund large-scale military operations, while the country’s 
military lacked the technical ability to conduct a successful military action.
808 Bokova, 1996, pp. 22-23.
809 Thomas, 1999.
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Even more important was the fact that any territorial claims against Bulgaria’s Balkan 
neighbours would have undermined the prospects of Bulgaria’s being integrated into 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. Through bilateral and multilateral meetings between 
Bulgarian officials and their European or American counterparts the latter insisted 
that any East European state with territorial claims against its neighbours had no place 
in the institutions which these European and American officials represented.810
The official documentation of these institutions emphasized that Bulgaria should 
followed a constructive policy towards the Balkan region by scrapping any territorial 
claims and by seeking peaceful solutions to any bilateral or multilateral problems. The 
EC’s opinion on Bulgaria’s application for membership of the EU issued in July 1997, 
almost 18 months after Bulgaria’s application for EU membership, in the section on 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy emphasized that Sofia should have no 
territorial disputes with any member state of the Union or with Romania, and praised 
Sofia for following a constructive foreign policy towards the Balkan region.811
Some territorial issues remained unresolved, such as the demarcation of the 
continental shelf and of the boundaries at the mouth of the Mutludere-Rezovska river 
at the southeast frontiers between Bulgaria and Turkey. However, these did not pose 
any serious problems to Sofia’s relations with either Ankara or Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. Bilateral relations with Turkey had continually improved after 1989 as a 
result of the Bulgarian authorities’ decision to restore Muslim names to the Bulgarian
810 An anonymous European diplomat, personal interview, 25/1/2002; Moore, Roderick, personal 
interview, 16/1/2002; Zhelev, Zheliu, personal interview, 7/1/2002; Minchev, Chavdar, personal 
interview, 15/11/2001; Popova, Svetla, personal interview, 16/1/2002; Dimitrov, Boiko, personal 
interview, 24/1/2002; Abadzhiev, Dimitur, personal interview, 30/11/2001; Ilchev, Stanimir, personal 
interview, 7/12/2001; Mladenov, Nikolai, personal interview, 7/12/2001; Dimitrova, Ralitsa, personal 
interview, 15/1/2002.
811 EC, 1997, pp. 76-7.
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Turks and to give a political voice to the Bulgarian Muslims in the parliament by 
giving the MRF party the right to be represented in general, Presidential and local 
elections. In addition, when the Commission’s opinion was issued, Bulgaria was 
engaged in bilateral negotiations on the territorial issues that Sofia had with Ankara.812 
The negotiations were showing positive results and led to the settlement of these 
issues, with the Bulgarian government in December 1997 signing two bilateral 
agreements with Turkey, during an official visit that the Turkish Prime Minister, 
Mesut Yilmaz, paid to Sofia.813
Three parameters guided the policies of Euro-Atlantic institutions towards EES after 
the end of the Cold War. The first is related to the philosophy underlying the 
foundations of some of these institutions, whose creation aimed at bringing an end to 
long-standing territorial claims, which had led their member states into devastating 
military conflicts in the past, and inaugurating a period of cooperation through which 
the member states would seek to solve bilateral and multilateral differences by 
peaceful means. For example, the philosophy behind the Coal and Steel Community, 
the Council of Europe and the CSCE was that European states should be helped to 
overcome the territorial conflicts of the past by enforcing recognitions of the post- 
1945 territorial status quo of the European continent, and by fostering cooperation in 
the fields of economy, politics, the military and others through their participation in 
the activities of these institutions.814
813 http://www.hri.org/news/turkev/trkpr/1997/97-12-05.trkpr.html#04: 
http://www.rferl.Org/features/1997/12/f.ru.971210145649.asp
814 Van Ham, 1993, pp. 15-51.
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The second referred to the territorial policies of EES after 1989 which was related to 
protection of their territorial integrity. Any challenge to the territorial status quo of 
Eastern Europe it was thought would drive the states of that region into endless 
military conflict which would have serious political, economic and social implications 
for the member states of these institutions and might challenge the territorial status 
quo of the whole European continent by drawing even member states of the Euro- 
Atlantic institutions into conflict.
The principle of protection of the territorial status quo of EES was challenged only on 
a few occasions during the first half of the 1990s, such as during the dissolution of the 
USSR, Czechoslovakia and the Yugoslav Federation with the official recognition of 
FYROM, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, formerly constituent parts of the 
Yugoslav Federation, as independent states. But even in these cases the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions recognized the independence of component Republics of the previously 
mentioned federal states and did not seek to redraw the borders of the federal 
constituent republics by encouraging ethnic groups to create new states.
The third parameter is related to how foreign policy decisions in Euro-Atlantic 
institutions such as the EU and NATO are taken, which gives the right to member 
states of these institutions to veto foreign policy decisions whenever they deem them 
to be against their national interests. A number of policy-makers in the EU and NATO 
felt that the historical example of Greece and Turkey, two states with territorial 
differences that became member states of NATO in 1952, showed that offering 
membership to states nurturing territorial claims against other states would seriously 
affect the smooth functioning of the institutions. These states could abuse their rights
345
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
to veto foreign policy decisions whenever they viewed that foreign policy decisions of 
these institutions favoured the national interests of states against which they had 
territorial claims. Furthermore, membership for states harbouring territorial claims 
against other states would lead Euro-Atlantic institutions to become involved in 
solving the territorial differences of these states. Such involvement would require the 
otherwise unnecessary deployment of diplomatic personnel and efforts on the part of 
the Euro-Atlantic institutions.
In addition, through their membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions, states with 
territorial claims against other states would gain access to the decision-making bodies 
of these institutions and, thus, have the potential to influence the foreign policy of 
these institutions in a particular state’s favour. Such influence would undermine the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions stated policy of remaining independent about international 
issues and, thus, would undermine the credibility and the international status of these 
institutions.
Bulgaria did observe the rules set by Euro-Atlantic institutions and, like its 
communist predecessors during the Cold War, Sofia’s political authorities after 1989 
did not challenge the territorial status quo of the Balkan region. Even when the map of 
the Balkan region changed as a result of the war in neighbouring Yugoslavia, Bulgaria 
resisted making any territorial claims against its neighbours and acknowledged the 
territorial status quo of the nation states that had resulted from the dissolution of the 
pre-1989 Yugoslav Federation.
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Bulgaria was the first country to recognize FYROM as an independent nation state 
once the state authorities in Skopje proclaimed independence from the Yugoslav 
Federation in December 1991,815 despite the fact that previously the Bulgarian 
authorities had questioned the existence of any distinct Macedonian nation in the 
Balkan region. Indeed, according to the official policy of almost all Bulgarian 
governments since the end of the 19th century there was no Macedonian nation in the 
Balkan region and all the people who called themselves Macedonians were 
Bulgarians and the language that they spoke was a dialect of the Bulgarian 
language.816
Sofia’s decision in January 1992 to recognize FYROM under its constitutional name 
of the Republic of Macedonia did not conflict with the policy of the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. Some such as NATO did not have a policy on recognition, while others 
such as the EU did not view Bulgaria’s decision to recognize FYROM as Republic of 
Macedonia as something that would damage Sofia’s relations with other EU member 
states. In fact, most EU member states would probably also have recognized FYROM 
under its constitutional name, if Greece had not objected so strongly, arguing that the 
name Macedonia implied territorial claims on the northern Greek province of 
Macedonia and constituted a usurpation of what the Greeks saw as part of their 
particular history and culture.817 Official recognition by EU member states of FYROM 
as the Republic of Macedonia would have upset relations with Greece and might have
815 Zhelev, 1998, pp. 151-18l;Georgiev & Tsenkov, 1993, pp. 5-20; Alexandrov et al., 1997, pp. 71-3; 
for a different view see Lefebvre, 1995, pp. 457-460; Borden Savova-Mahon, 2001, pp. 415-420; for a 
general overview on Greece’s, Bulgaria’s and FRY’s policies on the name issue of FYROM see 
Poulton, 1995, 177-178.
816 Jelavich, 1983, Vol. 2, pp. 89-100, 255-6, 272-3, 317-8; Engstrom, 2002; Georgiev & Tsenkov,
1993, pp. l-4;Tsevkov, 1993, pp. 280-2; Braun, 1983, pp. 219-224; Poulton, 1995, pp. 48-143; 
appendix, map 6.
8 7 This is because the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia, to which FYROM traced its ancient origins, 
was claimed by Greeks as being Greek and, therefore, was deemed to be part of the national history of 
the Modern Greek state. See Michas, 2002, pp. 42-6, 126-7.
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destabilized the whole Balkan region by leading the Greek authorities to resort to 
extreme political measures to force the political authorities in FYROM to remove the 
term Macedonia from the constitutional name of their country.818
By recognizing FYROM under its constitutional name, Sofia mainly aimed to show 
the West that Bulgaria had overcome its past irredentism by denouncing territorial 
claims on a region which Bulgaria’s authorities used to see as Bulgarian and had 
sought to incorporate into the Bulgarian state.819 This was seen by the Bulgarian 
authorities as being important for the country, because it would help Bulgaria to foster 
strong political and economic relations with the Western world in the medium term 
and overcome the problem of national security. In addition, fostering strong relations 
with the Western world was seen as the first step towards the country’s membership 
of powerful Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the EU.
In addition, the decision to recognize FYROM as an independent state can also be 
explained by the fact that the Bulgarian authorities viewed the existence of an 
independent Macedonian Republic on Bulgaria’s borders as preferable for Bulgaria’s 
national security than a federal republic under Belgrade’s political control, as had 
been the situation with the Macedonian state during communism, or a state partitioned 
between Greece and Milosevic’s Serbia, which might revive the military conflicts 
between Balkan states of the early 20th century.820 This led the Bulgarian authorities to 
follow a policy of protecting the territorial integrity of FYROM. The Bulgarian
818 Michas, 2002, pp. 47-56, 60-61; Kofos, 2001, pp. 234-256.
819 Alexandrov et al., 1997, pp. 7-3; Georgiev & Tsenkov, 1993, pp. 15-9; Zhelev, Zheliu, personal 
interview, 7/1/2002; Todorov, Vurban, personal interview, 20/12/2001; Todorov, Antoni, personal 
interview, 3/12/2001; Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001; Minchev, Ognian, personal 
interview, 2/11/2001; Kiuranov, Deian, personal interview, 4/12/2001;
820 Giatzidis, 2002, p. 152; Minchev, Ognian, personal interview, 2/11/2001; Zhelev, Zheliu, personal 
interview, 7/1/2002.
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President, Zheliu Zhelev, used his influence with the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin 
to persuade Yeltsin also to recognize FYROM as an independent state.821 Zhelev was 
the first head of state to visit Macedonia in February 1993, and Bulgaria offered 
assistance to the Macedonian state on two occasions. The first was at the time of 
Greece’s trade blockade on FYROM in the mid-1990s when Sofia offered the Black 
Sea port of Burgas for the trading of goods and fuel with FYROM.822 The second was 
during NATO’s bombing of Serbia in spring 1999, when the Bulgarian state offered 
FYROM economic assistance such as tents, food and personnel in order to help the 
Macedonian state accommodate the huge number of Albanian refugees fleeing to 
FYROM from Kosovo.823
Bulgaria’s recognition of FYROM as an independent state, however, was 
overshadowed by statements from the country’s authorities who rushed to clarify that 
this recognition should not be interpreted by the political authorities of Skopje as 
Bulgaria’s recognition of a distinct Macedonian nation in the Balkan region. The 
Bulgarian authorities staunchly supported the political position of the past, according 
to which a Macedonian nation in the Balkan region with its own language and history 
did not exist.
These statements were designed to placate the more nationalist elements within the 
Bulgarian electorate, the majority of whom were political supporters of both the UDF 
government and President Zheliu Zhelev. This part of the electorate had been 
unhappy about the decision to recognize FYROM as an independent state, because 
they felt that in doing so, Sofia had sold out what they saw as Bulgarian historical and
821 Zhelev, Zheliu, personal interview, 7/1/2002; Zhelev, 1998, pp. 161-166.
822 Giatzidis, 2002, p. 152.
823 http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/99-14/03-14-1 .htm.
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cultural rights in the region, by which they meant FYROM’s incorporation into the 
Bulgarian state at some point.
In addition, the statements came as an attempt on the part of the Bulgarian state to 
forestall the political authorities in Skopje from challenging Bulgaria’s territorial 
integrity by demanding that the authorities in Sofia recognize the existence of a 
Macedonian minority in Bulgarian territory.824 Indeed, since the creation of the 
modem Macedonian state at the end of WWII, Skopje had claimed ethnic kinship 
with a large number of slavophone people living mainly in the Macedonian region of 
Pirin in south-western Bulgaria and asked that the political authorities in Sofia 
recognize these people as ethnic Macedonians.825 However, due to the Bulgarian 
political authorities’ persistent refusal to recognize the existence of a Macedonian 
nation in the Balkans, Sofia had easily rebuffed all these claims.826 Indeed, Zhelev on 
many occasions stated publicly that Bulgaria did not recognize the existence of either 
a Macedonian nation in the Balkan region or a Macedonian minority in Bulgarian 
territory.827
Although this refusal to recognize the existence of a Macedonian identity did not 
imply any Bulgarian territorial claims on FYROM, it quickly damaged the positive 
impressions that Sofia’s recognition of FYROM ’s political independence had initially 
made on Skopje and on the international community. Instead of leading to an 
improvement in bilateral relations, Sofia’s decision kept official Bulgarian-
824 Giatzidis, 2002, p. 152.
825 Poulton, 1991, pp. 107-111; Poulton, 1995, pp.148-159.
826 Ibid.
827 Poulton, 1995, p. 160.
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Macedonian relations in a state of disruption throughout the 1990s.828 Bulgaria’s 
refusal to recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian nation increased political 
tension between the authorities of the two states, who often exchanged vitriolic 
political statements and comments through the press and the mass media. The 
common denominator in all these statements and comments was the request of 
Macedonian political leaders for Sofia’s recognition of their nation and language, and 
of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria while the Bulgarians demanded that the 
Macedonian authorities recognize the existence of a Bulgarian minority in FYROM.829
What was most important was that Sofia’s refusal to recognize the existence of a 
distinct Macedonian nation prevented either side from concluding 22 bilateral 
economic and cultural agreements.820 The Macedonian side wanted the agreements to 
be translated into both Macedonian and Bulgarian, which the Bulgarian side refused 
also refusing to include interpreters in the negotiations lest this be seen as an 
acknowledgement of the existence of a distinct Macedonian language and thus a 
Macedonian nation.831 The deadlock in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations was overcome 
only after the intervention of the EU and the USA which led the two parties to enter 
bilateral negotiations on the language issue, which concluded with the signing of a 
common declaration by the governments of Bulgaria and FYROM in February 1999. 
According to this declaration, Bulgaria and FYROM stated that they had no territorial 
claims against each other, and that they recognized the official language of the other
828 Unofficially, though, Bulgarian-Macedonian relations seem to have been much better and this is due 
to the fact that since February 1994, Greece officially introduced a unilateral economic embargo on 
FYROM -  in fact, the embargo had been in force without being declared since 1992, which meant 
FYROM had to redirect its trade through Albania and Bulgaria. See Center for the Study of 
Democracy, 2002, pp. 17-18, 20-21.
829 http://www.macedoniainfo.com/buletin/msi04/msi 1 bul.htm
830 http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/44-98/34-44-l.htm.
831 Drezov, 2001, p. 51; Williams, 2000, p. 29; Engstrom, 2002.
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as the language stipulated by the constitutions of the two states and, in this way, 
Bulgaria recognized implicitly the existence of a Macedonian language, while Skopje 
implicitly acknowledged that Macedonians living in Bulgaria were Bulgarian 
citizens,who could not be exploited to challenge Bulgaria’s territorial integrity.832 The 
outcome of these negotiations over the language issue was also facilitated by the fact 
that, at the time of negotiations, the Macedonian government was controlled by the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party for Macedonian 
National Unity (IMRO-DPMNU) which had won the general elections of 1998. 
IMRO-DPMNU was closer to the Bulgarian position on the Macedonian language 
than the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM), which had been in power 
until 1998, mainly due to the strong political links that IMRO-DPMNU had 
developed with Bulgarian political parties such as the Bulgarian IMRO and the UDF, 
through which it sought to oppose to what it saw as the pro-Yugoslav foreign policy 
of the SDUM.833
The settlement of the language dispute put an end to a major problem in official 
Bulgarian-Macedonian interstate relations, allowed the two sides to resume all the 
stalled agreements, and opened up the prospect for further political, economic and 
cultural cooperation at the interstate level.834 After the joint declaration on the 
language issue, Bulgaria following the earlier examples of Greece and Turkey, who 
had donated part of their decommissioned weaponry to Skopje, donated $3.5m worth 
of decommissioned weaponry to FYROM.835
832 http://www.omda.bo/engl/news/comment/madedonia.htm: http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/99-06/10- 
06-1-htm; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/44-98/32-44-l.htm ; Synovitz, 1999;Giatzidis, 2002, p. 153.
833 Perry, 1998, pp. 241-2; http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/44-98/32-44-l.htm.
834 Giatzidis, 2002, p. 153.
835 Ibid.
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Bulgaria’s renunciation of any territorial claims against neighbouring Balkan states 
was included in a series of official documents which defined the framework of the 
country’s foreign and military policies after 1989 including the National Security 
Concept of 1995, which was replaced by the National Security Concept of April 1998, 
and the Military Doctrine of April 1999 among others.836 These policy documents 
were drafted with the help of diplomats and military officials from the member states 
of the EU and NATO and their content was modeled on the content of NATO and EU 
member states’ documentation.837 Thus, all Bulgarian foreign and military policy 
documents cited above asserted that Bulgaria did not regard any country or group of 
countries as rivals nor did it have any territorial claims against other states.838 In 
addition, these documents defined the legal framework through which the Bulgarian 
military would evolve into a modem army under full civilian control, whose main 
purpose would be the defence, and not the expansion, of the post-1945 territorial 
borders of the Bulgarian state.839
Apart from Sofia’s official territorial policy towards neighbouring Balkan states, 
Bulgaria’s process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions also diminished 
the scope of public influence for political factions and individual political activists 
with irredentist views. They could not suggest any realistic plan for how their views 
could be realized without serious economic or other costs to the country. After 1989,
836 Dimitrov, 2001b, p. 102; Dimitrov, 2002,32-35; National Assembly XXXVIII, 1998, pp. 89-95; 
Council of Ministers o f the Republic of Bulgaria, 1998; Council o f Ministers o f the Republic of 
Bulgaria, 1995; Council of Ministers o f the Republic of Bulgaria, 1993; Callaghan et al., 2000, pp. 68- 
9; Bozhinova, Tzvetana, ‘National Security Concept Has No Political Hue’ in Foreign Broadcast 
International Service (FBIS), FBIS-EEU-95-160, 18/8/1995, p. 4;Rachev, Valeri, personal 
interview, 16/1/2002; Behar, Nasen, personal interview, 16/1/2002.
837 Rachev, Valeri, personal interview, 16/1/2002; Behar, Nasen, personal interview, 16/1/2002.
838 Dimitrov, 2001b, p. 102; Dimitrov, 2002, 32-35; National Assembly XXXVIII, 1998, pp. 89-95; 
Council of Ministers o f the Republic of Bulgaria, 1998; Callaghan et al., 2000, pp. 68-9; Rachev, 
Valeri, personal interview,16/1/2002; Behar, Nasen, personal interview, 16/1/2002.
839 Ibid.
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Bulgaria lacked the necessary economic and military means to impose these views, 
while at the international level, no international body was willing to back its claims.
Bulgaria’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions it was hoped would improve the 
living standards of Bulgarian citizens and boost the country’s military capabilities so 
that it could defend itself against any military attacks. This view was shared by an 
increasing part of the Bulgarian public, which came to support the prospect of 
Bulgaria joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions as reflected in the many opinion polls 
that were published in the 1990s, which showed that support for some institutions
such as the EU had reached 70% at the end of 1990s.840
Bulgaria’s Minority Policies
Bulgaria’s post-1989 democratization process affected Sofia’s policies towards ethnic 
minorities.841 For many members of the Bulgarian political elite and the public, the 
process included Bulgaria’s membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as the EU 
or the Council of Europe, which was conditioned on the protection of minority rights. 
The protection of human rights and minority groups was provided for in the
Association Agreement that Bulgaria signed with the EU in March 1993 and
constituted one of the main criteria for EU membership of EES set by the Copenhagen 
European Council in June 1993 and also applied to Bulgaria’s membership of Euro- 
Atlantic organisations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe.842
840 Appendix, tables 34, 35,47, 48, 37, 49, 6 la-6 lb.
841 For a general overview on Sofia’s policies towards the Bulgarian ethnic and religious minorities 
during the post-communist period see Kanev, 1998, pp. 80-9; Zheliaskova, 1998, pp. 165-187; 
Zheliaskova et al., 1997.
842 Papadimitriou, 2002, pp. 137-145; http://www.europa.eu.int/Comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm; 
appendix, pp. 5-13.
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Since Bulgaria’s minority policies had been a source of political and military friction 
with neighbouring Balkan states in the past, any influence on these policies was going 
to have political repercussions on Sofia’s relations with neighbouring Balkan states. 
In seeking to protect the human rights of Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities, Euro-Atlantic 
institutions such as the EU or the Council of Europe assumed a role, which in the past 
was mainly taken by neighbouring Balkan states and, in doing so, these institutions 
removed potential sources of political and military conflicts between Bulgaria and its 
Balkan neighbours. This role was to monitor the political, economic and social life of 
ethnic minorities in Bulgaria and intervene whenever it was considered that minority 
rights were not being respected by asking the Bulgarian authorities to take political 
measures to improve the living conditions of ethnic minorities and bring them up to 
the standards determined in the legal documents of these institutions, including 
multilateral treaties, conventions and declarations.
Both Sofia, and Bulgaria’s neighbouring states, recognized Euro-Atlantic institutions 
as reliable guarantors of Bulgaria’s minority rights and, this recognition established 
the preconditions for avoidance of political or military conflicts over minority issues 
with the countries of the Balkan region. For Bulgaria’s Balkan neighbours, non­
recognition of the Euro-Atlantic institutions’ role as protectors of the minority rights 
of Bulgarian ethnic minorities would bring them into conflict with these institutions 
and, thus, harm any future prospects of membership for them. In addition, non­
recognition of the Euro-Atlantic institutions’ role in protecting the minority rights of 
what they saw as kin ethnic groups in Bulgaria would confront these states with the 
difficult task of assuming this role themselves which would doubtless have affected
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their bilateral relations with Bulgaria, the stability of the Balkan region as a whole, 
and the economic prosperity of their own populations. Sofia did not accept that any 
neighbouring state had the right to intervene in its internal affairs to the extent that 
Euro-Atlantic institutions have intervened since 1989.
Through their active involvement in Bulgaria’s minority policies since 1989, the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions paved the way for improving the living conditions of 
Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities and avoided large-scale ethnic tensions that could have 
led Bulgaria into political and military conflicts with neighbouring states. This is not 
to say that the absence of ethnic tensions in post-Cold War Bulgaria should be 
interpreted as an indication that minority rights were completely respected after 1989. 
On the contrary, official reports issued by institutions such as the EC or NGOs such as 
Helsinki Human Rights Watch point to the fact that there were serious problems in 
relation to minority rights and that Bulgaria had a long way to go to meet the 
standards set by international institutions such as the EU. Such reports point to 
problems such as the constitutional ban on the formation of Bulgarian political parties 
on an ethnic basis, discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities by 
administrations such as the Bulgarian police and the high unemployment faced by 
ethnic and religious minorities.843 While unemployment for Bulgarians ranged
843 http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Helsinki-06.htm:
http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/europe/bulgaria.html: http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Eca-05.htm: 
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe6.html: EC, 1997, pp. 18-20; Koinova, 1999;
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportl998/bu en.pdf;
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportl999/bu en.pdf:
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2000/bu en.pdf:
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/bu en.pdf;
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/bu en.pdf:
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2003/bu en.pdf:
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between 10% and 15% throughout the 1990s, for the ethnic and religious minorities 
unemployment sometimes reached 25% to 30%.844
However, none of these problems could hide the fact that the process of Bulgaria’s 
integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions since 1989, along with the greater 
involvement of these institutions in the country’s internal political affairs, had set the 
political conditions for a gradually improving political and social environment for 
Bulgarian ethnic and religious minorities. The process of Bulgaria’s accession to 
institutions such as the EU or the Council of Europe had led Sofia to gradually adapt 
its legal system regarding the country’s ethnic minorities to the norms, practices and 
legal provisions provided by the legal frameworks of these institutions. Through such 
adaptation institutions such as the EU or the Council of Europe hoped to create a 
more liberal political environment for ethnic and religious minorities in Bulgaria, 
which would allow these minorities to participate more actively in the policy 
decision-making process and offer them equal opportunities. As a result of Bulgaria’s 
legal system being adapted to the legal framework of institutions such as the EU and 
the Council of Europe, Sofia incorporated into Bulgaria’s legal documentation the 
Framework Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of National 
Minorities in October 1997 and passed laws concerning the establishment of a 
National Council for Ethnic and Demographic Affairs with the participation of 
political representatives of the government and of the major Bulgarian minority 
groups, which aimed to promote policies of tolerance and understanding between the 
various ethnic and religious groups in the country .845
844 Koinova, 1999, p. 150.
845 http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportl999/bu en.pdf: 
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportl998/bu en.pdf.
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It could be argued that laws alone cannot improve the political, economic and social 
conditions of minorities. Practice matters and issues such as stereotypes nurtured by 
both the country’s authorities and the ethnic majority in relations to Bulgarian ethnic 
and religious minorities, need to be overcome. Stereotyping was one of the main 
sources of discrimination and violation of human rights. For example, ethnic 
minorities such as Roma have often been victims of the negative stereotypes bestowed 
on them by both the authorities and ethnic Bulgarians. There have been frequent 
clashes between ethnic Bulgarians and Roma in mixed population regions, and 
between members of the Roma ethnic groups and the Bulgarian police. There have 
been cases of arson, and of Romas being beaten by ethnic Bulgarians; there have been 
arbitrary arrests and threats from the Bulgarian police.846 In addition, a series of 
segregation policies have resulted in Roma being forced to live in ghetto-style 
economically downgraded regions, Roma children receiving poor education, Roma 
conscripts being made to serve in the construction and labour corps, and Roma not 
being allowed to join the police force.
However, this negative stereotyping takes time to overcome. The process of adapting 
Bulgaria’s legal system to the legal framework of institutions such as the EU or the 
Council of Europe is only a first step in this direction in creating a different legal 
environment for minorities, but in the long run it is expected to produce a positive 
outcome. At the very least, this process of adaptation has created expectations among 
the EU, Bulgarian minorities and their neighbouring kin-states that Bulgaria’s 
accession to the EU and the Council of Europe will improve conditions for minorities
846 Kanev, 1998, p. 87; http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Helsinki-06.htm-. 
http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/europe/bulgaria.html;
http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/europe/bulgaria.html: http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Eca-05.htm.
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in Bulgaria, and these expectations have been enough to ease ethnic tensions and curb 
political and military conflicts between Bulgaria and its Balkan neighbours.
Sofia’s process of accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions has also entailed a series 
of economic and social projects which have been funded by these institutions and 
implemented by the Bulgarian authorities in partnership with NGOs. These projects 
have had an immediate effect on the social life of Bulgarian minorities and set the 
conditions for their smooth integration into post-Cold War Bulgarian society, a 
necessary precondition for the avoidance of ethnic tensions in the future.
One such project is the so-called framework programme for the integration of the 
Roma minority into Bulgarian society, adopted by the Bulgarian government in April 
1999 and funded by the EU.847 The programme involved extensive consultations 
between the Bulgarian government and Roma organisations and human rights NGOs 
leading to the establishment of core principles and general measures to fight 
discrimination and unemployment, increased levels of education and health care, 
improved housing conditions, and the cultural protection of the Roma minority, as 
well as increased access to the national media.848 This framework programme also 
envisages the establishment of a National Committee for Prevention of Discrimination 
whose tasks would be to monitor cases of discrimination against Roma in Bulgaria’s 
public and private sectors, and report these cases to the Bulgarian authorities to allow 
administrative and judicial measures to be taken.849
847 http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportl999/bu en.pdf. pp. 15-16.
848 Ibid.
849 Ibid.
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Bulgaria’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions has also led Sofia to take 
political measures aimed at improving minority political and social life. These 
measures have been either the result of political pressures exercised by officials of 
these institutions or an effort by the Bulgarian authorities to conform to the political 
standards set by these institutions in the hope that such compliance would help 
Bulgaria to become a member state. Thus, for instance, the decision at the beginning 
of the 1990s to recognize the MRF, a political party whose supporters and political 
cadres are largely members of the Bulgarian Muslim minority, as eligible to stand in 
general, Presidential and local elections was mainly the result of political pressures 
from European and American officials who pointed out that non-recognition of the 
MRF could lead to ethnic strife with the Bulgarian Muslims and would undermine the 
country’s prospects for future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.850
In addition, the political tolerance shown by Bulgarian authorities in relation to the 
political and social activities of ethnic Macedonians living in the region of Pirin since 
the end of the 1990s comes in sharp contrast to the measures taken in the past to 
restrict their activities. For example, while up until the end of the 1990s meetings of
850 See article 11, item 4 of the post-Cold War Bulgarian Constitution on 
http://www.online.bg/law/const/constD.htm; Melone, 1998, pp. 74-76. Due to political pressure from 
European and American officials and in order to secure the orderliness o f the elections as well as the 
acceptance o f their legitimacy by the country’s Muslims the Central Electoral Committee (CEC) in the 
1990 general elections asked its district electoral commissions to register candidates nominated by the 
MRF, even though in the past Sofia’s district court had refused to register the MRF as a political party. 
The MRF’s registration as a political organisation, and not as a political party, was sufficient to allow 
its participation in the general elections of June 1990. The CEC decision was also justified by the 
numerous pledges given by the MRF leadership that their party was not an ethnic party because, apart 
from Bulgarian Turks, it included ethnic Bulgarians, Jews and Roma among its members. Although the 
legal basis of the CEC’s ruling was shaky and it drew protests from BSP members, as well as from a 
large section of the Bulgarian public, the decision has been used as the legal foundation for rulings 
taken by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, which rejected petitions submitted to it by BSP members 
that requested a ban on MRF political activities on the basis that it was a political organisations formed 
on an ethnic basis, which contravened the provisions of article 11 of the post-1989 Bulgarian 
constitution. See Poulton, 1991, pp. 166-168; Melone, 1998, pp. 74-76, 277-8; http://www.b- 
info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-12/dec27.bta; http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria- 
macedonians.PDF; Melone, 1994; Melone, 1997; Bell, 1997, p. 366; Kanev, 1998, p. 84.
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the Macedonian minority were prohibited or dispersed, more recently there have been 
signs of greater toleration.851 For example, on 21 April 2002, for the first time post- 
1989, members of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria were allowed to gather 
peacefully at Rozhen monastery in the region of Pirin, in order to celebrate the 
anniversary of the death in 1915 of the Macedonian national hero, Jane Sandanski.852
This relaxation on the part of the Bulgarian state towards members of the country’s 
Macedonian minority was perhaps because Sofia wanted to avoid international 
criticism at a crucial time in the process of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.853 
Bulgaria applied for NATO membership and NATO’s summit of Prague in November 
2002 was to decide over Sofia’s application, while Bulgaria had been in negotiation 
for EU membership with the EC since March 2000 and any negative reports on the 
country’s human rights record in relation to ethnic or religious minorities might 
seriously disturb negotiations, membership being conditional upon the candidate state 
respecting the human rights of all its citizens.854
The process of integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions also affected Sofia’s policies 
vis-a-vis ethnic Bulgarians living in neighbouring Balkan states.855 Although the 
human rights of ethnic Bulgarian groups living in the Balkan region outside the 
borders of the Bulgarian state was a sensitive issue for the post-Cold W ar Bulgarian 
political elite, the authorities were careful about how they handled this issue lest it
851 Poulton, 1995, pp. 151-9.
852 RFE/RL, Vol. 6, No. 18, 3-5-2002.
853 Ibid.
854 Respect of human rights was one of the three main criteria for EU membership set by the European 
Council in Copenhagen in June 1993. For more details see 
http://www.europa.eu.int/Comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm
855 For a general overview o f ethnic Bulgarians living abroad see Nyagulov & Milanov, 1998.
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cause political conflicts with their country’s neighbours, which would destroy 
Bulgaria’s post-Cold War international image as a peace-loving Balkan state.
In general, the Bulgarian authorities’ preoccupation with the international image of 
their country has led them to follow a two tiered policy towards Bulgarian minorities 
living in neighbouring Balkan states. Firstly, with reference to neighbouring states 
such as Greece, the Bulgarian state has never raised the issue of human rights abuses 
of the slavophone communities living mainly in the north-western part of Greek 
Macedonia, around the regions of Fiorina and Kastoria, or the slavophone Muslim 
communities of western Thrace, known as Pomaks, either with the Greek authorities 
or in international forums.856 These communities were viewed as ethnic Bulgarians by 
the Bulgarian authorities in the past, but the Greek authorities have never officially 
recognized these communities as ethnically distinct or respected their ethnic and 
cultural rights.857 Most Greek governments since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when the regions of Greek Macedonia and western Thrace were annexed to
856 Assessing the exact population of the slavophone communities in the north-western part of Greek 
Macedonia and the Pomaks in western Thrace is problematic due to the tendency to exaggerate or 
downplaying their numbers depending which side is producing the estimates: the Greeks, the 
Bulgarians, the Macedonians, or the Turks. Estimating their numbers becomes even more problematic 
because many of the Pomaks and the slavophones o f north-western Greece do not identify themselves 
as such in censuses conducted by the Greek state, fearing administrative or other discriminatory 
measures. The main political aim of the Greeks is to assimilate the members o f these communities into 
the ethnic Greek majority - politically, economically, socially and culturally. Many slavophones of 
north-western Greek Macedonia have fled Greece to countries such as Canada, the USA and Australia, 
as a result o f discrimination against them and punishment from the Greek authorities in retaliation for 
their collaboration with the communist partisans during the Greek civil war. Best estimates suggest 
around 30,000 Pomak people (http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/pomaks.html). The national 
census of 1951, was the last official census to record the slavophones of north-western Greece as a 
distinct ethnic group, and puts their number at 47,000; various Yugoslav and Bulgarian sources 
estimate their number at between 300,000 to 350,000 people. Both these figures should be seen as 
either underestimates or overestimates. It would be safe to say that the number of slavophones living in 
that Greek region today is between 10,000 and 150,000 people. Poulton, 1991, pp. 175-180; Poulton 
1995, p. 162, 167.
857 Poulton, 1995, pp. 162-171.
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the Greek state, have followed a policy of assimilating these communities ethnically 
and culturally into Greece’s ethnic majority.838
The reason why the Bulgarian authorities seemed not to be interested in protecting the 
human rights of the Greek slavophone communities of north-western Greece and the 
Pomaks of western Thrace was not because the post-Cold W ar Bulgarian political 
elite had changed its views with regard to the ethnic origins of these people. On the 
contrary, a large part of the political elite and the public continued to view both the 
Pomaks and slavophone people living in north-western part of Greece as ethnic 
Bulgarians.859 However, any attempt by the Bulgarian state to present itself as the 
protector of an ethnic minority, the existence of which the Greek authorities did not 
officially recognize, would have brought Sofia into conflict with Greece, which was 
seen as being harmful to their prospects of joining Euro-Atlantic institutions. Being a 
full member state of both organisations, Greece had the power to hinder Bulgaria’s 
accession by vetoing decisions.860
In addition, there was also fear that if Bulgaria raised the issue of human rights abuses 
of the slavophone communities of north-western Greece, Sofia would become 
involved in political tensions with the authorities in Skopje, who claimed that the 
ethnic origin of these communities was not Bulgarian, but Macedonian and, therefore, 
FYROM and not Bulgaria had the right to be interested in the living conditions of 
these communities. This would make Sofia look like a troublemaker.861
858 Ibid; http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/bhr/english/articles/the macedonians.doc.
859 Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001; Ilchev, Stanimir, personal interview, 7/12/2001.
860 Ibid.
861 Ibid.
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In terms of neighbouring states such as the FRY where a Bulgarian minority of 
approximately 30,000 people lives in the eastern part of Serbia, around the towns of 
Tsaribrod and Bassilegrad,862 the Bulgarian authorities were more sensitive to the 
issue of minority human rights than in the case of Bulgarians living in other 
neighbouring countries, and the human rights of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia has 
on many occasions dominated the agenda of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations during the 
1990s.863 For most of the 1990s, FRY was isolated from the international community 
which made it easier for Bulgaria to raise the issue without fear of being accused of 
destabilizing the region. On many occasions, the Bulgarian authorities managed to 
gain the support of international organisations such as the UN and after appeals by the 
UDF party and NGOs in March 1995 the United Nations Commission for Human 
Rights (UNCHR) expressed its concerns for the violations of the human rights of the 
Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia and appointed Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Elizabeth 
Rehn as UN special envoys to investigate the issue.864 In their reports to the UNCHR, 
they described serious abuses, noting that the minority were refused the right to 
communicate in their mother tongue, to have their own schools and have cultural 
contacts with Bulgaria, all of which the Yugoslav authorities denied. At the 58th 
Session of the UNCHR held 10 March to 18 April 1996, the FRY delegation to the 
Commission distributed two documents which claimed that there were approximately 
3,000,000 people in Bulgaria who belonged to national minorities, including the 
Serbian minority.865 At the same time, the FRY government issued a policy paper in 
which it suggested that the people in eastern Serbia whom the Bulgarian authorities
862 Appendix, map 5.
863 FBIS-EEU-96-034, 20/2/1996, p. 9; Interview with the FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic in FBIS- 
EEU-95-085, 3/5/1995, p. 3.
864 Nikova, 1998, p. 298.
865 UNCHR, Report o f the Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki, documents: E/CN.4/157, 
paragraphs 92-97; E/CN.4/1996/9, paragraphs 111& 113; E/CN.4/1996/63, paragraph 161;
E/ CN.4/1996/125; E/CN.4/1996/142.
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viewed as a Bulgarian minority were not ethnically Bulgarian but were in fact Serbs. 
It also argued that the living conditions of the Serbian minority in Bulgaria, the 
existence of which had been unheard of until that time, was much worse than the 
living conditions of the people whom Bulgaria viewed as a Bulgarian minority in the 
eastern part of Serbia.866
Another reason why the Bulgarian authorities were more sensitive to the human rights 
of the Bulgarian minority in eastern Serbia was that the Bulgarian minority in the 
FRY had been particularly politically active, inside both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
The Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia is the only Bulgarian minority in the Balkans 
with its own Bulgarian-language weekly newspaper, Bratstvo, published in Nis.867 In 
October 1990, a political organisation, the Democratic Federation of Bulgarians in 
Yugoslavia, was established in Nis with the Bratstvo journalist Cyril Georgiev as its 
chairman.868 The organisation was set up to improve the human rights of ethnic 
Bulgarians in the FRY and in the former Republics of the Yugoslav Federation.869
The cautious way that the Bulgarian authorities handled the issue of human rights of 
Bulgarian minorities in neighbouring countries is also related to the active 
involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the EU in the domestic affairs of the 
states which wished to join it. This involvement led an increasing number of the 
Bulgarian political elite to believe that the future prospects of Balkan integration into 
international institutions such as the EU would lead to a long term improvement in the 
living conditions of the Bulgarian minorities living in neighbouring states and in the
866 Nikova, 1998, p. 298.
867 Poulton, 1991, p. 97; Nikova, 1998, 298.
868 Poulton, 1991, p. 97.
869 Ibid.
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cultural communication between these minorities and Bulgaria. As a result, a number 
of Bulgarian nationalist political groups, such as the IMRO party, which was 
preoccupied with the issue of human rights of Bulgarian minorities living in 
Bulgaria’s neighbourhood, began to acknowledge that Bulgaria’s integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic structures should be a priority for Sofia’s foreign policy.870
Sofia’s Diplomatic Activity since 1989
Through the process of accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions, Bulgaria’s post- 
1989 democratization project has influenced diplomatic activities in the Balkan 
region. In the long term, the process of accession has restricted the foreign policy 
options of Bulgarian political actors and aligned them with the policies of the Euro- 
Atlantic institutions towards the region. This alignment is more evident during the 
second half of the 1990s.
Also, since the mid-1990s, Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the EU and NATO have 
encouraged political and economic cooperation among the states of the Balkan region 
through political initiatives such as the Royaumont Process, SECI and the Stability 
Pact.871 As a result of these efforts Bulgaria has participated in a series of regional 
infrastructure projects, funded by international institutions such as the EU and the 
USA. These projects were based on neo-functionalist ideas which held that political 
relations among Balkans states could be strengthened by encouraging economic 
cooperation among them, in the same way that political relations among the states of
870 Interview with Evgeniy Ekov, secretary of IMRO, by Svetlana Tikhova, Reporter, No 7 in FB1S- 
EEU-94-063, 1 April 1994, pp. 4-5; Todorov, Antoni, personal interview, 3/12/2001.
871 See pp. 335-338 above.
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Western Europe had been strengthened, first through the creation of the Coal and 
Steel Community and later through the creation of the EEC.872
Bulgaria had been involved in a number of regional infrastructure projects since the 
mid-1990s including the European Corridor No 8 which connects the Albanian ports 
of Durres and Vlore on the Adriatic Sea with the Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea. 
This aims to provide an alternative land route between the Black and the 
Mediterranean seas in the process of easing the traffic bottlenecks and pollution in the 
Turkish Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.873 The project was conducted by 
Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM in the mid-1990s and funded by the EU ’s PHARE 
programme.874
Apart from infrastructure projects, political initiatives to encourage regional economic 
and political cooperation in the Balkans led Sofia to take political measures aimed at 
eliminating trade barriers with its neighbours. The best example is the conclusion of a 
series of FTA(s) between Bulgaria and several of its Balkan neighbours since 1998. 
These agreements were made primarily under the auspices of the Stability Pact and 
should be seen as the result of the political encouragement that the EU offered to 
candidate states in seeking the liberalization of their trade regimes through the 
conclusion of FTA(s) with either prospective EU members or states which enjoyed a 
special trade regime with the Union. The EU viewed these agreements as a first test 
for the EU candidate states in a competitive liberal trade environment.
872 Phinnemore & Siani-Davies, 2003, pp. 336-7.
873 The natural extension of the corridor in the West was the southern Italian ports and in the east the 
Black Sea ports of Odessa, Novorossiysk, Poti and Batumi. See appendix, map E7.
874 Triffonova & Kashoukeeva-Nousheva, 1999, pp. 279-283.
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In July 1998, Bulgaria became a member state of the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA), which includes Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania, and immediately after its accession, began to 
liberalize its trade in industrial and agricultural products with the other member 
states.875 In January 1999, a FTA between Bulgaria and Turkey came into force which 
provided for full liberalization of Turkish-Bulgarian trade in agricultural goods from 
2002 and for mutual trade concessions.876 Under the auspices of the Stability Pact 
Bulgaria has also concluded FTA with the FRY, Croatia and FYROM in 2001, with 
Albania in 2002, with Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia-Montenegro in 2003, and with 
Moldova in 2004. Like the agreements with Turkey and the CEFTA member states, 
the agreements which Bulgaria signed with all the former Yugoslav Republics and 
Moldova provided for a gradual liberalization of trade in agricultural and industrial 
products.
These EU and NATO efforts to encourage regional cooperation also affected 
Bulgaria’s political stance towards regional organisations such as the BSEC.877 Sofia 
was initially against the evolution of the BSEC from an intergovernmental forum to a 
regional organisation whose political decisions would be legally binding on its 
member states.878 However, in October 1998, the Bulgarian National Assembly 
ratified the Charter of the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(OBSEC), adopted by the intergovernmental BSEC summit held in June 1998 in
875 http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/30-98/18-30-l.htm
876 Ibid; http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportl999/bu en.pdf: 
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2000/bu en.pdf:
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/bu en.pdf
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/bu en.pdf
http://www.europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2003/bu en.pdf
877 Aybak, 2001, pp. 53-55.
878 Sayan, 2002, p. 30; Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001; Hinkova, Sonia, personal 
interview, 16/11/2001.
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Yalta, Ukraine, which transformed the BSEC into a regional economic organisation 
whose decisions would be legally binding on its member states.879 Participation in 
regional cooperation initiatives such as the Royaumont Process, SECI and the 
Stability Pact had established the view among large section of the Bulgaria political 
elite that both the EU and NATO were concerned with the strengthening of regional 
cooperation in the Balkans and that Bulgaria’s involvement in the political activities 
of regional organisations such as OBSEC would facilitate, rather than undermine its 
prospects of joining the EU and NATO.880
EU and NATO political initiatives after the mid-1990s to encourage regional 
cooperation in the Balkans led the Bulgarian authorities to develop more balanced 
political and economic relations with neighbouring states as a result of their concerns 
over security resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet bloc.
The choice of which states Bulgaria developed bilateral relations with at this time was 
largely determined by how the main political parties interpreted the fluid post-Cold 
War political environment. Thus, the BSP favoured bilateral relations with Greece, 
Romania and the FRY because according to the BSP leadership, Bulgaria need to 
cooperate with Balkan states that would be willing to take political and, if necessary, 
military action against Turkey’s expansionist policies in the Balkan region. By this 
the BSP meant Ankara’s efforts to assume the role of the patron state of the Balkan 
Muslim communities living outside Turkey’s territorial borders by supporting these 
communities to claim respect of their human, religious and cultural rights from the 
political authorities of the nation states in which these communities lived, such as the
879 Hinkova,2002, p. 9.
880 Sayan, 2002, p. 30; Mitreva, Rumiana, personal interview, 29/10/2001; Hinkova, Sonia, personal 
interview, 16/11/2001.
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general support which Ankara offered for Bosnian Muslims during the ethnic 
conflicts in Bosnia-Hercegovina in the mid-1990s.
Greece and the FRY were seen as willing to join forces with Bulgaria in developing 
an anti-Turkish political bloc. The ethnic majorities of both Greece and FRY were 
Orthodox Christian and they nurtured anti-Turkish feelings for various reasons, 
including the negative view of the Ottoman period presented in the historical 
discourses of all three states and the foreign policy of the modem Turkish state. In 
addition, both states were suspicious of Turkish Balkan policy in the post-Cold War 
period; for Greece, besides historical rivalries over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, 
Turkey was a strong economic competitor in the new markets of the Balkan states, 
while FRY was sceptical about Ankara’s political support for the Bosnian Muslims in 
the ethnic conflicts between Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Apart from historical prejudices against Turkey, the BSP’s anti-Turkish foreign policy 
agenda reflected an effort on the part of the BSP leadership to present the BSP as the 
only Bulgarian political force interested in protecting Bulgaria’s national sovereignty 
and interests in the unstable regional environment of the post-Cold W ar period. In so 
doing, the BSP leadership hoped to rebuff the political claims of its political rivals, 
according to whom the BSP was incapable of defending Bulgaria’s national interests 
because it consisted of the same political protagonists who, under communism, had 
surrendered the country’s national sovereignty to Moscow. Both the timing and the 
domestic political environment seemed to favour the adoption of an anti-Turkish 
foreign policy agenda. Bulgaria was emerging from a period when the authorities had 
conducted a campaign to assimilate Bulgarian Turks into the ethnic majority. The
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campaign had politically radicalized Bulgaria’s Turks who, with Turkey’s support, 
had managed to secure preferential political treatment and rights from the Bulgarian 
state. The Bulgarian Turks were the only ethnic group that had secured continuous 
representation in the Bulgarian National Assembly through their own party, the MRF, 
despite the fact that the post-1989 Bulgarian constitution banned parties’ 
parliamentary representation on an ethnic basis. This radicalization had provoked 
anti-Turkish feelings among the Bulgarian ethnic majority, which the BSP sought to 
exploit, and secure an undisrupted political position in Bulgaria’s post-Cold War 
political spectrum.881
That Bulgaria should foster strong bilateral relations with Greece, FRY and Romania 
was also determined by the fact that, unlike other Bulgarian political forces which at 
the time emphasized Bulgaria’s relations with the USA and NATO, the BSP gave 
priority to relations with the EU. Of the Balkan states, Greece was the only country 
which was a full EU member and, according to the BSP leadership, by fostering 
political and economic relations with Athens, Sofia could count on Greece’s political 
influence and lobbying in the political organs of the EU to ease Bulgaria’s 
membership of the Union. However, given the fact that Greece at the time was 
following a policy of strengthening bilateral relations with the FRY and Romania in 
an attempt to increase its political and economic influence in the Balkans and perhaps 
to restrict Turkey’s influence in the region, relations with Greece would mean that 
Sofia would have to align its regional policies with those of Athens and seek to 
develop political and economic relations with FRY and Romania.
881 Poulton, 1991, pp. 166-168; Melone, 1998, pp. 74-76, 277-8; http://www.b-
info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-12/dec27.bta; http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria- 
macedonians.PDF: Melone, 1994; Melone, 1997; Bell, 1997, p. 366; Kanev, 1998, p. 84.
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When the BSP came to power in 1994, it launched diplomatic campaigns in Athens, 
Belgrade and Bucharest to foster political and economic relations with these 
countries. This campaigning and the BSP’s Balkan policy in general depended on 
PASOK being in power in Greece and the Iliescu led successors to the National 
Salvation Front being in power in Romania, both of whom the BSP had strong 
political alignments which dating back to the pre-1989 period. In June 1995, the 
socialist Prime Minister, Zhan Videnov, paid an official visit to Athens where he was 
warmly welcomed. He and the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, 
concluded several agreements and signed a joint statement calling for close 
cooperation in economic and military affairs.882With reference to Romania and the 
FRY, Videnov paid an official visit to Bucharest in April 1995 and to Belgrade in 
February 1996, the first by a Bulgarian Prime Minister for 11 years, where he 
discussed with the Romanian and the Yugoslavian authorities political measures to 
improve political, economic and military relations with Bulgaria.883 From 
Yugoslavia’s viewpoint Videnov’s visit to Belgrade was a welcome chance to end 
Belgrade’s international isolation by building links with FRY’s Eastern Balkan 
neighbours and, thus counterbalance the country’s broken links with the West and 
former Yugoslav republics such as Slovenia and Croatia.884
In contrast, the UDF tended to favour political and economic relations with Turkey, 
FYROM and Albania. By favouring political and economic relations with these states, 
the UDF hoped to present itself as a new political party with fresh ideas and policies
882 Nikova, 1998, pp. 288-290; Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 150-1.
883 Alexandrov, 1997, p. I l l ;  Nikova, 1998, p. 297; http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/omri/1995/95-05- 
02.omrs.htm/#05.
884 Giatzidis, 2002, pp. 150-1; Nikova, 1998, p. 297
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that were not politically captive to historical prejudices like the BSP. Such an image it 
was hoped would bring political gains to the UDF since it obtained the votes of some 
of Bulgaria’s Muslims in general elections, and left the door open for future 
cooperation with the MRF, both inside and outside the Bulgarian parliament.
Also, by establishing relations with Balkan states such as Turkey, who had strong 
influence in international institutions such as NATO, or FYROM and Albania which 
were not on good terms with Belgrade, Bulgaria would gain the reputation of being an 
ally of the West because Western countries did not favour any form of political or 
economic relations with Belgrade, which at the time was under an economic embargo 
imposed by the UN. According to the UDF leadership, this would increase the 
country’s international prestige, and would further Bulgaria’s chance of joining 
NATO and the EU. In the early 1990s, the UDF had emphasized Bulgaria’s relations 
with the USA and NATO more than with the EU and because Turkey was seen as 
America’s chief political and military ally in the Balkan region relations with Ankara 
were therefore more important than cooperation with Athens.
In line with these views, when the UDF came to power in October 1991, it sought to 
promote political and economic relations with Turkey, FYROM and Albania. At the 
end of 1991, the UDF government signed a treaty of friendship, good neighbourly 
relations, cooperation and security with Turkey and, in January 1992, Sofia 
recognized FYROM as independent under its constitutional name of the Republic of 
Macedonia. In addition, the UDF leadership, including the former Bulgarian President 
and UDF leader, Zheliu Zhelev, strongly supported economic projects such as the 
creation of the so-called ‘East-West corridor’ in the Balkans, which called for the
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construction of transport and energy corridors running from Durres and Tirana 
(Albania), through Skopje (Macedonia), Sofia and Plovdiv (Bulgaria) to Istanbul 
(Turkey). The ‘East-West corridor’ aimed to establish a direct economic link between 
Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria and Turkey and, in this way, to diminish Bulgaria’s 
economic dependence on the predominantly Yugoslav-Greek highways in the Balkan 
region and on energy projects favoured by the BSP, such as the construction of the 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline.885
In the late 1990s, the Bulgarian governments’ relations with the country’s Balkan 
neighbours were well balanced. This was mainly because the political cooperation 
which the EU and NATO sought to promote in the region presupposed avoidance of 
preferential political or economic relations with certain Balkan states at the expense of 
others. Preferential relations with certain neighbouring states provoked suspicion and 
insecurity in other states, which would undermine cooperation in the region.
Bulgaria’s balanced relations with its Balkan neighbours can be seen in Sofia’s 
bilateral relations with both Athens and Ankara. Unlike the preferential political and 
economic relations, which Bulgarian governments had promoted with Greece and 
Turkey in the first half of the 1990s, the Bulgarian government now sought to 
maintain balanced bilateral relations with both. This was seen as a prudent political 
strategy, which in the long run would assist Bulgaria’s foreign policy aim of joining 
both NATO and the EU. Both Athens and Ankara had strong political bonds with the 
West which dated back to the Cold W ar period, and keeping good relations with them
885 Nikova, 1998, pp. 287, 289; Triffonova & Kashoukeeva-Nousheva, 1999, pp. 179-181.
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would provide Sofia with two valuable political allies in NATO and the EU, who 
could lobby for Sofia’s accession.
The UDF government that came to power after the fall of the socialist government in 
1997 therefore sought to foster sound political and economic relations with both 
Greece and Turkey. Ivan Kostov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister under the UDF 
government, paid official visits to Athens in July 1999 and Ankara in October 1999, 
during which he was promised political support by the Greek and the Turkish 
governments in Bulgaria’s bid to join the EU and NATO.886 In return for this support, 
the Bulgarian government pledged to promote in the Bulgarian territory the 
construction of infrastructure projects which would benefit Greece and Turkey. 
Rostov’s government pledged support for the construction of the Burgas- 
Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the so-called ‘Upper Arda’ hydroelectric project. 
This was part of an ‘electricity for infrastructure’ deal agreed between the Turkish and 
the Bulgarian governments, through which Turkey would increase its imports of 
electricity from Bulgaria in exchange for the involvement of Turkish companies in the 
construction of the hydroelectric plant in Southeast Bulgaria.887
Efforts to maintain strong bilateral relations with Greece and Turkey continued when 
the NMSH came to power in June 2001. In January 2002, the Greek Prime Minister, 
Costas Simitis, paid an official visit to Sofia during which bilateral issues such as the 
progress on the construction of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline were 
discussed and the Greek Prime Minister confirmed Greece’s political support for 
Bulgaria’s efforts to join Euro-Atlantic structures. Due to the good relations between
886 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Frame/Frame6index.htm
887 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Frame/Frame6index.htm
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the two sides, earlier in August 2001, Greece had pledged to donate $54.29m to 
Bulgaria as part of the Greek government’s economic plan to assist in the post-Cold 
War reconstruction of the economies of the Balkan states.888 In October 2002, the 
Bulgarian Prime Minster, Simeon Saxkoburgotski, paid an official visit to Ankara 
where he met with the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. During the meeting, the 
Turkish Prime Minister, confirmed Turkey’s support for Bulgaria’s membership of 
NATO and discussed issues of common interest, such as the resolution of the property 
issues of Bulgarian Muslims living in Turkey and the clearing of minefields along the 
common borders of the two states.889 Also, in April 2003 the Bulgarian President 
Georgi Parvanov paid a one-day working visit to Athens where he met with the Greek 
Prime Minister Costas Simitis who renewed Greece’s pledges to offer political 
support to Bulgaria in its accession to NATO and the EU. In June 2003 the Turkish 
Interior Minister, Abdul Kadir Aksu, visited Sofia and met with the Bulgarian 
Minister of the Interior, Georgi Petkanov, to sign a bilateral agreement on cooperation 
between police forces of the two states on the issue of combating transnational crime, 
smuggling and terrorism.890
The promotion of regional cooperation in the Balkans after the mid-1990s also 
produced some trilateral meetings. These occurred between the political authorities of 
Bulgaria and two other Balkan states and aimed to foster Bulgaria’s relations with 
these states through the promotion of political and economic cooperation on issues of
888 In return for Simitis’ visit to Sofia in January 2002, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Simeon 
Saxkoburgotski, paid an official visit to Athens in November 2002, during which the two state leaders
opened a Greek-Bulgarian economic forum and agreed that, regarding the joint economic project of the
Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, each of the participants, namely Greece, Bulgaria and the Russian 
Federation would receive 1/3 of its profits. Greece repeated its political support for Bulgaria’s 
application to join NATO and the EU and confirmed its political pledge to go ahead with the project of 
reconstructing the Balkans and provide investments that would benefit Bulgaria to the tune of $54.29m. 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Frame/Frame6index.htm.
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common interest. Before 1997, the trilateral meetings were restricted to Greece and 
Romania as a result of the socialist government’s foreign policy at the time which 
favoured relations with Athens and Bucharest.891 After the fall of the socialist 
government in 1997, these trilateral meeting were extended to include Albania, 
FYROM and Turkey. Thus, the first trilateral meetings between the heads of state of 
Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria was conducted in October 1997 in Varna, Bulgaria, 
while the first trilateral meeting between Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM was held in 
July 1999 in Sofia.892 A second Turkish-Bulgarian-Romanian meeting was held 
between 1-15 May 2002 in the Turkish Aegean resort of Cesme, where an agreement 
was signed which provided for the cooperation of the three states in the event of 
emergencies such as humanitarian or natural disasters.893 Between 11-13 July 2003, at 
the initiative of the Bulgarian President, Georgi Parvanov, the Presidents of the 
Republics of Bulgaria, Albania and FYROM also met on three consecutive days in 
each of the three countries to discuss the progress of the infrastructure project 
‘Transport Corridor No 8’,894 which involved the construction of a motorway, gas and 
oil pipelines, as well as an electricity grid connecting the three states.
Conclusion
Until the end of the Cold War, Bulgaria was politically marginalized in the Balkan 
region. At the end of WWU, this marginalization was the result of the Bulgarian 
political elite’s irrendentism and their efforts to recreate the territorial borders of the 
Greater Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty. As a result, Bulgaria was treated with a
891 Hinkova, 2002, pp. 21-2.
892 Ibid.
893 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Frame/frame3index.htm
894 Ibid.
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suspicion which undermined all political initiatives aimed at fostering political and 
economic cooperation in the Balkan region.
Bulgaria’s marginalization continued throughout the Cold W ar period as a result of 
Sofia’s political alliance with Moscow and the Soviet bloc after the end of WWII. 
Sofia’s involvement in initiatives aimed at regional cooperation was discouraged 
unless it had Moscow’s consent. Even in periods when M oscow’s political control of 
Sofia was not strong, such as after the mid-1980s, a series of Bulgarian policies, such 
as Zhivkov’s assimilation campaign against the Bulgarian Muslims, undermined any 
efforts on the part of Sofia to play an active political role in regional politics.
Since the end of the Cold War Bulgaria has come out of the political margins and has 
taken an active role in regional politics. Sofia has been involved in political initiatives 
aimed at promoting peace, political stability, security and cooperation within the 
Balkan region. This is in contrast to previous policy and can be explained by 
Bulgaria’s attempts to develop its weak economy and install a functioning democratic 
system. This has helped post-1989 Sofia follow a more peaceful foreign policy than 
the previous totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.
However, this chapter has also tried to offer an explanation for Bulgaria’s post-Cold 
War Balkan policy that is somewhat different from those in the literature. According 
to this alternative explanation, since the end of the Cold War, Sofia’s Balkan policy 
has been influenced by the security vacuum in which Bulgaria was left as result of the 
dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the demise of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 
the 1990s. This vacuum was precedent in the country’s modem history and the only
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way to resolve it appeared to be Sofia’s accession into the Euro-Atlantic structures, 
which became a priority in Bulgarian foreign policy.
This process of accession into Euro-Atlantic structures affected three aspects of 
Sofia’s Balkan policy and made it qualitatively different from many previous policies. 
Firstly, Bulgaria has continued to follow the territorial policy of the communist period 
towards the Balkan region. That is to say that, as in the communist period, since 1989, 
Sofia has not nurtured any territorial claims towards neighbouring states and has 
avoided promoting any policies that might be construed as undermining the territorial 
integrity of neighbouring Balkan states.
Secondly, the accession process has led Sofia to comply with the rules, norms and 
regulations regarding ethnic and religious minorities which are in force in 
international institutions such as the EU and the Council of Europe. Such compliance 
has led to the gradual improvement of the living standards of Bulgaria’s ethnic and 
religious minorities, which, in turn, has had a positive effect on the country’s relations 
with the neighbouring kin-states of these minorities. In terms of ethnic Bulgarians 
living in neighbouring Balkan states, the accession process has led the Bulgarian 
authorities to be cautious in advocating the human rights these populations and to 
avoid political measures and statements, which could have led Bulgaria into conflict 
with the countries in which they reside. Such conflicts would have not only damaged 
Sofia’s international prestige but also could have undermined the country’s efforts to 
join Euro-Atlantic structures. Thirdly, Bulgaria’s accession process has affected its 
diplomatic activity in the Balkan region. It has prompted the Bulgarian authorities to 
establish balanced political and economic relations with their Balkan counterparts and
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has led them to promote policies designed to bring peace and cooperation to the 
Balkan region. It has also led to them playing an active role in regional organisations 
such as the BSEC.
Sofia’s post-1989 policy, promoting stability, cooperation and peace in the Balkan 
region was not just the outcome of the choices determined by the country’s post-Cold 
War economy or of the influence exercised by Bulgaria’s post-1989 democratic 
system: it was a result of the process of democratization, which included accession to 
Euro-Atlantic institution, and which left scope for these institutions to influence the 
actors and many of the decisions of Sofia’s post-1989 foreign policy.
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Concluding Chapter
Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy making presents both continuities and 
discontinuities with that of the communist period. On the one hand, the mechanisms, 
the decision-making process and the political agents of state foreign policy all 
changed in the process of democratization which the country has followed since 1989. 
New political institutions and organs such as the President of the Republic, the 
Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Policy, National Security and Defence Policies, 
and the Constitutional Court have been formed and play an active role in Sofia’s 
foreign policy making, while the roles of the Prime Minister and the M inister of 
Foreign Affairs have become more important.
In addition, unlike the communist period when foreign policy institutions and 
mechanisms were occupied by cadres which originated from a single political 
formation, namely the BCP, from the end of 1989, Bulgaria’s democratization created 
a competitive and free political environment which allowed the formation of 
numerous political parties whose ideas about foreign policy and national priorities 
varied. As a result of the different ways that there were perceived, Bulgarian political 
parties formed foreign policy agendas through which they hoped to attract the support 
of the Bulgarian electorate.
Since the end of the 1980s, Bulgaria’s foreign policy mechanisms and actors have 
been transformed and this has affected the foreign policy of the Bulgarian state. This 
is in sharp contrast to the theoretical views of many classical realist and neo-realist 
scholars, who tend to downplay the impact of domestic mechanisms and actors on
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foreign policy. For classical realists, state foreign policy is governed by immutable 
laws deriving either from human nature or from the dynamics of inter-state 
competition. They are seen as fixed, politically bipartisan and transcending any 
changes in the domestic political scene.895 For neo-realists, most of the foreign policy 
choices of domestic actors within a state are shaped by the ‘anarchic’ international 
system, which lacks any central authority to enforce rules and norms or to protect the 
interests of the wider international community. This leads these actors to function as 
rational political entities whose foreign policy strategies are selected on the basis of 
the political, economic and military capabilities of the state to which they belong and 
according to which strategy will best secure the survival of the state and maximize its 
benefits in an ‘anarchic’ and competitive international system.896 In short, realists do 
not believe that either domestic politics or ideological changes influence state foreign 
policy.
However, contrary to these views, it is Bulgaria’s political change in 1989 which has
brought a foreign policy to the country. The main foreign policy priorities of most
Bulgarian governments since 1989 have been quite different from those of past
communist governments. Under communism the priorities were the maintenance of
strong political, economic and cultural relations with the Soviet Union and the states
of the Soviet bloc, as well as with Third World countries that flirted with communist
ideology. Under communism, the West was viewed as an enemy of the communist
ideology, and thus of Bulgaria, whose national interests seemed to be identified with
the political application of this ideology. However, this picture changed after 1989,
when Sofia reviewed Bulgaria’s foreign relations with the countries of the former
895Burchill, 2001a; Krasner, 1992, p. 39; Dunne & Schmidt, 2001.
896 Ibid.; Lamy, 2001; pp. 182-188.
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Soviet bloc, most of which were in economic decline for much of the 1990s, and 
began to foster closer relations with the West.
In addition, the periods of communism and democratization in Bulgaria should not be 
treated as two separate, uniform historical terms with regard to the way that foreign 
policy was conducted. In both periods, there were at times remarkable 
differentiations in Bulgarian foreign policy making, which further challenge the 
realist and neo-realist views according to which nation-states conduct their foreign 
policies as if they were rational actors, regardless of who is in power and regardless of 
the domestic political, economic and social environment. During the second half of 
the 1980s, the communist government abandoned the policy of isolation from the 
West and sought to improve Bulgaria’s political and economic relations with Western 
states such as the FRG, in the hope that this would gain it access to economic and 
technological aid which would enable Bulgaria to cope successfully with the 
economic crisis it faced as a result of M oscow’s policy of reviewing its economic 
relations with the states of Eastern Europe and significantly reducing the energy and 
other economic subsidies it had been providing.
During the period of democratization, Bulgaria’s foreign policy priorities changed 
according to which political party was in power. For example, when the UDF came to 
power at the end of 1991, Bulgaria’s priorities were to foster political and economic 
relations with Western states such as the USA, Germany and France, and international 
organisations such as the EU, NATO and the IMF. The BSP government which took 
over at the end of 1994, although it continued to foster Bulgaria’s relations with 
international organisations such as the EU and the OSCE, downplayed others such as
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NATO and the IMF and instead sought to strengthen Sofia’s political and economic 
ties with the Russian Federation and with the developing states of the Third World 
such as Syria, Libya and Iran, with which Bulgaria had had close political and 
economic ties under communism.
The second UDF government, which came to power in 1997, continued to encourage 
political and economic relations with the West, giving priority to Bulgaria’s relations 
with the EU and working hard to gain Bulgaria membership. This contrasts with the 
foreign policy priorities of the first UDF government, which placed greater value on 
Bulgaria’s political and economic relations with the USA seeing them as more 
important than relations with any other Western state or international organisation, 
including the EU.
Thus, to what extent can theoretical analyses of realism explain the foreign policy 
making of states such as pre- and post-1989 Bulgaria? The empirical part of this thesis 
has shown that the theoretical framework set by the realists cannot fully explain 
Bulgaria’s foreign policy making under communism and after. This is mainly because 
the realists view foreign policy making as a static rather than a dynamic process in 
which domestic factors have limited influence; something which was not the case in 
either the communist or post-communist period.
However, it would also not be correct to overemphasize the role of domestic political 
factors on foreign policy making as many liberal theoretical scholars such as Doyle 
and Fukuyama have done and, thus, to conclude that it was Bulgaria’s domestic
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political environment that was responsible for Sofia’s post-1989 foreign policy.897 As 
the empirical chapters show, Bulgaria’s post-1989 domestic political actors were not 
politically unconstrained in conceiving and prioritizing the country’s national interests 
and, thus, setting their foreign policy agendas. The actions of domestic actors with 
were determined by the security vacuum, understood in its widest form, which 
Bulgaria was left in after 1989 as a result of the demise of the Soviet bloc and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. After WWII, Bulgaria’s membership of the Soviet 
bloc guaranteed its national security through the protection of the country’s territorial 
integrity* which Bulgaria enjoyed as a member of the Warsaw Pact, as well as through 
the country’s political and social stability, mostly resulting from the generous 
economic subsidies that Sofia received from Moscow. These subsidies secured good 
living standards for the majority of the Bulgarian population and, therefore, 
guaranteed positive feelings towards communism, lacking almost everywhere else in 
Eastern Europe, except perhaps in Yugoslavia.
Due to its loss of guaranteed security, a large part of Bulgaria’s political elite and 
public reached the conclusion that the only solutions was to seek political and 
economic integration into the Western world. For a long time there was little 
consensus on what political and economic integration meant among either the public 
or the political groups. The majority of Bulgarians supported the idea. The fact that 
both the EEC, later renamed the EU, and NATO had played a decisive role in the 
politics of the Western world after the end of WWII increased the political prestige of 
the two organisations, membership of which came to be of high importance at both a 
symbolic and a practical level. On a symbolic level, membership of the EU and
897 Kant, 1970, p.100; Doyle, 1986; Doyle 1997; Burchill, 2001b; Fukuyama, 1992, p. xx; Russett,
1993; Dunne, 2001, pp. 171-173.
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NATO came to signify that Bulgaria had been accepted as an equal partner in the club 
of Western states.
On a practical level, membership was seen as offering a solution to two aspects of 
Bulgaria’s national security. On the one hand, membership of the EU would 
consolidate Bulgaria’s nascent democratic political system and secure economic and 
technical assistance, which, in the short term, would secure economic stability; in the 
long term, it would result in increased foreign economic investment and trade and, 
thus, improved living standards. At the same time, membership of a security 
organisation such as NATO would safeguard Bulgaria’s territorial integrity and 
provide the means for improving the military capability of the Bulgarian army, which 
would contribute to Bulgaria’s being able to defend itself in the event of a foreign 
military threat. This view could be seen as a variant of the balance of power politics 
by which theorists of classical realism and neo-realism refer to the formation of 
military alliances, through which nation-states seek to check and balance the military 
power of other states seen as posing a threat to their national security.898
The increased political prestige of both the EU and NATO in world politics led the 
Bulgarian political authorities to seek membership of these international political 
entities. The accession process has been lengthy and rather slow and, as far as NATO 
was concerned, for much of the 1990s did not always attract the political enthusiasm 
and support of the political elite and the public. Nevertheless, the process was to 
affect Sofia’s foreign policy throughout the period of democratization. The majority 
of the Bulgaria’s political actors aligned their foreign policy agendas to the political
898 Waltz, 1979, 111; Dunne & Schmidt, 2001, pp. 153-155; Burchill, 2001a, pp.81-90, 108-11;
Burchill, 2001b, pp. 44-47.
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views and decisions on which the EU and NATO conditioned membership. By the 
end of the 1990s, as a result of this alignment, the actors had generally come to an 
agreement on the country’s main foreign policy priorities. Thus, in addition to 
membership of the EU and NATO, on which all the main Bulgarian parliamentary 
political forces agreed, the majority of the political elite maintained that Bulgaria 
should try to maintain good political and economic relations with all member and 
candidate member states of the EU and with non-EU states of the Western world, 
such as the USA, Canada and Japan, and support the promotion of sound bilateral and 
multilateral relations with the states of South-Eastern Europe.
Most of the political parties represented in the Bulgarian parliament since the mid- 
1990s supported the view that fostering political and economic relations with the 
West should not lead Bulgaria to neglect the country’s relations with the Russian 
Federation, on whom Bulgaria was dependent for the supply of oil and gas, or with 
developing states in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, which could become 
future markets for Bulgarian products which were not competitive in Western 
markets. This was on the provision that political, economic or any other relations with 
either the Russian Federation or the developing countries of Africa, the Middle East 
and Latin America did not conflict with the EU ’s or NATO’s connections with these 
countries.
It could be argued that, during both the periods of communism and democratization, 
international actors such as the Soviet Union, the EU and NATO, influenced the 
foreign policy agendas and constrained the international activities of Bulgaria’s 
domestic political actors. This would confirm the theoretical view supported by neo­
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realist scholars such as Waltz, according to whom the international environment 
constrains the foreign policy activities of state actors who are not entirely free to 
conduct state foreign policy in the way they might wish.899 The constraint on the 
international activities of state actors comes about as the result of such mechanisms as 
the balance of power by which neo-realists mean the political and the military status 
quo that militarily powerful nation states establish after large-scale international 
wars.900 The establishment and preservation of the military status quo is mainly based 
on strict control, which the powerful nation states exercise on the military capacities 
and the international activities of other states. On many occasions, such control can 
take the form of direct intervention in domestic politics of, or military action against 
any state attempting to gain enough power to disturb the international status quo.
A more detailed examination of Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy shows that neo­
realist views, with reference to the ability of the international environment to control 
the foreign policy activity of state actors, are not entirely applicable. First of all, the 
political control, which international organisations such as the EU and NATO 
exercised on the foreign policy agendas and the international activities of Bulgaria’s 
domestic political actors, does not assume the form of arbitrary international 
behaviour of powerful nation states seeking to punish any nation state whose foreign 
policy challenges the international status quo, as the neo-realists would suggest. Such 
a form of political control is more related to Sofia’s political relations with Moscow 
during the communist period. At that time, M oscow’s control over the foreign policy 
agenda and the international activities of the Bulgarian communist regime was almost
899 Waltz, 1990, p.33; Waltz, 1979, pp. 1-17, 116-123; Burchill, 2001a, pp. 87-98.
900 Burchill, 2001b, pp. 44-47; Burchill, 2001a, pp. 81-90, 108-111; Waltz, 1979, p.l 11; Dune & 
Schmidt, 2001, pp. 153-155.
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absolute, and any attempt on the part of Bulgaria to loosen this control or follow an 
independent foreign policy would have provoked Moscow’s political outrage, which 
could theoretically have led the USSR to intervene politically or militarily to tighten 
its political control on Bulgaria as it did with Czechoslovakia in 1968.
But even during the communist period, the USSR’s political control of Bulgarian 
foreign policy was not continuous, and was mainly depended on the domestic political 
environment within the Soviet Union. For example, Gorbachev’s decision after the 
mid-1980s to relax the Soviet Union’s political control Eastern Europe led Bulgaria to 
take foreign policy decisions which contravened Moscow’s wishes. For example, the 
BCP’s decisions to change the Muslim names of the Bulgarian Turks to Bulgarian 
ones in the mid-1980s led Bulgaria to the verge of military conflict with Turkey. This 
decision did not have M oscow’s political blessing and Soviet officials made it clear 
that Sofia should not count on the USSR’s assistance in the event of an escalation in 
the political crisis with Ankara.
In contrast, the EU’s and NATO’s control of the international activities of Bulgaria’s 
domestic actors was based on the political decisions which have been taken 
collectively by the member states of these organisations. This control was exercised 
through political mechanisms such as the Bulgarian-EU Parliamentary committee and 
the NACC, whose establishment Bulgarian state actors had consented to through 
bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded with the EU and NATO.
Although foreign policy making during the period of democratization was a more 
complex political process than under communism, and involved enlargement of the
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network of foreign policy mechanisms and multiplication of the domestic actors 
involved, nevertheless, it still remains a political process confined to only a small 
circle of the country’s political elite. This circle included the leadership of the 
political party or parties in power, with some input from the other political groups 
represented in the Bulgarian parliament. The role of the Bulgarian public in the 
country’s foreign policy making was mainly confined to taking part in general or 
Presidential elections every four to five years, and to expressing their views with 
reference to foreign policy decisions taken by the authorities through frequent opinion 
polls. Important foreign policy issues, such as the decision of the Bulgarian 
government to apply for NATO membership, were arguably pushed through against 
the wishes of a large section of the Bulgarian public, which shows that the input of the 
Bulgarian public in the country’s post-1989 foreign policy making was limited.
In addition, apart from the political parties represented in the Bulgarian parliament, 
other domestic actors, including NGOs and ethnic and religious minority groups, had 
little say in foreign policy making. However, through mechanisms such as democratic 
conditionality, the process of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU and NATO has 
established the political framework for a broader and more active involvement of 
NGOs, ethnic and religious minorities and the Bulgarian public in future foreign 
policy.
Bulgarian foreign policy making after 1989 was a closed political process. 
Application for membership of the EU and NATO gave some prospects for its being 
opened up. However, Doyle and Fukuyama, maintain that liberal democratic states 
pursue qualitatively different foreign policies from states whose political systems are
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non-democratic.90' This is mainly because the foreign policy making of liberal 
democratic states is seen as an open process which leaves little room for bellicose 
state authorities to pursue foreign policies that endanger the peace and security of the 
immediate regional and the international environment. Any bellicose feelings on the 
part of the political authorities of liberal democratic states are allegedly constrained 
by the public, which is viewed as a peace-loving political entity whose political 
support is vital for the ruling party in a democratic state to remain in power. As a 
result of the public’s ability to contain any dangerous tendencies in the state political 
authorities, liberal democratic states are viewed as pursuing foreign policies which 
aim to promote peaceful relations with other states and to solve any problems which 
might arise, through peaceful means such as diplomacy.
There are areas where these liberal theoretical views are at odds with Sofia’s post- 
1989 foreign policy making. Bulgaria’s public was not always a peace-loving political 
entity with the ability to keep the state political authorities in check. On the contrary, 
at times the Bulgarian public attempted to impose its views on the country’s political 
authorities, which might have led the country into political or even military conflict 
with neighbouring states. One such occasion was after the collapse of the totalitarian 
regime of Todor Zhivkov when the Bulgarian government decided to review 
Zhivkov’s decision to change the Muslim names of the Bulgarian Turks to Bulgarian 
ones in the mid-1980s and gave Bulgarian Turks the right to reclaim their Muslim 
names. The decision caused a huge reaction amongst a large part of the Bulgarian 
public living in ethnically mixed areas, who, at the instigation of local authorities, 
organised public demonstrations to express their opposition. Such demonstrations put
901 Kant, 1970, p. 100; Doyle,1986; Doyle 1997; Burchill, 2001b; Fukuyama, 1992, p. xx; Russett,
1993.
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heavy pressure on the Bulgarian government and, if they had yielded to the public’s 
requests, there would have been a risk of a further already strained relationship with 
Turkey with unpredictable consequences for bilateral relations between the two states, 
as well as the peace and security of the immediate Balkan region.
Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy has presented many of the characteristics of 
foreign policy in states with consolidated democratic regimes, such as the USA and 
most of the EU member states. This is to say, Sofia’s foreign policy since the end of 
the 1980s has aimed at promoting peace and political and economic stability in the 
Balkan region, fostering political and economic cooperation with all Balkan states, 
and gaining membership of international organisations such as the EU, NATO and the 
IMF with whom the Bulgarian authorities have generally cooperated well. However, 
this policy was not the product of the country’s newly nascent democratic regime, 
whose political institutions were fragile and unconsolidated, and whose foreign policy 
making was largely confined to a small circle of the country’s political elite.
Nor was it the product of Bulgaria’s integration into a strong network of economic 
activities with neighbouring states through the establishment of strong foreign trade 
relations with these states or economic investments inbound and outbound with 
neighbouring countries, as some liberal views maintain in explaining why democratic 
states follow more peaceful foreign policies than states with non-democratic regimes. 
Bulgaria’s integration into such a network meant Sofia’s political authorities risking 
inflicting a high economic cost upon their country in the event that they disturbed 
political relations with neighbouring states. As has been argued in this thesis, the 
nexus of trade relations, which Bulgaria managed to establish with neighbouring
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states since the end of the 1980s, was small and in no way explained Sofia’s post- 
1989 foreign policy towards the Balkan region, while, with the exception of Greece 
and Turkey, whose economic investments in the country have been high, the level of 
foreign investment from other Balkan states to Bulgaria, or from Bulgaria to these 
states, remained at a low level throughout the 1990s.
Sofia’s post-1989 foreign policy is also in contrast with the theoretical views of 
scholars such as Jack Snyder and Alexander Kozhemiakin whose research focuses on 
the foreign policy making of nascent democratizing states. In Jack Snyder’s view, the 
main factor explaining Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy would be the country’s 
consolidated, check-and-balance democratic institutions. For Snyder, while 
consolidated democratic regimes pursue foreign policies aiming at peace and stability 
for the regional as well as the international environment, newly democratizing states 
that have not consolidated their democratic institutions are prone to bellicose foreign 
policies.902 However, contrary to what Snyder argues, Bulgaria’s post-1989 peaceful 
foreign policy has been far from bellicose; something which should not be explained 
as the effect of the country’s post-1989 democratic institutions. On the contrary, these 
institutions were fragile and with often confused in relation to the responsibilities of 
the President of the Republic who frequently clashed openly with the government on 
foreign policy issues
In Alexander Kozhemiakin’s view, the peaceful foreign policy of post-1989 Bulgaria 
could be well explained as the result of consolidation of democratic practices, norms 
or values in the country’s political elite and the public. According to Kozhemiakin,
902 Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Snyder, 1991, pp. 32-5, 49-52.
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consolidation of democratic practices, norms and values were the result of the 
country’s intense political and economic interactions with consolidated democratic 
regimes of the Western world since the end of the 1980s.903 However, if Bulgaria’s 
post-1989 democratic institutions were weak and far from being considered 
consolidated, the country’s democratic practices, norms and values were even weaker 
and well below the level of democratic practices, norms and values of consolidated 
democratic regimes in the West. The post-1989 Bulgarian state suffers from high 
levels of corruption, as a result of which large sectors of the Bulgarian public, NGOs 
and the majority of ethnic and religious minorities are often outside the process of 
policy making and state authorities seem unable to exercise their political control over 
smuggling and illicit arms trading which could undermine peace and political stability 
in the Balkan region and draw Bulgaria into political and military conflicts with 
neighbouring Balkan states. In addition, the country’s political elite has taken foreign 
policy decisions in a polarized political climate where democratic institutions interfere 
with the decision-making processes so that the political power of those institutions 
which there are seen as political competitors are undermined. For all these reasons, 
post-1989 Bulgaria should not be seen as a country where democratic institutions 
have been consolidated. Sofia’s post-1989 democratic system is in a process of 
consolidation, but is far from being considered as developed as the democratic 
systems of Western countries such as the USA, Germany, France or the UK.
Even if intense political and economic interactions with consolidated democratic 
regimes of the Western world was the explanation for Sofia’s peaceful foreign policy 
post-1989, and the consolidation of democratic practices, norms and values in
903 Kozhemiakin, 1998, pp. 17-34.
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Bulgarian society, it should be noted that, in its almost fifteen years of 
democratization, Bulgaria has not been interacting solely with states in which 
democratic regimes are consolidated. Although the post-1989 security vacuum, along 
with the economic crisis which Bulgaria sustained led Sofia’s political elite to seek to 
foster political and economic relations with consolidated democratic states in the 
West, Bulgarian political forces such as the BSP still sought to foster political and 
economic relations with illiberal democratic or non-democratic states such as 
Milosevic’s Serbia, the Russian Federation and developing Third W orld states such as 
Iran, Libya and Syria and, indeed, a significant section of Sofia’s post-1989 economic 
relations, even in vital economic areas such as the energy sector, were conducted with 
some of these states.
In addition, contrary to Kozhemiakin’s view that in newly democratizing states 
consolidation of democratic practices, norms and values is the outcome of intense 
political and economic interactions between these states and consolidated democratic 
regimes of the Western world, Bulgaria’s foreign policy making during the period of 
democratization shows that any democratic practices, norms or values of the 
Bulgarian state in the aftermath of 1989 were not simply the result of Sofia’s political 
interaction with consolidated democratic regimes such as the USA, Germany, France 
and the UK. Democratic practices, norms or values in post-1989 Bulgaria were 
imposed on Sofia through institutional mechanisms such as democratic conditionality 
which international organisations like the EU used in order to align Bulgarian 
institutional mechanisms and political decisions with those of the EU before 
membership.
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Kozhemiakin’s view that consolidation of democratic practices, norms and values 
within democratizing states could have the same pacifying effects on the foreign 
policy of democratizing states with those of the consolidated democratic states is also 
problematic. International events such as the Anglo-American military invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003 have shown that, when opposing or competitive political poles 
with reference to various international political events are developed between 
consolidated democratic states, it is quite possible that this will affect the functioning 
of the democratic system of small nation-states such as Bulgaria. This is because, on 
many occasions, the domestic political actors of newly democratizing states seek to 
legitimize and consolidate themselves in the politically fluid domestic environment of 
their country by copying political ideas and models of political behaviour or aligning 
their policies to those of international actors whom the domestic political actors value 
as worthy of imitation for the benefit of their country or for the sake of their own 
political survival in a politically fluid and unpredictable domestic environment.
In the case of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, for example, the disagreement 
between the permanent members of the UN Security Council over the invasion led 
some of Bulgaria’s political actors - namely the NMSII government and the vast 
majority of the political cadres of NMSII, the political leadership and many political 
members of the UDF, and the leadership and the majority of the political cadres of the 
MRF - to side with the USA, the UK and Spain, which supported the invasion, while 
others - the political leadership and the majority of the political members of the BSP 
and some members of the UDF - sided with France and Germany which disagreed 
with the military action. It could be also the case that a prolonged political 
disagreement or conflict over an international event such as the Anglo-American
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invasion of Iraq would create a deep political cleavages and lead to prolonged, as well 
as intense, political conflicts between Bulgarian domestic actors which, in turn, could 
have paralyzed the functioning of the country’s nascent democratic system and led 
Bulgaria to adopt bellicose foreign policy decisions.
The question is whether Bulgaria’s post-1989 democratization process had had any 
effect on the country’s foreign policy making. Bulgaria’s post-1989 democratization 
has been accompanied by changes in the country’s foreign policy making which have 
led the country’s policy to assume characteristics that can be traced to the foreign 
policies of consolidated democratic states of the Western world. These changes have 
led many scholars and policy makers to uncritically adopt the views of liberal scholars 
such as Doyle and Fukuyama to explain Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy as being 
the result of the country’s successful democratization process. However, Sofia’s 
foreign policy making during the period of post-1989 democratization should be seen 
neither as a result of any successful process of developing democratic institutions, nor 
as the outcome of a successful consolidation of democratic practices, norms or values 
in Bulgarian society. Both democratic institutions and norms are still in the 
development process, are fragile and, thus, incapable of having any foreign policy 
effects such as scholars like Jack Snyder of Alexander Kozhemiakin suggest. 
Bulgaria’s post-1989 foreign policy should be seen as an outcome of the political 
consensus established among Sofia’s political actors to fill the country’s security 
vacuum by seeking Bulgaria’s integration into the political, economic and military 
structures of international organisation such as the EU and NATO, and fostering 
strong political and economic relations with powerful Western states such as the 
USA, Germany, France and the UK. This consensus has paved the way for the W est’s
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increasing engagement in Bulgaria’s foreign policy making, which has often led to the 
alignment of Sofia’s foreign policies with those of Western states and international 
organisations. On many occasions, that alignment has been the result of the Bulgarian 
authorities’ willingness to copy Western policies, because they viewed that by doing 
so, Bulgaria would win the approval of powerful Western states and, in this way, gain 
access to a series of political, economic and military advantages, including 
membership of the EU and NATO, within a relatively short period of time.
Preserving Bulgaria’s political consensus on integration into Euro-Atlantic political, 
economic and military structures in the future will be determined by two main factors. 
The first is that Bulgarian domestic actors should maintain the priority on Bulgaria’s 
foreign relations with the West rather than non-W estem states or organisations, such 
as the Russian Federation or the CIS. The second is the preservation of strong 
political cooperation among Western actors on international issues and the avoidance 
of any prolonged politically opposing blocs among Western states. Although not 
immediately foreseeable, a possible lack of these two factors could set the ground for 
limited Western influence on Bulgaria’s foreign policy and the appearance of 
isolationist or nationalist political forces with foreign policy agendas, the application 
of which could imperil regional and international security.
-The end-
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Chronology of Events 
Bulgaria and the European Union2
• 8 August 1988: Bulgaria establishes diplomatic relations with the European 
Economic Community (EEC).
• 8 M ay 1990: Bulgaria signed with the European Economic Community the 
Convention on Trade, Business and Economic Relations. The PHARE 
Programme was opened for Bulgaria.
• 1 November 1990: The Convention on Trade, Business and Economic 
Relations became effective. It envisaged the gradual elimination of the 
quantitative limitations on Bulgarian imports to the Community and mutual 
concessions in the field of trade in agricultural goods.
• 22 December 1990: The Bulgarian Parliament adopted a decision whereby the 
willingness of the Republic of Bulgaria to become a member of the European 
Community was expressed. The signing of the Europe Agreement with the 
European Community was regarded as a step towards this ultimate goal.
• 1 O ctober 1991: The European Council decided to authorize the European 
Commission to start preliminary talks with Bulgaria for signing Europe 
Agreement.
• 20 M arch  1992: The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria 
established an Interdepartmental Commission on the Association of the 
Republic of Bulgaria to the European Community. The then Deputy Prime 
Minister, Mr. Uko Eskenazi, was appointed as the head of the Commission.
2 The list is based on the chronology of events of Bulgaria’s relations with the European Union as 
presented on the website of the Delegation of the European Commission to Bulgaria 
http://www.evropa.bg
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• 14-15 May 1992: The first round of the negotiations for association between
Bulgaria and the European Community was held.
• M arch - December 1992: Seven rounds of the negotiations as well as a 
number of consultations at political and expert level were held before a Europe 
Agreement and a Provisional Agreement on Trade and Related Matters were 
developed.
• 8 M arch 1993: The Europe Agreement for Bulgaria and the Provisional
Agreement on Trade and Related Matters were signed. The Europe Agreement 
provided a framework for the development of a profound political dialogue
and for the establishment of a free trade zone covering trade between Bulgaria
and the European Community. :
.*• 15 .A pril 1993: The Bulgarian Parliament ratified the texts of the Europe
Agreement and the Provisional Agreement on Trade and.Related Matters.
• 21-22 June  1993: The European Council was held in Copenhagen. The 
Council decided that the countries in Central and Eastern Europe which had 
signed Association Agreements with the EU could become full members of
. the EU in the future. The timeframe of Central and East European countries 
attaining membership of the EU would depend on their meeting certain 
political and economic criteria set by the European Council in Copenhagen.
• 27 O ctober 1993: The European Parliament ratified the Europe Agreement for 
Bulgaria.
• 31 December 1993: The Provisional Agreement on Trade and Related Matters 
became effective. The business section of the 1990 Convention on Trade, 
Business and Economic Cooperation was suspended.
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• January 1994: The first Additional Protocol (link to Documents) to the 
Europe Agreement whereby the EU unilaterally made additional business 
concessions to Bulgaria became effective.
• March 1994: The first meeting of the Joint Bulgaria-EU Committee was held. 
Sub-committees on the approximation of legislation, competition, agriculture, 
transport, and customs cooperation were set up within the Committee. A 
contract on ferrous metals was drawn up.
• 14 April 1994: The government of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted a 
declaration confirming the willingness of the country to become a member of 
the European Union.
• 24 November 1994: Bulgaria and the other associated countries were invited 
to sign EU declarations on foreign policy and security matters.
® December 1994: Two rounds of consultations with the European Commission 
on adaptation of the Europe Agreement and improvement of market access 
were held in relation to the EU accession of the three EFT A countries Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden.
• 9 - 1 0  December 1994: The European Council in Essen adopted a Strategy on 
Preparing the Associated Central and East European countries for EU 
accession.
• January 1995: The Second Additional Protocol to the Europe Agreement on 
the equalization of the trade liberalization time-schedule for Bulgaria and that 
of Visegrad countries became effective.
• 1 February 1995: The Europe Agreement for Bulgaria became effective.
• 22 March 1995: The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted 
Decree 66 whereby a special European integration mechanism, involving a
7
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Government Committee, a Coordinating Commission, and a Secretariat of 
European Integration at the Council of Ministers was created.
• 29 May 1995: The first meeting of the Bulgaria-EU Association Council was 
held in Brussels. Bulgaria’s strategy for EU integration, regional stability, and 
the free movement of Bulgarian citizens to EU Member states and the 
Schengen group were discussed.
• 6 - 8  September 1995: A joint Bulgaria-EU Parliamentary Committee was set 
up in Sofia. The political, social and economic situation in Bulgaria, Bulgaria- 
EU trade and economic relations, cooperation in the field of justice and home 
affairs, the PHARE Programme performance and the political situation in 
South and Central Europe were discussed.
• 25 September 1995: The Council of EU Ministers of Justice and Home 
Affairs approved a list of countries (Regulation No. 2317/95) whose citizens 
were required to have visas when crossing the external borders of the 
European Union. Bulgaria was on the list.
• 9 -1 0  November 1995: The first meeting of the Bulgaria-EU Association 
Committee was held in Sofia. A detailed review of the Europe Agreement 
performance was made.
• December 1995: The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria 
adopted a decision to apply for EU membership.
• 14 December 1995: The Bulgarian Parliament adopted a resolution for an 
official application by Bulgaria for EU membership.
• 15 -16  December 1995: The third meeting of Heads of State and Government 
during the European Council in Madrid held. Javier Solana was given the 
application of the Republic of Bulgaria for EU membership. The European
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Council asked the European Commission to prepare an opinion on the 
membership applications of the associated countries.
• April 1996: The European Commission requested the Bulgarian government 
to fill in a detailed questionnaire, so that an EC opinion on the Bulgaria 
application for membership could be prepared.
• 31 Ju ly  1996: Answers to the questionnaire were prepared and delivered to the 
Delegation of the European Commission in Sofia.
• 3 March 1997: The European Commission invited Bulgaria to update the 
information provided within the questionnaire:
• . 17 -18 March 1997: EC Commissioner Hans van der Bruk paid an official 
visit to Sofia. The basic measures to be taken by the government for preparing 
Bulgaria foT EU enlargement were outlined.
• 25. April 1997: The up-to-date ! answers to the European Commission 
questionnaire on Bulgaria’s adaptation to European criteria were submitted to 
the Delegation of the European Commission to Bulgaria.
• 16 July 1997: The opinion on Bulgaria’s application for membership was 
published within Agenda 2000. The Republic of Bulgaria was assessed as a 
candidate country which was not sufficiently prepared to start negotiations for 
accession to the EU.
• 12 -13 December 1997: The European Council in Luxemburg decided to start 
negotiations for accession with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic 
and Cyprus. At the same time, the Council decided to accelerate the 
preparation for negotiations with Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and 
Romania by starting a screening of the legislation.
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• 23 M arch 1998: The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted 
a National Strategy on Bulgaria’s Accession to the EU.
• 27 April 1998: The multilateral screening of the legislation of Bulgaria 
started.
• May 1998: The first National Programme for the adoption of the Acquis was 
prepared.
• 10 M arch 1999: The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted 
Decree No 47 on improvement of dialogue with the EU and for the 
establishment of a coordination mechanism for Bulgaria’s preparation for 
membership. The Council of European Integration and topical work were set 
up.
® 29 November 1999: Memorandum on decommissioning Kozlodui Nuclear 
Power units was signed with the EU.
• 10 December 1999: The European Council in Helsinki decided to invite 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania and Malta to begin 
negotiations with the EU.
• December 1999: The Council of Ministers of EU decided to update the 
Accession Partnership for Bulgaria.
• 20 Jan u ary  2000: The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria 
adopted Decree No 3 upon which the Chief Negotiator of Bulgaria, the core 
team for negotiations, and work groups according to negotiation chapters were 
appointed.
• 15 F ebruary  2000: The first Intergovernmental Conference on Bulgaria’s 
accession launched the negotiations for Bulgaria’s membership of the EU.
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• M arch 2000: A Committee on European Integration was set up within the 
Bulgarian Parliament.
• 28 M arch 2000: The first working meeting at deputy level was held. Bulgaria 
presented negotiation positions on 8 chapters
• 25 May 2000: The second meeting at deputy level was held. Six chapters for 
negotiation were opened.
• 14 June 2000: The second Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level 
was held in Luxemburg. Four negotiation chapters were closed ahead of 
schedule.
• 2 August 2000: Bulgaria presented its position on the chapter ‘Free ; 
Movement of Capital’.
® 24 October 2000: The third session at deputy level was held in Brussels. 
Bulgaria presented one position and three new negotiation chapters were 
opened.
o 16 November 2000: The fourth meeting at deputy level was held. Bulgaria. 
Four chapters were opened for negotiation.
» 20 November 2000: The third meeting at ministerial level was held. The
chapters Culture and Audiovisual Policy. External Relations, Statistics, and 
Consumer and Health Protection were provisionally closed.
• 1 December 2000: The Council of Ministers on Justice and Home Affairs 
decided to exclude Bulgaria from the Schengen visa list.
9  30 M arch 2001: The fifth meeting at deputy level was held. Three new 
chapters were opened.
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• 11 June 2001: The fourth meeting at ministerial level held. Three new 
chapters were opened and the chapter on Company Law was provisionally 
closed.
• 27 July 2001: The eighth meeting at deputy level was held. Two new chapters 
were opened and the chapter on the Free Movement of Capital was 
provisionally closed.
® 28 November 2001: The tenth meeting at deputy heads of delegations level
held. Three chapters were opened, and the chapter on ‘Freedom to Provide 
Services’ was provisionally closed.
• 20JDecember 2001: The eleventh meeting at deputy level was held. The 
chapter on Industrial Policy was opened and provisionally closed.
s* 21 March 2002: The twelfth meeting at deputy level.was held. Two chapters
\yere opened for negotiations. -
» 22 April 2002: The thirteenth meeting at deputy level held. The chapters on
; Economic and Monetary Union, Employment and Social Policy, and 
Institutions were provisionally closed. ••
•' 10 June 2002: The chapters on Free Movement of Persons, Free Movement of
Goods, and Taxation were provisionally closed.
• 29 July 2002: The chapter on Customs Union was provisionally closed.
• 30 September 2002: The chapter on Financial Control was provisionally 
closed.
• 9 October 2002: The European Commission’s regular reports were published, 
recommending the accession of ten new member states. Bulgaria was 
recognized as a ‘functioning market economy’. The European Commission 
expressed support for Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007.
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• 24-25 O ctober 2002: The European Council in Brussels arrived at the
decision that the Commission and the Council should prepare a ‘package’ for 
Bulgaria and Romania to be presented at the Copenhagen meeting of the heads 
of state in December 2002. The ‘package’ should contain a detailed ‘roadmap’ 
for the accession of both countries and increased pre-accession assistance.
• 12-13 Decem ber 2002: The European Council in Copenhagen expressed its
support for Bulgaria and Romania in their, efforts to achieve the objective of 
membership in 2007 and adopted the roadmaps of both countries.
•  19-20 Ju n e  2003: The European Council in Thessloniki supported Bulgaria in
its efforts to achieve the objective of concluding negotiations in 2004 and join 
the EU in 2007. . . .
• 15 Ju n e .2004: Bulgaria provisionally closed all negotiation chapters with the 
EU and is therefore ready to join the.Union.
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Chronology of Events 
Bulgaria and NATO3
• 13 July  1990: Declaration of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 
which Bulgaria accepted the invitation of NATO’s secretary General to 
establish diplomatic relations with NATO
• 12-14 June 1991: The Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Voemer, 
paid an official visit to Bulgaria.
•  20 December 1991: Bulgaria participated as a co-founder state of the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council.
•  14 February  1994: Bulgaria signed the framework document and joined 
the Program of NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP).
» 28 November 1994: A joint session between the North Atlantic Council
and Bulgaria was held at which the individual Partnership Program (IPP) 
between Bulgaria and NATO was accepted. Since that session, the 
program has been updated annually.
• 16 O ctober 1995: Bulgaria joined the Agreement between NATO member 
states and the states participating in PfP on the status of their armed forces. 
This agreement provides the legal framework for the participation of 
military forces of states that take part in PfP in activities on foreign 
territory.
• 2-3 M ay 1996: The Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, paid an 
official visit to Bulgaria.
3 The following list o f events is based on the chronology of events on the relationship between 
Bulgaria and NATO as published on the website of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence 
http.y/www.md.govemment.bg/ en /date events.html and the website of the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.govemment.bg/index en.html.
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• 17 M arch 1997: The Bulgarian government accepted a National 
programme for the preparation and accession of Bulgaria to the North 
Atlantic Alliance. A decree of the Council of Ministers was issued 
establishing a governmental mechanism to coordinate efforts for 
preparation and accession to NATO, the so-called Inter-Agency 
Committee for integration to NATO. The committee is headed by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence and includes the 
Chief of General Staff of the Bulgarian Army and deputy Ministers of all 
Ministries concerned with these issues.
• 8 M arch 1997: A declaration was issued by the Bulgarian government 
which stated that Bulgaria’s accession to NATO was one of the highest 
priorities in state foreign policy.
9 July 1997: NATO summit, in Madrid. During the summit, invitations 
,were offered to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to start 
negotiations for membership of NATO.
• 20 July 1997: Bulgaria signed an agreement to participate in the 
Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to the 
agreement, Bulgaria would provide the SFOR with an engineering platoon 
staffed with 31 servicemen under the leadership of the Dutch contingent. 
Later, Bulgaria would send to Bosnia-Hercegovina a transport platoon 
staffed with 27 servicemen and 10 vehicles in the multinational group 
BELUGA which offered logistical support to SFOR.
• 3 October 1997: Bulgaria hosted a meeting of the ministers of defence of 
NATO and PfP states from South-Eastern Europe.
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• 4 December 1997: Bulgaria decided to establish a permanent diplomatic 
mission to NATO and the West European Union (WEU) in Brussels. The 
first head of the mission presented his credentials on 18 March 1998.
• 23 O ctober 1998: The National Assembly ratified a governmental 
declaration on Kosovo by which it expressed the government’s support for 
NATO’s efforts to stop the ethnic conflict in the Yugoslavian province.
• 25 M arch 1999: The National Assembly ratified a governmental 
declaration in which it was stated that the National Assembly confirmed 
that full membership of NATO was Bulgaria’s strategic choice for the 
future. In the same declaration, it was pointed out that Bulgaria would 
participate neither directly nor indirectly in military activities, organised 
by NATO, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
®. 24 April 1999: NATO’s summit in Washington. Bulgaria was offered an 
Action Plan for future membership of NATO. NATO’s South-East Europe 
Initiative was launched.
•  28 A pril 1999: Bulgaria signed an agreement with NATO. The agreement 
provided NATO aircraft with a transit passage through Bulgarian air 
space.
•  21 June  1999: Bulgaria signed an agreement with NATO. The agreement 
provided NATO’s military forces with a transit passage through Bulgaria’s 
territory.
•  6 O ctober 1999: Bulgaria signed a Memorandum with the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. The Memorandum stated that Bulgarian troops would 
participate in the United Nations peace-keeping forces (KFOR) sent to
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Kosovo after NATO’s military attacks, under the leadership of the Dutch 
contingent of KFOR.
• 6 Decem ber 1999: A session of the Senior Political Committee of NATO
was held with the government of Bulgaria to discuss the implementation 
and application of Bulgaria’s Action Plan for membership of NATO.
• 9 F eb ru ary  2000: The Bulgarian military units which agreed to participate
in KFOR were deployed in the Dutch contingent..
® 9-10 F ebruary  2000: The newly elected Secretary General of NATO,
Lord George Robertson, paid an official visit to Bulgaria.
® 13- 14 M arch 2000: The. Supreme Commander of NATO forces in
Europe, General Wesley Clarke, paid an official visit to Bulgaria.
•  26 M ay 2000: The Bulgarian National Assembly voted in favour of a draft 
•of Chapter 27 of negotiations with the EU entitled ‘General Military and 
Security Policy’. The draft stated that, along with integration into the EU, 
Bulgaria actively sought to join both NATO and the WEU.
® 2 O ctober 2000: The deputy Secretary General of NATO, Klaus-Peter
Kleibert, paid an official visit to Bulgaria. The General discussed with the 
Bulgarian authorities the implementation of military reforms of the 
Bulgarian army.
N ovem ber 2000: The beginning of the process of surveying the structure 
of the Bulgarian armed forces. The plan of the survey was as follows: a) 
Preparation of a preliminary survey by the Bulgarian government on the 
structure of the armed forces by February 2001; b) consultations with 
NATO headquarters in Brussels on the preliminary survey of the structure 
of the armed forces by June 2001; c) visit of a team of NATO military
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experts to Sofia with the objective of conducting additional consultations 
on the preliminary survey of the structure of the Bulgarian armed forces.
• 23 January  2001: Admiral James Ellis, Allied Commander of NATO for
Southern Europe, paid an official visit to Bulgaria. Admiral Ellis hold
discussions with the Bulgarian authorities on the participation of Bulgarian 
military units in the KFOR and SFOR, the reforms of the Bulgarian army 
and cooperation with the south command of NATO with a view to 
Bulgaria’s future membership of NATO.
• 21 M arch 2001: Bulgarian Defence Minister Boiko Noev and NATO 
Secretary General Lord Robertson signed an agreement between Bulgaria 
and NATO regarding the transit of NATO forces and NATO personnel 
(the agreement was ratified by the National Assembly 6 April 2001).
° 22 M arch 2001: The Council of Ministers! agreed on transit passage for
, NATO’s military forces through Bulgarian territory. The agreement was
signed by the Minister of Defence on 21 March 2001 at NATO’s 
headquarters in Brussels.
® ..April 2001: A session between the Council of NATO and Bulgaria which 
assessed the progress that Bulgaria had made on the implementation of the 
Membership Action Plan.
• 9 June  2001: The Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe, 
General Joseph Ralston, paid an official visit to Bulgaria.
• 13 Septem ber 2001: The Bulgarian Government expressed the readiness 
of Bulgaria, though not yet a party of the North Atlantic Treaty, to apply 
the commitments stemming from article 5 of the Treaty, and to provide the
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assistance that may be required in accordance with the statement of the 
North Atlantic Council dated 12 September 2001.
• 5 O ctober 2001: Sofia summit of the New Democracies with the 
participation of the heads of state of the Vilnius group countries, attended 
by Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO. The summit adopted a 
solidarity declaration with the United States and the NAC Decision of 4 
October 2001, reaffirming the commitment of the V-10 countries to 
conduct foreign and security policies in accordance with the implications 
of the Washington Treaty, including commitments stemming from article 
5.
• 14 November 2001: The National Assembly unanimously ratified a 
bilateral agreement between the governments of Bulgaria and the United 
States regarding over-flight, transit through, and presence'in the territory 
of the Republic of Bulgaria o f U.S forces personnel and contractors in 
support of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. Under the 
agreement, Bulgaria would host the first ever US air force base on its 
territory.
9  19 Decem ber 2001: The National Assembly adopted by consensus a
declaration in support of the decision of 29 November 2001 of the 
Bulgarian government on the. decommissioning and destruction of the SS- 
23 missiles.
• 10 Jan u ary  2002: Bulgaria joined the Memorandum of understanding, 
signed in London, concerning the formation of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In February 2002, a Bulgarian 
contingent was deployed in the Kabul area.
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• 14 February  2002: A meeting in Bucharest of the Foreign Ministers of 
Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey launched a ‘2 plus 2’ dialogue and 
cooperation regarding the early accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
North Atlantic Alliance.
• 27 F ebruary  2002: The president of the USA NATO Enlargement 
Committee, Bruce Jackson, met the Bulgarian Minister of Defence, Mr. 
Nikolai Svinarov. The president expressed his confidence that the 
acceptance of Bulgaria and Romania in NATO would contribute to the 
strengthening of the southern flank of NATO and stressed that this would 
be a good reason for the two states to receive an invitation for membership 
in NATO in the coming NATO summit in Prague..
• 28 F eb ru ary  2002: NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, met with 
•the Bulgarian M in ister'o f Defence, Mr. Nikolai Svinarov. They both 
assessed positively the activities which had been taken by the Bulgarian 
government on Defence management, planning, programming arid 
budgeting in the defence sphere, and outlined as priorities for the future 
the improvement of the structures of the Bulgarian officers’ corps and the 
professional development of the young servicemen, improvement of the 
operational capabilities of the Bulgarian Army, and the readiness of the 
Bulgarian Army to participate in joint military activities with the Armies 
of the NATO member states.
• 18 M arch  2002: General Joseph Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe, during his visit to Bulgaria, assured the leadership of the Ministry 
of Defence that he would continue insisting on Bulgaria being invited for 
membership of NATO at NATO’s summit in Prague in November of that
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year. General Ralston thanked the Bulgarian people for Bulgaria’s 
substantial and timely NATO anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and 
gave an excellent assessment of the Bulgarian security company in SFOR 
in Sarajevo.
• 9-14 April 2002. The Bulgarian Minister of Defence, Mr. Nikolai 
Svinarov, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, 
General Miho Mihov, visited Canada and the USA. During their meetings
. with the Canadian Minister of Defence, Mr. Arthur Eggleton, and with the 
deputy assistant State Secretary of the USA, Vaan Van Diepen, they 
presented the progress that Bulgaria had made in the field of reform of the 
Bulgarian Army. :. • .
• 18 April 2002: Within, the framework of the- international conference
. ‘NATO-50 years ahead. Cooperation and Stability in Southeastern
Europe’, held in Athens, the Ministers of Defence of Bulgaria, Greece,
. Romania and Turkey made a joint statement of their unified position that 
the acceptance of Bulgaria and Romania by NATO Would strengthen the
* Southern flank of NATO, achieving a geographical balance* and
• enhancing Euro-Atlantic security and stability.
• 21 November 2002: At the Prague summit meeting, NATO heads of state 
and government formally invited Bulgaria along with Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks with 
NATO.
• 29 December 2002: Bulgarian government approved the team for the 
accession talks, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Lubomir Ivanov.
21
Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
• 10 Jan u ary  2003: First round of the accession talks at NATO 
headquarters in Brussels.
• 7 February  2003: The National Assembly adopted a decision granting 
permission for over-flight, temporary presence and transit through the 
territory of the Republic of Bulgaria of forces and personnel of the United 
States and other members of the coalition. The decision also authorised the 
deployment of Bulgarian nuclear, biological and chemical protection units 
out of the country, in support of a possible coalition operation, in 
connection with the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 
1441.
• 26 M arch 2003: At ari extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council, the Permanent Representative of the 19 member states signed the 
protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty oh the accession of Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, in the 
presence of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passi and the foreign 
ministers of other invitees.
• A ugust 2003: An infantry battalion of the Bulgarian army (462 
servicemen) was deployed in Kebala, Iraq, within the Polish command 
zone.
M ay 2005: The Bulgarian parliament decided to pull all Bulgarian troops 
out of Iraq by the end of December 2005.
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Bulgaria’s Third World Debtor States4
Bulgaria’s Debtors 
Syria
Libya
Algeria
Yemen
Iraq
Vietnam
Mongolia 
North Korea 
Cambodia
Laos
Afghanistan
Indonesia
Angola
Mozambique
Nigeria
Type of Debt
government credits, 
trade credits, debt to 
Bulbank
government credits, 
receivables of engineering 
companies, not subject to 
transfers by joint ventures
government credits, from joint 17.8;15.6 
Ventures
93.1
1.6
Amount of Debt in mln $ 
(unless otherwise indicated)
78.7,39
51.1; 306.62;6.5 Libyan 
dinars
on clearing account, under 
clearing agreements
on clearing account, under 
clearing, agreement
military supplies, to trade 
Organisations
59.769mln transferable' 
rubles
7.9mln transferable rulbes; 
3 .97  clearing rubles •*> .
2.44 mln clearing rubles; • 
1.37mln clearing rubles
3 .6mln clearing rubles; 
597.736m ln clearing 
rubles
25.333
0.366
86.126 and 692,000 
currency levs; 5.00
6.291mln and 2.158 
million currency levs
25.429
4 The table is published in the Bulgarian newspaper Capital on the 29th of March 1998. The page is 
published on the website on http://www.capital.bg/weeklv/11 -98/22-11 -1 .html
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Ethiopia
Somalia
Tanzania
Zambia
Cuba
Nicaragua government credits, company credits
44.241
4.848
11.230mln currency 
Levs
2 .156mln currency 
Levs
288.7mln 
transferable rubles
218.5; 11.5
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Table 1
Bulgarian Imports from the Balkan Neighbourhood
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bulgarian Exports to the Balkan Neighbourhood
Table 2
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Bulgarian Imports from the West
Table 3
Table 4
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Table 6
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□  Middle East
□  Africa
H Eastern Europe
□  EU
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Year
UN Statistical Yearbooks 1999,2000 
Table 14.
31
F o re ig n  P o lic y  M a k in g  in  D e m o c r a t iz in g  S ta te s :  T h e  C a se  o f  B u lg a r ia  in the 1 9 9 0 s
Composition of Trade Commodity Exports of Bulgaria after 1989
° //o
100%
6 0 % -
1992 1995
Year
2000
El Commodities not classified by 
kind
■ Miscellaneous manufactured 
goods
□ Machinery and transport 
equipment
13 Basic manufactures
□ Chemicals and chemical 
products
■ Animal and vegetable oils and 
fats
□ Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc.
□ Crude materials, non-edible, 
except fuels
SI Beverages and tobacco
□ Food and Live animals
The Vienna Institute.for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava. 
WIIW Handbook o f Statistics, 2001, table VII/3.J 1, p. 396 
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Composition of Trade Commodities Imports of Bulgaria after 
1989
100%
80%-
60%-
40%-
20% -
1995 2000
H Commodities not classified by 
kind 10,8 9,3 21,3
■ Miscellaneous manufactured 
goods 17,9 11,3 9,6
□ Machinery and transport 
equipment 21,5 28 25,8
B Basic manufactures 12,6 16,9
11,6
0 Chemicals and chemical 
products 0,4 0,9 0,2
B Animal and vegetable oils and 
fats 6,7 6,1 14,8
□ Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc. 6,5 
5,1 5,9
□ Crude materials, non-edible, 
except fuels 10,5 9,3 3,2
B Beverages and tobacco 13,1 
10,5 6
□ Food and Live animals 1992 
1995 2000
— Italy 
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- • - U K  
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CO■eo
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c
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The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook o f Statistics, 2001, VW3,2 1, p. 407 
. Table 16. .
Bulgarian Exports to the EU States and Switzerland after 1989
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 2001, table VII/2.11, p.360 
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Bulgarian Exports to Prospect EU Member States of Eastern Europe
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Hungary 
Poland 
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o  0 ,5
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Year
Syria
-K — Libya
Lebanon
, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook o f Statistics, 2001, table VII/2.11, p.360 
Table 18.
Bulgarian Exports fo Middle East States after 1989
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^  0,5 
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Year
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 2001, table VII/2.11, p.360 
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Bulgarian Exports to the Balkans after 1989
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CL
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^  2
—♦—Albania 
—^ —Romania 
Macedonia 
- Turkey 
— Yugoslavia
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 2001, table VII/2.1 L, p.360 
Table 20.
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 2001, table VII/2.11, p.360 
Table 21.
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
- ♦ —USA 
—B— Russia 
—sfe~ • Ukraine 
—X —Canada 
Moidova 
Japan
Bulgarian Exports to the USA, Russia, Ukraine, Canada, Moldova and 
Japan after 1989
0
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
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Germany 
Italy 
Greece 
--X— France 
—X Austria 
—• — Belgium 
—I— Netherlands 
— Spain 
-——Switzerland 
UK
Sweden 
Finland 
—X— Denmark 
-HR- Ireland 
—®— Portugal
~y  -
Bulgarian Imports from EU States and Switzerland after 1989
' 0
1990 1995 1996, 1997 . 1998 ..1999 2000
-Year
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 2001, table M l  1, p.372.
Table 23.
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook o f  Statistics, 200 ratable VII/2.11, p.3?2.
Table 22.
Bulgarian Imports from Propsective EU Member States from Eartern Europe after 1989
— ♦ — Czech R. 
— ■ — Poland 
-sfe- Hungary 
— K—  Slovak R. 
— * — Slovenia
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
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. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 2001, table VII/2.11, p.372.
Table 24. .
—♦— Macedonia 
—e— Romania 
4 Turkey 
— Yugoslavia
Bulgarian Imports from Balkan States after 1989
1990 1995 1996 1997
Year
1998 1999 2000
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook o f Statistics, 2001, table VII/2.11, p.372.
Table 25.
-a
1990 1995 1996 1997
Year
1998 1999 2000
•Tunesia 
• Algeria
1,6
£  1,4
0
E 1»2
1  1
J? 0,8
Bulgarian Imports from African States after 1989
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— Russi a 
-& -U S A  
Ukraine 
-■*— Japan  
— Chi na 
— Ca nada  
—i— Kazakhstan
Bulgarian Imports from Russia, USA, Ukraine, Japan, China, 
C anada and Kazakhstan after 1989
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
The. Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Countries in Transition 2001, Bratislava, 
WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 2001, table VI172.11, p.372.
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Decision-makers' information sources about EU (a comparison between Bulgaria and 
candidate states' average)
cand. States Bulgaria
□ National Press
0 Magazine "European Dialogue Dialogue”
□ National Television
□ National Periodicals
9 Personal Contacts with EU people
□ National Radio
□ Visits to EU countries
□ Travel 
H Internet
S Government
□ Eli Television Broadcast
□ Periodicals from EU countries 
0 Libraries
0  Press from EU countries
0 Embassies, consulates and cultural 
centers from EU states
0 The EU delegations in the capital of our 
country
□ Radio Broadcast frpm EU countries
□ University
□ Cinema
□ School
□ Others
□ None of them
□ At work
Based on Centra] and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figures 59& 60.
Table 27.
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Where does your country's future lie?
Ms
A ' e fO ' ‘o' <bN 
Countries
f - j f #  ^ \ A
0 European Union 
B Russia
□ USA
□ Other Central Europe
■ Other Western 
Europe
□ Germany
■  Other
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figure 1.
Table 28.
Where does your country's future lie? (Bulgaria)
S3 European Union 
H  Russia 
□  USA 
□  Other Central Europe 
■  Other Western Europe 
I I  Germany 
^  Other
s
I
i\
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figure 1.
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Where does the future of your country lie? (a comparison between Bulgaria and 
candidate countries' average)
□ Bulgaria 
fi Cand. states
European Russia USA Other Other Germany Other 
Union Central Western
Europe Europe
Responses
I   :  ------
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarcmeter,1997, annex figure 1.
Table 30.
. .
E] Positive 
B Neutral 
□ Negative
19971992 1995
Year
European Union's Image in Bulgaria (1990-1997)
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figure 9.
Table 31.
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Positive
Neutral
Negative
European Union's Image in Bulgaria (1990-1997)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figure 9
Table 32.
Bulgarian people's information sources about the EU
J?'Jsr
< /  
Information Sources
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.1997, annex figure 19.
Table 33.
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If there w ere to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of 
Bulgaria's membership of the BJ w hat w ould you vote?
ED For 
E3 Against 
□ Undecided
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figure 32.
Table 34.
If there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of your 
country's membersnip ofthe BJ'What w ouldyou'vote? (srcorrpariscrr 
betw een Bulgaria and candidate states' average)
»of Public 
support. El Bulgaria 
■ cand. States
For Against Undecided
Referendum Results
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figure 32.
Table 35.
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If there w ere to be a referendum tomorrow on the question 
of Bulgaria's membership of NATO w hat w ould you vote?
El For
M Undecided 
□ Against
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figure 35.
Table 36.
If there w ere to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of your 
country's membership of NATQ.w.hat w ould you vote? ( a . 
conparison between Bulgaria and candidate states.', average)
□ Bulgaria 
U Cancf. States
Undecided Against
Results of the voting
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,I997, annex figure 35.
Table 37.
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If Bulgaria joins NATO before the European Union w ould that 
make you:a)more likely;b)less likely to vote for EU 
membership, or w ould it not make any difference (1997)
O More likely to vote for 
EU Membership EU 
membership
H Makes no difference
I D Less likely to vote for 
EU membership
Based on Central and Eastern Eurobarometer,1997, annex figure 38.
Table 3 8 . ........................
If your country joins NATO before the European:Union, would that make 
you more likely to vote f or.the EU, less likely'to vote for the BU„ or w ould 
it make no differenoe?( a comparison betw eenBulgaria and candidate 
•states’ average)
Bulgaria cand.states
Results of the voting
E3 More likely to vote for EU 
Membership EU 
membership
S Makes no difference
□ Less likely to vote for EU 
membership
Based on Central ana Eastern Euiobarometer, 1997, annex figure 38.
Table 39.
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Do you feel informed about Bulgaria’s accession process?
El Not at all informed 
H Not very well informed
□ Well informed
□ Very well informed 
■ No opinion
□
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 5.7A 
Table 40.
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 5.7A 
Table 41.
Do you feel informed about your country’s accession 
process? (a comparison between Bulgariai and candidate 
states' average)
!□ Bulgaria 
i HCand. States
i _____■ .. •_______________ !
Not a t all Well No
infotmed informed opinion
Responses to the survey
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Projected Date of Bulgaria's Accession to the EU (What year do you 
think Bulgaria will become a member of the EU?)
25 ^
20 -
%
IQ-
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2016- Never
2020
Year
Based on candidate countries" Eurobarometer, 2001, table 5.1 
Table 42.
Desired Date of Accession to the EU (Whatyear woUd you like Bulgaria t o  become a
member of the EU?)
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2016- Never
2020
Responses
iL
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 5.2
Table 43.
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People's Trust in Institutions (A comparison between Bulgaria and the 
candidate states' average)
"  ^ Bulgk^^ ■ ■ ^
i
I - . ■
-
□ The written press 
H Radio
□ Television
□ The legal system 
B The police
□ The army
□ The church
□ Trade unions
■ Political parties
□ Civil service
□ Big companies
□ The government 
a  The parliament
■ NGOs
□ Charitable 
organizations
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 1.14. 
Table 44.
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National Pride (Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud,or 
not at all proud to be Bulgarian?
□ Very Proud 
H Fairly proud
□ Not very proud
□ Not at all proud
■ Does not feei to be Bulgarian
□ No answer
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 1.15A.
Table 45.
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Bulgarians' visits to foreign countries
□ Belgium
□ Denmark
□ Germany
□ Greece 
S Spain
□ France 
H Ireland
□ Italy
■ Luxembourg
□ The Netherlands
□ Austria
□ Portugal
■ Finland
■ Sweden 
iBTheUK
■ Cyprus
□ Czech Republic
□ Estonia 
[□Hungary
□ Latvia
□ Lithuania
□ Malta
□ Poland
□ Romania
□ Russia
□ Slovakia
□ Slovenia
□ Turkey
□ Switzerland
□ Liechtenstein 
0  Norway
□ None of the above
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 1.18.
Table 46.
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EU Bulgaria 
Ucand. States
How people would vote on a referendum concercning Bulgaria's 
accession to the EU? (A comparison between Bulgaria and the candidate
states' average)
Against I would not No answer 
go to vote
Options
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobafrometer, 2001, table 4.2A 
;• Table 47.
How wQuld Bulgarian people vote on a  referendum concerning 
< Bulgaria's accession to the EU?
El For 
H Against
□  I would not go to vote
□  No answer
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 4 .2A
Table 48.
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Which EU topics would Bulgarian people like to know more about?
Other 
Social policy 
Environment 
Consumer protection 
European citizenship 
Youth 
Culture 
Education 
European budget 
Pre-accession Funds
« Enlargement
'ELo
H Regional policy
Internal relations of EU 
Common foreign and security policy 
Agriculture 
Other financial, economical 
European single market 
EU economy in general 
The Euro 
EMU
Institutions of EU 
History of the EU
2 0  3 0  4 0
% of public interest
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 3.9.
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How much Bulgarian people are aware of international institutions (Have you 
heard of the following international institutions?)
The
lIi
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 3.2A
Table 50.
The European Court of Human Rights 
International Court of Justice in Hague 
The Council of Europe
NATO
The United Nations
The EU
UNo ] 
□ Yes |
I
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Awareness of International Institutions (A comparison between Bulgaria and the 
candidate countries' average)
E Bulgaria 
H Cand. States |
International Institutions
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 3.2A
Table 51.
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Bulgarian people's sources of information about the EU
Not interested 
Other 
Parliamentarians 
Other associations 
Unions & associations 
Government 
Printed materials 
Internet 
Radio 
TV
Other press 
Daily newspapers 
Discussions 
Political rallies
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 3.7. 
Table 52.
□ Bulgaria
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Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 3.7.
Table 53.
Sources of information about the EU (a comparison between Bulgaria and the 
candidate states average)
Other
Parliamentarians
Other associations
Unions & associations
Discussions
Not interested
Political rall!es
Daily new s papers
Government
Radio
TV
Other press
0  cand .states 
□ Bulgaria
Printed materials
Internet
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EU 72%
NATO 41%
Russia 65%
USA 47%
Table 54a.
Approval of closer relations with:
HEU
SNATO
□  Russia
□  USA
' Table 54b.
Europe 48%
Russia 20%
USA 7%
Other 3%
No opinion 22%
Table 55a
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Bulgaria's foreign policy priority 
ought to be:
El Europe 
11 Russia
□  USA
□  Other
B  No opinion
Table 55b.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Positive 47% 46% 51% 42% 37% -27% 42% 50%
Negative 1% 1% 2% 6% 6% 8% 4% 3%
Neutral 14% 16% 12% 17% 23% 15% 19% 17%
Table 56a.
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□  Neutral 
H Negative 
M Positive
The image of EU in Bulgaria
1992 1994 1996
Year
1990
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Table 56b.
Positive image of EU an Bulgaria
Positive
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year
Table 57.
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Negative image of EU in Bulgaria
N egative
Y ear
T able58.
Germany ' France UK Italy
Poland 6361 911 495 671
Czechosl. 3720 606 184 353
Hungary 3156 392 188 490
Romania 916 326 84 211
Bulgaria 598 237 51 193
Total 14751 2473 1002 1918
% world total 3.0 0.9 1.5 1.4
Table 59a.
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Table 59b.
Germany France UK
Poland 5421 751
Czechosl. 3805 • 465
Hungary 3199 517
Romania 906 386
Bulgaria 399 125
Total 13731 2245
% world total 2.8 0;8 1.8
Table 60a.
Italy 
448 490
187 479
148 651
84 274
53 135
920 2029
1.38
□ Italy
□ UK
0 France 
□Germany
E x p o rts  (ECU m illio n s)  fro m  th e  fo u r m o s t  e c o n o m ic a lly  p ow erfu l EU s ta te s  
to  E a s te rn  E u ro p e  in 1991
9000
8000
7000
6000
A m o u n t o f  5 0 0 0  
E x p o rts  (ECU
m illio n s )  4000 
3000 
2000 
1000
Poland Hungary Bulgaria
East European states
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Table 60b.
Imports (ECU millions) from East European states to the 
four m ost economically powerful EU states in 1991
□  Italy
□  UK
□ France
□ Germany
Poland Hungary Bulgaria 
East European sta tes
8000
7000
6000
Amount of 5000 
imports (ECU 4000 
millions) 300o
2000
1000
0
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Meaning of the European Union for the Bulgarian 
public
Responses %
Better future
A European government 
Freedom of movement 
Peace
Economic situation 
Jobs
Citizens' rights
Bureaucracy
Dream
Loss of culturai diversity 
Other
Table 61a.
Meaning of the European Union for the Bulgarian public
□ Better future
a  A European gov ernment
□ Freedom of movement
□ Fteace
■ Economic situtation
□ Jobs
B Citizens' rights
□ Bureaucracy 
B Dream
H Loss of cultural diversity
□ Other
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 2.2
Table 61b.
76
32
60
58
51
56
51
12
10
13
0
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The image of the EU in the Bulgarian public
------------— i
□ Very negative 
B  Fairly negative
□ Neutral
□ Fairly positive 
■ Very positive
□ No answer
Based on candidate countries’ Eurobarometer, 2001, table 2.1 A. 
Table 62a.
The image of the EU in the 
Bulgarian public
%
Very negative 2
Fairly negative 3
Neutral 17
Fairly positive 41
Very positive 29
No answer 9
Table 62b.
Perceived personal benefit of 
Bulgaria's EU membership
%
Yes 47
No 35
No answer 18
Table 63a.
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Perceived personal benefit of Bulgaria’s BJ membership
□ Yes
□ No
□ No answer
Based on candidate countries' Eurobarometer, 2001, table 4.5 
Table 63b. ,
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Ethnic and Religious Composition of the Republic of 
Bulgaria According to 1992 Census5
Ethnic Composition
Ethnic/Religious Group Population
Ethnic Bulgarians 7.300.000
Ethnic Turks 800.000
Roma (Gypsies) 313.000
Pomaks ('Bulgarian Muslims') 70.000
Ethnic Macedonians 10.800
Jews 3.500
Armenians 13.700
Vlahs  5.160
Karakachans 5.150
Greeks 4.900
Russians 17.000
Total Population 8.500.000
Table 64a
5 The date provided below have been taken from Borden Savova-Mahon, Milena, The Politics o f  
Nationalism under Communism in Bulgaria, unpublished PhD Thesis: School o f Slavonic and East 
European Studies (SSEES), University College London (UCL), 2001, p. 13.
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Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Republic of Bulgaria according to the 1992
Census
□ Ethnic Bulgarians 
0  Ethnic Turks
□ Roma (Gypsies)
□ Pomaks (‘Bulgarian Muslims') 
0 Ethnic Macedonians
□ Jews
0 Armenians
□ Vlahs
0 Karakachans 
0 Greeks
□ Russians
Table 64b.
Religious Composition
Christians Muslims Others
Bulgarians 98 2 0,1
Turkish 1,1 98,8 0,1
Roma 60,4 39,2 0,3
Others 71,8 11,4 16,8
Total 87 12,7 0,2
Table 65a
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Religious Composition of the Population of the Republic of Bulgaria 
according to the 1992 census
Bulgarians Turkish Roma Others 
Ethnic Groups
i
i ___  __________________ ________________________
□  Others 
H Muslims
□  Christians
Religious
Affiliation
Table 65b
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ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA (CENSUS of 2001)6
Ethnic composition of Bulgaria (according to the census o f 2001)
Bulgarian 6.655.210
Turkish 746.664
Gypsies 370.908
Russian 15.595
Armenians 10.832
Vlachs 10.566
Macedonians 5.071
Greeks 3.408
Ukrainians 2.489
Jewish 1.363
Romanian 1.088
Others 18.792
Not stated 62.108
Unknown 24.807
Table 66a
Ethnic C om position o f the Population o f the Republic of Bulgaria 
{C ensus of 2001)
□ Bulgarian
■ Turkish
□ Gypsies
□ Russian
■ Armenians
□ Vlachs
■ Macedonians
□ Greeks
■ Ukrainians
■ Jewish
□ Romanian
□ Others
■ Not stated
■ Unknown
Table 66b.
6 Data of the census of 2001 for the ethnic and religious composition of the populations of Bulgaria can 
be found on http://www.nsi.bg/census e/census e.htm
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Size cf Ethnic 
Groups
1
Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Bulgaria
□ Bulgarian
□ Turkish
□ Gypsies
□ Russian
■ Armenians
□ Vlachs
□ Macedonians
□ Greeks
■ Ukrainians
□ Jewish
□ Romanian
□ Others
□ Not stated 
H Unknown
Table 66c
Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Republic of Bulgaria (Census
of 2001)
Religious Composition of Bulgaria (according to the census o f2001}
Orthodox 6.552.751
Catholics 43.811
Protestants 42.308
Muslims 966.978
Others 14.937
Not Stated 283.309
Unknown 24.807
Table 67a.
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Major Religious Groups in the Republic of Bulgaria 
(Census of 2001)
!IF
□  Orthodox 
B  Catholics
□  Protestants
□  Muslims 
■  Others
0  Not Stated 
0  Unknown
Table 67b.
Major Religious Groups in the Republic of Bulgaria (Census of 2001)
7.000.000 \
6.000.nr,0 ! j
5.000.000 I
4.000.000Size of Religious
Groups 3.000.000
2 .000.000
1 .000.000
0  Orthodox.
■  Catholics
□  Protestants
□ Muslims 
9  Others
□  Not Stated
■  Unknown
Main Religious Groups
Table 68.
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Table 69.
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Table 70.
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ORGANIZATIONAL SCHEME ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN BULGARIA
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
MINISTER OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(National Aid Coordinator)
COUNTRIES 
OF EUROPE 
DIRECTORATE. 
MFA
MISSION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF 
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THE EU
DIRECTORATE 
EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION, MFA 
(SECRETARIAT OF 
THE 
COORDINATION 
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Delegation ol the 
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Embassies of EU 
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Foreign Policy Making in Democratizing States: The Case of Bulgaria in the 1990s
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Map 1.
Taken from Borden Savova-Mahon, Milena, The Politics o f Nationalism under 
Communism in Bulgaria, unpublished PhD Thesis: School of Slavonic and East 
European Studies (SSEES), University College London (UCL)
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Map 2.
Taken from Crampton, R.J, A Short History o f Modem Bulgaria, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.ix.
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Novi Sail
'  BO SN IA  ■ " ^ r  
\  H ERCEG O VIN A * 
I Sarajevo '
i Belgrade ROMANIA
A SERBIA Bucliureiil
Vidin
V  B U  L G  AIR IA Vai
/  ^TGrnovo < —>
S 0  Slivniisa
\  EA STE R N  %
Plovdiv RU M  ELIA
'JMOMTENEI
'ShkodeH
Ohrid
San Stefaix
m m i
m m
UVADtA
• V > ; V 'V v l '“•
W I . 
A sulci'1-
'■ i
GERMANY'
s ' '  r  *  V ienna'
\  ♦' \ 
^ A U S T R I A  -
GALICIA
R U S S I A
H U N G A R Y
▲Budapest
h is i» \  OJ» n\
Zagreb
v
ITALY "
SICILY
J Greal Bulgaria 
Borders In Trealy ol San Sleiano (3 March 1078)
------------- Final border ol Bulgaria, June 1B7B
— Border ol Bulgaria, 1885
Map 3.
Taken from Borden Savova-Mahon, Milena, The Politics o f Nationalism under 
Communism in Bulgaria, unpublished PhD Thesis: School of Slavonic and East 
European Studies (SSEES), University College London (UCL)
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Map 4.
Taken from Eldurov, Svetlozav, ‘The Wars for Bulgaria Irredenta, 1912-1918’, 
Bulgarian Military Review, Vol.2, No.3 (Special Issue), 1994, p. 36.
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Map 5.
Taken from Eldurov, Svetlozav, ‘The Wars for Bulgaria Irredenta, 1912-1918’, 
Bulgarian Military Review, Vol.2, No.3 (Special Issue), 1994, p. 36.
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The Macedonian Question
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Map 6 .
Taken from Borden Savova-Mahon, Milena, The Politics of Nationalism under 
Communism in Bulgaria, unpublished PhD Thesis: School of Slavonic and East 
European Studies (SSEES), University College London (UCL)
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Map 7.
Taken from Eminov, Ali, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, London: 
Hurst, 1997, p. 73
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Map 8.
Taken from Eminov, Ali, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, London: 
Hurst, 1997, p. 73
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EXISTING CONNECTIONS AND 
CONNECTIONS UNDER CONSTRUCTION 
TO A NEW REGIONS
PORTS ON THE CORRIDORS
Map T1
Taken from Triffonova, Elena & Kashoukeeva-Nousheva, Vanya (eds.), Regional 
Infrastructure Projects in South-Eastern Europe, Sofia: Institute for Regional and 
International Studies, 1999.
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Map T2
Taken from Triffonova, Elena & Kashoukeeva-Nousheva, Vanya (eds.), Regional 
Infrastructure Projects in South-Eastern Europe, Sofia: Institute for Regional and 
International Studies, 1999.
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